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i ABSTRACT 
When  S.  Korea  was  liberated  from  Japan  and  soon  partitioned  between  the  South 
and  the  North  in  1945,  she  was  one  of  the  world's  poorest  countries.  The  Korean 
War  (1950-1953)  had  a  profound  impact  on  S.  Korean  society.  Hunger  became  even 
more  routine  and  famine  very  common.  After  the  military  revolution  in  1960 
onwards  the  S.  Korean  government  consistently  continued  a  "growth-first  approach" 
to  promote  rapid  economic  development  which  could  then  generate  resources  to  raise 
the  living  standards  of  those  on  low  incomes,  rather  than  a  selective  and  targeted 
approach  which  involved  extensive  public  action  to  improve  the  circumstances  of 
destitute  people.  Since  this  time  S.  Korea  began  to  be  counted  as  a  rapidly 
industrialising  country.  In  1960,  about  65.9  per  cent  of  the  labour  force  in  S.  Korea 
was  engaged  in  agriculture  and  a  mere  9.2  per  cent  in  the  mining,  manufacturing  and 
construction  sectors.  In  1990,  only  19.5  per  cent  of  the  labour  force  was  engaged  in 
agriculture  and  34.7  per  cent  in  the  mining,  manufacturing  and  construction  sectors. 
Even  in  industry,  the  structure  of  the  industry  has  changed  from  labour-intensive 
industry,  such  as  textiles  and  shoes,  to  capital  and  skill-intensive  industry,  such  as 
shipbuilding,  automobiles  and  electronics.  In  1960,  the  urban  share  of  total 
population  was  28.0  per  cent.  This  figure  grew  to  74.4  per  cent  in  1990.  All  these 
were  accompanied  by  changes  in  occupation,  social  class,  even  the  way  of  life.  Even 
within  the  house  itself,  the  change  in  the  use  of  fuel  from  timber  to  gas  and  electricity 
was  accompanied  by  a  dramatic  change  in  the  design  and  structure  of  housing. 
S.  Korea's  rate  of  economic  growth  since  1960  has  few  parallels  in  the  world.  It  has 
often  been  called  an  "economic  miracle".  Moreover,  equality  in  S.  Korea  with  a 
rapidly  growing  economy  was  enough  to  challenge  the  conventional  economic 
wisdom  that  a  tradeoff  has  to  be  made  between  augmenting  growth  and  reducing 
inequality.  Nevertheless,  over  28  per  cent  of  urban  households,  with  an  average  of 
3.7  persons,  live  in  only  one  room.  Several  extreme  cases  related  to  housing,  such  as 
suicide  because  of  increased  rents,  Mock-Dong,  Sadang-Dong  and  Sangge-Dong 
tenant  struggles  and  new  squatter  settlements  are  emerging  in  recent  years.  Thus,  the 
main  purpose  of  this  research  is  empirical:  to  arrive  at  a  better  understanding  of  the 
ii housing  problems  of  low-income  households  in  the  big  cities  of  a  rapidly  growing 
economy. 
In  a  rapidly  changing  society  to  achieve  a  greater  understanding  of  the  housing 
problems  of  low  income  households  and  the  housing  policies  of  the  past  and  present, 
and  ideally  to  predict  or  even  influence  the  future,  it  is  necessary  to  analyse  and 
comprehend  many  aspects  of  the  changing  economic,  social  and  political  structure 
historically.  Thus,  another  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  explore  the  relationship 
between  economic  development  and  social  development  in  S.  Korea,  particularly  on 
the  relationships  to  be  seen  through  the  "lens"  offered  by  the  housing  sector  of  the 
economy.  The  other  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  explore  the  function  of  housing  in 
the  relationship  between  economic  and  social  development  for  different  people  at 
different  stages  of  economic  and  urban  growth. 
This  research  tries  to  unravel  the  interaction  of  economic  changes,  social  changes 
and  changes  in  housing,  and  to  explore  the  implication  of  the  changed  housing 
conditions  of  low  income  households  for  economic,  social  and  political  structures. 
Thus,  it  draws  upon  material  from  a  wide  variety  of  intellectual,  cultural  and 
historical  contexts. 
The  thesis  concludes  with  a  summary  of  its  findings,  and  a  brief  exploration  of  the 
new  challenges  facing  a  changing  generation  and  the  implications  of  the  reunification 
which  now  seems  increasingly  likely.  It  is  high  time  to  make  a  fundamental  re- 
examination  of  housing  policies  if  Korea  is  not  to  become  a  divided  society  instead  of 
a  divided  country. 
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x CHAPTER  1.  INTRODUCTION 
I.  I.  Background  to  the  Study. 
One  primary  reason  for  desiring  economic  growth  is  to  raise  the  general  living 
standards  of  the  population.  Many  studies  and  theories  have  suggested  and  confirmed 
that  in  a  poor  country,  economic  growth  is  the  first  and  necessary  step  for  the  well- 
being  of  all  people,  and  some  people  have  assumed  that  the  benefits  of  economic 
growth  will  eventually  "trickle  down"  to  even  the  poorest  people,  and  thereby  non- 
income  problems  such  as  housing  would  be  solved  by  increased  national  and 
household  incomes. 
The  economic  growth  of  S.  Korea  has  often  been  called  an  "economic  miracle". 
Income  and  productivity  growth,  life  expectancy,  literacy,  life  expectationsl  etc., 
dramatically  increased  and  improved.  For  instance,  in  1960,  per  capita  GNP  in 
S.  Korea  was  US$  79.  This  figure  increased  to  US$  5,659  in  1990.  The  proportion  of 
expenditure  by  the  average  S.  Korean  household  devoted  to  necessities  such  as  food, 
clothing  and  footwear  has  substantially  decreased  and  the  standards  of  such 
necessities  have  been  dramatically  improved. 
But,  behind  this  picture  of  average  growth  and  progress  in  S.  Korea,  the  World 
Bank  estimated  about  5  per  cent  of  S.  Koreans  (about  217,600  persons)  were  still 
living  in  absolute  poverty  in  1990.  There  were  28.8  per  cent  of  households  using 
only  one  room,  I  per  cent  and  0.4  per  cent  of  households  living  without  a  kitchen 
and  even  a  toilet  in  cities  in  1990.  Furthermore,  there  were  3.5  per  cent  of  urban 
households  living  in  buildings  not  intended  for  human  habitation.  Yet  total  output  of 
housing  was  very  high,  achieving  annually  a6  per  cent  increase  in  urban  housing 
stock  during  the  period  1960-1990.  Average  monthly  housing  expenditure  as  a 
percentage  of  household  income  in  cities  has  been  steadily  and  rapidly  increasing 
over  time.  In  1965  the  average  urban  household  spent  only  about  13.8  per  cent  of 
their  income  on  housing  consumption  costs.  By  1988  that  figure  had  increased  to 
30.9  per  cent. 
It  is  apparent  that,  in  general,  the  lower  the  income  and  the  greater  the  number  of 
dependent  people  in  a  household,  the  smaller  the  proportion  of  income  they  can 
afford  for  housing.  However,  according  to  the  Korea  National  Housing  Corporation's 
report  (1983),  in  certain  poor  housing  areas,  some  low-income  households  living  in 
rented  houses  with  over  two  dependents  spend  up  to  63  per  cent  of  their  incomes  on 
housing  consumption  costs.  In  June,  1991,  there  were  several  frustrated  households 
who  committed  suicide  because  they  were  unable  to  pay  the  increased  rents. 
Furthermore,  new  squatter  settlements,  which  had  almost  disappeared  in  the  early 
1980s,  began  to  appear  again  in  the  biggest  cities. 
1 Two  things  are  clear  in  S.  Korea;  firstly,  on  average,  most  aspects  of  living 
conditions  have  substantially  improved,  but  those  of  some  people  have  worsened; 
secondly,  unlike  other  commodities,  housing  in  S.  Korea  appears  to  have  special 
features  not  present  in  other  commodities.  Lower  income  households  are  paying  more 
and  more  for  what  is  not  becoming  better  and  better,  and  this  despite  rapid  economic 
growth  and  very  high  total  output  of  housing.  This  situation  poses  several  questions: 
1)  Are  the  housing  situations  of  low-income  households  an  unfortunate,  and 
probably  temporary,  effect  of  urban  growth  in  any  rapidly  growing  economy,  or  are 
they  due  to  the  general  structure  of  S.  Korea's  social,  economic,  political  and 
housing  system? 
2)  Is  poor  housing  simply  a  symptom  of  low  income,  or  does  the  housing  system 
itself  cause  low  income? 
3)  Are  these  situations  the  temporary  and  inevitable  costs  of  economic  growth,  or 
are  they  becoming  structural  underpresent  systems  as  time  goes  by? 
4)  Will  the  benefits  of  economic  growth  eventually  "trickle  down  "  to  even  the 
poorestpeople? 
1.2  Research  Purpose  and  Direction. 
The  main  purpose  of  this  research  is  empirical:  to  arrive  at  a  better  understanding 
of  the  housing  problems  of  households  with  low  incomes,  particularly  in  the  big  cities 
of  a  rapidly  growing  economy,  in  S.  Korea.  It  may  be  first  required  to  consider  the 
nature  of  housing  problems  and  the  definition  of  low-income  households. 
1.2.1  The  Housing  Problem. 
Housing  is  often  called  'shelter',  but  shelter  itself  is  only  a  part  of  what  is  meant  by 
a  house.  The  simple  function  of  shelter  from  the  elements  such  as  rain,  wind  and 
enemies  is  a  relatively  minor  aspect  of  a  house.  The  meaning  of  a  house  contains  not 
only  the  physical  unit,  but  also  a  place  of  privacy  and  a  collection  of  rights  and 
duties,  which  may  be  distributed  in  various  ways  among  various  people  in  a  different 
form  in  a  each  society. 
Housing  has  many  different  characteristics  from  other  consumer  goods  and  it  has 
many  characteristics  of  private  goods  and  public  goods  too.  The  period  of  production 
is  particularly  long  because  of  the  nature  of  the  building  process  and  the  need  for  land 
which  is  a  very  limited  resource  and  not  elastic  to  demands.  Thus  there  are  high  risks 
2 to  realise  surplus  value  (or  profit)  and  it  takes  a  long  time  to  begin  a  new  circuit  of 
production.  Houses,  unlike  other  consumer  goods,  cannot  move  between  areas  and 
regions  in  response  to  change  in  needs  or  demands. 
The  price  of  housing  is  very  expensive  in  relation  to  the  income  of  the  vast 
majority  of  households.  Thus,  equity  accumulation  in  housing  is  the  largest  means  of 
saving  for  the  vast  majority  of  households.  Most  households  are  unable  to  purchase 
houses  outright  and  can  only  pay  for  them  as  they  consume  them  over  an  extended 
period  of  time,  making  for  a  unique  financial  system.  Housing  has  relatively  high 
transaction  costs,  involving  advertising,  agents'  commission,  legal  charges,  survey 
fees  and  moving  costs.  This  acts  as  one  of  the  discouragements  to  exchange  (or 
mobility)  unlike  other  consumer  goods.  Therefore,  when  housing  consumption  costs 
go  up,  it  is  not  easy  to  substitute  cheaper  housing,  at  least  in  the  short  run. 
Moreover,  in  general,  the  consumption  of  housing  is  by  a  household  not  an 
individual,  and  the  proportion  of  economically  active  and  dependent  members  of  the 
household  varies  at  each  stage  of  the  life-cycle.  So  their  housing  needs  and  their 
capacity  to  pay  vary  at  each  stage  of  the  life-cycle. 
Housing  consumption  does  not  mean  the  consumption  of  the  housing  unit  itself. 
Housing  affords  a  package  or  bundle  of  facilities,  including  the  environment  of  the 
area  or  region.  This  means  on  the  one  hand  that  the  preference  for  housing  and  the 
price  of  housing  largely  depend  not  only  upon  the  quality  of  the  housing  unit  itself, 
but  also  upon  the  environment  and  location.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  context  of 
urban  decay,  the  neglect  of  an  individual  house  can  affect  neighbours  and  the 
immediate  community  by  imposing  social  costs  on  other  local  residents.  In  addition 
to  this,  in  theory  the  economies  of  scale  are  consistent  with  most  commodities  of 
private  production,  but  when  considering  environmental  amenities  or  public  facilities 
and  services  as  a  part  of  housing,  no  suitable  large  scale  entrepreneur  may  be 
available. 
The  excess  demand  induces  a  variety  of  non-price  adjustments,  such  as 
discouraged  movement,  reduced  household  formation  or  increased  occupational 
densities  which  are  difficult  to  monitor  and  this  may  diffuse  and  reduce  the  clarity  of 
price  signals  to  suppliers.  Nevertheless, housing  obviously  has  some  different 
characteristics  from  other  social  services  such  as  education  and  health.  Housing  has 
the  nature  of  being  both  a  commodity  and  a  private  good.  This  means  that  this 
'service'  lends  itself  more  readily  to  market  provision  than  so  many  other  aspects  of 
welfare.  Housing,  hence,  seemed  the  most  appropriate  welfare  commodity  to  lead  the 
U.  K.  's  privatisation  drive,  since  it  is  the  one  welfare  service  whose  benefits  are 
continuously  and  individually  experienced  (Whitehead,  1984). 
3 At  a  macro  level,  housing  construction  (supply)  and  consumption  (demand)  do  not 
only  depend  on  the  physical  structure  itself.  There  are  various  important  facilities 
within  housing  such  as  TV,  freezer,  etc  and  outside  the  house  such  as  street  lighting, 
piped  water  systems,  etc.  Housing  supply  and  demands  affect  the  vast  industry  of  a 
nation.  Therefore,  investment  in  housing  can  have  an  important  impact  on  income 
and  employment  through  the  utilization  of  unemployed  or  underemployed  workers.  In 
fact,  in  S.  Korea,  housing  represented  4.1  per  cent  of  national  output  in  1988  (Lee  M- 
S)  1992);  according  to  the  Bank  of  Korea,  housing  makes  up  one  fourth  of  gross 
investment  in  fixed  capital  in  the  economy  (KHB,  1993)  and  construction  employs 
1.3  million  people,  equivalent  to  7.4  per  cent  of  the  total  employed  (NSO,  Monthly 
Statistics  of  Korea,  1992).  Multiplier  linkages  through  the  economy  can  be 
substantial.  In  addition  to  this,  housing  has  important  social  dimensions.  It  is  often 
argued  that  housing  mediates,  sustains  or  ameliorates  some  wider  aspects  of 
deprivation.  As  Edwin  Chadwick  (1842)  argued,  'low  moral  standards'  were  a 
consequence  rather  than  a  cause  of  poor  housing  environment. 
The  nature  of  housing  is  a  complex  one  to  define  in  a  simple  manner.  Therefore, 
for  different  kinds  of  people  -  rich,  poor;  young,  old;  etc  -  and  different  kinds  of 
countries  -  socialist,  capitalist;  developing,  developed;  etc  -  different  emphases  and 
interpretations  would  be  appropriate.  So  'housing'  means  different  things  to  different 
people  and  countries,  and  to  the  same  people  and  countries  at  different  times.  What, 
therefore,  are  housing  problems?  According  to  the  traditional  housing  policy  aim,  "a 
decent  home  for  all  families  at  a  price  within  their  means",  housing  problems  seem  to 
be  essentially  about  quality,  quantity  and  price. 
First,  housing  problems  can  be  assessed  by  asking  how  many  houses  are  'unfitfor 
human  habitation'  or  'below  tolerable  standard'.  How  is  it  possible  to  decide  which 
house  is  unfit  for  human  habitation  or  below  tolerable  standard?  Most  countries 
explicitly  or  implicitly  establish  minimum  standards  (in  capitalist  countries)  and 
minimum  requirements  (in  socialist  countries).  These  standards  differ  from  country  to 
country  and  tend  to  be  changed  from  time  to  time.  The  distinction  between  the 
definition  used  by  the  Census  Bureau  of  the  U.  S.  A.  in  1960  and  1970  provides 
evidence  of  this  (Morris  and  Winter,  1978,  p.  84).  The  1960  concept  of  kitchen 
facilities  was  a  kitchen  or  cooking  equipment.  A  kitchen  was  a  room  used  primarily 
for  cooking  and  meal  preparation;  cooking  equipment  was  defined  as  a  range  or 
stove,  whether  or  not  regularly  used,  or  other  equipment  such  as  a  hotplate  regularly 
used  to  prepare  meals.  The  1970  concept  of  kitchen  facilities  includes  complete 
kitchen  facilities,  defined  as  including  a  sink  with  piped  water,  a  range  or  cook  stove, 
and  a  refrigerator.  These  facilities  must  be  located  in  the  same  building  as  the  living 
quarters  but  need  not  be  all  in  the  same  room.  Thus  in  ten  years  one  of  the  definitions 
4 of  a  housing  unit  has  drastically  changed,  from  a  room  with  merely  a  hotplate,  to  a 
kitchen,  complete  with  running  water,  a  refrigerator,  and  a  range.  In  the  socialist 
countries,  like  capitalist  countries,  minimum  requirements  have  been  altered  as  socio- 
economic  conditions  change.  For  instance,  in  1919  the  minimum  space  in  the  USSR 
was  8.25  sq.  m  of  floor  space  and  30  cubic  metre  of  air  space  for  each  adult  and  20 
cubic  metre  for  children  under  14  years  of  age.  In  1926  the  floor  space  in  the 
minimum  requirement  was  enlarged  to  9  sq.  m.  On  the  other  hand,  the  minimum 
requirement  of  China  was  still  8  sq.  m.  So,  the  UN(1977,  p.  3)  has  declared  that 
housing  standards  should  be  guided  by  a  nation's  own  climatic,  economic,  technical 
and  social  circumstances. 
Secondly,  in  S.  Korea,  during  the  last  three  decades,  'housing  shortage'  has  always 
been  regarded  as  the  first  and  most  fundamental  housing  problem  (EPB,  1992,  p.  2). 
The  housing  shortage  in  S.  Korea  has  been  defined  as  a  shortfall  of  housing  units 
compared  to  number  of  households,  but  this  takes  no  account  of  size,  location, 
quality,  amenities  or  age  of  the  house,  or  the  characteristics,  size  and  composition  of 
the  household.  In  a  freely  competitive  market  a  shortage  may  be  defined  as  an 
excessive  demand  at  the  prevailing  price  such  that  market  forces  will  raise  the  price 
until  demand  and  supply  are  once  more  in  better  equilibrium  at  a  new  and  higher 
price.  Hence,  an  economic  shortage  will  be  eliminated  but  this  does  not  deny  that 
those  unwilling  or  unable  to  pay  the  new  price  will  go  without.  However,  if  society 
believes  that  everyone  should  be  housed  above  a  given  housing  standard  then  this 
adds  a  new  perspective  to  the  meaning  of  shortage,  for  in  the  free  market  many 
people  may  be  unable  (or  even  unwilling)  to  acquire  the  amount  and  quality  of 
accommodation  considered  'socially  desirable'. 
Furthermore,  in  India  and  Africa  there  are  many  who  sleep  in  the  streets  or  in  open 
country,  not  only  because  of  housing  deficits  but  also  because  of  the  climate.  While 
summers  in  S.  Korea  are  hot  and  humid,  with  July  temperatures  rising  to  36  Cl  the 
winter  of  S.  Korea  brings  the  thermometer  down  below  freezing-point.  For  instance, 
in  January  temperatures  fall  to  below  -13  C  in  the  mountains.  For  much  of  the  year, 
therefore,  street  sleeping  would  be  impossible.  So  homelessness,  in  the  sense  of 
'frooflessness",  is  rare,  providing  different  perceptions  of  the  housing  problem  from 
those  in  India  and  Africa. 
Thirdly,  in  S.  Korea,  although  there  are  no  explicit  official  lines,  the  generally 
accepted  standard  for  determining  'high  rent  burden'  is  that  any  household  paying 
over  about  25  per  cent  of  household  income  for  housing  is  spending  more  than  it 
should  be  (KNHC).  However,  this  is,  in  fact,  unrealistic.  For  some  households,  10 
per  cent  of  their  income  is  too  much  to  have  to  spend  for  housing.  For  some,  even  I 
5 per  cent  is  too  much  if  they  are  to  meet  their  other  needs  out  of  their  meagre 
incomes. 
Therefore,  no  one  can  tell  in  what  respect  and  to  what  degree  specified  housing  is 
deficient  and  problematic,  and  what  number  of  households  in  a  country  have  serious 
housing  problems.  Since  housing  problems  are  difficult  to  define  and  measure,  the 
policies  for  tackling  them  may  be  equally  difficult  to  plan  and  evaluate.  Moreover, 
the  inter-relationship  between  different  sectors  is  very  marked  in  housing.  Housing  is 
closely  influenced  by  the  large  number  of  issues  which  are  neither  housing  policy  nor 
housing  market  behaviour.  Statutory  minimum  standards,  subsidies,  eligibility  rules 
for  mortgages,  price  controls,  various  taxes,  slum  clearance,  land  use  controls,  urban 
policy,  regional  development,  even  monetary  policy  etc,  -  some  of  these  may  not 
normally  be  regarded  as  instruments  of  'housing  policy'  but  they  nevertheless  exert  a 
great  influence  upon  housing.  Moreover,  as  mentioned  earlier,  the  impact  of  housing 
is  not  confined  to  the  housing  sector  alone.  The  most  commonly  discussed  impacts 
envisage  housing  acting  as  a  barrier  to  productivity  of  workers  and  to  mobility,  as  a 
cause  of  misery,  as  a  measure  of  economic  growth  and  as  a  measure  of  the 
redistribution  of  wealth  or  income. 
One  important  implication  of  the  complicated  characteristics  of  housing  and  the 
broader  inter-relationship  between  different  sectors  in  housing  is  the  potential  for 
conflict  between  different  housing  policies  affecting  different  social  groups. 
Professor  Donnison  (1967,  p.  86  quoted  in  Cullingworth,  1973,  p.  40)  has  deftly 
illustrated  this: 
A  policy  of  housing  those  in  most  urgent  need  may  conflict  'Kith  a  policy  of 
replacing  the  worst  houses,  and  both  may  conflict  with  a  policy  for  stimulating 
demand  through  subsidies  directed  to  those  who  are  most  likely  to  be  persuaded  by 
such  help  to  build  or  buy  homes  for  themselves:  different  people  will  benefit  from  the 
pursuit  of  each  of  these  objectives.  An  attempt  to  keep  pace  with  the  housing  needs  of 
expanding  industrial  centres  may  conflict  with  an  attempt  to  revive  poverty  stricken 
regions.  A  policy  designed  to  improve  productivity  in  the  building  industry  may  not 
be  best  suitedfor  eliminating  unemployment  in  the  building  trades.  A  policy  designed 
to  eliminate  rent  controls  and  create  a  free  market'  in  housing  may  conflict  with  the 
need  to  avoid  inflation  of  living  costs  and  wages.  Every  country's  housing  policies 
contain  the  seeds  of  several  such  conflicts,  for  housing  is  so  central  a  feature  of  the 
economy  and  the  way  of  life  it  supports  that  many  of  the  competing  aspirations  at 
work  in  society  gain  some  expression  in  this  field". 
And  he  (1982,  pp.  13-4)  emphasized,  "  Housing  problems  can  be  solved,  and  many 
have  been.  But  the  solution  of  one  problem  focuses  attention  on  others". 
Housing  is  the  area  where  the  government  is  involved  in  every  aspect.  In  every 
country  the  government  may  be  involved  in  the  various  housing  markets  in  a  different 
fashion  within  the  social  context  in  which  there  are  always  acute  choices  between  the 
well-being  of  the  current  generation  and  of  its  heirs,  and  between  the  well-being  of 
6 one  social  group  and  another.  It  may  be  very  hard  to  choose  the  best  mix  of  policies 
to  achieve  particular  objectives.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  government's  policy 
or  programme  would  inevitably  be  influenced  by  keen  political  competition  for 
limited  resources,  whether  in  absolute  or  relative  terms.  Therefore,  housing  policies 
should  not  be  isolated  from  the  changing  social  structure. 
1.2.2  Low  Incomes. 
Low  income  and  poverty  can  be  defined  as  the  living  standards  of  20  or  30  per  cent 
of  people  in  the  lowest  income  bands  or  poverty  can  be  viewed  as  mere  physical 
subsistence  (Rowntree,  1901,1941  and  195  1),  as  the  inability  to  participate  in  certain 
forms  of  social  interaction  within  a  society  of  changing  norms  and  customs  (Abel- 
Smith  and  Townsend,  1965  and  Townsend,  t979)  or  as  deprivation  with  respect  to 
certain  basic  needs  or  capabilities  (Sen,  1986).  These  are  quite  different  conceptions 
of  low  income  (or  poverty)  with  quite  different  consequences  for  how  it  is  identified. 
In  Korea,  the  underground  market  (or  curb  market)  accounts  for  about  20-30  per 
cent  of  GNP  and  remittance  income  is  often  a  major  source  of  household  income  in 
some  households.  Hence,  the  concept  of  income  should  be  carefully  defined.  Even 
then,  such  estimates  do  not  take  into  account  certain  types  of  income  which  must  be 
included  for  an  accurate  picture.  These  include  employers'  national  insurance 
contributions,  benefits  in  kind  as  provided  by  both  the  employers  and  the  state  (e.  g. 
school,  public  services,  etc.  ),  transactions  in  the  informal  economy  which  are 
particularly  important  for  low-income  households  and  benefits  received  in  the  form  of 
expense-account  living  which  have  become  increasingly  important  for  high  salary 
earners  as  a  means  of  "topping  up"  salaries. 
Furthermore,  people  at  the  bottom  of  the  income  distribution  in  Korea  may  not  see 
themselves  as  poor,  particularly  if  they  make  comparisons  with  the  hunger  and 
starvation  of  the  1950s  and  1960s.  Indeed,  the  poverty  line  drawn  by  the  poor 
themselves  was  far  lower  than  the  poverty  line  drawn  by  the  government  (KRIHS, 
1989,  p.  12  1) 
To  some  extent,  since  the  launch  of  housing  related  saving  schemes  in  1978,  which 
gave  preferential  purchasing  rights  for  new  housing  to  the  housing  related  saving 
account  holders  at  controlled  prices,  many  families  have  divided  their  members  and 
registered  as  new  legal  households  yet  continue  to  live  with  the  same  source  of 
income.  Therefore,  another  conceptual  problem  in  analysing  low  income  is  the  basic 
unit  for  which  the  information  should  be  gathered:  is  it  the  individual,  the  nuclear 
family  or  the  household? 
More  importantly,  the  period  over  which  resources  should  be  measured  should  also 
be  carefully  considered.  In  Korea's  rapidly  changing  society  in  which  economic 
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which  is  limited  to  those  who  are  currently  poor  had  less  meaning  than  in  a  stable 
society.  There  has  been  a  broader  range  of  chances  for  people,  as  well  as  a  broader 
pool  of  people  at  risk  of  being  included  in  low  income  definitions.  As  Orshansky 
(1969)  stated,  "Counting  the  poor  is  an  exercise  in  the  art  of  the  possible.  For 
deciding  who  is  poor,  prayers  are  more  relevant  than  calculations  because  poverty, 
like  beauty,  lies  in  the  eye  of  the  beholder"  (quoted  in  Walker  and  Walker,  1994, 
p.  43) 
All  these  imply  that  low  income  is  inevitably  a  political  and  moral  concept,  and 
thus  inherently  a  disputable  one.  Since  the  term  itself  portrays  a  negative  image  of 
society,  it  implies,  and  requires,  some  social  actions,  which  depend  upon  political 
negotiations.  Various  definitions  of  low  income  may  be  made  in  order  to  justify  new 
and  different  policy  actions.  To  select  one  rather  than  another  definition  would  thus 
lead  to  a  very  different  approach  to  both  the  problem  and  the  solution  of  low  income. 
This  research  is  not  designed  to  define  poverty  and  measure  the  poor,  but  to  explore 
who  are  the  more  vulnerable  in  a  rapidly  changing  society. 
Prior  to  the  Korean  War  (1950-53),  S.  Korea  was  one  of  the  world's  poorest 
countries.  The  War  brought  about  more  serious  and  widespread  hunger  and  famine. 
Until  1960,  about  half  of  the  population  lived  in  absolute  poverty.  National  Poverty 
was  the  main  low-income  issue. 
After  the  launch  of  the  First  Economic  Development  Five-year  Plan  (1962-66), 
S.  Korea  has  been  celebrated  as  an  examplary  case  of  a  rapidly  industrializing  country 
in  the  Third  World.  Industrial  growth  was  concentrated  on  cities  and  the  disparity  of 
income  between  urban  areas  and  rural  areas  has  been  widened.  Although  basic 
infrastructure,  amenities  and  public  services  were  inadequate  everywhere,  rural 
poverty  became  the  main  low-income  issue,  which  pushed  a  great  number  of  people 
out  of  rural  areas. 
Although  the  economic  growth  of  S.  Korea  remained  rapid,  the  industrialization 
could  not  successfully  cope  with  the  rapid  urbanisation,  coupled  with  a  rapid  increase 
in  the  population.  The  most  visible  consequence  of  industry's  inability  in  urban  areas 
to  provide  adequate  employment  for  such  a  rapidly  growing  labour  force  was  the 
increase  of  the  informal  sector  and  street  economy.  The  common  characteristics  of 
workers  in  those  sectors  was  their  low  incomes,  identifying  them  as  the  core  of  the 
poverty  issue. 
Since  the  mid-1970s,  the  industrial  structure  of  S.  Korea  has  been  gradually 
modified  from  labour-  intensive  export  industry  towards  capital  and  skill-intensive 
export  industry.  S.  Korean  firms  began  to  reorganize  on  the  basis  of  subcontract  as  the 
emergence  of  China  and  South  Asia  countries  has  squeezed  S.  Korea  out  of  the  low 
8 end  of  international  markets.  Although  economic  grow  of  S.  Korea  steadily  and 
rapidly  continued,  big  factories  moved  out  of  the  biggest  cities  and  new 
manufacturing  industry  tended  to  locate  out  of  them. 
A  great  number  of  unskilled  or  less  skilled  workers  who  could  not  keep  pace  with 
the  changes  have  fallen  out  of  work  or  into  non-standard  employments.  A  new  low- 
income  issue  emerged.  The  most  serious  problem  is  that  this  stage  of  the  low-income 
problem  is  not  frictional  or  cyclical,  but  structural. 
1.2.3.  Housing  Problems  of  People  with  Low  Incomes. 
Urban  poor  housing  conditions,  such  as  overcrowding,  lack  of  facilities  and 
security,  and  physical  decay,  have  always  been  regarded  as  housing  problems  of  low- 
income  households.  However,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  low  income  households 
really  want  a  high-standard  house  at  the  expense  of  other  necessities  and  savings  for 
the  future.  Indeed,  a  high-standard  house  and  the  improvement  of  houses  did  not 
have  a  high  priority  among  dwellers  in  poor  houses.  For  them  the  most  important 
thing  was  reducing  housing  consumption  costs  (KNHC,  1983,  p.  118).  Furthermore, 
can  poor  housing  always  be  assumed  to  be  problematic?  Evidence  from  Sadang  2- 
Dong,  called  Bulryang  Chon  or  an  unauthorized  settlement  area  in  Seoul,  which  drew 
attention  to  the  close-knit  social  structure  which  allowed  the  urban  poor  to  survive 
because  economic  exchange  networks  underpinned  social  networks  shows  that  poor 
housing  itself  is  not  problematic  (Hur  S-L,  1989).  One  household  may  endure 
substandard  housing  conditions  at  low  rent  in  order  to  be  able  to  acquire  other 
necessities  of  life,  while  a  second  household  may  do  just  the  opposite,  sacrificing 
nonhousing  essentials  so  as  to  occupy  a  decent  home.  It  is  inconsistent  to  suggest 
that  the  first  is  deprived  and  a  problem,  but  the  other  is  not.  Both  households  do  have 
a  low-income  problem.  Only  in  the  first  case,  though,  does  the  problem  manifest 
itself  in  the  form  of  occupancy  of  a  substandard  house. 
Throughout  industrialisation  and  urbanisation,  some  were  excluded  from  the  main 
source  of  economic  security  -  well  paid  employment  in  urban  areas  -  and,  therefore, 
are  disenfranchised  as  consumers  from  the  new  forms  of  consumption  emerging  at  an 
ever  faster  rate.  Industrialisation  was  represented  by  the  establishment  of 
manufacturing  factories  which  gave  full-time  gainful  employment  not  only  to  men  but 
also  to  women  and  children  who  in  rural  area  rarely  enjoyed  more  than  seasonal  or 
part-time  work  for  pay.  There  was  a  serious  housing  deficit,  but  they  were  immune, 
at  least  from  housing  consumption  costs,  until  the  mid-1960s  because  they  could 
build  their  house  by  themselves.  Thus,  the  main  housing  problem  of  low-income 
households  was  the  quality  and  size  of  the  dwelling. 
9 After  the  mid-1960s,  with  the  emergence  of  underemployment,  the  increase  of  the 
informal  sector  and  a  street  economy,  the  core  of  housing  problems  changed  from  the 
dwellings  towards  the  dwellers  and  their  low  incomes. 
Since  the  mid-1970s,  there  have  been  rapid  increases  in  irregular  workers  and  in 
house  prices.  Housing  policy  has  been  further  focused  on  owner-occupation.  Housing 
problems  of  low-income  households  began  to  combine  dwelling  problems  and  dweller 
problems. 
All  these  are  puzzles  or  paradoxes  when  viewed  in  isolation.  Housing  problems  of 
low-income  households  are  likely  to  arise  from  the  operation  of  a  broad  range  of 
social,  economic  and  political  processes,  as  well  as  housing  processes. 
1.2.4.  Housing  Policy  for  People  with  Low  Incomes. 
The  question  raised  here  is  whether  government's  policy  represents  the  needs  and 
the  problems  of  low-income  households  in  theory. 
It  was  quite  clear  that  in  poor  countries  economic  growth  was  a  necessary  condition 
for  eradicating  social  problems  including  housing  problems  related  to  low  income. 
One  of  primary  reasons  for  desiring  economic  growth  was  that  economic  growth 
makes  it  possible  for  those  on  low  incomes  to  avoid  a  miserable  life  without  reducing 
the  living  standards  of  others. 
As  Professor  Donnison  (1982,  p.  13)  explains,  "Housing  policy  is  any  sustained 
course  of  action  designed  to  affect  housing  conditions.  It  need  not  even  be  designed  to 
improve  these  conditions:  sometimes  governments  deliberately  restrain  investment  in 
housing  for  the  bendit  of  other  sectors  of  the  economy  ".  In  this  respect,  there  are  two 
approaches  towards  solving  housing  problems  related  to  low  income  households.  One 
approach  can  be  called  a  growth-first  approach  which  refers  to  promoting  rapid 
economic  development  which  could  then  generate  resources  to  improve  overall  well- 
being.  It  is based  on  the  assumption  that  a  proportion  of  increased  income  would  be 
channelled  into  public  services  intended  to  raise  the  living  standards  of  those  on  low 
incomes,  which  would  be  politically  easier  when  the  economy  continues  to  grow. 
This  involves  social  development  alongside  economic  development.  The  other  can  be 
called  a  selective  and  targeted  approach  which  involved  extensive  public  action  to 
improve  the  circumstances  of  certain  destitute  people.  The  latter  was  advocated  in 
many  developing  countries  by  the  international  community  under  the  name  of  a  basic 
need  approach  on  the  assumption  that  policies  sharply  focused  on  basic  needs  are,  in 
principle,  capable  of  eradicating  some  of  the  worst  aspects  of  poverty  fairly  quickly. 
The  improved  education,  housing  and  health  of  the  targeted  group  can  make  a  major 
contribution  to  increased  productivity.  To  some  extent,  adequate  standards  of 
nutrition,  health,,  shelter,  water  and  sanitation,  education  and  other  essentials  can 
10 make  a  major  contribution  to  increased  productivity.  Thus  economic  growth  and 
social  development  could  have  a  momentum  through  linkages  and  multiple  effects 
(Streeten,  1981). 
In  S.  Korea,  after  the  military  revolution  in  1960  onwards  the  government 
consistently  continued  the  "growth-first"  approach.  As  Kim  K-D  (1979)  pointed  out, 
"Economic  growth  represented  by  the  principle  of  growth-first-redistribution-later 
was  the  philosophy  of  national  policy".  Since  the  launch  of  the  First  Economic 
Development  Five-year  Plan  (1962-66),  the  economic  growth  of  S.  Korea  has  often 
been  called  an  "economic  miracle".  S.  Korea  achieved  nearly  full  employment. 
Income  and  productivity  growth,  life  expectancy,  literacy,  mortality,  etc.  were  all 
indicators  of  an  outstandingly  successful  example  in  developing  countries  (World 
Bank,  various  years).  The  relative  equality  achieved  in  S.  Korea  with  a  rapidly 
growing  economy  was  enough  to  challenge  the  criticism.  Moreover,  there  have  been 
no  mortgage  markets,  no  tax  relief,  no  public  housing  and  no  rent  allowances  or 
rebates.  Nevertheless,  over  half  of  households  in  S.  Korea  possessed  their  own 
houses.  Over  the  last  three  decades,  government  investment  in  the  housing  sector  has 
only  accounted  for  1.4  per  cent  of  the  government's  budget.  Nevertheless,  housing 
stocks  in  urban  areas  have  continuously  increased  at  over  6  per  cent  per  year  during 
the  last  three  decades.  Housing  was,  as  I  shall  show,  more  evenly  distributed  through 
households  in  different  income  levels  and  occupations  than  lands  and  monetary  assets. 
Housing  standards  such  as  density  and  amenities  were  all  improved  on  average. 
In  contrast,  the  poverty  issue  is becoming  the  central  focus  of  political  and  social 
debates.  Moreover,  several  extreme  cases,  of  kinds  which  the  government  intended 
economic  growth  would  avoid,  related  to  housing,  such  as  suicide  because  of  the 
increased  rents,  Mock-Dong  and  Sadang-Dong  tenant  struggles  and  new  squatter 
settlements  emerging  in  recent  years.  Is  the  cake  not  large  enough?  It  is  more  likely 
that  although  the  link  between  problems  and  the  government's  response  to  them  has 
not  always  been  obvious  nor  has  the  relationship  always  been  appropriate, 
nevertheless  it  exists  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent.  It  is  more  likely  that  the  definition 
of  a  situation  as  a  social  problem  and  policy  as  a  social  solution  related  to  the  power 
structure  of  society. 
Put  simply,  as  a  working  definition  of  this  research,  power  refers  to  the  ability  to 
produce  a  distinctive  set  of  life  chances  and  exclusion  refers  to  the  lack  of  ability  to 
change  the  existing  set  of  life  chances.  These  patterns  of  power  and  exclusion  occur 
not  only  through  the  operation  of  housing  markets,  but  also  labour  markets  and  the 
socio-political  process.  Thus,  if  there  is  one  dominant  theme  in  this  research,  it  is  the 
need  consciously  to  integrate  housing  into  broader  issues  of  social  structure. 
11 1.2.5  Research  Direction. 
These  arguments  mean  that  the  fundamental  question  is  what  was  the  power 
structure  in  S.  Korea  and  how  has  it  developed?  When  Korea  was  liberated  from 
Japan  and  soon  partitioned  between  the  South  and  North,  S.  Korea  was  an  agricultural 
society.  In  1945,  about  80  per  cent  of  the  labour  force  in  S.  Korea  was  engaged  in 
agriculture  and  less  than  3  per  cent  in  the  mining,  manufacturing  and  construction 
sector.  Under  these  circumstances,  two  land  reforms  in  1947  and  1949  meant  the 
collapse  of  a  traditional  social  order  based  on  land,  especially  a  rice  cultivating 
society,  and  the  start  of  a  new  social  order.  Furthermore,  the  Korean  War  (1950- 
t953)  had  a  profound  impact  on  S.  Korean  society,  destroying  existing  capital  stocks 
and  levelling  out  the  distribution  of  non-agricultural  assets,  with  the  majority  of 
Koreans  in  destitution.  In  1960,  S.  Korea  experienced  another  massive  change  by  the 
military  revolution.  The  military  government  adopted  a  currency  reform  and 
nationalised  commercial  banks.  The  Economic  Development  Five-year  Plan,  which 
combined  the  planning  function  with  the  budgeting  process,  was  first  launched  in 
1962.  Since  this  time  S.  Korea  began  to  be  counted  as  a  rapidly  industrialising 
country.  In  1990,  only  19.5  per  cent  of  the  labour  force  was  engaged  in  agriculture 
and  34.7  per  cent  in  the  mining,  manufacturing  and  the  construction  sector.  Even 
industry  has  changed  from  a  labour-intensive  structure  for  production  of  goods  such 
as  textiles  and  shoes,  to  capital  and  skill-intensive  industry,  such  as  shipbuilding, 
automobiles  and  electronics.  Until  the  early  1960s,  S.  Korea  was  a  rural  society  in 
which  72  per  cent  of  the  population  lived  in  rural  areas.  In  1990,  more  than  74  per 
cent  of  the  population  lived  in  cities  with  a  population  of  over  50,000.  All  these  were 
accompanied  by  changes  in  occupation,  social  class,  even  the  way  of  life. 
Furthermore,  the  contemporary  S.  Korea  is  still  changing  in  such  profound  ways 
that  the  accounts  of  social  life  offered  by  "classical"  theorists  -  above  all  Marx, 
Weber  and  Durkeim  -  are  likely  to  be  an  obstruction  to  understanding.  Similarly,  the 
nature  and  limits  of  state  action  cannot  be  settled  on  abstract  grounds  of  principle. 
For  instance,  occupation,  as  the  basis  for  constructing  class  categories,  has  always 
been  anathema  to  class  analysts  in  S.  Korea  (see  Kim  Y-M,  1982;  Hong  D-S,  1983; 
Sur  K-M,  1984;  Koo  H-K,  1985  and  Kwon  S-W  et.  al.,  1992).  This  raises  many 
difficult  issues  for  analysis  of  the  power  structure  or  class  structure  because  of  the 
rapid  changes  in  industrial  structure  and  occupation  in  less  than  a  half  century.  Their 
common  conclusion  is  that  social  class  in  Korea  has  not  yet  formed,  it  is  still  in  the 
process  of  formation. 
These  rapid  changes  -  in  every  aspect  -  make  it  more  difficult  to  analyse  housing  on 
the  basis  of  conventional  accounts  which  often  apply  to  the  most  advanced  and  stable 
countries,  such  as  the  market  analysis  based  on  neoclassical  economics,  state-centred 
12 social  policy  analysis,  a  consumption  approach  based  on  the  labour  market,  the 
structure  of  housing  provision  approach,  etc.  In  other  words,  the  housing  market, 
problems  and  policies  in  S.  Korea  cannot  be  appropriately  understood  prior  to 
examining  the  general  changes  in  the  S.  Korean  society.  Thus,  the  starting  point  here 
is  to  avoid  relying  on  a  theoretical  framework  by  which  the  society  and  the  role  of 
the  state  are  assumed  to  be  fixed  according  to  a  certain  ideological  stance. 
The  key  route  to  power  in  S.  Korea  has  been,  on  the  one  hand,  in  and  through  the 
state,  but  the  state  is  not  a  source  of  power  in  its  own  right.  On  the  other  hand,  those 
in  government  were  using  a  degree  of  autonomy  to  actually  recast  the  basis  of  social 
power  on  which  the  state  rests.  Skocpol's  statements  are  more  likely  the  case  in 
S.  Korea,  "to  talk  of  states  as  actors  involves  a  recognition  that  they  canformulate 
and  pursue  goals  that  are  not  simply  reflective  of  the  demands  or  interests  of  social 
groups,  classes  or  society"  (quoted  in  Bonnett,  K.,  1994,  p.  26).  The  Figure  below 
drawn  by  Bonnett  (1994)  portrays  these  links  and  gives  a  framework  for 
understanding  how  the  different  dimensions  of  the  government  and  society  relate  in 
the  development  of  a  power  structure  in  S.  Korea  and  the  associated  political 
processes. 
Figure  1-1  Dimensions  of  Political  Change. 
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it  must  be  ernphasised  that  this  research  is  not  intended  to  establish  a  form  of 
political  determinism  but  to  understand  how  political  factors  combine  with  economic 
1  -ý and  cultural  factors  to  determine  historical  patterns  of  development  in  Korea, 
particularly  exploring  the  relationships  to  be  seen  through  the  'lens'  offered  by  the 
housing  sector.  The  general  conclusion  is  that  housing  policy  in  S.  Korea  reflects  the 
power  structure  in  society,  under  the  impact  of  major  changes  in  economic,  social 
and  political  restructuring  and  relationships.  These  patterns,  then,  tend  to  support  and 
solidify  the  existing  structures. 
A  further  conclusion,  developed  in  this  research,  is  that,  throughout  the  two  land 
reforms,  the  Korean  War  and  the  military  revolution,  the  traditional  social  order  and 
power  structure  collapsed  and  new  economic,  social  and  political  structures  led  by  the 
public  bureaucracy  began  to  emerge.  This  altered  way  of  life,  industrial  structure, 
occupation  and  social  class  system,  necessarily  resulted  in  the  alteration  of  the  power 
structure.  Since  the  late  1970s,  the  new  economic,  social  and  political  structure  began 
to  solidify,  as  another  strong  bureaucratic  organisation  emerged  in  the  private  sector, 
and  supported  the  economic,  social  and  political  structure,  sustained  by  a  developing 
white  collar  politics. 
Starting  from  a  study  of  economic  growth,  low  income  and  housing,  it  became 
clear  in  the  course  of  this  research  that  the  central  problem  was  not  the  physical 
character  of  the  poorest  housing  -  that,  in  a  very  rapidly  growing  economy,  can  be 
improved  fairly  quickly.  The  main  problem,  on  which  the  thesis  has  to  focus,  is  the 
processes  leading  to  the  exclusion  of  significant  numbers  of  poor  people  from  the 
opportunities  available  to  people  in  the  mainstream  of  their  society,  and  the  part 
which  housing  plays,  along  with  education,  family  structure,  and  other  factors,  in 
bringing  about  that  exclusion. 
The  core  of  this  thesis  deals  with  'exclusion'  and  explores  when,  how  and  why 
some  people  have  been  excluded  from  the  mainstream  of  society.  This  research  was 
not  intended  to  explore  class  and  status  structures  and  their  consequences  in  terms  of 
social  inequalities,  but  how  power  structures  in  S.  Korea  formed  and  how  they  affect 
housing  policies  and  markets.  Throughout  the  exploration  of  the  changed  economic, 
social,  political  and  housing  environments  according  to  the  following  research 
structure,  the  relationship  between  economic  development  and  social  development 
will  be  pictured,  the  function  of  housing  in  such  relations.  That  will  enable  the 
housing  problems  of  households  with  low  incomes  to  be  better  understood.  This 
research  tries  to  unravel  the  chain  of  economic  changes,  social  changes  and  the 
changes  in  housing,  and  then  finally  the  changes  in  the  housing  of  the  low  income 
households.  Thus,  this  research  draws  upon  material  from  a  wide  variety  of 
intellectuall  cultural  and  historical  contexts. 
14 1.3  The  Structure  of  Research. 
The  questions  and  purposes  which  I  envisage  in  the  last  sections  will  be  explored  in 
the  following  chapters. 
Chapter  2  briefly  traces  the  evolution  of  S.  Korean  society  and  national  policies 
which  have  helped  to  shape  S.  Korea's  economic,  social  and  political  structures  and  to 
frame  S.  Korea's  housing  policy  and  housing  markets. 
Chapter  3  considers  the  economic,  social  and  political  context  to  S.  Korean  housing. 
The  power  structure  in  society  emerges  as  a  consequence  of  how  things  are  produced. 
In  order  to  produce  things  people  have  to  enter  into  social  relations  with  one  another 
(Rose  and  Marshall,  1994,  p.  3).  This  chapter  first  deals  with  urbanisation,  and 
changes  in  economic  and  social  structures  in  line  with  economic  development.  This 
chapter  explores  the  cause  and  the  effect  of  such  changes  on  the  power  structure  of 
S.  Korean  society. 
Chapter  4  focuses  on  a  low-income  issue.  A  low  income  can  result  from  life-cycle 
transitions  or  from  economic  changes.  Thus,  the  low-income  problem  should  not  be 
confined  to  those  who  are  currently  poor.  Moreover,  high  and  costly  housing 
consumption,  for  example,  can  also  make  a  household  poor.  A  household  can  be  cast 
into  poverty  because  of  low  earnings  or  high  consumption  expenses,  or  a  combination 
of  both.  Social  policy,  therefore,  can  be  carried  out  by  direct  subsidies  or  by  indirect 
ways,  such  as  encouraging  opportunities  of  making  a  livelihood  or  reducing 
consumption  expenses.  This  chapter  deals  not  only  with  the  earning  aspect  but  also 
household  spending  and  social  policies  related  to  the  low-income  people  in  the 
context  of  changing  economic,  social  and  political  structures.  It  explores  how  power 
in  society  and  policies  come  together  and  influence  -  or  even  transform  -  one  another. 
Chapter  5  first  traces  the  evolution  of  housing  policies  which  have  helped  to  shape 
S.  Korea's  housing  conditions  and  explores  the  impact  of  the  changed  economic, 
social  and  political  structures  dealt  with  in  the  previous  chapters  on  housing.  Then 
this  chapter  explores  what  the  government  tried  to  achieve  through  housing,  and  how 
the  government  was  able  to  achieve  it  and  at  what  costs. 
Chapter  6  first  discusses  the  housing  system  of  S.  Korea  and  what  people  of 
different  income  gain  from  the  system,  and  the  dilemmas  posed  by  any  attempt  to 
continue  this  system.  Subsequently,  this  chapter  explores  what  happened  for  the 
households  excluded  from  the  housing  system  by  tracing  urban  redevelopments.  It 
shows  the  ways  in  which  households  move  through  the  housing  system,  the  effects  of 
urban  redevelopment  and  the  kinds  of  people  who  are  most  likely  to  be  in  difficulties. 
Then,  in  Chapter  7,1  look  at  the  problems  of  people  at  the  bottom  end  of  the 
housing  market  and  suggest  the  indirect  impact  of  housing  policies  which  in  the  long 
run  create  many  difficulties  in  housing.  Patterns  of  consumption  of  housing  may 
15 themselves  contribute  to  inequalities  of  life  chances.  Housing  price  inflation  is 
constantly  widening  the  economic  gap  between  owners  and  non-owners.  Increasing 
rents  widen  the  gap  further.  This  chapter  explores  how  existing  economic  and 
political  inequalities  are  overlaid  by  housing.  Housing  contributes  an  important  aspect 
to  the  economy,  society  and  politics,  embodying  not  only  personal  meanings  but 
expressing,  maintaining  and  mediating  social  orders  and  structures.  This  Chapter  tries 
to  reveal  the  meaning  of  housing  to  economic,  social  and  political  arenas,  in  other 
words,  the  impact  of  the  changed  housing  conditions  of  low-income  households  on 
economic,  social  and  political  structures. 
Chapter  8  summarizes  the  main  findings  of  this  research  and  suggests  foreseeable 
changes  in  S.  Korea  in  the  near  future. 
Thus,  this  research  will  take  the  following  form. 
Introduction  (Chapter  1) 
Economic  growth;  the  baLflground,  goals  I 
and  policies  (Chapter  2) 
1 
Changing  geographic,  economic,  social  and  political 
structure  and  the  process  of  exclusion  (Chapter  3) 
1 
Exclusion  from  the  benefits  of  growth  I 
(Chapter  4) 
1 
Evolution  of  housing  policy  in  the  changing 
economic,  social  and  political  environments  (Chapter  5) 
Exclusion  from  the  formal  housing  system  and 
the  changes  in  existing  low-income  houses  (Chapter  6) 
Exclusion  from  the  housing  market,  filtering  down 
and  the  impact  of  changed  housing  conditions 
on  low  income  households  (Chapter  7) 
Research  findings  and  suggestions  I 
(Chapter  8) 
1 
16 1.4  The  Scope  of  Research  Area  and  Period. 
Area:  Urban  areas. 
Some  have  asked  why  most  low-income  housing  studies  focus  on  urban  areas.  In 
rural  areas  housing  conditions  are  worse  than  in  urban  areas  and  the  availability  of 
and  access  to  basic  infrastructure  are  less  (Gilbert  and  Gugler,  1982,  p.  96).  Nientied 
and  Linden  (1988,  p.  319)  explained  this  focus  by  saying  that  high  visibility  seems  to 
be  the  prime  reason  why  urban  situations  attract  so  much  attention.  That  seems  to  be 
correct.  In  S.  Korea,  in  1990,  over  74  per  cent  of  the  population  were  living  in  cities 
which  had  a  population  of  over  50,000.  Moreover,  over  90  per  cent  of  illegal  houses 
in  which  most  occupants  live  with  insecurity  were  concentrated  in  cities.  But  in  most 
rural  areas  there  are  still  clean  streams  nearby  if  there  is  no  piped  water  supply. 
There  is  lots  of  space  for  children  to  play.  Furthermore,  the  urban  household's 
expenditure  on  housing  consumption  is  generally  higher  than  that  of  rural 
counterparts.  In  the  rural  areas  of  S.  Korea,  after  the  two  land  reforms  (1947  and 
1949),  although  people  often  suffer  from  harvest  crisis,  the  communities  are  more 
equal  than  they  are  in  urban  areas,  and  households  help  each  other  more  than  city 
dwellers  do.  In  urban  areas,  living  standards  are  crucially  dependent  on  harsh  cash 
income.  People  have  to  buy  coal  or  gas  for  heating  and  cooking,  and  so  on.  There 
are  no  alternatives  if  they  have  no  income.  Also,  if  housing  conditions  become  very 
bad,  they  are,  in  urban  areas,  more  likely  to  provoke  political  turbulence  demanding 
government  attention. 
Period:  mainly  since  1960  to  1990. 
In  a  rapidly  changing  society  to  achieve  a  greater  understanding  of  the  housing 
problems  of  low  income  households  and  the  housing  policies  of  the  past  and  present, 
and  ideally  to  predict  or  even  influence  the  future,  it  is  necessary  to  analyse  and 
comprehend  many  aspects  of  the  changing  economic,  social  and  political  structure 
historically.  The  story  told  in  this  research  therefore  begins  after  the  second  World 
War,  but  most  of  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  years  since  1960  when  the  S.  Korean 
economy  began  to  grow  rapidly. 
Prior  to  the  start  of  industrialisation,  self-building  was  an  alternative  way  of 
meeting  housing  needs  for  low  income  households.  People  built  their  own  houses 
using  raw  materials  which  they  collected  and  processed  themselves  with  the  help  of 
friends  and  neighbours.  The  quality  of  housing  was  limited  by  the  availability  of 
materials  and  the  skills  of  self-builders  but  housing  was  not  a  commodity  produced 
17 for  profit,  that  is for  its  exchange  value  rather  than  its  use  value.  Most  house  builders 
were  no  more  than  small  artisans.  Housing  consumption  costs  and  housing  tenure 
were  no  problem.  Since  the  start  of  industrial  isation,  housing  has  increasingly 
become  a  commodity,  house  builders  have  also  begun  to  change  from  the  form  of 
small  artisans  towards  mass  productive  enterprises.  The  standard  of  housing  enjoyed 
by  a  family  depended  increasingly  on  what  it  could  afford  rather  than  what  a 
household  could  build  for  itself.  Thus,  in  S.  Korea,  housing  problems  in  their  modern 
forms  only  emerged  as  industrialisation  and  urbanisation  got  under  way  after  the 
Korean  War  of  1950-53.  Interesting  though  it  might  have  been,  a  study  of  earlier 
periods  would  have  dealt  with  different  issues. 
18 CHAPTER  2.  THE  PATHWAY  TO  AN  "ECONOMIC  MIRACLE". 
2.1.  Introduction. 
Korea  was  liberated  and,  at  the  same  time,  partitioned  just  after  the  end  of  the 
Second  World  War,  1945.  Five  years  later,  the  Korean  War  broke  out,  devastating 
the  process  of  development.  Destitution  was  not  confined  to  a  minority  group.  The 
whole  country  suffered  from  famine.  Henceforth,  economic  growth  was  seen  as  of 
primary  importance.  Huge  resources  and  energy  have  since  concentrated  on  economic 
growth  in  Korea. 
It  is  necessary  to  recognize  that,  in  many  other  capitalist  countries,  the  state  has 
often  intervened  to  correct  pre-existing  market  distortions.  In  S.  Korea,  however,  as 
Amsden  (1989)  titled  chapter  6  of  her  book  "Getting  relative  prices  'Wrong'",  the 
S.  Korean  government  has  intervened  in  the  market  mechanism  to  distort  capital, 
labour,  and  other  markets.  Many  studies  about  S.  Korea  (Kuznets,  1977; 
Hamilton,  1986;  Henderson,  1993;  etc)  have  commonly  concluded,  as  J.  Henderson 
(1993)  entitled  his  article,  "Against  the  economic  orthodoxy",  although  some  argue 
that  policies  in  Korea  conformed  to  the  natural  functioning  of  markets  (Westphal, 
1978;  Balassa,  1990).  Therefore,  to  some  extent,  low-income  households  and  housing 
in  Korea  cannot  be  appropriately  understood  without  understanding  the  wholesale 
process  of  economic  growth. 
This  chapter  explores  how  S.  Korean  society  created  an  economic  miracle  and  what 
role  the  government  played  in  that,  as  a  precondition  to  understanding  low-income 
households  and  their  contemporary  housing  problems. 
2.2  National  Goals  and  Policies. 
In  1945,  just  after  the  conclusion  of  World  War  11,  Korea  was  partitioned  between 
South  and  North.  The  partition  of  the  country  along  the  38th  parallel  left  South  Korea 
with  slightly  less  than  half  the  Korean  peninsula,  but  with  about  66  per  cent  of  the 
population. 
At  that  time,  as  Table  2-1  shows,  the  South  was  primarily  an  agricultural  country, 
with  three  quarters  of  its  population  engaged  in  farming.  Manufacturing  output 
accounted  for  a  mere  23.8  per  cent  of  output  in  1940.  In  manufacturing,  the  South 
concentrated  on  light-industry  products,  the  North  produced  largely  heavy  and 
19 chem  ical-  industry  products.  In  mineral  resources,  the  North's  dominance  was 
considerable.  The  mining  production  of  the  South  was  only  a  quarter  of  the  total.  All 
the  iron  ore  and  coal  and  more  than  70  per  cent  of  the  gold,  silver,  tungsten  and 
graphite  were  produced  in  the  North.  More  critically,  at  the  time  of  partition,  92  per 
cent  of  total  electric  power  was  generated  in  the  North  (BOK,  1949). 
Table  2-1  Comparison  of  Net  Commodity  Product  Between  South  and  North  Korea,  1940 
(million  yen  at  current  market  prices) 
South(A)  North  All  Korea(B)  A/B 
Agriculture  965.1(60.2)  561.9(42.7)  1,527  63.2 
Forestry  109.7(6.9)  103.3(7.9)  213  51.5 
Fishery  141.2(8.8)  85.8(6.5)  227  62.2 
Mining  62.0(3.9)  194.0(14.7)  256  24.2 
Manufacturing  324.3(20.2)  371.7(28.2)  696  46.6 
Total  1,602.3(100)  1,316.7(100)  2,919  54.9 
Source:  Kwang-Suk  Kim  and  Michael  Roemer,  1979,  p.  23. 
Partition  didn't  just  mean  the  loss  of  heavy  industry,  it  meant  the  loss  of  major  coal 
deposits  and  almost  all  electric  power  generating  capacity.  The  loss  of  the  North, 
therefore,  caused  massive  damage  to  the  Southern  economy  because  of  these  deficits. 
An  industrial  survey  conducted  in  March  1947  revealed  that  the  number  of 
manufacturing  and  construction  establishments  in  S.  Korea  declined  to  about  4,500, 
less  than  half  the  10,065  establishments  existing  in  June  1943.  Employment  in 
manufacturing  and  construction  declined  by  41  per  cent  between  1943  and  1947 
(BOK,  t948). 
After  partition,  the  South's  economy  and  it's  living  standard  were  extensively 
dependent  on  the  harvest  cycle.  However,  Korea  was  not  a  well  endowed  country 
even  in  agriculture.  The  proportion  of  arable  land  in  the  South  was  only  20.6  per  cent 
and  per  capita  arable  land  was  a  mere  1,309  sq.  m  at  the  time  of  partition.  More  than 
two-thirds  of  the  farm  families  were  full-time  tenants,  and  most  of  the  others  were 
part-time  tenants  -  that  is  to  say,  they  combined  farming  with  other  work.  Together 
they  accounted  for  94  per  cent  of  the  rural  population  (Hatada,  1969,  p.  127).  Most 
rural  S.  Koreans  lived  in  abject  poverty  (G.  Henderson,  1968,  p.  156),  subjected  to 
exorbitant  rents  varying  from  50  per  cent  to  90  per  cent  of  the  crop.  Hunger  was 
routine,  and  famine  was  common  (Hatada,  1969,  p.  126).  To  make  matters  worse, 
after  1945,  the  population  rapidly  increased,  partly  due  to  natural  increase  and  largely 
due  to  refugees  from  the  North  and  repatriated  Koreans  from  Japan  and  elsewhere. 
The  population  of  the  South  increased  from  15.879  million  in  1944  to  20.03  million 
20 in  1948  (BOK,  1950).  The  refugees  and  repatriated  Koreans  were  estimated  to  have 
added  about  2.3  million  to  the  South's  population  during  1946-1948  (BOK,  1949). 
Hunger  became  even  more  routine  and  famine  very  common. 
Lessening  the  starvation,  and  social  stabilization,  were  the  most  urgent  objectives 
of  national  policy.  One  of  the  first  land  reforms  in  the  South  implemented  in  1947, 
under  American  auspices,  was  the  sale  of  half  a  million  acres  of  confiscated  Japanese 
land  to  more  than  730,000  tenant  farmers  (Park  K-H,  1966,  Pp.  95-6).  A  law 
imposing  a  33  per  cent  ceiling  of  the  harvests  on  rents  was  also  enacted  and  enforced, 
vastly  improving  tenancy  conditions  (G.  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  156)  The  South 
Korean  Government  was  formally  established  in  the  Republic  of  Korea  on  August  15, 
1948,  after  a  general  election  (hereafter  all  references  to  Korea  are  to  South  Korea). 
Dr  Rhee  was  elected  as  the  president  of  the  first  republic.  The  second  land  reform 
was  launched  by  the  enactment  of  the  Agricultural  Land  Reform  Act  in  June,  1949 
after  protracted  wrangling  in  the  Assembly.  The  Korean  government  took  over 
landlords'  properties  with  nominal  compensation  and  distributed  the  land  to  some 
920,000  farm  households.  Tenancy  was  virtually  eliminated.  A  limit  of  land  holding 
of  three  cheongbo  (roughly  three  hectares  of  paddy  land)  was  imposed.  The  two  land 
reforms  not  only  improved  the  economic  conditions  of  rural  households,  which 
accounted  for  about  62  per  cent  of  households  in  Korea,  they  reduced  rural  starvation 
and  increased  the  output  through  more  intensive  application  of  labour,  and  also 
contributed  to  the  egalitarian  growth  of  rural  incomes  and  stabilization  of  Korean 
society  (Choo  H-J,  1982,  p.  51).  However,  they  drastically  increased  the  number  of 
sub-marginal  farms. 
The  land  reforms  hold  significant  meaning  in  Korean  society.  They  represent  the 
collapse  of  traditional  social  order  based  on  land  and  the  start  of  a  new  social  order 
(Mason,  et  al.,  1980,  pp.  419-24,  Kim  C-Y,  1980,  p.  107).  A  large  supply  of  labour 
was  freed  from  the  land  which  could  easily  be  shifted  to  industry. 
The  Korean  War(1950-1953)  halted  the  wholesale  process  of  progress  and  forced  a 
return  to  economic,  social  and  political  chaos.  During  the  War,  damage  to  non- 
military  buildings  and  structures,  equipment,  and  other  movable  assets  was  estimated, 
at  between  U.  S.  $2  billion  (Cole  and  Lyman,  1971,  p.  22)  and  3.1  billion  (BOK, 
1955),  equivalent  to  about  two  years'  GNP  of  1952  and  1953.  The  war  destroyed 
almost  half  of  the  manufacturing  plants  that  existed  in  1949,20  per  cent  of  education 
facilities  and  about  18  per  cent  of  the  housing  stock.  In  addition  to  this,  agricultural 
output  dropped  27  per  cent  between  1949  and  1952,  and  GNP  16  per  cent.  Prices 
rapidly  rose  and  the  rate  of  inflation  more  than  doubled  between  June  and  September 
of  1950,  and  then  shot  up  to  2,128.5  per  cent  In  1951,5,243.6  in  1952  and  7,618.8 
in  1953  (Kuznets,  1977,  p.  38). 
21 The  war  had  a  profound  impact  on  Korean  society,  obliterating  social  distinctions 
and  disrupting  social  networks  (Lee  H-B,  1968,  p.  55).  During  the  war,  civilian 
casualties  approximated  one  million,  including  those  killed,  wounded,  and  missing, 
and  the  war  casualties  of  all  UN  Forces  reached  about  419,000,  of  which  South 
Korean  Troop  casualties  were  approximately  300,000  (BOK,  1955).  The  War  left  a 
large  number  of  widows  and  orphans,  who  make  up  a  part  of  the  poor  today. 
Housing  conditions  at  the  time  were  the  worst  in  Korean  history  (KNHC,  1979, 
p.  208  and  MOC,  1987,  p.  932).  Nevertheless,  attention  was  distracted  from  housing 
problems  by  the  even  more  urgent  problems  of  hunger  and  famine. 
For  the  coming  years,  most  national  resources  and  energy  were  concentrated  on  the 
reconstruction  of  industrial  plants  and  infrastructure  damaged  by  the  War.  Industrial 
policy  was  mainly  inward-looking.  At  that  time,  the  Korean  economy  could  be 
managed  only  with  a  massive  inflow  of  foreign  relief  and  aid.  But  inflation  began  to 
rise  and  in  1956  was  about  31  per  cent.  As  a  result,  the  government  gradually  shifted 
its  policy  emphasis  from  reconstruction  to  price  stabilization.  The  first  target  of  the 
program  was  to  reduce  public  spending.  Another  program  was  to  import  cheaper 
grain.  The  price  stabilization  programmes  were  helped  by  the  imported  cheap  grains 
and  two  consecutive  bumper  crops  in  1957  and  1958.  Both  made  possible  a  sharp 
decline  in  grain  prices  during  1957-1958. 
The  first  republic,  led  by  the  Rhee  dictatorship  with  the  Liberal  party,  was  toppled 
in  April  1960  by  a  student  revolt  (Cole  and  Lyman,  op.  cit.,  p.  32).  Although  the 
issue  of  economic  development  was  submerged  under  politics,  its  failure  underlay  the 
turmoil  that  brought  the  decade  to  a  close  (Amsden,  1989,  p.  42). 
After  the  launch  of  the  second  republic,  led  by  Jang,  Korea  was  in  no  more  than  a 
state  of  anarchy.  For  example,  in  1961,  there  were  some  2,000  student 
demonstrations,  an  average  of  more  than  five  a  day.  This  state  of  instability  needed, 
above  all,  a  strong  government.  This  was  further  taken  for  granted  in  Korea  with  a 
weak  private  sector,  stunted  local  and  provincial  government  and  internal  and 
external  conflict  between  the  Left  and  the  Right. 
After  the  launch  of  the  third  republic  through  a  military  coup  on  the  16th  of  May, 
1961,  the  Korean  government  became  strongly  committed  to  'a  political  strategy 
emphasizing  economic  performance'  (Cole  and  Lyman,  op.  cit.,  p.  86).  President 
Park  declared;  "One  cannot  deny  that  people  are  more  frightened  of  poverty  and 
hunger  than  totalitarianism"  (cited  in  Oh  K-C,  1990,  p.  28).  Park  summed  up  his 
political-economic  goals  in  the  Country,  the  Revolution  and  1  (1963,  p.  105);  to  7he 
purpose  of  this  revolution  is  to  reconstruct  the  nation  and  establish  a  self-sustaining 
economy,  and  its  essential  purpose  is  to  restore  to  all  the  people  the  political  and 
economic  systems  that  had  become  the  possession  of  a  few  privileged  classes".  Unless 
22 the  people  were  relieved  from  their  perennial  economic  plight,  he  believed  that 
xpulsion  of  "democracy  is  a  species  of  social  luxury,  at  best  a  precarious  venture,  "E 
want  and  extreme  poverty"  became  the  first  and  foremost  national  goal  (cited  in  Park 
Joong,  196  1,  p.  13). 
Poverty  was  still  not  confined  to  a  minority  in  Korea.  Nearly  all  Korea  was  in 
poverty.  Therefore,  the  expulsion  of  want  and  poverty  could  only  be  achieved 
through  national  growth,  rather  than  redistribution.  The  government  adopted  the 
principle  of  'growth-first-distribution-later'.  There  was  a  strong  belief  that 
accelerated  economic  growth  would  sooner  or  later  trickle  down  to  everyone  and 
every  place.  Economic  growth  was  the  most  significant  administrative  norm  and 
served  as  the  primary  criterion  for  allocating  government  resources  (Whang  I-J, 
1969).  National  planning  was  the  chosen  instrument  for  national  resource  allocation 
for  reasons  of  efficiency. 
On  Jauary  1,1962,  the  military  junta  announced  the  First  Five-year  Economic 
Development  Plan  (1961-66).  It  was  generally  believed  that  the  process  of  national 
development  was  a  well  defined  task  which  could  be  planned  and  managed  with 
central  directives.  A  hierarchical  executive  structure  was  the  instrument  for  the 
effective  implementation  of  the  plan.  The  Economic  Planning  Board  (EPB)  was 
established  on  July  22,1961.  The  EPB  was  soon  upgraded  to  a  full  ministry  to 
coordinate  all  economic  plans. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  talented  and  ambitious  technocrats  for  the  plan  (rather  for 
economic  development)  were  increasingly  recruited  by  a  highly  competitive 
examination,  called  "Godung  Gosi",  replacing  the  under-qualified  officials,  the  so- 
called  political  bureaucrats.  In  the  early  periods  of  the  Park  rule,  for  instance,  about 
36,000  employees,  equivalant  to  about  10  per  cent  of  the  bureaucracy,  were  thus 
replaced  (Cho  S-C,  1971,  p.  224).  Park's  appointees  to  the  economy-related  posts  in 
the  Third  Republic  were  professionals  who  climbed  up  the  ladder  in  their  fields  based 
on  the  criteria  of  a  meritocracy  (Oh  K-C,  1990,  p.  32).  To  improve  the  effectiveness 
of  the  plan,  centralisation  on  decision  making  occurred.  In  the  classless  society, 
however,  it  was  a  prelude  to  the  emergence  of  a  bureaucratic  authoritarianism. 
The  dominant  thinking  among  the  powerful  technocrats  in  the  public  bureaucracy 
was  that  national  poverty  could  be  solved  by  reducing  unemployment  and  forming 
self-sufficient  economic  structures  which  could  be  achieved  through  industrialisation, 
rather  than  rural  development.  Thus  industrialisation  was  first  directed  to  labour 
intensive  and  import  substitution  industry  on  the  basis  of  urban  areas.  However,  the 
import  substitution  industrial  isation  policy  did  not  achieve  the  economic  growth 
desired  by  the  government,  due  to  limited  domestic  markets,  a  deficit  of  domestic 
capital  and  the  increasing  balance  of  payments  crisis  (Kang  B-K,  1989,  p.  7). 
23 Accordingly,  after  1964,  industrial  isation  policy  was  switched  to  production  for 
exports.  Thereafter,  the  government  increasingly  made  exports  a  compulsion  rather 
than  a  choice  for  the  private  sector  (Suh  S-M,  1985,  pp.  5-6).  Exports  as  a  share  of 
GNP  rose  steadily  from  less  than  5  per  cent  of  GNP  in  the  1950s  to  approximately  35 
per  cent  in  the  1980s.  The  growth  of  exports  in  labour  intensive  manufacturing  could 
absorb  the  mass  of  underemployed  workers,  transforming  Korea's  domestic  political 
environment  (Amsden,  op.  cit.,  p,  72).  In  the  five  years  from  1965  to  1969, 
employment  in  the  manufacturing  sector  expanded  by  50  per  cent. 
The  technocrats  soon  realized  that  labour-  intensive  industrial  isation  was 
accelerating  the  dependence  of  the  Korean  economy  on  imports  of  intermediate 
materials  and  capital  goods  in  line  with  the  increase  in  the  export  of  products  of 
labour-intensive  light  industry.  According  to  their  assessments,  Korean 
industrial  isation  policy  shifted  towards  heavy  and  chemical  industry  in  the  Third 
Economic  Development  Five-year  Plan(1972-76).  In  1971  the  share  of  merchandise 
exports  was  only  about  14  per  cent  of  total  exports.  The  share  had  increased  to  38  per 
cent  by  1979,  and  by  1984  to  60  per  cent. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  achievement  of  high  economic  growth  gave  Korea  the  feeling 
of  "pride",  "self-confidence",  etc.  On  the  other  hand,  the  military  revolution  was 
partly  justified  by  visible  economic  growth.  For  example,  in  the  general  election 
immediately  after  the  coup,  Park  had  defeated  the  opposite  candidate  only  by  a  slim 
margin.  In  the  general  election  two  years  later,  he  won  a  landslide  victory.  Then 
economic  growth  itself  became  a  paramount  goal  that  could  not  be  compromised  by 
any  other  competing  objectives.  In  pursuit  of  economic  development,  all  other 
democratic  values,  processes  and  means  were  of  secondary  importance  for  the  Park 
Administration.  Most  of  the  national  resources  and  energy  were  concentrated  on 
maximizing  economic  growth.  All  measures  ranging  from  macro  policy  to  wage 
negotiation  were  used  for  visible  economic  growth.  Most  resources  were  invested  on 
the  basis  of  the  traditional  consumption-  investment  dichotomy  and  under  the  rule  of 
efficiency. 
President  Park's  authoritarian  leadership  was  ended  by  his  assassination  in  1979 
after  the  Pu-Ma  strike,  led  by  students  and  unemployed  inmigrants  to  the  cities,  just 
before  the  second  oil  crisis.  After  that,  the  fourth  republic  was  launched.  It  was  led 
by  the  former  prime  minister,  Choi,  who  had  a  non-military  background.  However, 
the  second  oil  price  shock  and  the  following  worldwide  recession  brought  the  growth 
of  the  Korean  economy  to  a  halt.  Korea  recorded  its  first  negative  economic  growth 
since  the  end  of  the  Korean  War  in  1980  and  faced  unprecedented  high  inflation 
rates,  high  unemployment  rates  and  a  crisis  in  the  balance  of  payments.  To  make 
matters  worse,  Korea  suffered  its  worst  harvest  failure,  especially  in  Honam  region. 
24 This  accompanied  with  the  recession  in  1980,  resulted  in  the  Kwangju  riot  - 
(Kwangju  is  the  biggest  and  central  city  in  Honam  region). 
The  army,  led  by  general  Chun  to  put  down  the  Kwangju  incident,  again  became 
involved  in  politics.  General  Chun  came  into  power  leading  a  new  political  party,  the 
Democratic  Justice  Party.  With  the  birth  of  the  new  republic  in  1981,  president  Chun 
outlined  four  major  political  doctrines;  expansion  of  democracy,  realisation  of  a  just 
society,  construction  of  a  welfare  state,  and  development  of  native  culture.  The  title 
of  the  "Economic  Development  Plan"  was  changed  into  the  "Economic  and  Social 
Development  Plan"  from  the  Fifth  Plan  (1982-86).  This  plan  was  aimed  at  achieving 
three  main  objectives;  growth,  equity  and  stability  of  society.  The  Fifth  Plan  clearly 
defined  its  objectives  as  follows  (Government  of  the  Republic  of  Korea,  1982,  p.  89); 
(1)  to  mitigate  'undesired  effects  that  have  resulted  from  a  part  of  the  past  growth 
process'  ;  and  (2)  "to  cope  efficiently  and  effectively  with  the  rising  demands  of  the 
people  for  social  welfare".  Priority  in  the  Fifth  Plan  was  more  or  less  given  to 
dispersing  the  fruits  of  growth  to  the  excluded  people  and  regions.  Indeed,  the 
government's  expenditure  on  social  development  such  as  eduction,  health,  social 
security,  housing  and  others,  steadily  increased.  The  share  of  the  central  government 
outlays  on  social  development,  for  example,  rose  from  22.2  per  cent  of  the  budget  in 
1975  to  27.7  per  cent  in  1985  (Ministry  of  Finance,  Government  Finance  Statistics  in 
Korea). 
However,  fundamental  changes  had  already  affected  the  economic  and  social 
structure.  As  Table  2-2  shows,  a  large  number  of  those  who  were  self-employed, 
including  farmers,  had  transferred  to  become  dependent  on  wages  and  salaries.  By 
the  early  1980s  salaried  or  waged  workers  constituted  the  largest  part  of  the 
population.  Under  these  circumstances,  further  economic  growth  itself  afforded  a  sort 
of  political  legitimation  since  stabilizing  the  position  of  salary  and  wage  workers  was 
the  best  way  to  reduce  political  insecurity. 
Table  2-2  Structural  Change  of  Labour. 
(percentages) 
Year  1963  1967  1971  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983 
Self-employed  63.5  60.9  58.0  57.0  50.0  50.4  50.0  48.4 
The  dependents  on  28.3  32.9  37.5  38.9  44.8  45.1  45.6  47.5 
wage  and  salary 
Unemployed  8.2  6.2  4.5  4.1  5.2  4.5  4.4  4.1 
Total  100  %  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Source:  reconstructed  from  Suh  Kyon-Mo,  Class  Structure  and  Class  Division  of  Modem  Korean 
Society,  Study  series  of  Korean  sociology,  Vol.  1,  Hanwool,  1988,  p.  67 
25 The  fifth  republic  government  (1981-87)  adopted  a  policy  for  economic  growth 
through  "the  second  economic  leaf"  by  encouraging  high-tech  industries,  such  as 
semi-conductors,  automobiles,  electronics  etc.  The  highest  priority  in  national 
policies  was  given  to  price  stabilization.  This  was  followed  by  policies  to  stabilize  the 
position  of  salary  and  wage  workers,  to  recapture  the  international  competitive  power 
of  Korean  goods,  to  increase  domestic  savings  and  then  to  overcome  the  crisis  of  the 
balance  of  payments. 
Tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  along  with  a  low-wage  policy  were  launched. 
The  salaries  of  civil  servants  were  frozen  -  (since  then  more  talented  young  people 
have  flowed  into  the  private  sector).  The  Chun  military  government  amended  the 
Labour  Act  in  December,  1980.  It  was  characterized  as  being  more  restrictive  on 
trade  union  organization,  in  institutionalizing  the  autonomous  collective  bargaining 
mechanism  and  in  providing  the  right  of  collective  action  (Park  F-K,  1993,  p.  45  and 
Park  J-W,  1991,  p.  78).  Instead,  there  were  a  rapid  increase  in  the  government's 
expenditure  in  social  welfare  and  various  social  welfare  programmes.  The  Chun 
government  also  launched  the  Five-million  Housing  Construction  Plan  (1981-91). 
One  notable  policy  saved  revenue  by  reducing  agricultural  price  supports  and  by 
increasing  imports  of  cheaper  grains  to  28  per  cent  of  total  consumption  by  1983. 
Political  priority  was  given  to  the  urban  salary  and  wage  workers  at  the  expense  of 
farmers.  It  may  be  noteworthy  that  between  1982  and  1985  there  was  a  mass  exodus 
from  rural  areas  (roughly  600,000),  even  larger  than  the  migration  associated  with 
the  1980  harvest  failure  (about  85,000).  It  was  at  this  time  that  massive  urban 
redevelopments  were  launched,  resulting  in  the  real  estate  boom  of  the  early  1980s. 
A  feature  of  changes  in  Korean  society  since  the  late  1970s  was  the  growth  of  the 
private  sector.  Big  businesses  became  a  powerful  lobbying  group  able  to  influence 
government  policy.  A  notable  feature  of  the  changed  circumstances  was  the  economic 
liberalization  policy.  A  central  aspect  of  the  liberalisation  policy  was  the  sale  of  the 
government's  shares  in  the  large  commercial  banks,  which  occurred  between  1981 
and  1983  (Cho  HJ  and  D.  C.  Cole,  1992,  p.  122).  Another  feature  was  the  emergence 
of  another  faceless,  but  powerful  bureaucracy  based  on  white-collar,  managerial  and 
middle-income  workers  in  the  private  sector.  They  began  to  run  those  big  businesses, 
and  lead  the  Korean  economy.  Since  then,  the  Korean  economy  was  led  by  these  two 
bureaucracies.  (This  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the  next  Chapter). 
Those  changes  in  Korea  can  be  understood  by  looking  at  high  economic  growth 
even  during  a  period  of  political  turmoil.  Between  1986  and  1988,  student 
demonstrations  reached  their  peak  and  spread  nationwide.  Oh  K-C  (1990,  p.  45) 
p  ictured  it  in  the  following  manner,  "  the  police  fired  volley  after  volley  of  tear  gas  at 
students  hurling  rocks  and  fire  bombs,  and  in  most  cities  the  biting  stench  of  the 
26 I pepper  gas'  hung  heavily  in  the  air".  On  June  29,1987  a  democratization 
declaration  was  announced  by  ruling  party  Presidential  candidate  Roh  Tae-Woo.  In 
March  1988,  former  General  Roh  was  elected  with  36.6  per  cent  of  the  votes  cast  and 
the  National  Assembly  elections  held  on  April  26,1988,  also  produced  a  first 
minority  ruling  party  (125  of  299  seats)  in  the  National  Assembly.  It  was  a  period  of 
political  turmoil.  Nevertheless,  economic  growth  recorded  over  12  per  cent  per  year 
during  this  period.  This  was  explained  by  factors  such  as  low  wages,  low  oil  prices, 
low  exchange  rates,  etc.  Although  this  discussion  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
research,  without  considering  the  strong  bureaucracies  based  on  white-collar  middle 
income  groups  which  actually  ran  the  businesses  and  led  the  Korean  economy,  the 
rapid  economic  growth  of  this  period  may  not  be  appropriately  explained. 
After  the  launch  of  the  sixth  republic  in  1988,  the  term  "welfare  state"  had  arrived 
in  public  policy.  The  role  of  taxation  and  public  expenditure  was  emphasized  as  a 
means  of  correcting  injustice  in  distribution  of  wealth  and  income.  The  "two  million 
housing  construction  plan"  was  announced  in  1988.  This  was  to  be  completed  within 
five  years.  However,  the  reality  of  the  welfare  state  was  no  more  than  the 
liberalisation  of  the  economy,  as  the  Sixth  Economic  and  Social  Development  Plan 
(1987-91)  stated,  "injustice  in  the  redistribution  of  thefruits  of  growth  has  been  due 
to  the  government  intervening  too  deeply  in  the  market  mechanism,  that  is 
"government  failure".  Vierefore,  restoring  thefree  market  mechanism  is  the  solution 
to  the  problems  in  redistribution". 
In  conclusion,  in  Korea,  economic  growth  has  been  the  dominant  political  ideology 
over  the  last  four  decades.  The  commitment  to  a  high  and  stable  level  of  employment 
was  essential  to  underpinning  political  stability.  Koreans  have  believed  that  economic 
growth  was  the  first  step  for  achievement  of  social  development.  This  is  being 
increasingly  challenged  not  by  theory,  but  by  the  reality,  and  will  be  explored  in  the 
following  chapters. 
2.3  Development  Strategies  and  National  Planning. 
2.3.1  Lhnitation  and  Furtherance. 
Conflict  in  a  society  may  be  caused  by  various  factors,  not  only  by  economic 
factors  but  also  social  factors,  such  as  race,  gender,  etc.  Fortunately,  in  Korea,  there 
is  one  single  race,  a  single  language,  common  cultural  assumptions,  and  there  is  no 
minority  group  of  significant  size.  The  differences  between  Koreans  are  not  defined 
27 so  much  by  ethnic,  language,  or  religious  differences  but  mostly  by  differences  such 
as  urban  or  rural,  regional,  industrial  or  agricultural,  modern  or  traditional,  rich  or 
poor,  and  educated  or  uneducated.  It  could  even  be  said  that  one  of  Korea's  greatest 
problems  has  been  that  of  excessive  social  and  cultural  homogeneity  and  integration 
(Lee  Y-H,  1975,  p.  13).  Korea  has  few  natural  lines  of  social  and  political  cleavage 
which  could  also  be  regarded  as  sinews  of  cohesion  at  the  intermediary  level.  Power 
in  Korea  has  thus  tended  to  be  excessively  centralized  in  the  president  and  the  capital 
city,  with  few  other  organisations  and  regional  centres  of  power  which  could 
counterbalance  the  central  power  (G.  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  64). 
As  mentioned  on  page  18,  Korea  is  not  a  well  endowed  country  in  terms  of  natural 
resources.  Moreover,  after  the  Korean  War,  as  Table  2-3  shows,  considerable 
proportions  of  available  resources  have  had  to  be  allocated  to  the  maintenance  of 
strong  military  forces  to  forestall  any  new  attack  ftom  the  North  (see  Cole  and 
Lyman,  op.  cit.,  p.  164).  Korea  faced  continuous  security  threats  from  North  Korea, 
bearing  in  mind  that  Seoul,  the  capital  of  S.  Korea,  is  only  40  miles  away  from  the 
de-militarized  zone.  A  strong  defence  policy  has  been  pursued  consistently  from  the 
Korean  War  to  the  present  and  has  been  an  objective  which  is  given  priority  over  all 
other  objectives.  This  national  security  consideration  has  been  a  serious  obstacle  in 
the  government's  responsiveness  to  societal  pressure. 
Table  2-3  Government  Final  Consumption  Expenditure  by  Function,  at  constant  prices  of 
1985. 
(Thousand  million  Korean  Won) 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1989  (%) 
I.  Defence  1,425  2,219  3,005  3,562  4,958(43.6) 
2.  Education  979  1,245  1,453  1,793  2,434(21.4) 
3.  General  public  services  503  701  1,071  1,203  1,596(14.0) 
4.  Public  order  and  safety  413  481  625  804  979(8.6) 
5.  Economic  services  120  177  223  271  425(3.7) 
6.  Social  security  and 
welfare.  69  78  122  182  385(3.4) 
7.  Health  44  74  128  92  173(  1.6) 
8.  Housing  and 
Community  amenities.  39  79  136  106  167(  1.5) 
9.  Recreation  and  culture.  22  39  54  55  159(  1.4) 
10.  Other  functions  28  38  60  68  90(0.8) 
Total  3,641  5,131  6,875  8,136  11,365  (100) 
Source:  U.  N.,  National  Accounts  Statistics,  1989. 
Where  are  the  sources  of  Korean  economic  growth?  It  has  to  be  understood  in  a 
much  broader  economic,  political  and  social  framework. 
28 2.3.2  Development  Strategies. 
The  basic  determinants  of  economic  growth  may  be  classified  under  five  main 
headings;  natural  resources;  labour  both  in  terms  of  quantity  and  quality;  capital; 
technological  progress;  and  the  social,  economic,  political  and  cultural  climate.  These 
determinants  are  closely  interrelated.  A  serious  deficit  of  one  of  the  determinants  may 
limit  economic  development  and  the  rate  of  development. 
Since  the  launch  of  the  third  republic  with  strong  government  thereafter,  it  has 
been  seriously  advocated  that  the  way  to  grow  is  to  organise  a  planned  and  controlled 
market  mechanism.  This  was  advocated  on  the  assumptions  that  since  there  were 
great  scarcities  of  national  resources,  it  would  be  possible  for  a  centrally  planned 
system  to  overview  the  national  economy  as  a  whole,  to  sustain  the  risk-taking 
activities  that  are  one  of  the  basic  components  of  the  growth  process  and  to  remove 
various  barriers  on  the  way  to  growth  in  efficiency  and  effectiveness. 
As  a  way  of  doing  this  task,  the  military  government  nationalized  the  commercial 
banks  five  months  after  the  coup.  The  government  also  amended  the  Foreign  Capital 
Inducement  Act  in  1962,  to  provide  stronger  government  guarantees  to  foreign 
lenders.  Together  with  nationalization  of  the  banks  and  control  over  credit 
guarantees,  the  government  effectively  controlled  overall  capital  flows  with  the 
exception  of  the  unofficial  "curb"  market,  often  referred  to  as  the  "underground 
financial  market"  or  "underground  market". 
This  contributed  more  or  less  to  prevent  the  concentration  of  wealth  in  the  hands  of 
a  few  people.  In  addition,  the  Korean  government  reorganized  and  centralized  both 
the  budget  and  planning  functions  of  the  Economic  Planning  Board  under  a  strong 
Deputy  Prime  Minister  in  1964.  Under  this  planning  structure,  housing  policies  and 
other  social  development  programmes  deliberately  functioned  for  economic  growth. 
Another  point  to  bear  in  mind  is  that  the  government  has  consistently  exercised  great 
control  over  the  economy,  both  in  the  direct  implementation  of  economic  decisions 
and  in  the  enforcement  of  compliance  by  the  private  sector.  For  example,  the 
government  supported  exporters  by  establishing  the  government-subsidized  Korean 
Trade  Promotion  Corporation  (KOTRA),  and  by  authorized  KOTRA  to  collect  one 
per  cent  of  the  value  of  imports  for  use  as  an  export  promotion  fund  (Suh  S-M,  1985, 
p.  5). 
This  "planned  capitalism"  since  1961  was  possible  because  the  Korean  government 
was  able  to  consolidate  its  power,  not  only  because  of  traditional  ethics  but  also 
because  of  the  weakness  of  social  class.  Workers  constituted  only  a  small  percentage 
of  the  population,  the  aristocracy  had  been  dissolved  by  land  reforms,  the  peasantry 
atomized  into  smallholders,  whilst  existing  industrial  capitalists  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  Korean  War  and  dismantled  by  the  strong  measures  to  confiscate  unjustifiably 
29 accumulated  wealth  in  1962,  and  following  the  currency  reform.  The  new  industrial 
capital  remained  beholden  to  the  state.  Furthermore,  partition  between  South  and 
North  and  the  following  "Cold  War"  contributed  to  consolidate  Koreans. 
Limited  national  resources  were,  however,  the  crucial  obstacle  to  the  economic 
growth  of  Korea.  Thus,  the  priority  among  various  issues  was  partly  compelled  by 
economic  and  political  constraints.  Even  with  identical  preferences,  various  choices 
were  affected  by  the  availability  of  finance  in  terms  of  absolute  amounts  and  in 
relative  terms.  The  key  question  was  not  whether  the  return  to  investment  in  certain 
sectors  was  high,  but  whether  they  were  higher  than  returns  to  alternative  uses  of  the 
resources. 
The  government  tried  to  tackle  the  problem  of  limited  national  resources  by 
changing  the  trading  pattern  from  import  substitution  towards  a  trading  pattern  of 
exporting  products  processed,  using  imported  materials.  Most  of  the  raw  materials 
and  the  manufactured  goods  were  intermediate  products  that  had  to  be  imported,  to 
be  processed  and  then  exported.  By  carrying  out  an  export-oriented  economic  policy, 
Korea  could  solve  the  problem  of  limited  national  resources  and,  at  the  same  time, 
access  international  capital  markets.  "The  government  implemented  numerous  export 
promotion  measures  including  preferential  loans  for  operation  and  facility  expansion, 
tax  and  tariff  exemptions,  wastage  allowances,  and  other  social  overhead  and 
administrative  supports"  (Kim  Y-B,  1980,  p.  232).  If  overseas  sales  were  not 
profitable,  then  the  government  compensated  the  losers  by  inflating  the  returns  on 
domestic  sales  (Amsden,  op.  cit.,  p.  70)  and  by  giving  industrial  licences  which 
permitted  the  losers  to  take  part  in  more  lucrative  industries.  In  addition  to  this,  the 
Korean  government  adopted  an  expenditure-switching  policy;  the  expenditures  of 
domestic  households  were  to  be  switched  from  foreign  to  domestic  goods  to  reduce 
imports.  This  was  accomplished  by  changing  the  prices  of  foreign  goods  relative  to 
domestic  goods.  That  was  often  done  by  taxing  imports  and  subsidizing  exports  or  by 
devaluing  the  exchange  rate. 
The  Korean  government  tried  to  engineer  a  massive  and  fairly  abrupt  shift  of 
resources  from  consumption  to  investment  for  production.  The  rate  of  new 
investment  was  one  of  the  determinants  of  the  rate  of  economic  growth.  Production 
capacity  could  be  increased  by  the  stock  of  capital.  Capital  could  be  accumulated 
from  two  sources.  Firstly,  it  may  be  accumulated  from  savings  from  households. 
Domestic  saving  was  crucially  emphasized,  as  Lipsey  (1971,  p.  663)  pointed  out,  "In 
the  long  run,  investment  by  firms  is  at  least  partly  limited  by  the  amount  of  saving 
done  by  households  andfirms".  The  conflict  between  high  interest  which  encourages 
savings  and  low  interest  which  increases  investment  has  been  mediated  by  subsidies 
such  as  long-term  credits,  multiple  interest  rates,  etc.  However,  mere  capital 
30 accumulation  would  not  necessarily  lead  to  rapid  economic  growth.  A  shift  of 
resources  from  consumption  to  investment  and  a  prevention  of  the  shift  of  resources 
from  investment  to  consumption  was  another  determinant  of  the  rate  of  growth. 
Domestic  savings  could  be  raised  in  line  with  increasing  households'  incomes.  But 
the  increase  of  households'  incomes  was  not  sufficient  to  achieve  this.  High  levels  of 
domestic  savings  could  be  achieved  largely  by  government  intervention  to  force 
people  to  save  at  a  much  higher  rate  than  they  otherwise  would.  Inflation  policy  was 
often  used  as  a  means  of  forced  saving,  especially  between  1962  and  1965.  Tax 
policy  was  also  used  as  a  means  of  encouraging  savings.  Tax  tools  were  employed  in 
encouraging  private  initiative  in  industrial  isation.  In  particular,  interest  income  was 
almost  untaxed;  an  Act  guaranteeing  the  anonymity  of  bank  accounts  was  enacted  in 
the  early  1960s  (Kwack  T-W,  1993,  p.  395).  Underground  financial  markets  had  a 
root  in  this. 
The  Korean  government  tried  to  increase  savings  by  reducing  consumption.  High 
levels  of  tariff  and  prohibition  of  imports  of  certain  goods  and  services  were 
executed,  not  only  for  protection  of  domestic  industry  but  also  to  reduce 
consumption.  Additionally,  high  levels  of  tax  were  levied  on  luxury  goods  to  reduce 
consumption  and  to  reduce  felt  disparities  between  the  rich  and  others.  The  housing 
sector,  which  was  the  main  component  of  consumption,  was  insulated  from  the  rest 
of  economy.  Thus,  the  development  of  mortgage  markets  was  originally  excluded 
from  government  policy.  Most  households  had  to  purchase  houses  outright  through 
inheritances  or  through  their  own  savings,  which  increased  domestic  savings  (this  will 
be  explored  in  Chapters  5,6  and  7).  Furthermore,  firms  were  permitted  not  to 
distribute  all  their  profits  to  households,  in  terms  of  lagged  wage  increases  to 
increases  in  the  labour  productivity,  in  order  that  they  could  be  used  for  re- 
investment.  This  was  justified  on  the  basis  of  the  assumption  that  if  firms  could  use 
their  savings  in  re-investment,  this  would  bring  into  use  unemployed  labour.  This,  in 
turn,  could  increase  household  income  in  the  near  future. 
Another  way  of  accumulating  the  capital  needed  for  growth  was  to  borrow  it  from 
abroad.  The  Foreign  Capital  Inducement  Act  enacted  in  the  early  1960s  provided 
generous  tax  privileges  for  foreign  investment  in  Korea  and  borrowing  from 
overseas.  In  the  course  of  economic  growth,  imported  capital  played  an  enormous 
role  in  Korea.  For  example,  when  the  first  oil  crisis  hit  the  world  economy  in  1973, 
the  domestic  savings  share  of  GNP  declined  from  19.8  per  cent  to  15.5  per  cent  in 
1975.  Total  foreign  debt  as  a  per  cent  of  GNP  rose  from  32  per  cent  in  1974  to  40 
per  cent  in  1975  and  total  investment  rose  from  25.6  per  cent  of  GNP  in  1973  to  30 
per  cent  in  1975.  By  1976  GNP  grew  by  14.4  per  cent.  However,  direct  investment 
by  foreigners  was  restricted  except  in  rare  cases  to  prevent  the  domination  of  foreign 
31 investors  over  domestic  firms.  This,  as  a  result,  protected  domestic  firms  from  the 
movements  of  capital  in  the  fluctuating  world  economy,  most  of  which  were  beyond 
the  control  of  policies  and  efforts  of  the  Korean  government.  Also,  direct  investment 
by  foreign  investors  in  the  conumption  sector  such  as  the  housing  and  service  sectors 
was  restricted  to  prevent  high  inflation.  The  conflict  between  undervalued  exchange 
rates  to  boost  exports  and  over-valued  exchange  rates  to  minimize  the  cost  of  foreign 
debt  repayment  and  of  imports  has  also  been  mediated  by  multiple  prices  and  multiple 
exchange  rates. 
The  accumulated  domestic  savings  and  borrowings  from  overseas  have  been 
channelled  into  industry  in  a  number  of  ways.  Financial  institutions  were  used  as  a 
means  to  control  the  flow  of  funds  towards  investment  for  production  according  to 
the  government's  plan.  As  the  World  Bank  (1979,  p.  63)  pointed  out,  "In  the  Republic 
of  Korea,  the  major  government-supported  development  banks  have  became  pivotal 
institutions  in  industrial  development  ".  For  example,  rural  savings  have  been 
successfully  transferred  into  industry  through  the  National  Agricultural  Cooperative 
Federation.  In  addition  to  this,  the  Korean  government  has  tried  to  maximise 
efficiency  and  effectiveness  in  the  overall  level  of  investment  by  using  'policy 
finance'  such  as  loans  with  low  interest,  making  borrowing  easy  and  giving  various 
benefits,  such  as  tax  exemption  and  subsidies.  Thus,  the  basic  condition  for  domestic 
savings  making  investment  and  growth  possible  was  the  widespread  control  by  the 
government  over  the  economy  and  society  of  Korea.  In  terms  of  investment  patterns, 
the  allocation  of  national  resources  was  concentrating  on  growing  sectors  or  areas  for 
reasons  of  efficiency. 
As  Deane(1979,  p.  142)  emphasized,  "An  inescapable  condition  of  successful 
economic  development  is  the  existence  of  an  expanding,  mobile  and  adaptable  labour 
supply".  In  the  respect  of  labour,  in  terms  of  quantity  and  quality,  Korea  had 
sufficient  for  the  requirements  for  economic  growth.  The  quantity  of  labour  was 
plentiful  at  the  start  of  the  first  development  plan,  as  the  level  of  unemployment  was 
over  17  per  cent  in  urban  areas  (Population  and  Housing  Census,  1960).  Moreover 
there  was  an  absence  of  a  strong  trade  union  movement,  a  lack  of  opportunity  for 
mass  international  migration,  and  changed  social  attitudes  towards  women,  mainly 
due  to  the  Korean  War,  had  made  it  increasingly  easier  for  women  to  enter  the  labour 
force.  All  of  these  factors  contributed  to  supply  a  labour  force  needed  for 
industrialization  and  contributed  to  keep  down  wages,  encouraging  investment  in  the 
early  stage  of  economic  development. 
However,  it  was  perceived  that  the  size  of  the  population  affected  the  level  of 
output  per  capita.  If  population  expands  rapidly,  a  country  may  make  great  efforts  to 
raise  the  quantity  of  capital  to  feed  a  corresponding  rise  in  population.  Over- 
32 population  is  an  obstacle  to  rapid  economic  growth  as  well  as  social  development 
(Whang  I-J,  1986,  p.  7).  This  was  fully  anticipated  because,  between  1955  and  1960, 
natural  increases  in  population  recorded  the  highest  level  of  2.98  per  cent  per  year 
due  to  the  baby  boom  following  the  Korean  War  (Lee  G-S,  1986,  p.  146).  A  rigorous 
family  planning  program  was  launched  in  1962. 
The  labour  force  needed  to  sustain  the  industrialisation  process  was  growing  at  a 
faster  rate  than  ever  before,  not  only  because  of  natural  increases  but  also  because  of 
rapid  urbanization  (this  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter),  and  participation  of 
women  in  the  labour  force.  The  abundant  supply  of  labour  at  a  relatively  low  price 
was  immensely  encouraging  to  investors.  However,  for  the  coming  years  from  the 
mid-  1970s,  the  labour  market  temporarily  turned  to  shortage  because  of  the  Middle 
East  construction  boom  which  drew  about  25  per  cent  of  its  production  workers  from 
Korea.  In  Korea  itself,  the  cost  of  labour  began  to  rapidly  increase.  However,  the 
rapid  rise  in  real  wages  has  driven  firms  to  invest  in  greater  technological  capability 
for  the  future.  Thus,  the  wage  increases  rather  contributed  to  sustaining  economic 
development.  Just  after  the  end  of  the  Middle  East  boom  in  1979,  the  scarcity  of 
labour  was  soon  remedied  by  the  returned  labour.  Since  the  early  1980s,  as  Figure  2- 
1  shows,  the  baby  boom  generation  has  begun  to  enter  the  labour  market.  So  the 
combination  of  low  wage  levels  in  the  early  stages,  fast  wage  increases  since  the  mid 
1970s  and  an  acceptable  supply  of  labour  in  1980s  has  contributed  to  the  dynamism 
of  Korean  growth  (Amsden,  op.  cit.,  p.  189).  Moreover,  in  a  small  country  in  which 
there  are  no  social  differences,  such  as  religion,  race  etc,  the  mobility  of  labour  has 
been  easy  and,  in  fact,  rapid. 
Fig  2-1  Population  Structure,  1960,1970,1980  and  1990. 
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33 In  addition  to  this,  Korean  labour  has  been  of  relatively  high  quality.  Since  the  end 
of  the  Korean  War,  the  government  used  a  large  part  of  overseas  aid  to  rapidly 
expand  education,  "which  by  1960  led  to  unversial  primary  education  and  contributed 
to  increasingly  higher  enrolment  rates  at  all  levels  above  the  primary  level" 
(Westphal,  Rhee  Y-W  and  Pursell,  1981,  p.  10  and  see  in  detail;  Krueger,  1979  and 
Mason,  et  al.,  1980,  chapter  10).  Aid  also  financed  overseas  education  and  training 
for  thousands  of  Koreans.  Education  has  played  a  most  important  role  in  the 
development  process,  helping  to  change  social  barriers  and  overcoming  bottle-necks 
on  the  way  to  economic  growth.  Family  planning,  public  health  care,  the 
participation  of  women  in  the  labour  force,  etc  were  made  possible  by  the  well 
organized  education  system. 
By  1944  approximately  50  per  cent  of  Korean  children  were  receiving  primary 
education,  and  every  town  had  at  least  one  primary  school.  According  to  the  census, 
Korea  had  a  national  literacy  rate  of  22  per  cent  in  1944.  In  1963,  it  had  risen  to  over 
80  per  cent  (G.  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  89  and  Cole  and  Lyman,  op.  cit.,  p.  66).  The 
dramatic  expansion  of  education  was  reinforced  by  a  long-standing  tradition.  Korean 
parents  have  viewed  education  as  a  necessary,  if  not  a  sufficient,  condition  for  the 
social  and,  to  a  much  lesser  extent,  economic  advancement  of  children  and  the  family 
as  a  whole.  G.  Henderson  (op.  cit.,  p.  221)  aptly  depicted  such  circumstances  in  1968, 
which  still  holds  to  a  large  extent  today; 
"Many  a  family  borrows  beyond  conceivable  capacity  to  repay,  mortgaging  all 
property,  skimping  on  food  and  clothing,  making  desperate  sacrifices.  The  child  is 
driven  to  almost  constant  study  and  every  crucial  entrance  examination  becomes  a 
shattering  emotional  crisis.  Failure  to  obtain  admission  to  the  proper  institution 
occasionally  leads  to  the  breakdown  of  child  or  mother  or  even  suicide  ". 
Moreover,  the  development  of  the  meritocracy,  in  terms  of  recruitment,  promotion 
and  reward  on  the  basis  of  achievement,  reinforced  such  strong  desires. 
The  combination  of  the  government's  effort  and  a  strong  desire  of  the  Korean 
people  have  contributed  to  improve  the  quality  of  labour,  which,  in  turn,  has 
increased  Korea's  ability  to  adapt  to  new  technology.  Moreover,  although  defence 
costs  have  been  one  of  main  constraints  on  economic  and  social  development,  the 
military  was  also  a  great  user  of  the  products  of  industrialization,  particularly  in  the 
early  stages.  The  increased  complexity  of  modern  military  technology,  weapon 
systems  and  organisations  generated  a  growing  requirement  for  training  among 
Koreans  in  a  wide  variety  of  skilled  occupations  which  would  not  have  been 
otherwise  possible  for  a  people  who  had  just  been  freed  from  colonial  domination 
(Lee  C-S,  1981,  p.  90).  The  technology,  organisations  etc  were  easily  transferred  to 
the  private  sector  via  the  military  governments.  Furthermore,  the  draftees  in  the  army 
34 had  a  chance  to  interact  by  learning  about  "perceptions  of  other  people,  other  places, 
and  other  ideas  and  techniques"  (Lee  H-B,  1968,  pp.  59-60).  The  military  was  one  of 
the  major  sources  supplying  the  technical  manpower  needed  for  industrial  and 
economic  development  in  Korea. 
In  addition  to  this,  to  promote  higher  value-added  products  embodying  a  greater 
level  of  skill  and  technology,  the  government  directly  established  the  Korean  Institute 
for  Science  and  Technology  in  February,  1966  and  other  public  research  institutes. 
Moreover,  the  government  aptly  organized  the  private  and  public  research  institutes 
by  using  subsidized  credit  and  executive  power.  For  example,  to  enter  the  world 
semiconductors  market  some  182  research  projects  of  131  industrial  firms  were 
selected  as  national  R&D  projects  to  which  the  government  contributed  about  $28 
million.  In  addition,  seven  special  projects  in  semi-conductors  and  bioengineering 
were  funded  with  an  additional  $40  million  (Amsden,  op.  cit.,  p.  83). 
Finally,  the  Korean  government  made  great  efforts  to  create  a  climate  in  which 
economic  growth  could  run  a  steady  path.  The  Korean  government  adopted  the 
incentive  system  (see  Brown,  1973  and  Jones  and  Sakong,  1981)  :  punishment  for 
failure  is  focused  on  a  few  individuals  while  reward  for  success  is  diffused 
throughout  the  system.  Industrial  licensing,  government  credit  allocation,  price 
supports  and  price  fixing,  etc.,  all  these  were  aptly  used  for  economic  growth.  This 
incentive  system  was  not  confined  to  trade  and  industry.  The  Korean  government 
used  social  policy  as  a  means  to  provide  a  disciplined  hard  working  labour  force  by 
placing  them  in  fear  of  losing  their  jobs  and  falling  into  poverty.  Pensions,  medical 
insurance  schemes  were  based  on  occupations,  whereas  unemployment  benefits  were 
not  designed.  The  support  for  the  poor  was  limited  at  the  lowest  level  of  survival 
(this  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  4). 
Table  2-4  Hours  of  Work  in  Manufacturing,  1976-1985. 
Country  Average  Workweek  (hrs) 
Korea  53.3 
Malaysia  48.4 
Hong  Kong  47.1 
South  Africa  47.0 
Mexico  46.0 
Japan  46.0 
Gennany  41.2 
United  States  40.1 
Sweden  37.8 
Source:  International  Labour  Office(1986),  requoted  and  reconstructed  in  A.  H.  Amsden(1989),  p.  205, 
Table  8.6. 
35 The  development  of  the  meritocratic  system  in  the  public  sector  as  well  as  in  the 
private  sector  was  able  to  offset  the  criticism  about  the  lack  of  social  security 
systems,  planting  a  widespread  prejudice  that  low-income  people  have  only 
themselves  to  blame.  The  combination  of  the  meritocratic  system  and  the  lack  of  a 
social  security  system  partly  helped  to  increase  the  input  of  labour  into  the  productive 
process  and  to  increase  hours  worked  per  worker  and  per  day,  as  Table  2-4  showed. 
2.3.3  National  Planning. 
In  Korea,  given  the  circumstances  of  scarce  natural  resources,  widespread  poverty, 
mass  unemployment  and  of  limited  government  budget,  the  Economic  Development 
Plans  were  planned  on  the  basis  of  the  following  assumptions.  First,  employment 
would  be  created  whenever  the  factors  of  production  were  mobilised.  Secondly,  high 
employment  rates  through  education  and  job  training  would  resolve  the  source  of 
poverty  rooted  in  unemployment.  Thirdly,  inequality  of  income  would  be  reduced  in 
the  later  stages  of  development  because  economic  growth  would  be  accompanied  by 
changes  in  the  industrial  structure  as  it  became  more  developed  and  modernized.  This 
would  promote  an  eventual  increase  in  the  demand  for  labour  by  offering  workers  a 
higher  wage,  and  would  then  increase  lower  incomes  more  rapidly  than  others. 
Fourthly,  economic  growth  would  increase  the  ability  of  the  government  to  supply 
more  public  facilities  and  services.  All  of  these  results  together  would  raise  the  living 
standard  of  the  people  in  Korea. 
Since  the  nationalisation  of  commercial  banks  and  the  launch  of  the  First  Economic 
Development  Plan  (1962-66),  as  noted  earlier,  the  government  led  the  pace  of 
industrialization.  The  Korean  government  set  the  private  sector  according  to  the 
development  plan  partly  by  using  industrial  licensing,  state  credit  allocation,  price 
control,  executive  power  such  as  tax  investigation,  etc.,  but  largely  by  relying  on  the 
superior  capacity  of  public  bureaucrats,  in  terms  of  knowledge  and  organisation. 
Under  the  centralised  bureaucratic  system,  the  major  objectives  and  targets  of 
development  projects  at  each  sector  and  level  are  organized  through  a  "top-down" 
approach,  from  the  national-level  target  to  sectoral  and  regional  level  targets.  The 
central  planning  agency  draws  up  the  objectives  of,  and  constraints  on,  national 
development  planning  as  basic  guide  lines.  Implementing  ministries  and  agencies  then 
draft  and  submit  project  proposals  in  line  with  these  guide-lines.  Through  repetitive 
interaction  between  these  two  processes,  a  mutually  acceptable  agreement  was 
reached,  particularly  at  the  national  level,  for  the  final  commitment  in  terms  of 
resource  allocation. 
36 The  Korean  government  linked  planning  with  budgeting  under  the  Minister  of 
Economic  Planning  to  prevent  encountering  difficulties  and  inefficiencies  in  obtaining 
budgetary  support,,  as  budgeting  is  primarily  a  political  process.  Accordingly, 
although  the  Ministry  of  Construction  (MOC)  has  been  in  charge  of  the  overall 
housing  policy,  the  housing  policy  and  construction  programme  of  the  MOC  must  be 
coordinated  with  the  national  economic  plan  and  resource  allocation  plan  of  the  EPB. 
Consequently,  sector  plannings  such  as  housing,  education,  health,  etc  become 
incremental  rather  than  a  rational  calculation  from  the  systematic  and  overall 
perspective  (Lindblom,  1959). 
In  the  MOC,  the  main  policy-making  body  for  national  housing  development  is  the 
Housing  Bureau.  The  function  of  this  bureau  is  to  study  and  collect  basic  data  on 
housing  to  formulate  and  implement  long-range  housing  policy  and  to  co-ordinate 
public  and  private  efforts  in  order  to  ensure  the  efficient  allocation  of  housing  funds 
and  resources  (Ha  S-K,  1987,  p.  89).  However,  the  Housing  Bureau  is  one  of  several 
bureaus  in  the  MOC  such  as  the  National  Physical  Environment  Planning  Bureau,  the 
Land  Bureau,  the  Urban  Affairs  Bureau,  the  Water  Resources  Bureau,  the  Road 
Bureau,  the  Construction  Industry  Bureau  and  the  Overseas  Construction  Bureau. 
Accordingly,  the  housing  development  of  the  Housing  Bureau  must  be  coordinated 
with  the  resource  allocation  plan  of  the  MOC.  Thus,  housing  has  been  treated  as  a 
part  of  national  physical  environmental  development  and  the  development  of  housing 
has  been  closely  related  to  economic  development,  rather  than  social  development. 
While  the  planning  of  tasks  takes  place  primarily  at  the  central  level,  local 
authorities  are  the  principle  institutions  for  implementing  policies.  They  are  appointed 
by  the  central  government  and  are  statutory  bodies  legally  dependent  on  central 
government.  This  hierarchy  has  been  reinforced  by  the  budgetary  process.  At  the 
local  level,  the  planning  process  coincides  with  the  budgetary  process  because  the 
project  proposals  are  relatively  simple  and  routine  in  terms  of  implications  on 
resource  allocation.  Budgeting  in  practice  at  the  local  level  has  tended  to  be  simply  a 
listing  of  projects  and  consolidations  of  funds  for  accounting  purposes  (Whang  I-J, 
1986,  p.  23).  So  local  governments  have  played  the  role  of  mere  agents  of  the  central 
government,  with  limited  authority. 
The  state  initiative  had  the  benefit  of  an  overview  of  the  economy  that  the 
individual  entrepreneur  lacks  (see  Nath,  1962).  But  under  this  centralized  planning 
system,  planners  fall  short  of  an  acute  awareness  of  the  need  to  distinguish  between 
national  prosperity  and  prosperity  in  different  regions  and  the  people's  prosperity  in 
different  social  groups.  The  monitoring  and  evaluating  systems  are  not 
institutional  ised  in  the  local  administrations,  particularly  for  social  policy  where  it  is 
costly  and  time-consuming  to  evaluate  effects.  Some  attempts  have  been  made  to 
37 monitor  and  evaluate  project  performance  in  quarterly  or  annual  reports  through 
administrative  channels  for  some  projects.  These  usually  include  indicators  on 
average  of  national  levels  on  the  basis  of  quantitative  terms  and  often  hide  the  real 
problems.  The  measures  of  judgement  have  tended  to  be  based  on  quantitative  outputs 
and  on  efficient  results.  This  has  occurred  in  housing  as  well  and  will  be  discussed  in 
Chapter  5. 
Under  the  centralized  planning  system,  the  general  development  process  takes  the 
following  steps.  First,  the  government  defines  what,  when  and  how  much  to  produce. 
In  this  decision,  the  government  has  two  different  directions  associated  with  the  size 
of  firms,  especially  when  planning  involves  a  new  product  or  process.  In  the  case  of 
production  mainly  for  domestic  consumption,  the  function  of  planning  mainly  rests 
on  market  rationale.  But  in  such  cases,  the  firms  must  also  have  responded  to  the 
overall  planning  directions,  including  the  use  of  capital,  labour,  etc.  In  the  case  of 
production  for  exports,  the  directions  of  their  activities  are  primarily  decided  by  the 
government.  The  firm's  policy  must  be  combined  or  coordinated  with  the 
government's  planning  in  the  following  areas  (Jones  and  Sakong,  1980,  p.  8  1); 
I.  Perception  of  a  new  economic  opportunity,  including  new  products, 
new  processes  of  production  and  new  markets. 
2.  Evaluation  of  the  profitability  of  a  new  opportunity. 
3.  Gaining  command  of  financial  resources. 
4.  Plant  design,  technology,  and  construction  supervision. 
5.  Recruiting  and  training  of  new  personnel. 
6.  Relationship  with  government. 
7.  Relationship  with  suppliers  and  purchasers. 
According  to  such  a  general  framework,  the  government  chooses  its  industrial 
strategy. 
Secondly,  the  government  develops  industrial  estates,  or  sometimes  plans  a  new 
industrial  city,  or  changes  land  use  for  the  production  of  a  chosen  industry  or  items, 
often  by  using  compulsory  powers.  To  optimize  land  distribution  among  competitive 
uses,  all  developmental  activities  related  to  land-use  planning  and  land  allocation  are 
administrated  and  coordinated  by  the  centralized  government.  The  ability  to  sustain 
or  expand  economic  growth  has  been  determined  not  only  by  the  accumulation  of 
capital  but  also  by  many  supporting  services,  particularly  transportation  and 
communication  infrastructure.  These  have  been  particularly  important  in  export- 
oriented  industry.  In  Korea,  infrastructure  for  production  such  as  the  development  of 
industrial  parks,  transport  links,  power  supply,  etc  were  given  high  priority  in 
national  planning.  However,  the  government's  direct  investment  in  infrastructure  and 
in  the  physical  environment  has  been  focused  on  what  it  regards  as  productive 
activities  and  based  on  long-term  investment  not  on  short-term  consumption.  Most  of 
38 the  development  of  the  built  environment  has  been  left  to  individual  households  and 
financed  by  utilizing  personal  savings  (this  will  be  discussed  in  Chapters  5  and  6). 
In  addition  to  this,  the  government's  investment  in  the  built  environment  was  often 
used  as  a  means  of  coping  with  the  economic  cycle.  An  example  was  the  Vamsil" 
large  scale  Apartment  construction  project  in  1975.  When  the  first  oil  crisis  hit  the 
Korean  economy  in  the  1973-74  period  and  the  mass  of  unemployed  people  had  no 
other  opportunities,  the  government  started  large  scale  apartment  construction 
projects  earlier  than  planned  in  February  1975.  About  2.8  million  people  were 
employed  per  year  on  the  project.  This  played  the  role  of  a  stepping  stone  for 
economic  growth  during  the  period  of  the  oil  crisis  (KNHC,  1979,  p.  277). 
Thirdly,  as  mentioned  earlier,  to  promote  technology  and  to  accelerate  technical 
progress,  the  government  established  a  number  of  research  institutes  and  organized 
existing  private  and  public  research  institutes,  for  planned  product  development. 
Fourthly,  the  government  protected  the  domestic  market  against  foreign 
competition  by  such  measures  as  the  use  of  tariff  barriers  for  approved  projects  until 
such  time  as  the  new  industries  or  products  were  internationally  competitive.  It 
restricted  direct  foreign  investment  in  favour  of  joint  ventures. 
Finally,  as  we  have  seen  earlier,  the  development  of  capital  markets  and  access  to 
foreign  sources  of  credit  were  rigidly  controlled  by  the  government.  Loans  and 
foreign  credits  were  delivered  at  very  low  interest  rates  for  government  approved 
projects  and  enterprises.  Table  2-5  demonstrates  the  government's  policy  shift  from 
light  industry  towards  heavy  industry  from  1976,  in  terms  of  investment. 
Table  2-5  Investment  by  Heavy  and  Light  Industries,  1976-79,  as  a  share  of  total  investment 
(percentages) 
1976  1977  1978  1979 
Light  industries  25.8  24.6  17.5  18.1 
Heavy  industries  74.2  75.4  82.5  81.9 
source:  KDI,  1981. 
One  dilemma  for  economic  growth  planning  was  that  as  projects  became  more 
capital  intensive,  more  public  funds  and  comprehensive  incentive  packages  were 
required  to  attract  private  firms  to  take  risks.  Thus,  the  government  investment  in 
social  development  has  not  increased  in  line  with  economic  growth.  As  I  shall  show 
in  Chapter  5,  after  1976,  the  shift  of  the  government's  industrial  policy  towards 
heavy  and  chemical  industries  required  more  resources,  and  acted  to  emphasise  self- 
help  housing  renovation. 
Private  firms  in  Korea  contributed  very  little  of  their  own  capital  to  investment 
projects.  By  law,  30  per  cent  of  a  plant's  total  costs  has  to  be  self-financed.  In 
39 practice,  however,  internal  financing  in  1963-1973  accounted  on  average  for  only  20 
per  cent  of  the  total  finance  (Lim  Y.,  1981).  In  1983,  the  manufacturing  sector  in 
Korea  is  said  to  have  financed  only  9.9  per  cent  of  its  business  through  retained 
earnings  and  capital  increases  (Amsden,  op.  cit.,  p.  85).  The  remainder  of  the  capital 
was  highly  subsidized.  As  a  consequence,  until  recently  nearly  all  big  businesses  in 
Korea  were  technically  bankrupt.  Through  the  control  of  the  banks  and  credit, 
however,  the  government  was  able  to  seize  indirectly  a  substantial  share  of  the  value 
produced  and  allocated  for  investment  or  savings,  following  carefully  defined 
economic  and  political  objectives. 
In  this  process,  big  business  conglomerates,  known  as  "Chaebol",  played  central 
roles  for  Korean  economic  growth.  They  have  acted  as  agents  of  industrialization, 
and  have  spearheaded  the  advance  in  terms  of  technology,  management  skills,  etc.  In 
exchange  for  entering  especially  risky  industries,  the  government  rewarded  entrants, 
not  only  with  various  incentives,  but  also  with  other  industrial  licenses  in  more 
lucrative  sectors  such  as  the  service  sector  and  even  golf  courses.  Thus  big  business 
gradually  diversified  over  time. 
Big  business  was  consistently  pressured  by  the  government  to  share  its  benefits 
with  its  employees,  the  main  strategy  of  redistribution  of  the  Korean  government. 
The  pressure  was  very  effective  in  so  far  as  the  government's  subsidy  was  essential. 
As  the  economy  grew,  private  business  groups  also  grew,  prompting  popular 
demands  for  reforming  the  government  dominent  industrial  nature.  As  outlined 
earlier,  the  response  of  the  government  was  "liberalization"  in  the  early  1980s. 
However,  as  Cho  and  Cole  (1986,  p.  145)  pointed  out,  "It  is  widely  believed  that  the 
large  conglomerate  groups....  succeeded  in  gaining  control  of  individual  banks".  Big 
business  grew  even  larger  and  concentration  increased  further  as  a  result  of  the 
liberalization  measures. 
2.4  National  Growth:  output  and  outcomes. 
The  economic  growth  of  Korea  has  continued  to  expand.  Between  1953  and  1962, 
the  growth  rate  recorded  an  average  of  4.1  per  cent  per  year.  Since  the  launch  of  the 
First  Economic  Development  Plan  in  1962,  as  Table  2-6  shows,  Korea  began  to 
record  dramatic  growth.  Thanks  to  this  rapid  economic  growth,  the  amount  of  GNP 
and  GNP  per  capita  have  rapidly  increased.  In  1960,  Korea's  GNP  and  per  capita 
GNP  were  merely  U.  S.  $2,315  million  and  U.  S.  $79.  They  increased  to  U.  S.  $19,926 
million  and  U.  S.  $565  respectively  in  1975,  and  by  1990  jumped  to  U.  S.  $242.2 
40 billion  and  U.  S.  $5,659.  This  high  rate  of  economic  growth  was  largely  fuelled  by 
high  rates  of  domestic  saving,  high  rates  of  investment  and  exports,  at  the  expense  of 
consumption. 
Table  2-6  The  Increased  Rate  of  GNP,  Domestic  Saving  and  Investment. 
(percentages) 
Period  1953-62  1962-66  1967-71  1972-76  1977-81  1982-86  1987-91 
GNP  4.1  7.8  9.6  9.7  5.8  8.6  9.9 
Dom.  Saving  3.7  11.8  14.6  23.9  20.5  32.5  35.5'j 
Investment  n.  a.  21.6  25.1  25.6  30.3  29.5  37.2  1) 
Note  1):  1990. 
Sources:  The  Bank  of  Korea,  National  Income  in  Korea,  1975,  pp.  142-143;  N.  S.  0.,  Major  Economic 
Indicators. 
Economic  growth  successfully  absorbed  the  unemployed  despite  an  increase  in 
population  of  over  100  per  cent  between  1949  and  1990  from  20,167,000  people  in 
1949  to  43,520,199  people  in  1990.  In  1963  the  official  unemployment  rate  was 
recorded  at  16.2  per  cent.  This  fell  to  4.5  per  cent  in  1972  and  2.3  per  cent  in  1990. 
Moreover,  during  the  last  three  decades,  real  wages  of  workers  have  steadily 
increased.  For  instance,  during  the  period  of  1977-1987,  the  nominal  wage  increase 
rate  was  18.4  per  cent  per  year  on  average,  whereas  the  consumption  price  increase 
rate  was  only  10.4  per  cent  per  year  on  average.  Such  high  rates  of  employment  and 
the  increases  in  real  wages  substantially  reduced  poverty  in  the  population.  As  Table 
2-7  shows  in  1960,  about  41  per  cent  of  the  population  was  in  absolute  poverty.  This 
has  dramatically  fallen  to  5.3  per  cent  in  1989. 
Table  2-7  The  Proportion  of  Absolute  Poverty  in  Population. 
Year  1960  1970  1975  1980  1985  1987  1989 
%  40.9  23.4  14.8  9.8  6.8  6.2  5.3 
Sources:  KDI,  1981  and  EPB. 
Furthermore,  inequality,  in  terms  of  wage  and  income  differences  between 
education  levels  and  between  different  jobs  had  deteriorated  until  the  mid  1970s  and 
then  improved  thereafter.  As  a  consequence,  Table  4-2  in  Chapter  4  shows  that  the 
Gini  coefficient  showing  inequality  between  households  was  increasing  by  the  mid 
1970s  and  then  reducing,  although  data  on  income  distribution  has  several 
limitations.  Before  1978,  for  example,  both  the  highest  and  lowest  segments  of  the 
distribution  were  systemetically  excluded  in  Korea,  and  even  now,  income  of  the 
self-employed  is  not  measured  adequately. 
41 As  the  Korean  economy  has  grown  and  households'  incomes  have  increased,  many 
commodities'  prices  have  fallen,  at  least  in  relative  terms.  In  1955,  household 
expenditure  on  food  accounted  for  56.9  per  cent.  This  declined  to  55.7  per  cent  in 
1965  and  44.7  per  cent  in  1975.  In  1985,  it  accounted  for  36.8  per  cent  of  household 
expenditure.  Similarly,  the  proportion  of  household  expenditure  on  clothing  and  other 
personal  effects  had  fallen  from  10.4  per  cent  in  1955  to  7.2  per  cent  in  1983.  In 
1959,  the  number  of  TV  sets  per  100  households  was  a  mere  0.03.  By  1969  it  was 
3.84  sets  and  now  it  is  unusual  for  any  household  not  to  have  at  least  one  TV  set. 
Social  indicators  also  show  that  Korean  society  has  improved  in  line  with  economic 
growth.  For  instance,  infant  mortality  per  1000  persons  was  59.9  in  1962.  It  had 
steadily  fallen  to  50.0  in  1971,35.8  in  1981  and  to  33.3  in  1984.  Life  expectancy  has 
steadily  extended  from  44.9  years  in  1944  to  57.5  years  in  1961,63.8  years  in  1971 
and  to  71.3  in  1990.  College  and  university  enrollment  rates  also  rapidly  increased 
from  8.0  per  cent  of  the  age  group  in  1966  to  37.6  per  cent  in  1990.  All  of  these 
economic  and  social  indicators  show  the  improvements  made  in  Korean  society  over 
time. 
Economic  growth  was  certainly  the  first  and  necessary  step  towards  the  positive 
achievements  mentioned  above.  Given  the  apparatus  of  the  state,  the  partition 
between  the  Northern  socialist  regime  and  Southern  capitalist  regime,  the  lack  of 
natural  resources,  and  the  limitations  on  government  expenditure,  the  Korean 
government's  device  to  economize  on  the  use  of  limited  public  funds  was  to  shift  the 
financial  burden  from  the  public  sector  towards  the  private  sector.  The  government 
concentrated  its  resources  on  the  creation  of  further  resources  and  investments.  In 
that,  the  Korean  government's  development  strategy  can  be  characterized  as  an 
'unbalanced  development'  strategy  by  specializing  in  those  sectors  in  which  the 
country  had  the  greatest  comparative  advantage.  This  was  carried  out  to  allow  the 
country  to  achieve  rapid  growth  in  the  short  run,  using  the  'big  push'  strategy  with 
massive  investment  in  major  projects  to  achieve  a  large  overall  shift  in  national 
production.  In  terms  of  spatial  impacts,  the  Korean  government  adopted  'growth 
pole'  strategies  until  the  late  1960s,  and  new  industrial  cities  from  1972,  and  then 
'growth  centres'  in  the  early  1980s  onwards.  (The  meaning  of  these  concepts  will  be 
explained  in  Chapter  3). 
All  of  these  policies  were  accompanied  by  a  rapid  economic,  spatial  and  social 
change.  The  structure  of  industry  has  been  manipulated  to  change  from  an 
agricultural  economy  towards  an  industrial  economy.  The  industrial  economy  itself 
has  been  manipulated  to  change  from  a  labour-intensive  import  substitution  industry, 
to  a  labour-  intensive  export-oriented  industry  in  1964  and  to  promote  heavy  and 
chemical  industry  in  the  early  1970s,  to  a  technical  and  capital  intensive  industry  in 
42 the  early  1980s.  In  spatial  terms,  the  government's  policy  for  industrialization  was 
initially  centred  on  cities  to  maximise  efficiency  in  existing  facilities,  and  then 
modern  industrial  and  service  activities  benefited  greatly  from  economics  of 
agglomeration.  This  spurred  the  growth  of  the  industrial  economy  in  the  cities.  These 
changes  imposed  considerable  demands  for  readjustment  and  change.  They  made  it 
necessary  for  people  to  move  among  occupations,  industries  and  areas.  Some 
industries  and  occupations  which  could  not  or  did  not  readjust  to  the  changes 
collapsed  causing  unemployment.  At  the  same  time  some  people  who  could  not  or  did 
not  readjust  to  the  changes  were  left  out  of  the  mainstream  of  society.  This  was  often 
described  by  the  terms  of  informal  sectors,  dual  labour  markets,  marginal  or 
peripheral  jobs  or  people,  underemployment  or  latent  unemployment. 
The  centralized  economic  development  plan  was  based  on  a  strict  efficiency  rule. 
The  efficiency  rule  also  has  applied  to  even  social  policies.  As  many  academic  studies 
have  pointed  out,  policies  have  been  implicitly  directed  to  benefit  middle-income 
households.  There  is  a  break-even  level  of  income,  at  which  consumption  equals 
disposable  income.  Below  the  break-even  level,  consumption  expenditure  will  exceed 
income.  Households  would  go  into  debt  or  use  up  past  savings  (dissaving)  below  this 
level.  Above  the  break-even  level,  consumption  would  fall  short  of  disposable 
income,  and  households  would,  on  the  aggregate,  be  saving  out  of  current  income. 
Social  policy  for  low-income  households  would  only  increase  consumption,  rather 
than  saving.  In  contrast  to  this,  support  with  the  same  money  for  those  above  the 
break-even  level  would  increase  savings.  Thus,  the  Korean  government's  policies 
tended  to  aid  those  whose  income  would  be  turned  into  savings  rather  than  be  used 
for  consumption.  Moreover,  throughout  the  period  1961-1990,  military  governments 
have  had  very  fragile  support  from  the  people.  Because  of  the  political  instability  of 
such  governments,  they  have  focused  on  enlarging  the  middle-income  group,  rather 
than  the  minority  of  low-income  households  (this  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  4). 
High  economic  growth  over  the  last  three  decades  has  meant  a  high  proportion  of 
resources  and  a  high  proportion  of  the  fruits  from  economic  growth  have  been 
devoted  to  investment,  at  the  expense  of  the  consumption,  in  other  words,  living 
standards.  This  has  always  been  justified  on  the  basis  of  the  assumption  that  if  the 
investment  was  used  to  build  new  factories,  etc.,  then  there  would  be  an  increase  in 
production  and  profit,  in  turn,  increasing  household  income.  However,  for  some 
people,  for  instance  the  elderly,  economic  growth  tomorrow  at  the  expense  of  current 
consumption  would  not  be  satisfactory.  For  some  people,  such  a  reduction  in  current 
consumption  would  result  in  a  loss  of  future  chances  in  life. 
The  Korean  government  has  been  mainly  concerned  with  the  structure  and 
development  of  the  economy.  This  has  had  significant  constraints  on  urban  policy 
43 development.  Urban  policies  over  the  last  three  decades  relied  on  the  same  logic  - 
because  socioeconomic  forces  affect  spatial  forms,  so,  too,  by  spatial  strategies  the 
state  might  reshape  the  socioeconomic  forces  (Kim  H-K,  1980,  p.  177).  Moreover, 
the  Korean  government  was  not  able  to  afford  the  enormous  funds  which  were 
required  for  the  construction  of  infrastructure.  So  limited  resources  were  to  be 
concentrated  on  chosen  cities  and  items,  whereas  the  development  of  the  related  built 
environment  was  left  to  households  and  individuals. 
The  government's  low  spending  on  consumption  and  the  shift  of  the  financial 
burden  from  the  public  sector  towards  the  private  sector  meant  that  there  were  no 
safety  nets  for  excluded  people.  Although,  policies  for  education,  retraining  and 
increasing  mobility  of  labour  were  used  as  part  of  a  general  effort  to  adjust  the 
excluded  people  to  the  changing  pattern  of  society,  the  economic  growth  could  not 
offset  the  powerful  market  trends  of  profit  and,  thereby,  the  exclusion  of  those  who 
were  unable  to  pay. 
The  exclusion,  in  aggregated  terms,  was  reinforced  by  the  changed  industrial 
structure  itself.  For  the  export-oriented  industry,  their  goods  were  sold  in  foreign 
markets  and  raw  materials  were  produced  in  foreign  countries.  Thus,  their  non-key 
workers  were  no  more  than  a  commodity  like  other  components  needed  for 
production.  Less  productive  workers  could  be  easily  replaced  from  the  pool  of  labour 
supplied  by  inmigrants  from  rural  areas.  Nevertheless,  there  was  little  argument  for 
and  little  attention  paid  to  the  human  cost  of  those  excluded  from  such  changes.  The 
rediscovery  of  poverty  which  took  place  in  Western  countries  in  the  1960s  had  little 
influence  under  the  conditions  of  mass  poverty  and  high  social  mobility  in  Korea 
during  the  1960s  and  1980s,  and  then  by  the  changing  social  powers  (which  will  be 
discussed  in  the  following  Chapters). 
Rapid  economic  growth  implanted  in  Koreans  a  widespread  prejudice  that  low- 
income  people  had  only  themselves  to  blame;  people  could  escape  low  income  if  they 
tried  hard  enough  and  failure  to  do  so  was  because  those  with  low  incomes  were 
workshy  and  feckless,  or  at  least  unwise  in  their  spending.  Failure  to  achieve 
reflected  personal,  mental  or  physical  inadequacies  such  as  inability  to  manage 
household  budgets,  lack  of  effort  to  improve  earnings  or  not  making  full  use  of  their 
earnings.  At  best,  they  could  be  considered  unlucky.  Many  successful  cases  of  people 
who  had  overcome  extreme  poverty  by  saving  and  working  hard  were  shown  on  the 
TV,  radio  and  newspapers  under  the  banner  of  "Human  triumph". 
One  primary  reason  for  desiring  economic  growth  was  to  raise  the  general  living 
standards  of  the  population.  In  Korea,  GNP  per  capita  increased  by  one  hundred 
times  between  1948  and  1990.  But  have  real  living  standards  been  improved  at  the 
same  rate?  Have  the  living  standards  of  various  sections  of  the  population  been 
44 increased  by  the  same  proportion?  In  every  society,  the  benefits  from  growth  will 
not  be  spread  evenly.  Has  economic  growth  made  it  possible  for  those  on  low 
incomes  to  avoid  a  miserable  life  without  reducing  the  living  standards  of  others? 
Furthermore,  there  are  costs  as  yet  not  fully  known  with  regards  to  deterioration  of, 
or  even  destruction  of,  the  environment.  There  is  almost  complete  ignorance  about 
who  are  the  victims  of  these  costs. 
The  most  fundamental  question  raised  here  is  whether  the  increased  cake  can  now 
be  allocated  to  help  the  excluded  minority?  This  will  be  discussed  in  the  following 
chapters. 
45 CHAPTER  3.  CHANGING  INDUSTRIAL  AND  SOCIAL  STRUCTURE. 
3.1.  Introduction. 
Prior  to  1950,  as  witnessed  in  Chapter  2,  the  economy  of  Korea  was  dominated  by 
agriculture,  and  social  structures  were  based  on  land.  The  distribution  of  income,  and 
social  cleavages  in  Korean  society  were  based  on  agricultural  assets,  especially  land. 
The  two  land  reforms  in  1947  and  1949,  therefore  played  a  central  role  in  levelling 
out  the  distribution  of  wealth  and  social  cleavages.  Moreover,  the  Korean  War  (1950- 
53)  destroyed  existing  capital  stocks  and  flattened  the  distribution  of  non-agricultural 
assets,  leaving  the  majority  of  Koreans  in  destitution.  After  the  Korean  War,  some 
people  accumulated  large  amounts  of  wealth  through  war-time  business  and  bribes, 
tax  evasion,  etc;  but  just  after  the  military  coup,  the  military  junta  launched  strong 
measures  to  confiscate  such  unjustifiably  accumulated  wealth.  Furthermore,  the 
military  government  launched  a  currency  reform,  and  forced  people  to  save  incomes 
over  certain  fixed  amounts  of  exchanged  money  (Choo  H-J,  1982,  pp.  56-9). 
Government  control  through  the  nationalisation  of  commercial  banks  and  the 
Economic  Development  Plan,  crucially  restricted  the  principle  of  private  ownership 
and  the  government  came  to  play  a  greater  part  in  the  control  of  economic  decisions. 
Thus,  even  though  Korea  was  a  very  poor  country,  there  was  no  serious  social 
stratification.  New  social  strata  were  created  by  the  differing  access  to  knowledge  and 
capital.  Further  opportunities  for  knowledge  and  capital  depended  upon  further 
investment.  The  first  unequal  opportunities  arose  between  the  agricultural  sector  and 
the  industrial  sector,  in  other  words  rural  and  urban.  Such  different  opportunities  (or 
life  chances)  caused  massive  movement  of  people  from  agriculture  to  industry,  which 
was  accompanied  by  the  movement  of  people  from  rural  areas  to  urban  areas.  This 
change  will  be  discussed  in  section  2  of  this  chapter.  In  industries,  big  businesses  as 
development  agents  benefited  more  than  others.  Such  unequal  allocation  of  national 
resources  resulted  in  centralisation  of  the  Korean  economy,  which  will  be  discussed 
in  section  3.  These  altered  habits  of  life,  occupation,  industrial  structure  and 
organisation  necessarily  resulted  in  the  alteration  of  social  structures  and  vice  versa, 
which  will  be  discussed  in  section  4.  These  changes  then  further  influenced  the 
opportunities  open  to  Korean  people,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 
This  Chapter  tries  to  unravel  the  chains  of  economic  and  social  changes  to  achieve 
a  greater  understanding  of  low-income  households. 
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3.2.1  Urbanisation:  an  overview. 
In  Korea,  urbanisation  is  a  very  recent  phenomenon.  Traditional  Korean  society  has 
a  relatively  stable  balance  in  terms  of  Population.  After  liberation  from  Japan  and  the 
following  partition  in  1945,  population  rapidly  increased  partly  due  to  natural 
increases,  but  largely  due  to  repatriated  Koreans  from  overseas  and  refugees  from 
North  Korea.  The  population  of  South  Korea  increased  from  15.879  million  in  1944 
to  20.03  million  in  1948.  The  repatriated  Koreans  and  refugees  were  estimated  to 
have  added  about  2.3  million  to  the  South  Korean  population  during  the  years  1946- 
1948  (BOK,  1949  and  1950).  Although  there  are  no  precise  data  for  the  location  of 
the  refugees  and  repatriated  Koreans,  about  40-50  per  cent  of  them  were  estimated  to 
have  settled  in  urban  areas  (Song  B-N  and  Mills,  1980,  p.  76;  Kwon  T-H,  1980, 
p.  2  10).  The  uprooting  effects  of  the  Korean  War  and  the  influx  of  refugees 
accelerated  the  urbanisation  process  during  the  1950s. 
Table  3-1  Population  and  Growth  Rate,  1392-1990. 
Year  Population  Annual  Growth  Urban  Share  of 
(1,000  persons)  Rate  (%)  Population 
1392  5,549 
1592  13,737  0.45  n.  a. 
1776  18,003  0.15  n.  a. 
1876  16,884  -0.06  n.  a. 
1910  17,427  0.09  n.  a. 
1920  17,264  -0.09  3.3 
1944  25,900  1.67  14.5 
1950  20,389  18.4 
1955  21,526  1.06  24.5 
1960  24,989  2.98  28.0 
1970  31,466  2.31  41.2 
1980  37,436  1.74  57.3 
1990  43,411  Lol  74.4 
Note:  Figures  prior  to  1950  (above  the  horizontal  line)  include  North  Korea;  Urban  area  is  defined  as 
an  area  with  more  than  50,000  people  which  is  administratively  designated  as  a  city. 
Source:  Data  for  the  year  prior  to  1955  are  from  Byung-Nak  Song,  The  Rise  of  the  Korean  Economy, 
Hong  Kong,  Oxford  University  Press,  1990,  p.  35,  Table  3.1  and  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and 
Housing  Census. 
The  War  was  followed  by  a  baby  boom.  Between  1955  and  1960,  annual 
population  growth  rates  recorded  a  2.98  per  cent  increase.  The  urban  share  of  the 
total  population  rose  from  about  18  per  cent  in  1950  to  about  28  per  cent  in  1960. 
Since  the  launch  of  the  First  Economic  Development  Five-year  plan, 
industrial  isation  has  ocurred  in  urban  areas,  especially  Seoul  and  Pusan.  This  was 
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factories  in  urban  areas,  but  also  because  of  the  constraints  of  national  resources  and 
for  reasons  of  maximizing  the  use  of  existing  infrastructure.  The  period  1960-1990 
was  characterised  by  rapid  industrial  isation  and  by  urbanisation.  As  Table  3-2  shows, 
the  growth  of  secondary  and  tertiary  industry  has  been  closely  related  to  the  growth 
of  urban  ares.  By  1970  the  urban  share  of  the  total  population  had  increased  to  41.2 
per  cent.  It  reached  57.3  per  cent  in  1980  and  74.4  per  cent  in  1990.  Today  over  80 
per  cent  of  the  population  of  Korea  live  in  cities  with  a  population  of  over  50,000.  As 
a  result  of  this  very  rapid  urbanisation,  it  is  true  to  say  that  most  of  the  urban  poor  as 
well  as  the  urban  rich  have  their  roots  in  rural  areas. 
Table  3-2  Shares  of  Urban  Population  and  Industrial  Distribution  of  Total  Labour  Force, 
1920-1990. 
Year 
Urban  share  of 
total  population(%) 
Agriculture  Mining,  manufacturing 
and  construction. 
Services 
and  other. 
1920  3.3  91.5  1.5  7.0 
1930  4.5  87.9  1.6  10.5 
1940  11.6  n.  a.  n.  a.  n.  a. 
1950  18.4  79.4  3.7  16.9 
1960  28.0  65.9  9.2  24.9 
1966  33.6  58.6  13.3  28.1 
1970  41.2  50.5  17.2  32.3 
1975  48.4  45.9  23.5  30.6 
1980  57.3  34.0  28.7  37.3 
1985  65.4  24.9  30.5  44.5 
1990  74.4  19.5  34.7  45.8 
Note:  Urban  area  is  defined  as  an  area  with  more  than  50,000  people  which  is  administratively 
designated  as  a  city. 
Sources:  Data  prior  to  1960;  Economic  Planning  Board,  Statistical  Year-book,  various  years,  Ministry 
of  Home  Affairs,  Municipal  Year-book,  various  years  and  Ministry  of  Labour,  Year-book  of  Labour 
Statistics,  various  years  and  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  each  year. 
Explanations  for  this  rapid  urbanisation  include  many  factors,  such  as  the  income 
disparities  between  urban  and  rural  areas,  demographic  and  social  factors,  etc.  All  of 
these  factors  have  influenced  the  urbanisation  process  at  different  levels  and  at 
different  times.  S.  Korea  is  a  very  small  country  with  a  total  area  of  99,274  sq.  Km, 
about  two  fifths  of  the  UX  (244,046  sq  Km)  with  a  single  race,  language  and 
common  cultural  assumptions.  There  are  few  territorial,  social  and  cultural  barriers  to 
inter-migration. 
Another  characteristic  of  the  urbanisation  of  Korea  is  the  concentration  of 
population  in  a  few  cities.  After  independence  in  1945,  the  urban  population 
accounted  for  14.5  per  cent  of  total  population  of  which  the  population  of  Seoul  and 
Pusan  accounted  for  about  6  per  cent  and  3  per  cent  respectively.  After  the  launch  of 
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stratagy.  Population  growth  in  the  two  cities  began  to  accelerate,  creating  many  urban 
problems,  especially  with  housing.  These  problems  encouraged  the  government  to 
launch  the  first  National  Land  Comprehensive  Development  Plan  (1972-81).  This 
was  based  on  the  assumption  that  fast  urbanisation  and  concentration  of  the 
population  in  other  centres  of  the  country,  as  counter-magnets  of  Seoul  and  Pusan, 
was  required  (Choi  S-C,  1976,  pp.  67-8).  Since  then,  four  big  cities  (Taegu,  Inchun, 
Kwangju  and  Taijun)  also  began  to  grow,  as  the  Table  below  shows. 
Table  3-3  Distribution  of  Population  in  Six  Big  Cities,  thousand  persons,  1960-90 
1960  (%)  1990  (%) 
Total  24,989  (100.0)  43,411  (100.0) 
City  6,997  (28.0)  32,309  (74.4) 
Six  big  cities  5,231  (20.9)  20,646  (47.6) 
Seoul  2,445  (9.8)  10,613  (24.4) 
Pusan  1,164  (4.7)  3,798  (8.7) 
Taegue  677  (2.7)  2,229  (5.1) 
Inchun  402  (1.6)  1,818  (4.2) 
Kwangju  314  (1.3)  1,139  (2.6) 
Taijun  229  (0.9)  1,050  (2.4) 
Source:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  1960  and  1990. 
In  1990,74.4  per  cent  of  the  population  of  Korea  lived  in  cities  and  the  population 
of  these  six  big  cities  accounted  for  about  half  of  the  population  in  Korea.  Thus,  it  is 
not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  most  of  Korea's  housing  problems  are  the  problems  of 
urban  areas  and  most  of  them  are  the  problems  of  the  big  cities. 
3.2.2  Out-  and  In-migrants. 
Until  the  1910s.,  it  was  evident  that  the  economy  was  predominantly  agricultural, 
the  population  predominantly  rural,  and  that  the  characteristic  unit  of  production  was 
the  family.  The  principle  industries  were  organized  on  a  domestic  basis  and  were 
subordinate  to  agriculture.  In  the  hemp  cloth  industry,  for  example,  the  family 
picked,  cleaned  and  spun  the  hemp,  and  the  community  boiled  it.  Women  and 
children  wove  it.  Sicklemakers  and  other  metal  workers  generally  worked  in  sheds 
attached  to  their  cottages.  Many  craftsmen  also  owned  strips  of  land  and  its  produce 
was  of  crucial  significance  in  the  domestic  economy.  Many  of  the  labourers  moved 
from  industrial  to  agricultural  occupations  at  times  of  harvest  or  planting.  Most  of  the 
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and  it  was  rare  for  them  to  enter  into  the  process  of  exchange.  Another  characteristic 
of  the  society  at  that  time  was  a  lack  of  integration  among  its  regions.  Most  economic 
decisions  were  taken  in  relation  to  the  conditions  of  the  regional  market.  The  price  of 
products  differed  from  one  region  to  another.  "Bobusang  ",  hawkers  and  pedlars,  only 
mediated.  The  main  social  division  was  on  the  basis  of  land. 
After  the  colonization  by  Japan  in  1910  and  the  introduction  of  medical  technology, 
as  Table  3-1  showed,  the  relatively  stable  balance  in  terms  of  population  was  upset. 
Subsistence  agricultural  production  could  no  longer  be  a  realistic  objective. 
Industrial  isation  was  no  longer  an  option  but  a  vital  necessity.  However,  the  impact 
of  colonization  was  unquestionably  highly  negative.  Agricultural  production  was 
encouraged  to  provide  for  the  deficits  of  Japan,  not  for  Korea.  The  result  was  the 
emergence  of  the  "Tomak"  which  was  a  primitive  form  of  housing  with  illegal 
occupation  of  land  on  hillsides  or  river  banks  in  cities.  The  precise  origin  of  such  a 
form  of  shelter  is  not  clear,  but,  according  to  a  survey  in  Seoul  in  1940,65  per  cent 
of  residents  of  "Tomaks"  were  expelled  migrants  from  rural  areas  (Kang  M-K, 
1987).  Yi  Sang-Hwa's  (1900-43)  poem,  Does  Spring  Come  to  Stolen  Fields?,  well 
represents  such  situations; 
The  land  is  no  longer  our  own 
Does  spring  comejust  the  same 
To  the  stolen  field? 
Liberation  and  the  following  partition  in  1945,  as  noted  earlier,  brought  about  an 
enormous  influx  of  population,  repatriated  Koreans  from  overseas  and  migrants  from 
the  North.  However,  in  urban  areas,  many  industrial  plants  suspended  production 
activities,  owing  either  to  the  loss  of  managers  and  technicians,  most  of  whom  were 
Japanese,  or  to  the  lack  of  fuel  and  electric  power  which  were  largely  supplied  from 
the  North.  Urban  areas  could  not  provide  the  inmigrants  with  appropriate  livelihoods. 
The  symptom  of  such  inability  of  urban  areas  to  cope  was  the  emergence  of  the 
"Sangjajip",  i.  e.  housing  constructed  from  any  available  material,  usually  cardboard. 
The  land  reform  in  1949  substantially  halted  the  movement  of  the  rural  population. 
A  huge  number  of  seasonal  wage  workers  in  rural  areas  could  own  their  land. 
However,  within  one  year  of  this  land  reform,  the  Korean  War  (1950-1953)  broke 
out  and  devastated  the  whole  of  Korea. 
After  the  Korea  War,  a  rapid  increase  in  population  occurred  due  to  the 
introduction  of  advanced  medical  techniques  and  medicines  from  industrialized 
economies.  Furthermore,  two  consecutive  bumper  crops  in  1957  and  1958  meant 
cheaper  grain  and  better  nutrition,  which  increased  the  fertility  of  women,  resulting 
50 in  a  baby  boom.  The  rising  population  began  to  press  on  food  supplies  and  prices 
began  to  rise. 
Industrialization  still  could  not  successfully  absorb  the  urban  unemployed.  In  Seoul 
in  1960,  for  instance,  over  30  per  cent  of  the  economically  active  population  were 
estimated  to  be  unemployed.  Until  1965,  out  of  a  total  labour  force  of  1,012,000 
persons,  the  unemployed  amounted  to  230,000  or  23  per  cent  (Kuznets,  1977, 
p.  111).  In  contrast  to  this,  the  average  annual  increase  in  agricultural  output  rose  by 
2.3  per  cent  per  annum  in  the  period  1953-1962  (Ibid,  p.  133),  which  more  and  less 
reduced  the  burden  of  rapid  population  growth  in  rural  areas.  The  parity  index 
(1965  =  100)  showed  that  product  prices  received/farm  cost  paid  rose  from  78  to  113 
in  1963.  Although  income  per  worker  in  rural  areas  was  lower  than  that  of  urban 
workers  (the  ratio  of  income  per  rural  worker  to  income  per  urban  worker  was  43.4 
per  cent),  incomes  of  rural  households  and  income  per  capita  were  higher  than  those 
of  urban  areas.  The  ratios  of  rural  to  urban  were  116.3  and  101.1  respectively. 
Poverty  became  a  more  acute  problem  in  urban  areas  than  in  rural  areas. 
Thus,  until  the  early  1960s,  urban  population  growth  was  mainly  caused  by 
external  factors  such  as  independence,  the  partition  and  the  Korean  War  with  some 
outmigrants  from  rural  areas  -  mainly  the  extremely  poor,  or  the  rich  looking  for 
better  opportunities  (Kwon  T-H,  1980). 
Since  industrial  isation  began  in  the  early  1960s,  commodities  were  increasingly 
being  supplied  by  urban  manufacturers.  The  economy  was  becoming  more  specialized 
and  hence  more  dependent.  Cash  incomes  were  becoming  more  urgent  and  more 
valuable.  Rural  labour  became  a  great  deal  more  vulnerable  to  harvest  crises  and 
trade  depressions  than  in  the  past.  Continuing  population  growth  in  rural  areas  meant 
that  rises  in  the  real  incomes  of  rural  households  were  frustrated  unless  the 
productivity  of  rural  products  could  keep  pace  with  the  population  increase  or  the 
prices  of  agricultural  products  rose. 
Agricultural  output  depends  on  inputs  of  land,  labour,  and  the  different  types  of 
farm  capital  such  as  machinery,  irrigation,  fertilizer,  etc.  Agriculture  in  Korea  has 
been  characterized  by  small  holding  size  and  specialization  in  producing  rice. 
Production  was  already  so  labour  intensive  that  output  could  not  be  increased  with 
additional  labour  input  alone.  According  to  the  study  of  farm  labour  utilization,  an 
excess  of  workers  of  the  order  of  one-third  during  1958-64  was  found  (Hong  Y-P, 
1966).  For  the  rural  poor,  the  problem  was  not  the  level  of  wages  but  where  they 
could  earn  them.  At  that  time,  mechanization  was  limited  because  farm  households' 
incomes  were  too  low  to  purchase  equipment  without  credit.  Credit  was  not  often 
available.  Moreover,  low  wages  and  draft-animal  costs  made  mechanization 
uneconomic. 
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chemical  fertilizer  was  imported  before  1960,  when  the  first  of  a  number  of  urea 
plants  was  built.  By  the  late  1960s,  Korea  was  largely  self-sufficient  in  producing 
nitrogenous  fertilizers.  Input  of  fertilizer  elements  increased  more  rapidly  than  did 
output  during  the  1963-72  period  (Kuznets,  op.  cit.,  p.  134).  In  1956,170.8  metric 
tons  of  chemical  fertilizer  were  used,  it  rose  to  307.1  in  1963  and  647.7  metric  tons 
in  1973.  Thus,  the  increases  in  agriculture  output  were  accompanied  by  increases  in 
running  costs.  The  need  for  cash  and/or  credit  was  being  increased.  However,  most 
farm  households'  income  came  from  agricultural  products,  only  about  20  per  cent  of 
rural  households'  income  was  derived  from  non-agricultural  activities. 
In  rural  areas,  there  were  no  financial  institutions.  Most  farm  households  had  to 
borrow  money  for  running  costs  from  individuals  at  high  interest  rates.  The 
government  enacted  the  Usurious  Debt  Settlement  Act  of  1961  and  established  the 
National  Agricultural  Cooperative  Federation  (NACF)  to  supply  institutional  loans  to 
farm  households.  The  NACF  survey  showed  that  over  three-quarters  of  farm  debt 
was  obtained  from  individuals  at  rates  of  10  per  cent  or  more  per  month  (NACF, 
1965a,  and  1965b).  Since  1961,  informal  curb  market  interest  rates  subsequently 
dropped  to  3-5  per  cent  a  month.  Even  though  the  interest  rates  of  the  NACF  loans, 
15-25  per  cent,  were  double  the  export  support  loans,  6  per  cent  per  annum,  it  was  a 
benefit  compared  with  the  curb  market. 
Agriculture  contributed  over  one-third  of  GNP  by  1970,  yet  received  less  than  10 
per  cent  of  all  institutional  loans.  Most  of  the  loans  benefited  larger  farmers  and 
small  or  marginal  farmers  still  had  to  rely  on  the  curb  markets  for  fertilizers  and 
other  running  costs.  This  often  resulted  in  permanent  indebtedness.  When  recurrent 
harvest  crises  struck,  marginal  land  holders  had  no  alternative  but  to  starve  or  to 
migrate. 
Each  year,  the  Ministry  of  Agricultural  and  Fishery  estimated  demands  for  the 
domestic  output  of  foods  and  the  price  changes  in  foods,  and  decided  how  much  to 
import.  Cereals  imports  made  up  5-10  per  cent  of  domestic  crop  supplies  from  1956 
through  1968,  and  20-30  per  cent  afterward.  The  imported  cheaper  agricultural 
products  must  have  contributed  to  reduced  wage  increases  for  urban  workers. 
However,  the  imports  had  adversely  affected  agricultural  production  and  it  can 
hardlly  be  refuted  that  the  rural  economy  was  ravaged  (Choo  S-K,  1963,  p.  231).  The 
imports  of  agricultural  products  also  hindered  commercialisation  in  domestic 
agricultural  production.  Urban  demand  for  agricultural  products  rises  with  urban 
households'  income  and  urban  population  increase  because  demand  for  food  is 
typically  inelastic.  Prices  should  have  increased,  raising  farm  households'  incomes. 
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to  less  than  that  of  general  prices. 
In  contrast  to  this,  as  industrial  isation  accelerated,  there  was  an  increasing 
specialization  by  industry  and  occupation,  narrowing  the  range  of  tasks  performed  by 
the  individual  workman.  This  increased  the  number  of  purely  routine  tasks  falling  to 
the  unskilled  operators.  Women  or  uneducated  workers  could  enter  into  the  industrial 
labour  force.  Factories  gave  full-time  gainful  employment  not  only  to  men  but  also  to 
women  and  children.  Since  1964,  the  government  shifted  from  a  policy  of  import- 
substituting  industrialization  towards  labour-  intensive  export-oriented 
industrialization.  As  Norton's  study  (1974)  noted,  manufactured  products  which 
displayed  the  most  rapid  export  growth  were  among  Korea's  most  labour-  intensive 
manufactures.  The  growth  of  labour-intensive  manufactures  contributed  to  the 
increases  in  wages  of  urban  workers. 
The  income  ratio  of  rural  household  to  urban  household  was  reversed  from  116.3 
per  cent  in  1963  to  60.1  per  cent  in  1967.  The  income  ratio  per  capita  also  fell  from 
101.1  to  53.6  in  1967.  The  standard  of  living  of  rural  households  was  deteriorating 
over  time,  and  rural  poverty  became  the  main  poverty  issue.  The  story  of  success  for 
many  urban  migrants  filtered  back  to  rural  areas.  The  miserable  urban  life  was 
overlooked  and  successful  stories  were  embellished. 
Most  marginal  farmers,  whose  incomes  were  largely  derived  from  fluctuating 
seasonal  wages,  left  for  urban  areas  looking  for  uncertain  opportunities.  In  contrast  to 
this,  many  better-off  farmers  also  left  for  urban  areas  looking  for  better  opportunities 
because  the  ceiling  of  agricultural  land  holding  (roughly  three  hectares)  constrained 
further  investments.  The  rate  of  out-migration  from  rural  areas  into  urban  areas 
peaked  1966-1970.  During  the  previous  t960-1966  period,  migrants  from  rural  areas 
accounted  for  49.2  per  cent  of  the  urban  population  increase.  Between  1966-70,  this 
accounted  for  73.5  per  cent  of  the  urban  population  increase  (Population  and  Housing 
Census,  1960,1966  and  1970).  According  to  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and 
Forestry  annual  surveys,  an  absolute  drop  in  farm  population  began  after  1967. 
Although  rapid  migration,  particularly  rural  to  urban,  contributed  to  the  supply  of 
labour  required  for  the  early  stages  of  industrialisation  based  on  low-wages,  the 
influx  also  gave  rise  to  various  problems,  such  as  squatter  settlements,  traffic 
congestion,  etc.  Even  though  the  economic  growth  of  Korea  remained  rapid  -  for 
instance  in  the  period  between  1965-1975  manufacturing  grew  at  an  annual  rate  of 
nearly  20  per  cent  -  the  rapid  industrialization  absorbed  less  than  35  per  cent  of  the 
increased  labour  force.  The  most  visible  consequence  of  industry's  inability  in  urban 
areas  to  provide  adequate  employment  for  such  a  rapidly  growing  labour  force, 
having  no  education  or  only  primary  education  with  no  assets  except  their  labour, 
53 was  the  emergence  of  underemployment,  a  state  of  low  labour  productivity,  sporadic 
employment,  depressed  earnings,  and  the  increase  of  the  informal  sector  and  street 
economy.  The  rapid  growth  in  the  service  sector  around  1970  can  be  seen  in  Table  3- 
4.  The  common  characteristic  of  workers  in  those  sectors  was  their  low  income 
identifying  them  as  the  core  of  the  poverty  problem. 
Table  3-4  Distribution  of  Employment  by  Sector. 
(percentages) 
Year  1965  1967  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1975  1980  1985  1989 
Primary  58.9  55.2  51.3  50.4  48.4  50.6  50.0  45.9  34.0  24.9  19.5 
Secondary  10.4  12.8  14.3  14.4  14.2  14.2  16.3  19.1  22.6  24.4  28.2 
Tertiary  31.0  32.0  34.4  35.2  37.4  35.2  33.7  35.0  43.4  50.6  52.3 
Source:  EPB,  Economic  Active  Population  Year-book,  various  years. 
Housing  also  represents  the  influx  of  rural  migrants  at  the  time.  According  to  the 
Seoul  Municipal  Government  (Seoul  Statistical  Year-book,  1972),  about  20  per  cent 
of  all  inmigrants  to  Seoul  in  1970-71  settled  in  substandard  houses  were  built  without 
authorized  permission.  The  terms  which  indicated  squatter  settlements  or  poor  houses 
varied  from  a  description  of  a  housing  unit,  such  as  Tomak,  Sangjajip  and  Panjajip 
towards  the  term  "DaIdongne",  or  moon-village,  which  refers  to  poor  housing  areas 
on  a  hill-side. 
After  1969  onwards,  the  government  launched  the  "Dual  Grain  Prices"  policy  on 
rice  and  barley,  as  a  major  instrument  for  raising  farm  household  income  and,  at  the 
same  time,  for  subsidizing  the  wages  of  industrial  workers.  It  bought  these  crops  at  a 
high  price  from  producers  and  resold  them  at  lower  prices  to  consumers.  Since  then, 
rural  households'  incomes  have  steadily  increased.  Nevertheless,  until  1970,  rural 
household's  income  had  remained  less  than  70  per  cent  of  the  average  urban 
household's  income.  Moreover,  the  dual  grain  program  could  not  benefit  marginal 
farmers,  whose  products  were  only  enough  to  feed  their  families.  Thus,  the  dual 
grain  policy  was  more  or  less  successful  at  subsidizing  the  wages  of  industrial 
workers,  but  could  not  successfully  halt  the  inmigration  from  rural  areas.  Other 
compensatory  methods  such  as  a  compensation  for  harvest  failure  in  coping  with  the 
influx  of  rural  migration  to  cities  were  constrained  by  other  pressures  of  national 
resources.  The  government  inevitably  adopted  coercive  methods  which  required  less 
public  spending.  Since  the  mid  1960s  until  the  early  1970s,  massive  squatter 
clearance  policies  and  high-handed  policy  on  the  construction  of  new  squatter 
settlements  were  introduced. 
The  Sae-Maeul  (New-Community)  movement  was  initiated  in  late  1971  by  the 
government  as  a  nationwide,  comprehensive  self-help  program  to  improve  the 
standard  of  living  in  rural  areas.  The  program  was  in  line  with  the  government's 
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rural  areas,  principally  by  the  creation  of  more  nonagricultural  jobs  in  them.  The 
Saemaul  Factory  Program  was  a  part  of  the  comprehensive  program,  aimed  at  raising 
off-farm  incomes  of  rural  households.  By  1976,770  plants  were  established,  but 
mostly  near  cities.  Nevertheless,  the  composition  of  non-agricultural  income  in  farm 
household  income  declined  from  24.1  per  cent  in  1970  to  18.1  per  cent  in  1975. 
Unlike  other  programmes  in  the  Sae-Maeul  movement,  it  was  less  successful  partly 
because  of  poor  infrastructure,  credit  difficulties  and  the  character  of  rural  labour 
which  fluctuated  over  the  seasons.  It  must  not  be  imagined,  however,  that  the 
transition  from  agricultural  or  domestic  industries  with  their  seasonal  routine  and 
their  kinship-based  organization  to  the  monotonous,  machine-driven,  impersonal 
grind  of  factory  work  did  not  come  easily  in  rural  areas  at  that  time.  Moreover,  the 
first  oil  price  shock  in  1973  made  it  difficult  for  them  to  succeed.  In  effect,  most 
Saemaeul  factories  worked  as  a  training  ground  for  potential  out-migrants. 
The  government  launched  the  First  National  Comprehensive  Land  Development 
Plan  (1972-81),  designed  to  achieve  more  balanced  national  development.  Since  early 
1972,  as  the  government's  economic  policy  shifted  towards  heavy  and  chemical 
industries,  new  industrial  cities  were  developed  according  to  the  Plan.  The  growth  of 
new  industrial  cities  gave  rise  to  enormous  "feedback"  effects  on  rural  areas,  which 
began  to  raise  rural  household  income.  To  improve  matters  still  further,  there  were 
no  poor  harvest  years  between  1971  and  1976  and  agricultural  output  increased  over 
5  per  cent  a  year  during  that  period  (EPB,  various  years).  The  parity  index,  which 
dropped  to  94  in  1968,  advanced  to  113  in  1972  (EPB,  1972). 
In  urban  areas,  owing  to  migrants  from  rural  areas  during  the  1966-70  period, 
manufacturing  industry  grew  without  a  rapid  increase  in  wages.  The  rate  of  increase 
in  the  wages  of  production  workers  was  recorded  in  single  digits,  7.1  per  cent  per 
annum,  between  1971  and  1974.  As  the  first  oil  price  shock  hit  the  Korean  economy, 
many  inmigrants  found  it  difficult  to  get  jobs.  By  1975,  rural  household  income  on 
average  exceeded  urban  household  income.  The  ratio  of  rural  household  income  to 
urban  household  income  was  101.6  per  cent.  The  migration  from  rural  to  urban  areas 
slowed  down. 
When  the  nation's  industrial  structure  was  shifted  from  light  and  labour  intensive 
industry  to  heavy  and  chemical  industry  in  the  early  1970s,  plants  located  away  from 
existing  industrial  estates  and  needed  more  skilled  labour.  The  government  began  to 
develop  new  industrial  cities  and  to  expand  education  facilities.  While  unemployment 
or  under-employment  were  acute  in  the  biggest  cities,  there  were  recurrent  scarcities 
of  labour  in  the  expanding  industrial  towns  or  cities  of  southeastern  Korea.  Many 
young  and  skilled  workers  migrated  from  rural  areas  as  well  as  other  urban  areas  to 
55 the  new  industrial  cities.  Since  then,  migration  between  urban  areas  rapidly  increased 
and  rural  migrants  also  moved  to  the  new  industrial  cities  rather  than  the  biggest 
cities. 
Increasing  rural  household  incomes  enabled  rural  families  to  afford  higher 
education  for  their  children.  The  combined  consequence  of  rural  household  income 
growth  and  the  deficit  in  the  young  labour  force  accelerated  mechanization  in  rural 
areas  from  1973  (Lim  J-C,  1985,  p.  49).  Accelerating  mechanization,  in  turn, 
substantially  reduced  labour  input  in  cultivating  rice  and  barley  per  acre.  More  farm 
households  could  cultivate  cash  crops  by  using  new  technologies  such  as  green 
houses,  which  again  raised  rural  household  incomes.  Pulling  factors  became  more 
important  in  intermigration  than  pushing  factors  in  the  early  1970s. 
In  urban  areas,  the  surplus  of  labour  turned  to  shortage  in  the  mid  1970s  (Lim  J-C, 
19857  p.  42).  Additionally,  after  1977  the  Middle  East  construction  boom  attracted  a 
vast  number  of  workers  from  Korea.  According  to  the  Ministry  of  Labour,  the 
Middle  East  construction  boom  drew  as  much  as  27  per  cent  of  the  male 
manufacturing  workforce  away  from  Korea.  The  combination  of  industrial 
development  and  the  Middle  East  boom  boosted  the  wage  of  production  workers 
during  the  latter  half  of  the  1970s.  Between  1975  and  1979,  the  rate  of  wage  increase 
was  16.8  per  cent  annum. 
After  the  mid  1970s,  more  priority  was  given  to  the  development  of  heavy  and 
chemical  industry  in  government  investment  which  needed  more  capital.  More 
resources  were  invested  in  associated  infrastructure  as  preconditions  of  the 
development  of  the  heavy  and  chemical  industry.  Accordingly,  as  Table  3-5  shows, 
even  the  small  allocation  of  government  budget  to  the  agricultural  sector  declined. 
Productivity  in  agriculture  could  not  continue  to  rise  with  less  investment. 
Furthermore,  high  inflation  during  the  late  1970s  raised  the  running  costs  of 
agriculture.  Consequently,  the  farm  household  parity  index  steadily  declined.  In 
1981,  it  fell  to  88.9  from  a  base  of  100  in  1972.  To  make  matters  worse,  harvest 
failures  occurred  in  1978  and  especially  1980  when  output  decreased  by  over  19  per 
cent. 
As  a  consequence  of  urban  prosperity  and  rural  stagnation,  the  ratio  of  rural 
household  income  to  urban  household  income  declined  to  81.0  per  cent  in  1980. 
Small  land  holders,  who  largely  depended  upon  non-agricultural  incomes,  began  to 
migrate  away  from  rural  areas,  looking  to  Middle  East  construction  sites  and  for 
urban  manufacturing  jobs  even  though  these  were  being  substituted  by  machines. 
56 Table  3-5  Composition  of  Agricultural  Sector  in  Government  Finance  Expenditure. 
Year  General  account  (A)  Agriculture(B)  B/A 
1976  2,142.2  119.6  5.5 
1977  2,739.9  118.1  4.3 
1978  3,538.2  133.0  3.7 
1979  5,053.2  186.7  3.7 
1980  6,486.1  234.5  3.6 
1981  7,907.8  424.7  5.4 
Source:  EPB,  Outline  of  Budget,  various  years. 
By  1979,  the  Middle  East  boom  suddenly  cooled  and  the  second  oil  crisis  hit  the 
Korean  economy.  The  scarcity  of  production  workers  finished  with  the  collapse  of 
the  Middle  Eastern  construction  market  and  a  slow-down  in  Korea's  growth  rate. 
Urban  unemployment  rose  from  4.7  per  cent  in  1978  to  5.6  per  cent  in  1979  and  to 
7.5  per  cent  in  1980.  Whereas,  consumer  prices  rapidly  increased  over  the  same 
period.  They  rose  by  14.5  per  cent  in  1978,18.2  per  cent  in  1979  and  28.7  per  cent 
in  1980.  As  a  result,  civil  unrest  increased  with  strikes  such  as  the  Pu-Ma  strike  (Kim 
H-K,  1980,  p.  172).  To  make  matters  worse,  the  poor  harvest  crisis  in  1980  led  to 
further  deterioration  in  the  Korean  economy  and  drew  many  rural  households  off  the 
land.  In  1981,  the  Kwangju  incident  extended  into  nearby  rural  areas  in  which  the 
worst  harvest  failure  occurred. 
In  order  to  halt  high  inflation,  the  government  increased  imports  of  cheaper  grains 
and  reduced  agricultural  price  supports.  By  1983  imported  grain  was  equivalent  to  28 
per  cent  of  domestic  output.  The  government  also  froze  the  government  purchasing 
price  in  the  dual  grain  price  system.  Moreover,  the  volume  of  purchases  also 
reduced.  Accordingly,  the  farm  parity  index(1972  =  100)  declined  to  the  lowest  level 
of  84.0  in  1983,  and  slightly  advanced  to  86.9  in  1984.  As  noted  earlier,  between 
1982  and  1985  there  was  a  mass  exodus  from  rural  areas,  even  larger  than  the 
migration  associated  with  the  1980  harvest  failure.  The  imported  low  price  grains 
halted  the  increase  of  consumer  prices,  and  enabled  the  government  to  carry  out  a 
low-wage  policy  with  the  help  of  the  massive  influx  of  rural  workers.  As  Table  3-6 
shows,  since  1983,  the  increase  in  wages  and  consumer  prices  tended  to  stabilize. 
Despite  the  low  wage  increases  for  manufacturing  workers  and  the  relatively  high 
unemployment  rate  in  urban  areas,  rural  household  income  on  average  was  less  than 
90  per  cent  of  urban  household  income.  In  the  early  half  of  the  1980s,  the 
stabilization  of  the  Korean  economy  and  continuing  growth  was  possible  at  the 
expense  of  the  agricultural  population  which  accounted  for  a  mere  28.9  per  cent  of 
the  population  in  Korea  in  1980  (Major  Statistics  of  Agriculture  and  fisheries,  1981). 
57 Table  3-6  The  Increase  Rate  in  Government  Purchasing  Grain  Prices,  Wages  of 
Manufacturing  Workers  and  Consumer  Prices  (comparison  with  pre-year  and  per  cent). 
Year  Government  purchasing  Norminal  wage  increases  Consumer 
grain  price  increases  for  manufacturing  workers  price  increases 
1977-81  17.7  27.9  18.6 
1982  7.3  14.7  7.2 
1983  0.0  12.2  3.4 
1984  3.0  8.1  2.3 
1985  5.0  9.9  2.5 
1986  6.0  9.2  2.8 
Source:  Kang  Bong-Kyoun,  Economic  Development  strategy  and  Income  Distribution  of  Korea,  Seoul; 
KDI,  1989,  Table  2-16  and  Table  2-15. 
In  the  mid  1980s,  the  Korean  economy  recaptured  its  growth  momentum.  The 
economic  prosperity  of  urban  areas,  concentration  of  higher  education,  and  the  re- 
uniting  of  families  in  urban  areas  continued  to  draw  away  the  rural  population. 
Sequent  harvest  failures  in  1987,1989  and  1990  removed  the  remaining  marginal 
farmers  off  their  land.  As  a  result,  by  1990,  about  75  per  cent  of  the  Korean 
population  lived  in  cities  with  over  50,000  population. 
3.2.3  Urbanisation  and  Poverty. 
The  effects  of  migration  and/or  urbanisation  may  substantially  vary  from  one 
country  to  another  or  in  the  same  country  over  time.  Those  who  have  a  positive  view 
of  urbanisation  argue  that  in  the  urban  areas  on  the  one  hand,  the  marginal  product  of 
the  migrant  may  be  higher  than  in  the  rural  areas,  on  the  other  hand,  rural 
outmigration  may  reduce  the  rural  labour  surplus,  increase  agricultural  output  per 
capita  and  raise  rural  incomes  via  urban-rural  remittances.  Moreover,  the  costs  of 
public  services  and  facilities  per  capita  may  be  lower  in  cities  than  in  rural  areas.  In 
addition  to  these,  urbanisation  is  positively  viewed  because  cities  are  seen  as  centres 
of  consumption  which  drives  economic  change  forward.  Urban  agglomeration 
economies  can  reinforce  these  trends  (see  Wrigley,  1987,  pp.  133-156). 
In  contrast  to  this,  urbanisation  is  criticized  on  the  following  grounds.  Firstly,  rural 
outmigration  is  selective  in  age  and  skills,  resulting  in  the  export  of  human  capital, 
worsening  rural  income  distribution,  and  increasing  the  cost  of  public  services  in 
rural-areas  (Lipton,  1982).  Secondly,  the  movement  from  rural  farming  to  urban 
informal  sectors  reduces  the  marginal  productivity  of  labour  for  the  migrant  (Todaro, 
1969  and  1985).  It  generally  used  to  be  argued  that  the  process  of  enclosure,  by 
drawing  smallholders  and  cottagers  off  the  land  and  depopulating  the  rural  areas, 
created  the  large  proletarian  labour  force.  To  a  great  extent,  dependency  theorists 
58 argued  that  in  the  developing  countries,  such  processes  were  initiated  and  accelerated 
by  the  interest  of  developed  countries  via  the  international  market  structure  (Oxaal, 
Barnett  and  Booth  (ed.  ),  1975;  Evans,  1979). 
Three  quarters  of  the  Korean  population  were  engaged  in  farming  in  1945.  This 
dramatically  decreased  to  less  than  15  per  cent  of  the  population  in  1990.  Over  80  per 
cent  of  the  population  lived  in  rural  areas  in  1945.  By  1990,  only  about  25  per  cent 
of  Koreans  lived  in  rural  areas.  This  meant  agricultural  production  exceeded  the 
consumption  of  the  rural  population.  The  number  of  agricultural  households  grew 
until  1967  after  which  it  declined  leaving  more  land  available  per  farm  household. 
Family  sizes  had  also  been  decreasing  as  a  result  of  effective  family  planning  since 
1962,  again  adding  to  the  increase  in  size  of  farm  per  household.  Thus,  urbanisation 
positively  affected  household  income  for  farmers  who  remained  and  reduced  the 
burden  of  poverty,  at  least  in  aggregate  terms. 
Another  important  factor  in  the  rise  of  rural  income  has  been  remittances.  In 
Korea,  outmigration  from  rural  areas  did  not  only  mean  the  export  of  selective  human 
capital  from  rural  areas  to  urban  areas.  In  urban  areas,  serious  housing  shortages 
forced  people  to  share  accomodation.  Many  elderly  parents  remained  in  rural  areas 
and  many  returned  back,  contributing  to  the  nuclearisation  of  the  family  in  Korea 
(Lee  K-K,  1980,  p.  147).  Most  migrants,  therefore,  continued  a  close  relationship 
with  their  rural  hometowns  (Lee  M-0,1985,  p.  134).  They  sent  part  of  their  income 
back  home  in  various  ways.  As  Table  3-7  shows,  the  share  of  remittances  in  Korean 
farm  households'  non-agricultural  income  has  increased  rapidly,  in  line  with 
urbanisation,  accounting  for  about  20  per  cent  of  the  total  farm  household  income  in 
1981  (Park  F-K,  1983,  p.  12). 
Table  3-7  Composition  of  Farm  Household  Income. 
(vercenw,,  es) 
Year  Household  Agricultural  Non-agricultural  income 
income  income  Sub-total  side  income  wage  income  Remittance 
1962  100.0  79.6  20.4  3.8  9.4  7.2 
1965  100.0  79.2  20.8  3.5  8.9  8.4 
1970  100.0  75.9  24.1  3.8  10.4  9.9 
1975  100.0  81.9  18.1  2.5  9.4  6.2 
1977  100.0  72.3  27.7  2.7  12.5  12.5 
1979  100.0  68.7  31.3  2.0  14.2  15.1 
1981  100.0  67.2  32.8  2.9  10.0  19.9 
Source:  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries,  Report  on  the  Result  of  Farm  Households  Economy 
Survey,  quoted  in  Funkoo  Park,  1983,  p.  11. 
The  growth  of  cities  helped  to  further  agricultural  investment  and  specialization  and 
thereby  carry  forward  the  rising  trend  in  real  incomes.  As  Adam  Smith  (1970,  Book 
III,  chapter  IV)  has  stressed,  urban  growth  and  agricultural  improvement  can  afford 
59 each  with  a  mutual  stimulus  to  the  other.  Indeed,  despite  the  increase  in  urban 
households'  income,  the  Engel  Coefficient  had  not  dramatically  decreased  by  the 
early  1980s.  According  to  the  study  of  the  Central  Council  of  National  Agricultural 
Cooperative  Federation  (1981,  p.  8),  between  1970  and  1980,  urban  households' 
monthly  income  had  increased  from  f-56.3  to  f-100.6  on  average,  whereas  the  Engel 
coefficient  remained  at  42  per  cent.  Thus,  food  consumption  has  substantially 
increased.  Although  a  large  part  of  the  increased  demand  was  fulfilled  by  imported 
grains,  increasing  population  in  urban  areas  required  vast  quantities  of  food  which 
had  to  be  drawn  from  an  increasingly  wider  area.  Rural  households  could  trade  the 
surplus  agricultural  products  into  cash,  which  in  turn  encouraged  the  productivity  of 
agriculture  (Park  J-H,  1969).  For  example,  the  yield  per  10  acres  of  paddy  rice 
steadily  increased  until  1977  (Park  F-K,  op.  cit.,  p.  36).  Such  a  large  and  growing 
market  encouraged  specialisation,  not  just  in  the  growing  of  rice  and  raising  of 
animals,  but  also  in  all  the  tasks  associated  with  their  processing,  distribution  and 
sale. 
By  the  early  1960s,  farm  households  could  save  "cash"  income  (Moon,  P-Y,  19791) 
p.  165).  The  share  of  commercial  products  in  agriculture  steadily  increased.  In  196  1, 
it  accounted  for  only  24.3  per  cent,  and  rapidly  increased  to  70  per  cent  in  1980 
(Kim  S-H,  1980,  p.  186).  The  commercialisation  of  agricultural  products,  in  turn, 
encouraged  farmers  to  cultivate  a  higher  proportion  of  cash  crops.  For  example,  in 
1947,  rice  accounted  for  72.2  per  cent  of  agricultural  products.  The  proportion  fell  to 
52.1  per  cent  of  agricultural  products  in  1975  (Ibid,  p.  186).  Furthermore,  the 
development  of  agricultural  technology,  such  as  the  green  house,  the  method  of  early 
seeding  and  fertilizers,  since  the  mid  1960s  accelerated  the  increase  in  agricultural 
productivity,  and  then  commercial  isation.  Moreover,  since  the  mid  1960s,  the 
government  focused  on  the  development  of  roads,  for  instance,  in  1965,  the  Seoul- 
Pusan  motorway  construction  was  started.  The  development  of  transportation 
shortened  the  physical  and  social  distances  between  urban  and  rural  areas.  The 
development  of  transportation  accelerated,  not  only  out-migration  from  rural  areas 
but  also  commercial  isation  of  agricultural  products  (Keidel,  1980). 
In  the  early  stages,  the  distribution  of  agricultural  products  was  mainly  carried  out 
by  merchants  in  urban  areas.  Small  land  holders  were  easily  exploited  by  urban 
merchants  because  of  their  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  urban  market  and  lack  of  capital. 
Urban  merchants  gave  advanced  credits  to  the  farmers  for  seeds,  implements,  and 
other  necessities,  pending  the  harvesting  of  their  crops.  They  exploited  the  farmers  by 
promoting  their  indebtedness  (Jang  Y-S,  1985  and  Kim  S-H,  op.  cit.  ). 
After  the  early  1970s,  the  rural  community  began  to  organize  and  distribute 
agricultural  products  themselves.  The  Saemaeul  movement  fuelled  the  acceleration  of 
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the  distribution  of  agricultural  products  through  a  well  organized  National 
Agricultural  Cooperative  Federation,  which  protected  farmers  from  forced  sale  of 
crops  at  harvest  time  at  cheap  prices  by  building  rural  warehouses  for  the  storage  of 
crops.  It  also  protected  them  from  merchants'  usurious  credits,  and  encouraged  the 
organisation  of  rural  communities. 
The  land  reform  of  1949  limiting  land  holdings  up  to  three  Chengbo  (roughly  three 
hectares)  acted  to  push  the  rural  rich  off  the  land.  Furthermore  the  ceiling  of  land 
holding  itself  acted  as  a  protector  of  the  rural  community  from  the  invasion  of  urban 
capital  (Eddy  Lee,  1979,  p.  27).  Moreover,  whenever  the  harvest  crises  struck,  the 
rural  poor  had  no  alternative  but  to  starve  or  to  migrate.  The  stagnating  rural 
economy,  with  no  other  income  sources  and  no  social  safety  nets,  made  the  rural 
poor  more  predisposed  to  factory  work.  The  poorest  were  being  compelled  to  leave 
rural  areas  as  well  as  the  richest.  Therefore,  community  interests  could  easily  reach 
consensus.  Such  factors  increased  rural  households'  income  as  well  as  agricultural 
productivity  and  contributed  to  making  rural  areas  a  more  egalitarian  community  than 
the  urban  community. 
Urban  places,  at  least  until  the  late  1970s,  had  an  "open"  structure.  There  was  no 
visible  group  of  dominant  capitalists.  Furthermore,  the  nationalisation  of  commercial 
banks,  and  strong  government  intervention  after  1962  effectively  halted  the 
emergence  of  powerful  merchants.  Although  industrialisation  began  to  create  some 
big  industrial  groups,  these  were  originally  manufacturers,  not  merchants. 
Furthermore,  as  seen  in  the  last  Chapter,  the  industrial  capital  of  the  big  business  was 
subordinate  to  the  government,  not  to  the  circuits  of  merchant's  capital  and  credit. 
They  operated  more  in  accordance  with  the  logic  of  industrial  capital,  increasing 
overall  production  and  the  productivity  of  labour,  rather  than  merchant's  interest 
bearing  capital,  increasing  overall  circulation  and  accelerating  the  turnover  time  of 
capital. 
Industrial  isation  was  represented  by  the  establishment  of  manufacturing  factories. 
The  factories  gave  full-time  gainful  employment  not  only  to  men  but  also  to  women 
and  children  who  rarely  enjoyed  more  than  seasonal  or  part-time  work  for  pay  in 
rural  areas.  For  instance,  in  1972,3.4  million  women  were  engaged  in  agricultural 
activities  during  June,  at  the  time  extra  labour  was  needed  to  transplant  rice,  but  only 
1.2  million  in  December  after  harvesting  (Kuznets,  op.  cit.,  p.  113).  As  the  Table 
below  shows,  women's  participation  in  the  work  force  has  rapidly  increased, 
contributing  to  the  increase  in  household  incomes. 
61 Table  3-8  The  Ratio  of  Economic  Active  Participation,  age  between  15-65  years  old. 
Year  Total  Male  Female 
1963  55.3  %  76.4  %  36.3  % 
1965  55.6  %  76.6  %  36.5  % 
1970  55.9  %  75.1  %  38.5  % 
1975  56.5  %  74.5  %  39.6  % 
1980  57.1  %  73.6  %  41.6  % 
1982  56.8  %  72.5  %  42.4  % 
1983  55.8  %  70.9  %  41.6  % 
Source:  EPB,  Economic  Active  Population  Year-book,  each  year. 
The  big  businesses  mainly  engaged  in  production  for  export  and  the  government 
left  the  domestic  market  to  market  rationale.  This  led  to  multiple  industrialisation. 
Most  commodities  for  domestic  consumption  were  supplied  by  small  capitalists  or 
artisans,  mostly  taking  the  form  of  family  manufacturing.  There  were  no  dominant 
merchants.  Therefore,  the  supply  of  commodities  for  domestic  consumption,  the 
distribution  and  sale  of  them  had  an  "open"  structure. 
As  cities  grew,  the  development  of  the  tertiary  sector  lagged  behind  that  of  the 
secondary  sector.  The  deficit  of  a  tertiary  sector  attracted  rural  unskilled  households, 
who  could  easily  find  jobs  in  cities.  A  multitude  of  small  shops,  hawkers  and  pedlars 
carried  out  the  function  of  sale  and  distribution  and  operated  as  a  training  field  for  the 
new  in-migrants.  As  urban  areas  grew  and  the  real  income  of  urban  households  grew, 
demand  for  secondary  and  tertiary  products  also  grew,  increasing  employment  in 
secondary  and  tertiary  industries.  Therefore,  the  location  of  a  certain  export  industry 
and  its  workers  touched  off  multiple  growth  in  the  region  and  gave  rise  to  a  great 
expansion  of  "supportive"  or  "supplementary"  occupations. 
As  seen  in  the  last  Chapter,  since  1961,  the  unemployment  rate  has  rapidly 
decreased.  Some  argue  that  the  unemployment  rate  was  disguised  by  overemployment 
in  services  and  in  the  informal  sector  which  has  not  been  taken  sufficiently  into 
account  in  calculations  of  the  extent  of  urban  underemployment.  At  the  early  stages 
of  i  ndus  trial  isation 
,  the  incomes  of  migrant  households  were  relatively  "low",  but  this 
does  not  imply  that  they  were  relatively  poor  either  in  relation  to  rural  areas,  or  to 
the  past. 
It  has  often  been  argued  that  any  increase  in  employment  in  services  in  the 
framework  of  an  economy  in  which  agricultural  and  industrial  productivity  remain 
relatively  low  would  impede  development  (Bairoch,  1988,  p.  484).  In  a  country  where 
imports  and  exports  are  open,  overemployment  in  services  would  exert  pressures  both 
on  the  standard  of  living  and  on  prices  in  the  productive  sectors  of  the  economy, 
owing  to  the  additional  distribution  costs  entailed,  and  consequently  on  the  level  of 
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directed  toward  fresh  investment. 
However,  in  Korea  this  sector  was  an  asset  of  steady  economic  growth,  a  training 
field  for  urban  life  for  new  inmigrants  and  an  instrument  for  reducing  poverty.  As 
export  industries  grew  and  productivity  rose  in  industry  and  agriculture,  the  general 
level  of  consumption  increased.  The  informal  sector  connected  the  production  of 
goods  and  services  to  meet  the  essential  needs  of  the  population,  collecting  people's 
savings  and  channelling  them  into  productive  activities.  Often  the  capital  accumulated 
in  services  was  directed  towards  fresh  investment.  This  "open  structure"  was 
protected  by  high  tariffs  against  imports  of  consumption  goods.  That  was  well 
illustrated  by  a  statement  made  by  the  chairman  of  the  Lucky-Goldstar  group,  one  of 
the  top  ten  businesses  in  Korea; 
"My  father  and  I  started  a  cosmetic  cream  factory  in  the  late  1940s.  At  the  time, 
no  company  could  supply  us  m4th  plastic  caps  of  adequate  quality  for  cream  jars,  so 
we  had  to  start  a  plastic  business.  Plastic  caps  alone  were  not  sufficient  to  run  the 
plastic-molding  plant,  so  we  added  combs,  toothbrushes,  and  soap  boxes 
.  ...... 
This 
natural  step-by-step  evolution  through  related  businesses  resulted  in  the  Lucky- 
Goldstars  group  as  we  see  it  today.  For  the  future,  we  will  base  our  growth 
primarily  on  chemicals,  energy,  and  electronics  "(Harvard  Business  School,  1985) 
Some  rural  unskilled  poor  started  urban  life  as  construction  or  manual  workers. 
When  they  had  accumulated  a  small  amount  of  capital,  they  could  open  a  cornershop 
and  expand  it,  or  set  up  a  small  factory  to  produce  commodities  for  domestic 
consumption.  Others  amongst  the  rural  poor  started  as  hawkers  or  pedlars,  moving  on 
to  open  small  cornershops,  and  so  on.  In  comparison  with  studies  carried  out  during 
the  1960s  and  the  early  1970s,  the  national  migration  survey  in  1983  confirmed  how 
successfully  the  informal  or  traditional  sector  transferred  into  formal  and  modern 
sectors.  For  instance,  in  most  market  economies,  the  service  sector  expands  in  both 
absolute  and  relative  terms  over  time  with  economic  growth  (Chenery  and  Syrquin, 
1975).  In  Korea,  as  we  have  seen  in  Table  3-4,  by  1971,  the  composition  of  the 
service  sector  in  terms  of  employment  ratio  in  total  employment  had  increased  to 
37.4  per  cent.  It  steadily  decreased  to  33.6  per  cent  in  1976  and  then  increased  again 
as  the  economy  grew. 
So  this  open  structure  contributed,  not  only  to  increased  opportunities  for  social 
mobility  but  also  to  economic  growth.  Moreover,  many  technical  high  schools, 
polytechnics  and  national  universities  with  high  subsidies  by  the  government  played 
an  intermediate  role  between  education  of  young  rural  poor  and  the  supply  of  a 
skilled  labour  force  needed  for  industrialisation.  The  cities  were  a  pool  of 
opportunities,  although  the  opportunities  were  not  the  same  for  everyone. 
63 However,  since  the  mid  1970s  as  the  industrial  structure  has  shifted  from  labour 
intensive  industry  towards  skill-intensive  industry,  the  "open"  urban  structure  has 
increasingly  become  a  "closed"  structure,  and  universities  have  essentially  been 
functioning  as  instruments  of  control  over  opportunities  rather  than  as  ladders  of 
social  mobility.  (This  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  4).  Most  sons  and 
daughters  of  urban  low-income  households  have  been  increasingly  excluded  from 
opportunities  of  upward  social  mobility  because  they  cannot  afford  to  open 
cornershops.  Even  the  existing  cornershops  were  being  closed  by  modern  super- 
chains.  Neither  can  they  afford  tuition  fees  which  have  been  rapidly  increasing  over 
time. 
If  a  society  relies  on  the  family  as  its  principle  means  for  survival  in  hard  times,  as 
times  get  better  it  is  to  be  expected  that  successful  families  will  do  their  best  to  ensure 
that  their  children  benefit  from  their  growing  prosperity,  thus  building  growing 
inequalities  into  the  social  structure.  Economic  resources  can  be  used  to  gain  power, 
the  power  can  help  to  reinforce  power  or  to  create  economic  opportunities.  Thus, 
inequalities  of  condition  at  any  one  point  in  time  create  inequalities  of  opportunity  for 
future  achievement. 
In  Korea,  a  crucial  change  occurred  in  the  late  1970s.  At  this  time  the  majority  of 
people  were  separated  from  the  land  and  became  wage  earners.  They  became 
dependent  upon  wages  from  paid  labour.  Those  who  could  not  work  for  wages  could 
not  support  themselves  and  thus  were  poor.  Moreover,  household  expenditures  on 
education,  medical  treatments,  transport  and  especially  on  housing  began  to  rise 
rapidly  in  the  late  1970s.  This  implies  that  in  an  urban  system,  other  sources  of 
indirect  income  apart  from  the  labour  market,  appeared  to  be  creating  new  or  deeper 
patterns  of  inequality.  Pahl  (1973,  p.  101)  argued  that  the  provision  of  public  services 
and  facilities  has  its  own  pattern  of  inequalities.  The  question  raised  here  is  whether 
the  urban  system  in  Korea  itself  generates  inequality  or  whether  it  reflects  the 
economic  and  social  system  within  which  it  is  encapsulated.  Thus,  the  changing 
economic  and  social  structure  will  be  explored  in  the  following  sections. 
3.3  Changing  Industrial  Structure. 
The  two  land  reforms  and  the  Korean  War  (1950-53),  as  mentioned  earlier, 
flattened  the  distribution  of  non-agricultural  assets.  After  the  Korea  War,  some 
people  could  accumulate  large  amounts  of  wealth  through  war-time  business  and  by 
bribes,  tax  evasion,  and  so  on.  Just  after  the  military  coup,  the  military  junta 
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amount  of  confiscated  wealth  was  significant.  It  representing  6.6  per  cent  of  total 
corporate  savings  in  1961,16.6  per  cent  in  1962,3.8  per  cent  and  2.4  per  cent  in 
1964  and  1965  respectively  (Bank  of  Korea,  1965  and  1968).  After  the  launch  of  the 
Confiscation  of  Unjustifiably  Accumulated  Wealth,  Korea's  five  biggest  businesses, 
Buksam  Chemical,  Taichang  Textile,  Donglip  Industry,  Daiwang  Construction  and 
Jungang  Industry,  collapsed  and  were  never  revived  (Choo  H-J,  1982,  p.  62) 
After  the  launch  of  the  first  economic  development  five-year  plan  in  1962,  new 
larger  firms  began  to  be  established  as  a  matter  of  government  policy.  Firm  size  was 
significant  because  large  firms  tend  to  be  more  mechanised,  and  thus  increase 
productivity  faster.  However,  given  narrow  domestic  markets  and  a  poor  endowment 
of  natural  resources.,  import-substitution  industrialization  offered  limitations  for 
further  economic  development.  By  launching  the  second  economic  development  plan 
(1967-71),  the  government's  economy  policy  shifted  from  import-substitution 
towards  export-oriented  (or  outward  looking)  industrialization,  shifting  major 
demanders  from  domestic  households  towards  foreigners.  The  export  oriented 
industrialisation  was  very  successful,  but  also  had  a  crucial  flaw  -  i.  e.  sustaining 
growth  depended  crucially  on  responding  to  changes  in  world  trading  conditions. 
The  shift  towards  export-oriented  industrialization  itself  generated  the  conditions 
for  industrial  restructuring.  Once  an  export-oriented  policy  was  adopted  on  a  macro 
level,  a  deliberate  effort  had  to  be  made  to  diversify  the  economy  to  make  it  less 
vulnerable  to  international  downturns.  At  the  micro  level  flexibility  and  functional 
efficiency  in  Korean  industrial  organisation  became  necessary  in  coping  with 
fluctuating  international  markets;  industries  then  began  to  organize  in  a  hierarchical 
subcontracting  structure  with  functional  divisions  as  a  way  of  achieving  greater 
flexibility  and  efficiency. 
Big  businesses  did  make  significant  capital  investments  in  equipment  and 
machinery,  or  more  usually  by  building  larger  plants  and  employing  more  workers. 
Although  large  firms  tended  to  be  more  capital  intensive,  and  thus  absorb 
proportionately  less  labour  than  small  ones,  thanks  to  the  growing  size  of 
establishments,  the  majority  of  the  surplus  labour  force  derived  from  rural  areas 
could  transfer  into  new  factories.  For  example,  jobs  in  manufacturing  grew  at  an 
average  annual  rate  of  over  II  per  cent  during  1960-1970.  In  manufacturing,  exports 
accounted  for  just  3  per  cent  of  employment  in  1960.  It  increased  to  25  per  cent  by 
1970  (EPB,  1965  and  1972).  Evidence  from  D.  Morawetz  (1974,  p.  501)  shows  that 
the  shift  towards  export-oriented  industrialisation  went  hand  in  hand  with  growth  in 
employment. 
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skilled  labourers  could  fill  the  vacuum  between  the  production  for  domestic 
consumption  and  the  consumption  of  the  products.  They  played  the  role  of  inter- 
linkage  between  industry  and  commodities  of  consumption  (Bromley,  1978;  Peattie, 
1979).  Together  the  establishment  of  new  industries  for  export  and  the  prosperity  of 
the  informal  (or  traditional)  sector  could  successfully  absorb  the  increasing  labour 
force  and  reduce  poverty.  There  was  always  a  dilemma  between  whether  the  informal 
sector  should  be  basically  seen  as  a  social  service  which  should  be  encouraged  to  help 
provide  good  access  to  goods  for  all  the  population,  or  whether  it  should  be  viewed 
from  a  purely  economic  perspective  as  a  largely  privately  owned  industry,  often 
making  irresponsible  demands  on  the  environment  (see,  Park  C-C,  MP,  1989,  pp.  27- 
56).  Nevertheless,  its  growth  was  propelled  by  the  economic  structure  itself. 
However,  rapid  urbanisation  between  1966-1971  increased  unemployment  and 
underemployment.  The  first  oil  price  shock  in  1973  resulted  in  even  more  rapid 
growth  of  unemployment  and  underemployment.  Since  then,  the  government  decided 
that  the  time  had  come  to  undertake  a  new  strategy  leading  to  a  higher  stage  of 
development,  characterised  by  capital  and  skill-intensive  industrialisation,  such  as 
shipbuilding,  machinery,  steel  industry  and  petrochemicals.  A  large  part  of  national 
resources  were  allocated  for  the  development  of  heavy  and  chemical  industrialization 
in  which  the  government  saw  that  the  economies  of  scale  necessarily  took  a  greater 
advantage.  Some  big  businesses  were  chosen  by  the  government,  as  an  agent  of  such 
development.  According  to  one  estimate,  during  the  second  half  of  the  1970s,  as 
much  as  37  per  cent  of  the  investment  at  the  margin  was  given  to  investors  in  eligible 
key  industries  in  the  form  of  tax  privileges  (Kwack  T-W  and  Lee  K-S,  1991). 
In  contrast  to  this,  under  resource  constraints,  such  development  had  severe  effects 
on  small  businesses.  The  shortage  of  capital  reduced  rates  of  productivity  and 
hindered  the  growth  of  small  businesses.  As  the  turning  point  of  the  early  1970s,  big 
businesses,  known  as  the  Chaebols,  began  to  grow  rapidly  and,  at  the  same  time,  the 
Korean  economy  began  to  be  centralized.  Since  the  early  1970s,  for  example,  the 
average  annual  rate  of  value  added  of  the  biggest  five  Chaebols  has  grown  at  more 
than  twice  the  average  annual  GDP  growth  rate.  Until  the  late  1970s,  the  growth  of 
the  Chaebol,  and  thereby  the  centralisation  of  the  economy,  had  mainly  occurred 
through  new  establishment  and  then  the  expansion  of  heavy  and  chemical  industrial 
complexes  by  the  Chaebols. 
In  contrast  to  this,  the  creation  of  small  firms,  especially  in  the  manufacturing 
sector,  was  given  low  priority  until  the  early  1980s,  because  of  the  Korean 
government's  policy  of  promoting  the  expansion  of  production  capacity  in  existing 
firms  rather  than  the  establishment  of  new  small  firms  (Song  B-N,  1990,  p.  109).  The 
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bankruptcies  of  many  small  labour-intensive  light  industries.  The  difficulty  of  such 
industries  was  furthered  by  changes  in  the  labour  market.  Since  the  mid  1970s,  the 
supply  of  labour  shifted  from  over  supply  towards  scarcity  (Lim  J-C,  1985,  p.  42), 
causing  rapid  wage  increases  pushing  up  production  costs. 
Problems  were  not  confined  to  small  firms.  The  "big  push"  policy  began  to  show 
over-capacity  by  the  late  1970s  as  a  consequence  of  the  world-wide  recession.  The 
second  oil  price  shock  in  1979  resulted  in  bankruptcies  not  only  of  small  firms  but 
also  of  large  firms  such  as  Dosan  and  Yulsan.  Chaebols  realigned  their  overall 
organisations  by  selling  and  internally  merging  unprofitable  firms.  Moreover,  the 
government  launched  the  Anti-Monopoly  and  Fair  Trade  Act  in  1981  under  the  belief 
that  a  new  economic  order  was  necessary  to  adapt  to  the  changing  economic 
environment  as  a  legal  tool  to  attack  directly  the  problem  of  the  centralisation  of  the 
economy  (Lee  K-U,  S.  Urata  and  Choi  I-B,  1992,  pp.  212-3).  As  Table  3-9  shows,  as 
a  consequence  of  rationalisation  of  the  Chaebols  themselves  and  the  Act,  the  numbers 
of  affiliated  firms  temporarily  declined.  However,  the  unemployment  rate  began  to 
rise. 
A  harvest  failure  in  1980  was  accompanied  by  mass  out-migration  from  the 
agricultural  sector.  As  mentioned  earlier,  this  in  turn  led  to  several  social  crises.  The 
government  then  permitted  corporate  integration  for  the  purpose  of  rationalising 
industry  and  strengthening  international  competitiveness,  encouraging  big  businesses 
to  take  over  closed  industries  with  strong  support.  For  instance,  through  the  tax 
reform  in  1982,  the  government  reduced  corporate  income  tax  rates.  As  Kwack  T-W 
(1993,  p.  40  1)  pointed  out,  "From  a  pure  fiscal  view  point,  the  system  was  a  major 
source  of  revenue  loss. 
... 
led  to  unequal  tax  burdens  among  individuals  and  different 
sectors".  Nevertheless,  such  policy  successfully  reduced  the  unemployment  rate,  and 
hence  mitigated  a  social  crisis. 
Table  3-9  The  Number  of  Affiliated  Companies  of  30  Big  Chaebols. 
Year  1970  1979  1982  1985  1989 
Total  affiliated  companies  125  412  387  404  513 
Source:  Hong  J-P,  1989,  p.  87. 
In  addition,  to  cope  with  high  inflation  in  the  early  1980s,  government  launched 
tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  As  a  result,  small  companies  were  running  out  of 
money  to  pay  wages,  and  many  of  them  were  affiliated  to  big  businesses  as 
subcontractors.  Since  then  the  centralisation  of  the  economy  by  the  Chaebols  has 
been  undertaken  by  takeover,  mergers,  affiliation  and/or  incorporation  with  the 
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affiliated  firms  in  Chaebols  began  to  increase.  The  integration  of  small  firms  into  big 
businesses  as  affiliated  firms  allowed  the  Korean  economy  to  deal  more  easily  with 
structural  adjustment  problems  by  allocating  resources  and  technologies  internally 
from  profitable  and  affiliated  firms  to  others  within  the  Chaebol. 
After  the  world-wide  recession  in  the  late  1970s,  more  restrictions  by  developed 
countries  were  placed  on  the  established  exporting  countries  such  as  Korea,  Hong 
Kong,  and  Taiwan  (McMullen,  1982).  The  enlarged  big  businesses  therefore  began  to 
look  for  more  flexibility,  and  began  to  diversify  into  new  areas  as  a  way  of  diffusing 
risks  over  several  sectors.  They  began  to  enter  into  the  tertiary  and  service  sector.  It 
was  at  this  point  that  massive  urban  redevelopment  began,  changing  the  land  use  of 
city  centres  into  an  office  and  commercial  economy  (this  will  be  explored  in  Chapter 
6). 
The  Third  World  began  to  enter  into  international  markets  with  cheaper  wages 
since  the  early  1980s  squeezing  Korean  firms  out  of  the  low  end  of  the  markets.  Big 
businesses  had  to  compete  not  only  with  the  leading  American,  European  and 
Japanese  firms,  but  also  the  Third  World  countries  on  the  basis  of  quality  and 
responsiveness  to  specialized  customer  demands  and  not  exclusively  on  the  basis  of 
price. 
In  the  export  oriented  industrial  structure,  flexibility,  as  well  as  cheaper  production 
costs,  were  necessary  to  cope  with  the  changing  environments  of  the  international 
market.  Such  requirements  often  resulted  in  minimizing  the  quantity  of  labour 
required  to  perform  a  given  set  of  operations,  in  other  words  mechanization  or 
automation,  or  economies  of  scale.  This  had  previously  been  achieved  by  patterns  of 
organisation  which  have  been  described  as  "Fordist".  However,  in  many  modern 
industries,  if  not  all,  rapidly  changing  models  or  tastes  of  world  demands  often 
resulted  in  the  failure  of  Fordism. 
Korean  industry  could  cope  with  these  obstacles  in  two  ways.  One  was  by 
increasing  non-standard  employment  contracts  (irregular  workers),  especially  on  the 
production  line.  The  other  was  by  networking  between  big  firms  and  small  firms, 
formal  and  informal,  modern  and  traditional,  as  Figure  3-1  shows,  expanding 
subcontracts  or  reducing  subcontracts,  resulting  in  very  high  turnover  rates  of 
employees.  Through  this  structure,  Korean  industry  could  have  flexibility  and  the 
products  could  have  an  international  competitive  power  by  reducing  the  indirect 
payments  of  non-standard  employment  contractors  relying  on  part-time  workers, 
temporary  workers,  and  outworkers,  whether  legally  or  illegally.  Moreover,  reliance 
on  the  combination  of  both  irregular  workers  and  subcontracting  has  enabled 
Chaebols  to  reduce  capital  commitments,  which  has  helped  to  release  resources  for 
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Thereby,  on  the  one  hand,  Korean  goods  could  compete  in  high-tech  markets  and 
penetrate  low-income  markets  in  the  international  market  place,  continuing  economic 
growth.  On  the  other  hand,  the  centralisation  of  the  Korean  economy  by  the  Chaebols 
developed  its  own  momentum. 
Under  these  circumstances,  since  the  mid  1980s,  the  rapid  growth  of  organised 
work-place-based  groups  has  generated  political  pressures  'from  the  bottom  up'  in 
deciding  wage  levels.  Production  workers  began  to  organize  and  challenge 
professional  and  political  orthodoxies,  by  demanding  a  larger  share  in  the  fruits  of 
growth  and  more  influence  over  decisions.  As  a  consequence,  the  wages  of 
production  workers  have  rapidly  increased.  So  the  classic  economic  argument  again 
applied;  "as  labour  costs  increase  enterprise  will  seek  cheaper  alternatives".  Since 
then,  militant  unionisation  in  big  factories  and  extremely  expensive  factory  space 
have  encouraged  an  increase  in  irregular  workers  and  subcontracting  as  a  way  of 
alleviating  the  increased  wage  demands  which  increased  production  costs,  and/or  as  a 
way  of  reducing  capital  commitment  on  factory  sites. 
Figure  3-1  Industrial  Structure  of  Korea. 
Goods  raw  materials 
R&D 
A 
Big  business  (trade) 
Work  shop 
Medium  sub-contractor 
Small  sub-sub-contractor 
Outworker  (home-worker) 
This  structure  is  common,  if  not  universal  in  industry,  especially  in  the  case  of 
labour  intensive  industries  such  as  textiles,  footwear,  clothing,  etc.  which  accounted 
for  over  31  per  cent  of  manufacturing  workers  until  1989  (MOL,  January  1989), 
whose  competitive  power  has  traditionally  been  based  primarily  on  low  labour  costs. 
In  general,  the  smaller  the  firm,  the  more  likely  it  is  to  be  a  subcontractor.  It  seems 
that  the  smaller  factories  rely  more  extensively  on  non-standard  workers  due  to 
extremely  expensive  factory  space  in  an  effort  to  maintain  competitiveness. 
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even  assist  in  production  management  and  technology.  Thus  any  new  technology 
developed  can  easily  be  transmitted  to  small  firms.  Subcontractors  are  dependent  on 
contracting  firms  for  other  sources  of  capital,  and  for  the  marketing  of  their  products. 
They  have  no  control  over  the  marketing  of  their  products  and  they  are  paid  by 
contract  rate,  and  therefore  they  have  no  control  over  profit  extraction.  Some 
subcontracting  firms  serve  only  one  firm,  yet  most  work  for  several  simultaneously. 
It  is  then  up  to  the  subcontractors  to  finish  the  tasks  in  the  specified  time,  the  so- 
called  "just  in  time"  Process,  whether  by  working  overtime  or  by  bringing  in  more 
irregular  workers  in  order  to  obtain  new  orders  from  the  contracting  firms.  Under 
this  structure,  the  growth  of  small  and  medium-size  firms  has  depended  upon  the 
growth  of  the  large  firms.  This  gives  the  small  firms  an  impetus  for  growth  (Lee  K- 
U,  Urata  S.  and  Choi  I-B,  1992,  p.  215).  The  industrial  structure  can  be  easily 
understood  by  looking  at  the  Financial  Times  (Monday  August  8  1994): 
it  L  T,  I  11yundai  Heavy  Industries,  South  Korea's  largest  shipyard,  says  it  has  lost 
Won338bn  (E274m)  in  sales  as  a  result  of  a  strike  by  its  workers  that  began  on  June 
24.  The  Korea  Federation  o  Small  Business  warned  that  continuation  of  the  Hyundai 
strike  could  push  many  of  HH1's  1,500  suppliers  close  to  insolvency 
.  ....... 
The  small 
business  association  (sub  (-sub)  contractors)  urged  the  government  to  call  for 
emergency  arbitration  in  the  dispute  and  punish  the  HHI  workers  who  have  been 
occupying  the  shipyard  since  the  company  imposed  a  lock-out  on  July  20  of 
. 
The  Korean  government  has  devised  numerous  policies  since  the  mid  1980s  for  the 
purpose  of  easing  start-up  and  helping  small  businesses.  These  include  low  interest 
loans,  providing  cheap  sites  or  space,  job  creation  programmes,  and  retraining 
schemes.  Little  is  known  about  the  effects  of  these  policies.  It  may  be  too  early  to 
evaluate  the  policies.  Under  the  export-oriented  economic  structure,  the  changed 
international  market  and  this  industrial  structure,  however,  the  impacts  of  such 
programmes  necessarily  have  limitations. 
Moreover,  as  mentioned  earlier,  in  the  latter  half  of  the  1970s  the  government  used 
bank  credit  instruments  with  greater  than  usual  intensity  to  develop  heavy  and 
chemical  industries.  But  throughout  the  second  oil  price  shock  and  the  following 
world-wide  recession,  the  consequence  was  over-investment  and  an  apparent 
misallocation  of  capital  (Cho  YJ  and  Cole,  1992,  p.  122).  Partly  in  reaction  to  these 
assessments,  but  mainly  due  to  the  growth  of  Chaebols'  power  in  the  economyl  the 
government  changed  direction  and  reoriented  its  financial  policies  with  the 
liberalisation  of  commercial  banks,  occurring  between  1981  and  1983.  Government- 
held  shares  of  all  nationwide  commercial  banks  (about  20-30  per  cent)  were 
privatized  (Sakong  11,1993,  p.  72).  However,  as  T.  Michell  (1988,  p.  68  and  see  Cho 
Y-J  and  Cole,  1992,  p.  135,  note  4)  pointed  out,  "After  1980,  when  the  government 
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ended  in  the  hands  of  the  Chaebols  despite  stringent  measures  to  prevent  this".  Thus 
the  liberalisation  of  the  commercial  banks  contributed  to  the  growth  of  Chaebols  and 
the  further  centralisation  of  the  economy.  By  contrast,  small  businesses  faced  more 
difficulty  in  their  access  to  the  commercial  banks. 
If  economic  sociologists'  findings  that  strikes  are  apparently  more  frequent  when  a 
large  number  of  workers  are  employed  under  one  roof,  e.  g.  in  a  motor  car  factory, 
are  correct,  then  sub-contracting  industrial  organisation  must  have  contributed  to 
reducing  strikes  and  thereby  reducing  aggregate  costs.  Under  this  structure,  big 
businesses  are  located  far  away  from  subcontractors.  Managers  in  contracting  firms 
do  not  see  the  living  conditions  of  the  workers  in  subcontracting  firms.  Employers  of 
subcontractors  live  fairly  close  to  their  workers.  They  have  a  more  personal 
relationship  with  their  employees.  Most  of  these  employers  also  take  part  in  the 
production  process  (Han  H-0,1985  and  Cho  H-Y,  1993).  Thus  both  employer  and 
employee  have  mutual  obligations  to  a  much  broader  extent  than  in  a  big  factory. 
These  structural  environments  have  blurred  the  conflicts  between  employers  and 
employees  in  subcontractors. 
On  the  other  hand,  any  failure  of  subcontractors  in  the  output  process  would  result 
in  no  guarantee  for  a  further  contract  (This  has  been  much  emphasized  in  explaining 
Japanese  industrial  success  in  Western  countries).  The  growth  of  Chaebols,  and 
thereby  that  of  the  Korean  economy  are  based  on  this  internal  organization. 
Such  industrial  organisation  is  accompanied  by  a  crucial  functional  division 
between  contractor  and  subcontractor.  The  contracting  firms  mainly  focus  on 
marketing  in  international  markets  and  the  development  of  new  technology  and 
goods,  whereas  subcontractors  perform  purely  the  function  of  "just  in  time" 
production  according  to  the  order  of  contracting  firms.  Such  functional  division  is 
also  accompanied  by  the  intellectual  division  of  labour  according  to  the  functions.  In 
subcontracting  firms,  work  becomes  routine  and  meaningless.  This  has  been 
reinforced  by  the  development  of  technology.  In  that  structure,  Chaebols,  the 
contracting  firms,  require  the  careful  internal  conditioning  of  their  members  for 
maximum  external  effects  against  subcontractors  and  other  competing  enterprises  in 
international  markets.  The  new  recruit  to  the  labour  force  of  the  Chaebols,  via  highly 
competitive  examination,  is  deeply  and  carefully  drilled  in  the  purpose  of  his 
enterprise.  Higher  compensations  or  rewards  are  necessarily  required  to  create  the 
solidarity  on  which  external  power  depends.  Dualistic  labour  markets  emerged  as  the 
Korean  economy  shifted  towards  capital  and  skill-intensive  industry  and  this 
industrial  organisation  accelerated  the  bifurcating  tendency  in  the  labour  market. 
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the  tertiary  sector  in  association  with  enlarged  domestic  markets.  Since  the  mid 
1970s,  liberalization  in  imports  of  goods  and  services  by  the  force  of  developed 
countries  through  GATT  resulted  in  a  consumer  revolution.  Moreover,  the  rapid 
growth  of  wages  during  the  second  half  of  the  1970s  accelerated  the  consumption 
boom.  Retailing  also  seems  to  have  an  inbuilt  momentum  for  change,  at  once  both 
leading  and  being  led  by  changing  consumer  preferences  in  a  very  competitive 
market. 
Moreover,  as  a  result  of  the  world-wide  recession  after  the  second  oil  price  shock, 
the  Chaebols  experienced  severe  losses  due  to  rigidities  of  over  investment  in  heavy 
and  chemical  industries,  as  mentioned  earlier.  They  tried  to  offset  these  losses  by 
participating  in  the  lucrative  tertiary  sector  and  even  speculatively  in  real  estate 
markets.  Big  businesses  even  began  to  penetrate  retailing.  The  concept  of  super  chain 
stores  emerged  at  this  time  and  began  to  dominate  the  retailing  sector.  Thus  the 
centralisation  of  the  economy  was  driven  forward  by  the  Chaebols  which  kept  a  large 
number  of  affiliates  and  subcontractors,  ranging  from  manufacturing,  construction, 
finance,  insurance  to  retailing. 
Table  3-10  Combined  Sales  of  Top  Ten  Chaebols,  as  Percent  of  GNP,  1974-1984. 
Groups  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
1  4.9  4.3  4.7  7.9  6.9  8.3  8.3  10.5  10.4  11.8  12.0 
2  7.2  7.5  8.1  12.5  12.9  12.8  16.3  19.1  19.0  21.2  24.0 
3  9.0  9.8  11.3  16.0  16.9  17.6  23.9  27.6  27.4  30.5  35.8 
4  10.3  11.4  12.9  18.2  20.7  22.1  30.1  35.2  35.6  38.7  44.3 
5  11.6  12.8  14.5  19.8  22.9  24.6  35.0  41.3  42.2  46.7  52.4 
6  12.7  14.1  16.1  21.3  24.7  26.6  38.2  44.9  46.0  51.0  56.2 
7  13.5  15.3  17.5  22.8  26.4  28.5  41.0  48.0  49.2  54.2  59.4 
8  14.3  16.2  18.4  24.0  27.7  30.3  43.6  50.9  52.2  57.1  62.1 
9  14.7  16.7  19.3  25.2  28.9  31.6  46.0  53.3  55.1  59.8  64.8 
10  15.1  17.1  19.8  26.0  30.1  32.8  48.1  55.7  57.6  62.4  67.4 
Note:  (Aggregate  net  sales  of  the  largest  ten  business  groups/GNP)  X  100  for  each  year. 
Source:  Seok-Ki  Kim  (1987) 
The  changed  industrial  structure,  centralisation,  subcontracting  relationships,  and 
the  diversification  of  centralised  big  businesses  have  all  eliminated  small  individual 
businesses  and  restricted  the  number  of  newcomers  to  industry  and  business  (Lee  K- 
it  I  U,  S.  Urata  and  Choi  I-B,  1992,  p.  210),  resulting  in  a  closed  industrial  structure'  . 
Han  H-0  (1985,  p.  138)  depicted  such  trends  in  the  following  manner  through  her 
empirical  study  of  small  self-sustained  shoe  factories  in  1983; 
"Small  self-sustained  producers  well  know  the  limitation  of  marketing,  so  that  they 
are  reluctant  to  expand  their  businesses.  Even  though  they  could  accumulate  a  small 
amount  of  capital,  they  invest  in  housing  or  land  rather  than  re-investment  for  the 
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small  self-sustained  producers  " 
Since  1987,  domestic  savings  began  to  exceed  domestic  investments.  Under  this 
closed  industrial  structure,  the  surplus  money  was  channeled  into  real  estate  markets, 
and  the  unexpected  real  estate  boom  since  late  1987  necessarily  followed,  resulting  in 
explosive  house  price  increases  (KRIHS,  1990,  p.  7). 
3.4  Changing  Social  Structure. 
Once  general  Park  came  into  power  through  the  military  coup  in  196  1,  massive 
political  and  administrative  reforms  were  introduced,  setting  the  First  Economic 
Development  Five-year  Plan  (1962-66)  which  incorporated  both  administrative 
functions  and  political  processes  such  as  budgeting  (Lee  C-S,  1981,  p.  98).  The 
government  was  re-organized  with  a  centralized  hierarchy.  Since  then,  as  outlined  in 
Chapter  2,  in  the  political  and  administrative  landscape  of  Korea,  there  has  been  no 
division  of  power,  no  independent  local  government,  no  strong  political  parties,  no 
independent  parliament  and  no  judiciary  capable  of  curbing  executive  power. 
National  resources  were  allocated  according  to  the  development  plan  by  the 
government.  The  resource  allocation  system  was  a  vital  source  of  power.  The 
government  was  the  core  of  power.  The  public  bureaucracy,  with  strong  social  and 
ideological  cohesion  and  shared  professional  interests  and  cultural  values,  held  power 
and  led  Korean  society  until  the  late  1970s. 
The  dominance  of  the  public  bureaucracy  not  only  in  policy  implementation  but 
also  in  decision  making  was  often  explained  by  the  assertion  that  executive 
dominance  stems  in  part  from  the  leadership's  personal  motivation  and  strong 
commitment  to  economic  performance  and  in  part  from  historical  tradition  rooted  in 
Confucianism  (Whang  I-J,  1992,  p.  308;  Jones  and  Sakong,  1980,  pp.  58-66). 
However,  the  main  background  for  the  executive  dominance  arises  from  two  factors. 
Firstly,  there  were  no  other  groups  competing  for  power  outside  the  government.  As 
mentioned  earlier,  the  aristocracy  was  dissolved  by  two  land  reforms,  industrial 
capitalists  were  destroyed  by  the  Korean  War  and  dismantled  by  the  military 
revolution,  and  industrial  workers  were  a  small  percentage  of  the  population. 
Moreover,  the  unions  were  divided  by  their  ideologies  (Park  F-K,  1993,  p.  30).  The 
military  revolutionaries  formed  the  Democratic  Republican  Party  (DRP)  and  won  the 
election.  The  chairman  of  the  DRPI,  President  Park,  argued,  "A  new,  ifficient  and 
incorruptible  state  which  will  guarantee  liberty  and  justice  under  law,  and  provide  for 
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"administrative  democracy"  (General  Assembly  Official  Records,  requoted  in  Lee  Y- 
H,  1975,  p.  29).  For  instance,  when  the  Comprehensive  Measure  for  Economic 
Stabilization  was  announced  in  April  1979,  "although  the  EPB  technocrats 
understood  the  political  implications  of  the  CHES,  they  tended  to  neglect  them  as  they 
pursued  economic  rationality  to  cope  with  the  problems  that  the  program  was  to 
address"  (Whang  I-J,  1992,  p.  314). 
Secondly,  the  technocrats  in  the  public  bureaucracy  have  been  recruited  through  a 
highly  competitive  examination  on  the  basis  of  merit,  then  provided  with  extensive 
training.  Incompetent  bureaucrats  were  promptly  removed,  while  others  were 
promoted  on  the  basis  of  merit  (Lee  C-S,  1981,  p.  96).  Thus,  it  is  not  an  exaggeration 
to  say  that  the  public  bureaucracy  was  made  up  of  the  most  talented  people  in  society. 
Moreover,  they  were  highly  motivated  by  the  meritocratic  system  of  promotion  and 
rewards.  Thus,  there  was  little  competing  organisation  of  power  and  talent  to 
challenge  the  public  bureaucracy. 
Some  observers  have  often  described  this  bureaucratic  dominance  as  authoritarian 
and  undemocratic.  This  is  true.  However,  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  most  of  the 
bureaucrats  recruited  on  the  basis  of  their  ability  had  common  experiences  with  the 
people  they  in  effect  ruled.  They  had  lived  under  harsh  colonial  rules  and  they  had 
experienced  the  Korean  War  and  the  hunger  and  famine  which  followed.  Even  though 
they  were  authoritarian  and  undemocratic,  they  knew  the  misery  of  poverty  and 
understood  the  poor.  For  them,  economic  development  was  seen  as  the  first  and  most 
necessary  step.  Even  dictatorship  was  tolerated,  rather  required,  for  the  sake  of 
national  solidarity  and  economic  development.  They  have  been  anxious  to  alleviate 
the  problems  of  acute  poverty,  but  not  to  provide  general  social  welfare  schemes 
(Hasan  and  Rao,  1979,  p.  169).  The  method  to  cope  with  the  problem  was  "through 
economic  growth".  The  government's  strategies  for  equity  can  be  summed  up  under 
three  headings;  high  investment  in  education,  strong  control  of  the  mode  of 
production  and  cross-subsidization  through  highly  progressive  tax  on  the  wealthier 
people,  e.  g.  through  the  Special  Consumption  Tax. 
Ralph  Turner  defined  two  ideal  forms  of  mobility  which  he  termed  contest  and 
sponsored  mobility.  Contest  mobility  is  the  form  of  mobility  where  the  top  positions 
in  society  are  dependent  principally  upon  the  ability  and  effort  of  the  individual. 
Sponsored  mobility  is  the  form  of  mobility  where  recruits  to  the  leading  positions  in 
society  are  chosen  by  the  powerful,  not  on  individual  merit.  In  Korea,  both  forms  of 
mobility  exist,  but  the  contest  form  is  absolutely  dominant.  The  combination  of  the 
meritocratic  system  in  the  public  bureaucracy  and  the  government's  strong  emphasis 
on  education  contributed  to  the  building  of  a  remarkably  fluid  society.  Additionally, 
74 as  Hwang  E-G  (1993,  pp.  74-5)  pointed  out,  "without  the  belt  tightening  sacrifice  of 
the  then  poor  Korean  parents  for  their  children's  education,  the  foundations  for 
subsequent  high  growth  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  would  never  have  been  laid 
This  has  allowed  Korea  to  utilise  its  resources  of  talent  fully.  Considerable 
potential  talent  has  not  been  wasted  by  the  stratification  system  itself.  This  system  has 
become  acknowledged  as  one  of  the  main  factors  explaining  the  "economic  miracle". 
However,  in  a  highly  homogenous  society  without  ethnic,  linguistic  or  religious 
cleavages,  traditional  social  stratification  has  been  dismantled.  Educational  attainment 
has  begun  to  loom  large  as  the  most  important  cause  of  social  stratification  (this  will 
be  discussed  in  the  next  Chapter). 
Under  the  national  resource  allocation,  big  businesses  as  exporters  benefitted  more 
than  others.  Such  unequal  allocation  of  national  resources  has  resulted  in  the 
centralisation  of  the  Korean  economy,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last  section.  The 
concentration  of  economic  activities  has  been  a  pervasively  characteristic  feature  of 
industrial  development  ever  since  (Galbraith,  1985,  p.  131).  It  was  Marx's  assertion 
that  only  a  small  fraction  of  increased  value  was  returned  to  the  worker  in  his  wages. 
Surplus  value  in  the  form  of  interest,  profits,  and  rents  was  appropriated  by  the 
capitalist.  Should  wages  rise  because  of  an  unnatural  scarcity  of  workers,  this  would 
provoke  a  crisis  or  depression.  Such  crises  would  ultimately  bring  an  end  to  capitalist 
power.  Any  such  crises  leading  to  the  demise  of  small  entrepreneurs  would  contribute 
to  the  process  of  concentration  and  centralisation.  Large  capitalists  would  gobble  up 
the  smaller  businessmen  or  force  them  into  the  proletariat.  Along  with  the  crises, 
attenuation  and  weakness  from  over  concentration  and  centralisation  would  contribute 
to  the  final  collapse.  During  this  process,  the  state  would  be  viewed  as  an  executive 
committee  for  managing  the  affairs  of  the  governing  class  as  a  whole  (Marx  and 
Engels,  1976,  p.  486). 
In  Korea,  the  government  was  subjected  to  the  accumulation  of  capital,  but  the 
bureaucrats  mostly  had  a  background  of  poverty.  The  control  of  national  resources 
gave  power  to  the  public  bureaucracy  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  a  few  big 
capitalists  who  could  dominate  the  whole  economy.  As  Table  3-11  shows,  for 
instance,  the  average  debt  to  equity  ratio  in  manufacturing  industries  is  over  300  per 
cent.  So  technically  speaking,  all  big  businesses  in  Korea  are  in  a  state  of  bankruptcy 
(see  Kim  E-H,  1990,  pp.  341-57  and  Jones  and  Sakong  1987,  pp.  343-64).  There  is 
increased  centralisation  of  control  in  the  economy  by  the  Chaebols,  but  without 
entailing  increased  concentration  of  ownership. 
Many  critics  have  highlighted  the  fact  that  the  Chaebols'  asset  portfolios  were 
owned  and  controlled  by  a  few  individuals  and  their  family  members.  It  seems  to  be 
the  case  at  a  first  glance.  As  of  April  1992,  about  46.1  per  cent  of  total  paid  in 
75 capital  of  the  top  30  Chaebols  was  held  by  the  minority  individual  shareholders 
(usually  the  founders  or  their  inheriters),  their  relatives  and  the  Chaebol  itself 
(Sakong,  1993,  p.  186).  However,  considering  the  high  debt  to  equity  rates  and  the 
control  of  capital  by  the  government,  the  real  owner  of  the  Chaebols,  or 
conglomerates,  is  still  the  state.  Proof  of  this  lies  with  the  example  of  "Kukje",  one 
of  the  top  five  Chaebols,  which  was  dismantled  overnight  by  the  decision  of  the 
government  to  withdraw  credits.  After  dismantlement,  the  Chaebol  was  divided  and 
incorporated  into  other  companies  and  continued  to  grow  under  a  changed  name.  The 
chairman  of  the  Chaebol,  generally  known  as  the  owner,  became  no  more  than  an 
ordinary  retired  person.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  in  Korea,  there  are  some  very  wealthy 
businesses  but  there  are  no  very  wealthy  families. 
Table  3-11  Average  Debt  to  Equity  Ratio  in  Manufacturing  Industries. 
Year  1968  1970  1975  1980  1985  1988 
Debt  Ratio  201.3  328.4  339.5  487.9  348.4  340.1 
Source:  Byung-Nak  Song,  1990,  pp.  74-5. 
The  process  of  export-oriented  expansion  of  enterprises  increased  the  technical 
complexity  of  the  work  of  management,  creating  the  need  to  delegate  control  in 
varying  degrees  to  various  levels  of  the  bureaucratic  apparatus.  Moreover,  the 
development  of  technology  proceeded  apace,  accompanied  by  the  development  of 
bureaucratic  structures  to  carry  out  managerial  work.  Some  Marxist  works  and  a  host 
of  non-Marxist  economists  also  have  similar  views  on  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of 
the  separation  of  ownership  and  management  and  the  bureaucratisation  of  managerial 
work  on  control  relations  in  enterprise  and  on  class  formation  (see  Poulantzas,  1973 
and  1975  and  Carchedi  1975a  and  1975b). 
Growing  corporate  size,  as  the  Korean  economy  grew,  increasingly  sophisticated 
technology  and  the  need  for  specialized  management  and  marketing  skills  contributed 
to  transfer  power  from  shareholders  to  managers,  from  property  to  organisations.  The 
shift  in  power  from  capitalists  towards  the  management  was  affirmed  by  Berle,  Jr.  and 
Means  (1933).  They  concluded  that  in  the  majority  of  the  two  hundred  largest 
corporations  in  the  U.  S.  control  had  passed  to  the  management,  and  Berle,  Jr.  (1969) 
later  concluded  that  in  the  modern  large  corporation,  the  management  rather  than  the 
owners  of  the  property,  emerged  as  the  decisive  holders  of  power.  Lindblom  (1977, 
p.  26)  confirmed  that  organisation  is  the  ultimate  source  of  all  power.  It  was  further 
affirmed  by  Burnham  (1941),  Schumpeter  (1947),  Chandler  (1977)  and  Herman 
(1981).  Burnham  coined  the  phrase  managerial  revolution  to  describe  an  economy  in 
which  paid  managers  control  vast  business  enterprises  and  those  who  work  for  them. 
76 He  predicted  that  the  main  holders  of  power  in  future  societies  would  not  be 
communists,  socialists,  or  capitalists,  but  rather  people  who  possessed  expert 
technological  skills.  For  Schumpeter,  the  bureaucratisation  of  modern  economic 
enterprise  was  an  inevitable  complement  to  modern  economic  development.  Herman 
emphasized  that  it  was  obvious  that  the  shift  from  property  to  organisation  was  the 
prime  source  of  power  in  the  industrial  enterprise.  Of  course,  there  is  strong 
opposition  to  this  view.  For  example,  Scott  (1985,  p.  77)  showed  that  43  out  of  the 
top  250  British  firms  were  still  controlled  through  personal  shareholding. 
In  Korea,  the  ceiling  of  shareholding,  limitation  of  total  voting  rights  etc.,  all 
invalidate  the  theory  that  ownership  remains  crucial.  Hence,  a  Marxist  emphasis  on 
the  prime  importance  of  economic  power  residing  in  the  hands  of  a  dominant 
economic  class  often  an  inadequate  account  of  the  Korean  economy. 
Since  the  mid  1970s,  with  a  centralized  economy  but  not  a  concentration  of  wealth, 
the  means  of  production  have  been  increasingly  controlled  by  the  technocrats. 
Industries,  being  restructured  on  the  basis  of  function  according  to  status  as  a 
contractor  or  subcontractor,  have  paved  the  way  for  the  emergence  of  another  strong 
bureaucracy,  a  faceless  and  propertyless  but  powerful  group,  holding  more  power  as 
businesses  grew  and  management  became  more  complicated. 
As  the  Korean  economy  has  centralized,  the  growth  and  the  collapse  of  the 
Chaebols  have  shaped  patterns  of  employment,  wages,  tax  revenues  and  so  on.  This 
meant  that  economic  power  has  become  more  concentrated  and  hence  more 
influential  in  dealing  with  the  government.  In  other  words,  the  government  has  had  to 
increasingly  take  account  of  the  interests  of  these  powerful  big  businesses.  For 
instance,  since  the  4th  Economic  Development  Plan  (1977-81),  major  policy  issues 
began  to  be  discussed  in  the  "Economic  Policy  Conference  Council"  in  which  the 
private  bureaucrats  began  to  take  part.  Moreover,  after  the  launch  of  the  price 
stabilisation  which  froze  the  salaries  of  civil  officials  in  the  early  1980s,  the  young 
and  talented  have  turned  to  the  private  bureaucracy  because  jobs  and  other 
compensatory  rewards  became  more  important  as  an  instrument  of  power  as  society 
become  more  affluent. 
There  were  two  bureaucracies,  the  public  bureaucracy  and  the  private  bureaucracy, 
which  have  led  the  Korean  economy  (Rodgers,  1993,  p.  70)  and  society.  The 
relationship  between  the  government  and  businesses  was  authoritarian  during  the 
early  stages  of  economic  development,  when  the  private  sector  was  relatively  weak  in 
capital  accumulation,  managerial  talents  and  institutional  infrastructure;  but  not  since 
the  late  1970s. 
The  development  of  the  private  bureaucracy  has  several  advantages.  Firstly,  it 
enforces  a  universal  set  of  rules  on  industries  rather  than  relying  largely  on 
77 nationalised  firms  -  i.  e.  imposing  a  common  discipline  of  growth  maximisation  rather 
than  profit  maximisation  in  private  business.  Secondly,  this  discipline  is  achieved 
without  public  expenditure.  Moreover,  the  emergence  of  a  private  bureaucracy,  as  a 
competitive  and  countervailing  power  against  the  public  bureaucracy,  allegedly  acts 
as  an  important  factor  in  checking  what  O'Donnel  (1973)  termed  "bureaucratic 
authoritarianism"  in  Korea. 
The  two  do  not  always  converge.  Rather  the  public  bureaucracy  and  the  private 
bureaucracy  are  widely  regarded  as  mutual  enemies.  For  instance,  as  the  Chaebols 
grew,  in  1981  the  government  introduced  the  Monopoly  Regulation  and  a  Fair  Trade 
Act  and  formed  the  Fair  Trade  Commission.  In  1983,  through  the  amendment  of  the 
Bank  Act,  the  government  set  a  ceiling  of  8  per  cent  for  any  individual  or  group 
shareholder  owning  shares  of  a  bank.  In  1.984,  the  government  strengthened  the 
system  of  credit  supervision  for  large  Chaebols.  In  1986,  the  existing  monopoly 
regulation  and  fair  trade  Act  was  amended  specifically  to  deal  with  Chaebol  growth 
(Sakong,  1993,  p.  63).  They  have  varying  degree  of  influence  at  different  times  and 
over  different  issues,  and  exercise  countervailing  power  against  each  other  as  and 
when  necessary,  depending  on  the  issues.  Nevertheless,  there  has  existed  a  basic 
consensus  on  norms  and  goals.  They  have  common  characteristics  in  that  they  are 
recruiting  people  on  a  meritocratic  basis  through  competitive  examination,  who  have 
often  graduated  from  the  same  universities.  All  emphasis  is  on  service  to  economic 
growth.  Whang  IJ  (1992,  p.  318)  aptly  described  the  relationship  between  the  two 
bureaucracies,  "the  business  community  was  able  to  provide  information  and  advice 
on  policymaking  not  only  through  formal  mechanisms,  but  also  through  informal 
bilateral  channels  -  the  latter  means  seemed  more  powerful,  whereas  the  former 
tended  to  be  largely  cosmetic".  To  a  great  extent,  corruption  and  distortion  in 
economic  management  in  Korea  (see  Kim  K-S,  1983)  can  be  explained  by  these 
informal  channels. 
The  emergence  of  a  private  bureaucracy  helped  to  distribute  power  to  more  people. 
But  the  pluralist  assumption  (see  Dahl,  1961;  Dunleavy  and  O'Leary,  1987;  etc.  )  that 
all  citizens  have  potentially  equal  access  to  influence  through  the  operation  of  interest 
groups  is  too  optimistic.  Under  the  subcontracting  structure  the  difference  in  the 
strategic  position  of  subcontractors  and  contractors  is  so  overwhelming  that  the  work 
contract  ceases  to  be  a  "contract"  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word,  because  the 
former  are  unconditionally  at  the  mercy  of  the  latter  -  to  some  extent,  in  the  position 
of  workers  and  employers  in  subcontractors.  Therefore,  low-income  in  Korea  is  a 
synonym  of  powerlessness  in  economic  and  political  life.  Rodgers'  article  (1993) 
describes  the  industrial  relations  and  human  resource  management  policies  and 
practices  of  individual  firms  aptly  from  an  economist's  point  of  view. 
78 "  Almost  all  female  employees,  employees  in  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises, 
irregular  employees,  and  production  workers  in  labour  intensive  industries  face  low 
wages,  poor  working  conditions,  a  routinized,  fiagmented,  non-participatory  form  of 
work,  minimal  skillformation  and  unstable  employment.  Nonetheless,  because  of  the 
relatively  lower  labour  costs  and  greater  external  (numerical)  flexibility  associated 
with  these  categories  of  workers,  their  role  in  the  Korean  economy  is holding  steady 
or  even  rising.  At  the  opposite  end  of  the  spectrum,  very  different  policies  are 
applied  to  managerial,  professional  and  technical  employees  (virtually  all  male), 
particularly  those  in  large  companies  affiliated  with  a  major  Chaebol,  and 
particularly  in  capitalltechnologylknowledge  intensive  industries.  They  are  very 
carefully  selected,  trained,  and  socialized  to  become  highly  competent  craftsmen  or 
professionals  who  will  remain  faithful  members  of  the  corporate  families  (p.  75). 
These  relationships  make  up  the  urban  social  form.  In  other  words,  the  relationship 
of  superordination  and  subordination  plays  an  immense  role  in  social  life  (this  will  be 
discussed  in  Chapter  6).  Trade  unions  can  exert  a  countervailing  exercise  of  power 
for  the  blue  collar  workers.  The  end  of  the  Second  World  War  in  1945  brought  about 
labour  strife  with  the  union  houses  divided  by  their  ideologies  (Park  F-K,  1993, 
p.  30).  Since  the  launch  of  the  military  government,  to  maintain  competitive  power  in 
international  markets,  the  government  exercised  tight  control  and  rough  treatment 
over  labour  activities,  especially  in  the  key  export  industries  (Deyo,  1989).  As  Kim 
S-K  (1989,  p.  10)  described,  government's  intervention  in  the  labour  market  took  the 
form  of  "labour-government  relations"  replacing  "labour-management  relations". 
Evidence  of  the  government's  control  over  labour  may  be  found  in  strike  statistics. 
Sharp  peaks  in  the  number  of  labour  disputes,  towering  above  the  very  low  numbers 
in  normal  years,  occurred  in  1960-61,1979-80,  and  1987-89,  beginning  in  the 
months  immediately  after  the  successive  regimes  of  Presidents  Rhee,  Park  and  Chun 
had  ended.  It  does  not  appear  that  economic  factors  relating  to  the  business  cycle  had 
any  significant  impact  on  the  number  of  strikes  (Park  Y-K,  1991,  requoted  from 
Rodgers,  1993,  p.  78). 
Meanwhile  the  public  and  private  bureaucracies  became  increasingly  homogeneous. 
It  may  be  noteworthy  that  the  examination  method  helped  to  recruit  a  heterogeneous 
social  group  when  the  access  to  educational  opportunities  was  equal,  but  it  recruited 
an  increasingly  homogeneous  social  group  when  access  was  increasingly  limited  to  a 
certain  group,  homogeneous  in  social  origins,  educational  background  and  social 
intercourse.  Low-income  households  have  been  increasingly  excluded  from  access  to 
educational  opportunities  either  by  increased  education  costs  or  increased  housing 
consumption  costs  (this  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapters). 
Of  course  the  two  bureaucracies  are  not  political  parties.  However,  they  have 
specialist  knowledge  and  information  to  offer  the  politicians  for  decision  making  and 
they  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  decis  ion-  making,  as  translators  of  raw  political 
demands  into  political  issues.  As  a  consequence,  disagreement  about  large  and 
fundamental  issues  of  social  life  has  declined.  Ideological  conflict  is  becoming 
79 steadily  less  prominent.  These  are  now  regarded  as  the  exclusive  concern  of  students. 
But  a  white-collar  style  of  politics  has  been  dominating  Korean  politics  in  which  there 
was  apathy  about  income  equalisation,  but  active  opposition  to  high  taxation  and 
public  spending  on  social  welfare  services.  There  has  been  support  for  programmes 
expanding  control  of  employers  as  well  as  production  employees  in  the  enterprise, 
arguing  for  political,  economic  and  social  democracy  on  the  basis  of  a  meritocratic 
system. 
The  "labour-government  relations"  were  able  to  be  continued  by  the  implicit  and 
often  explicit  support  of  the  white-collar  workers.  Their  most  articulate  and 
compelling  voice  was  that  of  Jeremy  Bentham,  urging  the  testing  of  all  public  action 
by  the  rule  "The  greatest  good  for  the  greatest  number".  The  result  may  not  be 
perfect,  but  it  is  the  best  possible.  Implicit,  rather  than  explicit,  was  the  idea  that  not 
all  could  prosper;  some  must  fall  by  the  wayside  in  order  that  the  greatest  number  be 
served,  for  the  so-called  "the  public  interest"  or  "the  need  of  the  nation".  Some 
suffering  and  deprivation  is  inevitable  even  in  the  most  developed  country.  That')  it 
was  assumed,  was  a  manifestation  of  Darwinism  in  the  social  order;  its  governing 
principle  was  the  survival  of  the  fittest;  the  poor  were  poor  because  they  were 
inferior  in  a  competitive  society.  Poverty  was  the  cost  of  those  who  were  inherently 
worse. 
A  prevailing  ideology  significantly  influenced  by  a  powerful  group  forms  the 
boundaries  within  which  policies  will  be  made,  influencing  the  kinds  of  issues  that 
develop  and  limiting  the  range  of  possible  options  for  consideration,  so  that  a  group 
adopting  this  ideology  will  have  a  significantly  greater  chance  of  influencing  policy, 
and  then  be  able  to  benefit  even  more  from  those  policies.  They  are  likely  to  have  the 
skills,  resources  and  organisations  necessary  to  mount  campaigns  that  will  ensure  the 
protection  of  their  interest.  Steven  Lukes  (1974)  called  this  the  "third  dimension  of 
power".  Galbraith  (1985)  termed  it  "conditioned  power",  the  most  important 
instruments  of  power  in  modern  society.  The  bureaucrats  pursue  policies  which  they 
genuinely  believe  to  be  in  the  communal  interest  but  which  -in  Korea-  objectively 
benefit  middle-income  groups  much  more  than  others.  This  conception  of  power  and 
interest  can  be  easily  identified  by  examining  the  routine,  institutional  ised, 
unchallenged  public  policies,  and/or  non-politics  of  the  status  quo  (this  will  be 
examined  in  the  following  chapters). 
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After  the  Korean  War  (1950-53),  the  low-income  issue  was  mainly  national  poverty 
itself.  At  this  stage,  national  poverty  was  the  core  of  issues.  After  the  launch  of  the 
First  Economic  Development,  Korea  began  to  be  celebrated  as  an  exemplary  case  of 
economic  development  in  the  Third  World.  Society  had  an  open  structure  in  which 
most  big  businesses  mainly  engaged  in  manufacturing  and  exports  and  domestic 
markets  were  largely  developed  by  small  artisans  and  family  firms.  Under  these 
circumstances')  industrial  isation  meant  the  establishment  of  new  factories. 
The  economic  growth  of  Korea  steadily  and  rapidly  continued,  but  industrialization 
could  not  absorb  the  increased  labour  force.  The  most  visible  consequence  of 
industry's  inability  to  provide  adequate  employment  for  such  a  rapidly  growing 
labour  force,  especially  in-migrants  from  rural  areas  having  no  education  or  only 
primary  education,  with  no  assets  except  their  labour,  is  the  emergence  of 
underemployment  and  the  growth  of  the  informal  sector.  Their  common 
characteristics  were  low-income,  extremely  poor  working  conditions  and  harsh 
discipline,  which  identified  them  as  the  core  of  the  poverty  problem.  Continuing 
economic  growth  provided  more  full-time  gainful  employment  for  men  as  well  as 
women  and  as  urban  areas  grew,  with  rising  real  incomes  for  households,  demand  for 
secondary  and  tertiary  products  grew  also.  Employment  in  the  secondary  and  tertiary 
sectors  rose  as  a  result.  Surplus  rural  labour  was  absorbed  by  industrial  isation  as 
production  workers  in  factories  located  in  urban  areas. 
The  growth  of  the  urban  population  increased  demands  for  rural  output.  The 
decline  in  rural  population  reduced  the  burden  of  rural  poverty.  The  government's 
strong  investment  in  education  and  the  development  of  the  meritocratic  system  in 
recruitment,  promotion  and  reward  in  the  public  bureaucracy,  the  most  powerful 
group  at  that  time,  made  Korea  a  fluid  society.  This  was  coupled  with  a  strong  desire 
of  Korean  parents  for  their  children's  education. 
This  authoritarian  and  undemocratic  regime  was  tolerated  by  the  people  for  the 
sake  of  national  solidarity  and  economic  development.  Contrasting  socialist  and 
capitalist  Acts  and  reforms  were  possible  because  many  policy  makers  themselves  had 
backgrounds  of  poverty  and  were  accepted  by  the  people  because  society  was  more  or 
less  equal,  offering  more  or  less  equal  access  to  opportunities.  Thus  the  fluid  society 
itself  operated  as  the  best  mechanism  for  social  development. 
However,  things  changed  after  the  mid  1970s.  Diversification  of  economic  bases 
led  by  the  government  itself  brought  about  centralisation  of  the  economy.  The 
centralized  big  business  required  flexibility  in  production  according  to  fluctuating 
international  markets.  Thus  hierarchical  subcontracting  became  the  general  form  of 
Korean  industrial  structure.  Moreover,  sluggish  international  demands  pushed  the 
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can  say  with  certainly  is  that  the  changing  industrial  structure  did  not  provide  a  ready 
alternative  for  people  who  lost  their  jobs.  Centralisation  and  technological  innovation 
slowed  down  employment  growth  in  low-income  groups  significantly.  The  structural 
changes  penalized  low-income  groups  and  made  low-income  a  structural  problem. 
The  Korean  economy  has  been  centralized  by  the  Chaebols,  but  without  entailing 
concentration  of  wealth.  This  has  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  another  strong, 
faceless  propertyless,  but  powerful  bureaucracy.  Korean  society  was  led  by  the  two 
bureaucracies.  Meanwhile,  the  education  which  gave  the  only  ladder  for  the  urban 
low-income  households  to  move  upwards  began  to  operate  as  a  powerful 
discriminator,  as  access  to  educational  opportunities  has  increasingly  been  limited  to 
certain  groups  based  on  family  backgrounds. 
The  powerful  bureaucracies  are  made  up  of  people  from  similar  social  groups  and 
educational  backgrounds.  Relations  between  the  two  bureaucracies  have  become  more 
cooperative  partly  through  formal  mechanisms  but  largely  through  informal  bilateral 
channels.  What  serves  these  bureaucrats  -  the  control  of  concentrations  of  wealth,  the 
promotion  of  economic  growth,  the  provision  of  qualified  manpower,  the  property- 
owning  democracy  etc.,  leaving  the  poor  as  they  are  -  are  the  public  interests,  issues 
and  problems,  and  the  aim  of  public  policies. 
In  Korea,  there  is  no  visible  ruling  class  nor  underclass.  However,  Giddens  (1973, 
p.  107)  describes  the  situation  aptly  with  his  concept  of  "structuration",  "The  greater 
the  degree  of  'closure'  of  mobility  chances  the  more  this  facilitates  the  formation  of 
identifiable  classes.  For  the  effect  of  closure  in  terms  of  intergenerational  movement 
is  to  provide  for  the  reproduction  of  common  life  experiences  over  the  generations". 
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4.1.  Introduction. 
Following  the  discussion  about  the  evolution  of  Korea's  economic  and  social 
structures,  this  Chapter  investigates  the  meaning  of  such  changes  for  low-income 
households. 
Much  of  the  writing  on  poverty  has  emphasized  the  importance  of  measures  to 
increase  employment  opportunities.  As  Gilmour  (1983,  p.  69)  suggests,  "Keynes  saw 
that  unemployment  was  an  intolerable  evil".  As  Beveridge  (1943,  p.  118)  put 
forward,  "Unemployment  makes  men  seem  useless,  not  wanted,  without  a  countryll  - 
In  a  similar  vein,  Gans  (1968,  p.  281)  proposed,  "Ultimately,  then,  most  of  the 
problems  of  the  poor  can  be  traced  to  unemployment  and  underemployment,  and 
these  in  turn  are  largely  responsible  for  bringing  about  the  crisis  of  the  city".  In 
Korea,  "the  principle  of  growth  first  and  distribution  second"  has  been  credited  with 
the  reduction  of  poverty.  Indeed,  economic  growth  seemed  to  tackle  poverty  in  four 
ways.  Firstly,  a  high  rate  of  economic  growth  meant  a  higher  demand  for  labour 
relative  to  supply.  Secondly,  an  expansion  of  investment  increased  worker 
productivity  by  increasing  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  capital  stock  per 
worker.  Thirdly,  economic  growth  expanded  the  market  for  manufactured  goods  and 
so  further  increased  investment  and  output  and  labour  productivity.  Finally,  growing 
national  income  made  the  reduction  of  poverty  politically  easier  by  enabling  for  the 
government  to  redistribute  some  of  the  income  to  poorer  people  because  richer  people 
were  gaining  from  the  economic  development  too.  Zero  or  negative  growth  makes  it 
far  harder  for  politicians  to  help  the  poor. 
Since  the  launch  of  the  First  Economic  Development  Five-year  Plan,  according  to 
the  official  statistics,  as  Table  4-1  shows,  Korea  achieved  nearly  full  employment. 
Was  the  poverty  problem  confined  to  the  small  minority  of  the  unemployed?  Could 
the  continuing  economic  growth  and  full  employment  eventually  eradicate  poverty? 
In  Korea,  there  are  two  schools  of  thought  on  these  issues,  optimists  and  pessimists. 
Productivity  increased  faster  than  the  number  of  people  and  the  consumption  levels 
per  head  actually  increased  for  the  last  three  decades.  The  majority  of  the  population 
benefitted  from  falling  prices,  in  terms  of  relative  and  real  prices,  and  from  more 
employment  and  a  wider  range  of  earning  opportunities  to  enjoy  a  rising  standard  of 
living.  Optimists,  who  held  this  view  provided  evidence  such  as  improving  social 
indicators. 
The  controversy  is  not  small.  Others  -  their  sympathies  strongly  engaged  by  the 
sufferings  of  the  poor  -  hold  the  pessimistic  view.  They  argue  that  economic  growth 
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but  also  put  them  into  a  network  of  deprivation.  Actually  it  is  quite  difficult  to  give  a 
conclusive  answer  to  these  arguments.  Moreover,  the  argument  has  been  further 
complicated  by  the  introduction  of  "moral"  and  "aesthetic"  and  other  non-economic 
considerations.  Thus  section  2  of  this  Chapter  explores  those  on  low  incomes  in  full 
employment  in  Korea. 
Table  4-1  Unemployment  Rate. 
year  1960  1  st  plan  2nd  plan  3rd  plan  4th  plan  5th  plan  6th  plan 
('62-'66)  ('67-'71)  ('7  1  -'7  6)  ('77-'8  1)  ('82-'86)  ('87-'9  1) 
Unem.  rate  16.3  7.1  4.5  3.9  4.5  3.8  2.3 
Sources:  1960  data;  from  '60  Population  and  Housing  Census,  and  NSO,  major  economical  statistics, 
various  years. 
A  person  can  be  cast  into  poverty  not  only  because  of  low  income  or  an  income 
loss,  but  also  because  of  high  consumption  expenses.  Although  someone  can  be 
employed  with  better  wages  than  before,  if  he  has  to  expend  more  than  the  increase 
in  his  earnings,  has  his  living  standard  been  improved?  To  a  great  extent,  if  there  are 
important  discontinuities  in  the  development  process  in  social  overhead  capital  such 
as  harbours,  roads,  housing  etc,  current  consumption  may  actually  have  to  be  reduced 
to  make  room  for  social  overhead  capital  expenditure  as  a  precondition  for  economic 
growth.  The  main  sources  of  the  funds  for  such  expenditure  would  stem  from  tax 
revenue.  If  such  tax  revenue  came  from  indirect  tax  with  no  other  social 
compensations,  these  factors  would  tend  to  depress  some  households'  future 
opportunities  more  than  others.  A  recent  opinion  poll  (Kwon  S-W  et.  al.,  1992, 
p.  252)  showed  in  contrast  to  official  statistics,  that  over  50  per  cent  of  people 
perceive  their  incomes  to  have  decreased  compared  to  five  years  ago.  This  implies 
that  earnings  are  not  the  only  factor  determining  living  standards  of  a  household. 
Section  3  of  this  Chapter  briefly  envisages  low-income  households'  expenditures  in 
connection  to  the  changes  in  society. 
As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  2,  in  1960,  about  41  per  cent  of  the  population  were 
estimated  to  be  living  on  incomes  below  physical  subsistence  level.  Using  the  same 
measure,  in  1990,  the  rate  has  decreased  to  5.3  per  cent.  In  strict  terms,  general 
living  standards  of  the  population  have  improved,  in  particular,  compared  to  those  in 
1960.  Nevertheless,  in  recent  years,  the  poverty  issue  is  becoming  the  centre  of 
political  and  social  debates  in  Korea.  Some  argue  it  is  because  of  the  unequal 
distribution  of  income.  There  are  some  disagreements  about  what  the  actual  trends  in 
income  distribution  are  and  how  economic  growth  and  affluence  have  affected  this. 
Pareto  and  his  followers  (Pareto,  1971;  Kuznets,  1966;  Jackman,  1975)  contended 
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market  forces  caused  by  growth  and  the  level  of  affluence.  In  contrast  to  this,  others 
argue  that  there  has  been  little  change  in  income  distribution  in  the  post-war  period 
despite  rapid  economic  growth,  thus  economic  growth  does  not  have  any  equalising 
effect  (Titmuss,  1963;  Roberti,  1974). 
However,  in  Korea,  according  to  statistics  such  as  KDI,  World  Bank,  EPB,  etc.  , 
inequality  during  the  1980s  declined.  As  the  Table  below  shows,  the  Gini  Coefficient 
and  Decile  Distribution  Ratio  (bottom  40  per  cent  to  top  20  per  cent)  have  improved 
over  time. 
Table  4-2  Distribution  of  Income 
Year  1965  1970  1976  1982  1986  1990 
Whole  country 
Gini  Coefficient  0.3439  0.3322  0.3908  0.3574  0.3368  0.3226 
Decile  Distribution  0.4625  0.4716  0.3716  0.4373  0.4753  0.5066 
Non-farm  household 
Gini  Coefficient  0.4167  0.3455  0.4118  0.3705  0.3424  0.3239 
Decile  Distribution  0.2993  0.4384  0.3154  0.4129  0.4733  0.4994 
Farm  household 
Gini  Coefficient  0.2852  0.2945  0.3273  0.3061  0.2974  0.2991 
Decile  Distribution  0.5935  0.5497  0.4788  0.5433  0.5657  0.5520 
Note;  decile  distribution  rate  refer  to  the  share  of  lowest  40  per  cent  to  highest  20  per  cent. 
Source:  Choo  Hak-Chung,  1993,  pp.  339-340 
Nevertheless,  over  60  per  cent  of  people  perceive  the  disparities  between  the  better- 
off  and  the  worse-off  to  be  wider  than  before  (Kwon  S-W  et  al.,  1992,  p.  256).  The 
widening  perceived  gap  between  the  measured  and  felt  income  distribution  in  recent 
years  is  often  explained  (Choo  H-C,  1993,  pp.  354-6)  by  what  Hirshman  (1973) 
termed  the  "tunnel  effect",  referring  to  the  decrease  over  time  in  people's  tolerance 
of  inequality.  Are  the  perceptions  of  Koreans  explained  by  the  tunnel  effect? 
In  terms  of  redistribution  and  poverty,  as  Figure  4-1  shows,  the  distribution  A 
would  be  considered  more  equal  than  distribution  B  according  to  the  Gini  measure. 
However,  considering  poverty,  more  people  would  live  in  poverty  in  the  society  of 
A.  To  some  extent,  this  logical  misunderstanding  can  be  found  in  the  decile 
distribution  rate.  The  decile  distribution  A  in  Figure  4-2  would  be  considered  more 
equal  than  B.  However,  more  people  would  live  in  poverty  in  A  because  poverty  is 
not  just  inequality.  Moreover,  inequality  is  a  state  of  affairs,  and  whether  it  is 
acceptable  or  not  is  a  matter  of  opinion.  Opinions  may  be  hotly  disputed  about 
whether,  and  how  much,  inequality  is  acceptable.  Some  may  argue  some  inequality  is 
rather  desirable  as  an  incentive  to  hard  working.  Others  may  not.  Therefore,  how  to 
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Poverty  may  be  thus  correlated  to  inequality  but  the  two  concepts  are  not  the  same. 
Therefore,  equality  may  be  a  necessary  step  towards  reducing  poverty  but  not  a 
sufficient  one.  For  example,  equality  can  be  improved,  more  or  less,  by  penalizing 
the  top  income  group.  However,  this  cannot  guarantee  a  reduction  in  poverty  unless 
the  living  standard  of  the  poor  is  raised. 
Figure  4-1  Poverty  and  Gini  Coefficient.  Figure  4-2  Poverty  and  Decile  Distribution 
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The  ultimate  aims  of  the  good  society  cannot  be  achieved  by  one  policy  or  program 
alone.  Nevertheless,  it  may  not  be  denied  that  taxation  and  social  policy  can  play  a 
great  role  in  the  redistribution  of  income  and  the  reduction  of  poverty.  Section  3 
traces  the  structure  of  taxation  and  the  change  in  the  social  protection  system  in 
Korea. 
Finally,  the  experience  of  Korea  about  the  main  subject,  the  impact  of  changes  in 
economic  and  social  structures  on  low-income  households,  posed  at  the  beginning  of 
this  chapter  will  be  drawn  together  in  a  concluding  section.  The  micro-effects  of 
changes  in  detailed  policy  are  outside  the  scope  of  this  research.  The  main  concern  of 
this  chapter  is  with  the  economic,  social  and  political  implications  for  low-income 
households  of  Korea's  development. 
4.2.  Full  Employment  and  Low  Income. 
4.2.1  Changing  Industrial  Structure  and  the  Low-income  Labour  Market. 
Under  the  centralized  system,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  3,  the  industrial  structure 
of  Korea  has  been  gradually  adjusted  from  a  labour-intensive  and  import  substitution 
industry  to  high-tech  industry.  When  a  new  technological  system  emerged  and 
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individual  were  far  different.  Many  of  the  poor  in  the  labour  force  have  been  unable 
to  find  employment  despite  the  economic  expansion  because  their  skills  were  not  in 
demand.  This  'structural  unemployment'  contrasts  to  the  temporary  loss  of  jobs,  i.  e. 
'frictional  unemployment'.  Furthermore,  some  relatively  skilled  jobs,  such  as  those 
of  miners,  carpenters,  etc.,  have  been  automated  out  of  existence  with  changes  in  the 
Korean  economic  base. 
As  economic  growth  proceeds,  the  mix  of  required  inputs  (e.  g.  labour  and 
machines,  and  skilled  and  unskilled  labour)  changes,  as  do  the  proportions  in  which 
final  goods  are  produced.  Poor  people  -  often  migrants  from  rural  areas  -  could  in 
earlier  years  get  jobs,  but  the  mechanization  of  many  unskilled  tasks  has  reduced  the 
demand  for  such  unskilled  workers.  One  example  is  Korea's  paper  industry.  Half  of 
the  workers  in  the  industry  during  the  late  1950s  were  employed  by  small 
establishments  that  made  Korean-style  paper  -  "Hanji".  A  decade  later,  value  added 
by  these  establishments  had  dropped  from  15  to  3  per  cent  and  employment  from  50 
to  20  per  cent  of  the  paper  industry  total  (Kuznets,  1977,  p.  121).  The  traditional 
labour  intensive  Korean-style  paper  industry  was  being  replaced  by  the  modern 
products  of  larger,  more  capital-intensive  factories.  Many  of  those  on  low  incomes 
are  competing  for  fewer  jobs  with  the  new  arrivals  who  have  come  to  the  city  in 
search  of  a  better  life.  The  rising  supply  of  unskilled  workers  and  the  declining 
demand  for  them  combined  to  assure  that  the  wage  rate  for  these  occupations  has  not 
automatically  lifted  households'  living  standards. 
Some  economists  claim  that  when  labour  markets  are  very  tight,  employers  break 
down  complicated  tasks  into  simple  ones  which  the  most  unskilled  workers  can 
accomplish.  They  argue  that  the  myth  of  structural  unemployment  can  be  destroyed  if 
the  rate  of  growth  of  economic  activity  is  drastically  increased.  Table  4-3  indicates 
the  changing  industrial  structure  and  employment  patterns  of  Korea.  Since  the  early 
1970s,  the  development  of  the  heavy  and  chemical  industries  increased  the  demand 
for  professional  and  skilled  workers.  The  demand  for  such  a  workforce  was  derived 
from  the  establishment  of  new  enterprises  and  expansion  of  the  production  capacity. 
Thus  a  higher  proportion  of  the  population  could  work  and  the  increased  demand 
resulted  in  rapid  wage  increases  during  the  second  half  of  the  1970s.  As  a 
consequence,  despite  the  increases  in  inequality  (see  Table  4-2),  poverty  rapidly 
reduced  until  the  mid  1970s  (see  Table  2-8  in  Chapter  2)  in  terms  of  both  rates  and 
numbers. 
Throughout  the  second  oil  price  shock  in  1979  and  the  following  world-wide 
recession,  the  emergence  of  China  and  South  Asia  countries  in  the  international 
market  and  the  move  to  increased  protection  in  the  industrialized  countries  since  the 
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economy.  The  industrial  structure  of  Korea  began  to  shift  towards  a  more  capital  and 
skill  intensive  industry.  Another  change  in  industrial  structure  since  the  late  1970s  has 
been  the  expansion  of  the  tertiary  sector.  Thanks  to  continuing  economic  growth  and 
rapid  mechanisation,  people  had  less  work-time  and  could  spend  more  on  leisure  and 
consumption.  So,  service  and  exchange  industries,  such  as  banks,  insurance,  super 
chain  stores,  holiday  agencies,  entertainment,  sports,  etc.,  began  to  grow. 
Table  4-3  The  Employed  Labour  Force  by  Occupation. 
Professional,  technical 
and  related  workers. 
Administrative  and 
managerial  workers. 
Clerical  and 
related  workers. 
Sales  workers. 
Service  workers. 
Agriculture,  animal,  husb- 
andry  and  forestry  workers. 
Production  related  worker, 
transport  equipment. 
operators  and  labourers 
Workers  not  classified 
by  occupation 
Total  (A) 
1960  1970  1975  1980  1985 
165,904  322,772  417,426  580,882  811,977 
(2.4)  (3.2)  (3.3)  (4.6)  (6.1) 
90,351  95,799  102,327  133,608  173,572 
(  1.3)  (0.9)  (0.8)  (  1.1)  (  1.3) 
185,924  593,475  884,210  1,203,176  1,629,193 
(2.6)  (5.9)  (6.7)  (9.5)  (12.2) 
581,800  1,028,090  1,317,122  1,531,068  1,683,524 
(8.3)  (10.1)  (10.4)  (12.1)  (12.6) 
424,019  678,616  815,791  894,618  1,044,917 
(6.0)  (6.7)  (6.4)  (7.1)  (7.8) 
4,601,007  5,147,955  6,190,008  4,768,414  4,114,331 
(65.4)  (50.7)  (48.8)  (37.6)  (30.9) 
928,622  2,197,775  2,890,668  3,569,686  3,878,097 
(13.2)  (21.7)  (22.8)  (28.2)  (29.1) 
58,732  88,468  104,492  542  934 
(0.8)  (0.9)  (0.8)  (0.0)  (0.0) 
7,036,000  10,152,950  12,682,041  12,682,004  13,336,545 
Population  (B) 
A/B 
24,989,241  31,435,252  34,678,572  37,406,815  40,448,486 
28.16  32.29  36.56  33.90  32.97 
Sources:  EPB,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  each  year. 
Technical  progress  continued  at  a  fast  pace  and  significantly  altered  the  industrial 
structure  and  employment  patterns  in  Korea.  Enterprises  employed  more  developed 
machines  and  techniques  in  the  production  line,  meaning  new  labour-saving  methods 
of  production  often  achieving  the  same  output  with  reduced  labour.  According  to 
Rothwell  and  Zagveld  (1979,  p.  20),  in  the  manufacturing  sectors  of  EEC  countries, 
until  1965,  growth  in  employment  and  in  output  had  been  equal.  Since  1973,  output 
has  continued  to  grow  but  labour  use  has  declined.  In  Korea,  until  the  late  1970s, 
employment  elasticity  (employment  growth  rate/  output  growth  rate)  in 
manufacturing  was  very  high,  0.832  between  1970  and  1975,  and  0.730  between 
88 1975  and  1980.  Since  1980,  this  slowed  down  rapidly  to  0.22  during  1980-1985  and 
to  0.314  between  1985  and  1987  (Park  N-K,  et  al.,  1990,  p.  23). 
Along  with  the  changes  in  the  industrial  structure  and  technology,  the  number  of 
professional,  technical  and  related  workers,  clerical  and  related  workers  and  sales 
workers  began  to  increase  rapidly  from  the  mid  1970s.  Whereas,  agriculture,  animal 
husbandry  and  forestry  workers,  fishermen  and  hunters  declined  more  rapidly.  The 
growth  in  production  workers  began  to  slow  and  could  no  longer  fully  absorb  the 
migrating  farm  workers,  fishermen,  etc.  Traditional  labour-intensive  industries  and 
mature  industries  such  as  textiles,  clothing,  and  rubber  began  to  show  negative 
employment  elasticity  and,  moreover,  the  number  of  workers  in  such  industries  began 
to  decline  from  the  mid  1970s  as  a  result  of  plant  closures  and  reductions  in  capacity. 
While  capital  and  skill  intensive  industries  such  as  shipbuilding,  chemical  and  steel 
industries  grew  rapidly  from  the  mid  1970s  onwards  and  then  the  so-called  sunrise 
industries,  such  as  electronics,  automobiles  and  finance  grew  in  the  early  1980s,  the 
negative  effects  of  the  old  and  mature  industries  were  far  larger  than  the  jobs  created 
in  high-tech  and  sunrise  industries.  Moreover,  the  increase  in  employment  of  the 
latter  has  not  increased  opportunities  for  unskilled  manual  workers. 
Together  those  industrial  changes  and  demographic  changes,  e.  g.  the  increase  in 
older  people,  as  the  bottom  column  of  Table  4-3  shows,  reduced  the  proportion  of  the 
total  population  in  active  employment  since  the  early  1980s.  This  implies  that  in 
order  to  maintain  average  consumption  levels,  the  income  of  those  who  are  working 
must  rise  fast  enough  to  ensure  that  the  living  standards  of  the  whole  family  do  not 
fall. 
Among  production  workers,  the  decrease  in  unskilled  manual  workers  has  been 
more  visible.  According  to  the  estimation  of  the  Korean  Institute  for  Industrial 
Economics  and  Technology  (1990),  as  Table  4-4  shows,  such  trends  are  fully 
expected  to  continue.  While  the  growth  of  other  workers  continues,  the  proportion  of 
production  workers  in  Korea,  including  male  and  female,  continues  to  decline.  Of 
which,  unskilled  manual  workers  (operatives)  were  estimated  to  have  declined  from 
24.1  per  cent  in  1989  to  21.1  per  cent  by  1994  -  more  so  than  craftsmen  who  have 
decreased  from  44.5  per  cent  to  43.9  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  industrial 
workers. 
Table  4-4  The  Changing  Labour  Market  (excluding  the  primary  sector). 
(r)ercentages) 
Scientist  Professional  Production  worker  clerk,  manager  Total 
and  engineer  and  technician  Craftsman  Operative  and  salesman 
1989  3.0  9.8  44.5  24.1  18.6  100 
1994  4.6  11.2  43.9  21.1  19.9  100 
Source:  Korea  Institute  for  Economics  &I  eclinology,  199U,  pp.  6-7. 
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changing  market  conditions  in  line  with  economic  growth.  In  Korea,  as  we  have  seen 
in  the  last  Chapters,  the  economic  base  has  been  manipulated  by  the  government 
through  distorting  resource  allocation,  resulting  in  a  high  debt  to  equity  ratio  in 
manufacturing  industry.  These  debts  became  the  main  obstacle  to  wage  increases  and 
made  the  manufacturing  sector  the  lowest  waged  sector  of  industry,  except  the 
primary  sector,  because  a  larger  part  of  increased  profits  had  to  be  paid  towards 
interest  on  debts  (Bae  M-K,  1985,  p.  25). 
Table  4-5  Wage  Differentials  of  Whole  Workers  by  Industries 
(Average  manufacturing  wages:  100) 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1988  1989 
Manufacturing.  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Electricity,  Gas  &  Water.  259.8  241.4  192.9  190.8  183.7  177.7 
Construction.  169.9  229.3  175.7  150.9  137.0  132.3 
Wholesale  &  Retail  trade 
and  Hotels  and  Restaurants.  138.5  133.8  143.9  136.4  123.8  123.0 
Transportation,  Storage 
and  Communication.  129.5  128.2  138.7  129.0  123.1  121.4 
Finance,  Insurance,  Real 
estate  &  Business  services.  265.1  212.7  192.0  170.1  147.8  153.1 
Social  &  Personal  service.  170.3  201.2  187.7  166.7  151.5  160.9 
Sources:  Ministry  of  Labour,  Monthly  Labour  Statistics  Survey,  various  issues. 
In  line  with  the  diversification  of  the  economic  base  away  from  labour-  intensive 
and  towards  skill-intensive  industry,  the  focus  of  education  policy  has  shifted  from 
general  education  towards  higher  education  since  the  early  1970s.  Education  has 
become  the  most  important  factor  determining  the  line  between  adjustment  to 
changing  industrial  structure  and  exclusion  from  it.  It  marks  out  a  dichotomy  between 
white-collar  work  and  blue-collar  work  and  dualistic  labour  markets  have  also 
emerged  (Fei,  Ranis  and  Ohkawa,  1985).  The  development  of  the  Chaebol  in  Korea 
accelerated  the  bifurcating  tendency  in  its  labour  market.  In  comparison  with  Taiwan, 
where  the  labour  market  is  too  complex  to  be  split  into  a  simple  binary  structure  due 
to  the  dominance  of  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises.  In  contrast  to  this,  the  wage 
disparity  between  blue  and  white-collar  workers,  in  other  words  highly  educated 
workers  and  less  educated  workers,  tended  to  be  wider  and  more  evident  in  Korea 
than  in  Taiwan  (Tun-jen  Cheng,  1993,  p.  234).  For  example,  in  the  early  1980s, 
Korean  college  graduates  in  entry-level  positions  earned  as  much  as  2.3  to  2.5  times 
as  much  as  high  school  graduates,  whereas  the  same  earnings  ratio  in  Taiwan  was  1.5 
(Koo  B-R  and  Kim  J-C,  1985,  p.  103).  As  Table  4-6  shows,  the  ratio  of  wage  and 
90 salary  differentials  by  level  of  education  has  continued,  although  it  has  reduced  from 
3.9  times  at  the  highest  point  in  1976  to  2.3  times  in  1990. 
Vocational  training  centres,  both  inside  and  outside  factories  broadly  produce 
craftsman  to  support  technicians  and  engineers.  Technical  vocational  high  schools 
provide  educated  technicians  to  support  engineers,  scientists  and  other  professionals. 
This  structure,  however,  became  otiose  as  dual  labour  markets  and  wage  disparities 
according  to  educational  level  emerged.  Semi-skilled,  skilled  workers  and  technicians 
aspired  to  become  college  graduates.  Vocational  high  schools  transformed  themselves 
into  junior  colleges;  junior  colleges,  in  turn,  tried  to  emulate  fully-fledged  colleges  in 
their  instructional  programs. 
Table  4-6  Wage  and  Salary  Differentials  by  Level  of  Education. 
Year  Middle  School  High  School  College  & 
and  Lower  Higher 
1971  60.9  100  175.2 
1976  59.1  100  229.7 
1982  69.9  100  221.6 
1986  77.6  too  222.0 
1990  83.8  100  185.5 
Source:  NSO,  Social  Indicators  in  Korea,  1991. 
Blue-collar  workers,  especially  unskilled  production  workers,  once  hired,  receive 
very  little  orientation  or  formal  training.  They  are  typically  assigned  to  simple  jobs 
that  they  can  learn  in  only  a  few  days  of  on-the-job  training,  and  they  are  rarely 
rotated  or  given  opportunities  to  learn  new  jobs  (Cho  S-K,  1987). 
Table  4-7  shows  another  change  in  the  labour  market.  During  the  1960s  and  until 
the  late  1970s,  the  increase  in  work  forces  could  be  absorbed  mainly  by  the  growth 
in  regular  work  and  self-employment  thanks  to  rapid  industrialisation.  Since  the  late 
1970s,  corresponding  to  the  changing  industrial  structures  and  to  centralisation  of  the 
Korean  economy  by  the  Chaebols,  it  was  led  by  the  increase  in  irregular  work. 
Table  4-7  Trends  of  Non-farm  Workers  by  Type  of  Contract. 
(units;  1,000  persons  and  (%)) 
Year  Self-employed  Family  Regular  Temporary  Daily  Total 
workers  workers  workers  workers 
1963  803  (29.5)  212(7.8)  779(28.7)  341  (12.5)  584(21.5)  2,719(100) 
1970  1,250  (27.0)  417(9.0)  1,959  (42.3)  427(9.2)  576(12.4)  4,629(100) 
1980  2,270  (26.4)  642(7.5)  3,833  (44.6)  914(10.6)  933  (10.9)  8,592(100) 
1985  2,790  (25.0)  786(7.1)  4,860  (43.6)  1,527  (13.7)  1,177(10.6)  11,140  (100) 
Notes;  temporary  workers  based  on  contract  between  employers  and  employees,  including  part  time 
workers;  daily  workers  based  on  daily  contract,  for  example  in  construction  work. 
Sources:  EPB,  Econotnic  Active  Population  Year-book,  various  years  and  Yoon  J-H,  "The  Vicious 
Cycle  of  Poverty;  The  reality  of  urban  poor",  Shin-Dong-A,  1987,  requoted  from  KRIHS,  1989,  p.  64. 
91 In  Korea,  the  measurement  of  unemployment  rates  include  those  who  are  over  15, 
who  are  able  to  work  and  want  to  work  and  those  who  work  less  than  a  hour  in  the 
survey  week.  Those  excluded  are  soldiers,  those  who  are  attending  school  or 
vocational  training,  those  engaged  in  housekeeping,  those  too  old  to  work  and  those 
who  have  other  reasons  for  inactivity  (Kim  S-K,  1976,  pp.  23-4).  Thus,  the 
achievement  of  full  employment  shown  in  Table  4-1  can  be  explained  by  the  increase 
in  irregular  workers. 
Regular  workers  in  big  business  or  in  some  medium  firms  enjoy  an  array  of 
indirect  benefits  such  as  bonuses  and  some  measure  of  employment  security.  As 
Rodgers  (1993,  p.  91)  noted,  "To  non-Korean  businessmen  considering  doing  business 
in  Korea,  the  number  and  size  of  bonuses,  allowances,  paid  holidays  and  ffinge 
beneJ7ts  that  are  typically  paid  are  often  truly  alarming'.  Such  compensation 
packages  are  often  larger  than  the  basic  wage.  Extra  payments  are  almost  invariably 
fixed  in  advance,  mainly  according  to  the  industrial  structure  and  the  worker's 
position  (Ito  and  Kang,  1989).  Part  time  workers,  workers  employed  in  small  and 
family  subcontracting  firms,  and  outworkers  are  not  entitled  to  any  of  these  fringe 
benefits  whilst  they  also  have  a  lower  basic  wage.  As  Table  4-8  shows,  irregular 
workers,  although  belonging  to  the  same  group  of  production  workers,  were  paid 
lower  wages  than  their  counterparts,  even  excluding  fringe  benefits.  Part  of  the 
reason  why  a  small  subcontractor  can  manufacture  at  a  low  cost  level  and  how  small 
businesses  can  show  higher  rates  of  profit  in  spite  of  lower  labour  productivity,  lies 
in  the  evasion  of  these  indirect  payments  in  addition  to  lower  basic  wages.  Thus,  in 
Korea,  the  most  visible  wage  disparities  stem  from  the  industrial  structure,  according 
to  the  difference  between  contracting  firms  and  subcontractors.  Thus,  the  irregular 
workers  suffer  not  only  from  fluctuating  earnings  but  also  from  low  incomes. 
Nevertheless,  the  increase  in  irregular  workers  and  workers  in  subcontractors,  as 
outlined  in  the  last  Chapter,  has  resulted  in  a  weakening  of  trade  union  power.  This  is 
despite  full  employment  which,  in  theory,  meant  that  strikes  could  be  more  effective 
as  there  were  no  reserve  pools  of  labour  available. 
Table  4-8  The  Range  of  Production  Workers'  Monthly  Wage  by  Worker's  Position  in  Big 
Four  Cities. 
Distribution 
(Korean  1,000  Won) 
Regular  workers 
(percentages) 
Irregular  workers 
(percentages) 
Below  50  0.0  5.2 
50-  100  6.4  11.7 
100-200  34.3  44.8 
200-300  38.5  28.8 
300-500  18.3  9.3 
Over  500  2.5  0.1 
Source:  Yoon  J-H,  1987,  p.  520. 
92 Furthermore,  as  Table  4-9  shows,  the  relative  accident  rates  to  the  overall 
workforce  have  been  declining,  whereas  absolute  numbers  of  industrial  accidents 
have  not  declined.  According  to  the  ILO's  estimation,  in  manufacturing,  the  risk  of 
being  killed  in  a  factory  accident  in  Korea  is  higher  than  in  India  and  Singapore  and 
six  times  higher  than  in  America  (The  Economist,  survey,  October  Ist  1994,  p.  39). 
Unfortunately  most  of  the  industrial  accidents  occur  amongst  subcontractors. 
Although  there  are  no  systematic  statistics  about  detailed  accidents  based  on  industrial 
structure,  according  to  the  National  United  Workers  Federation,  the  accident  rates  in 
the  smaller  manufacturing  workshops  (in  which  less  than  50  workers  are  employed) 
was  4-8  times  higher  than  in  big  firms  (in  which  more  than  200  workers  are 
employed)  (requoted  in  KRIHS,  1989,  p.  199).  The  lack  of  a  national  health  service 
and  moreover  the  exclusion  of  non-standard  employment  contractors  from  the  meagre 
social  policy  based  on  the  insurance  system,  and  high  costs  of  private  medical  care 
combined  with  low-wages,  exacerbate  a  vicious  cycle  of  poverty  (this  will  be 
discussed  in  section  4  of  this  chapter). 
Table  4-9  Trends  of  Industrial  Accidents. 
Year  1973  1975  1977  1979  1981  1984  1988 
No.  of  accidents  59,367  81,642  118,011  130,307  117,138  157,800  142,329 
Index  of  accident  100.0  137.5  198.8  219.5  198.7  265.8  239.7 
Percentage  to  workers  5.089  4.446  4.476  3.612  3.412  3.599  2.478 
Sources:  Ministry  of  Labour,  Labour  )VWte  Paper,  1985;  and  Korea  Labour  Institute,  The  Analysis  of 
Labour,  1989. 
Among  workers  in  the  same  office,  shop  or  factory,  the  wage  differential  between 
new  recruits  and  senior  employees  is  particularly  large  (Park  S-1,1980).  This  reflects 
the  traditional  norm  of  'patriarchism'l  and  the  "living  wage"  ideology  whereby 
employees  must  be  paid  enough  to  meet  their  family  obligations.  These  traditional 
norms  and  ideology  may  have  on  the  one  hand  contributed  more  or  less  to  reducing 
the  life  cycle  poverty  that  would  otherwise  have  arisen.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may 
have  contributed  to  the  ratio  of  female  wages  to  male  being  lower  in  Korea,  as  Table 
4-10  shows,  than  in  any  other  country  in  which  the  ILO  has  gender-based  wage  data 
except  Japan  (Rodgers,  1993,  p.  91). 
The  disparity  in  wages  between  men  and  women  is  explained  on  various  grounds; 
girls  are  less  willing  to  undertake  long  apprenticeships  because  they  do  not  look  upon 
the  job  as  a  lifelong  career;  employers  are  reluctant  to  accept  girls  for  apprenticeships 
because  they  are  likely  to  get  married  and  not  stay  the  course;  and  so  on.  An 
empirical  analysis  (Lee  B-S,  1991,  p.  146)  based  on  about  8,000  households  from  the 
1983  National  Migration  Survey  showed  that  widow-headed  households  had  20  per 
93 cent  less  earnings  than  those  of  currently  married  male-headed  households.  The 
exploitation  of  women's  labour  has  marginally  decreased  through  the  enactment  of 
the  minimum  wage  in  1988.  The  unequal  social  and  economic  position  of  women  in 
their  opportunities  to  enter  a  firm,  to  work,  to  train  and  to  be  promoted  has  an 
important  meaning  in  Korea  since  the  Korean  War  (1953-1955)  left  so  many  widows. 
Indeed,  studies  have  consistently  shown  a  high  rate  of  women-headed  households 
among  the  poor  (Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Affairs,  1974,  p.  180;  Kang  K-K  et 
al.  , 
1978,  p.  20;  etc). 
Table  4-10  Trends  of  Wage  Differences  Between  Women  and  Men,  (Woman/Man  x  100). 
1971  1976  1980  1985  1988  1990 
Whole  Industry  43.6  43.9  44.5  48.3  52.0  53.7 
Manufacturing  44.2  44.2  45.6  49.1  52.0  51.4 
Source:  Ministry  of  Labour,  various  years,  quoted  from  Korean  Women  Study,  Korean  Women 
Labour  Association  and  Inchon  Women  Labour  Association,  199  1,  p.  62. 
Employers  are,  therefore,  keen  to  employ  very  young  women,  the  cheapest  labour, 
and  young  men  as  far  as  possible  to  minimize  their  labour  costs.  The  increasing  rate 
of  women's  participation  in  economic  activities  (from  37.2  per  cent  in  1965  to  47.0 
per  cent  in  1990)  cannot  be  divorced  from  this.  In  other  words,  the  older  male  is  first 
excluded  from  job  competition,  then  the  male  and  older  women.  For  example,  the 
comparison  between  1964  and  1979  of  the  composition  of  age  cohorts  among  workers 
in  the  formal  sector  clearly  shows  such  trends  (Korean  Christian  Social  Problem 
Research  Institute,  1986,  p.  61).  Between  1964  and  1979,  the  proportion  of  young 
workers  (between  14-25  years  old)  increased  from  35.2  per  cent  to  41.6  per  cent, 
whereas  that  of  older  workers  (over  40  years  old)  declined  from  26.7  per  cent  to  19.9 
per  cent,  not  in  line  with  demographic  trends.  The  excluded  older  workers  mainly 
transferred  to  become  irregular  employees  (KRIHS,  1989,  p.  61).  Table  4-11 
represents  such  trends.  Construction  work  is  a  typical  type  of  irregular  employment 
in  Korea.  In  comparison  with  manufacturing  workers,  more  older  people  are 
employed  in  the  construction  sector. 
Table  4-11  Age  Distribution  of  Construction  Workers  in  Comparison  with  Manufacturing, 
1987. 
(percentages) 
Below  30  30-39  40-49  Over  50  Total 
Construction  workers  21.7  34.0  28.9  15.4  100.0 
Manufacturing  workers  47.3  31.0  15.5  6.2  100.0 
Source:  EPB,  The  2nd  Employment  Structure  Special  Survey,  1987. 
94 4.2.2  Low  Income  in  Full  Employment. 
Wage  history  has  seen  the  existence  of  wide  variations  in  both  levels  and  trends 
with  five  visible  wage  disparities.  Wages  vary  according  to  firm  size  or  between 
contracting  firms  and  subcontractors;  between  industrial  sectors;  between  genders; 
between  regular  and  irregular  workers;  and  between  different  education  or  skill 
levels.  All  these  are  closely  correlated  and  multiply  interact. 
On  the  lowest  income  would  typically  be  unskilled,  low-educated  women,  working 
in  the  manufacturing  or  service  sector  in  a  small  company  possibly  in  the  informal 
sector  or  on  a  non-standard  contract.  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  consensus  about  how 
many  poor  there  are  and  where  they  live.  However,  it  is  a  fact  that  certain  groups  are 
better  rewarded,  not  because  they  are  functionally  more  important  than  others,  but 
because  they  are  well  organised  within  the  bureaucracy,  in  trade  unions,  in 
professional  associations,  or  even  by  culture,  having  developed  and  used  strategies 
and  ideologies  which  further  their  claims  for  differential  rewards.  It  is  hard  to  say 
that  they  have  a  homogeneous  situation  in  the  market  place.  The  diagram  below 
simply  shows  those  who  are  on  low  incomes,  in  other  words  those  who  are  the  more 
vulnerable  in  this  rapidly  developing  economy,  characterised  by  low  wages,  low 
security,  and  lack  of  effective  union  organisation  and  political  representation. 
Figure  4-3  Low  income  Group. 
Un-skilled  or 
Low-educatei 
Women. 
Irregular  workers. 
manufacturing  sector 
and  service  sector 
Until  the  late  1970s,  mobility  between  jobs  was  fairly  easy.  Since  the  industrial 
structure  shifted  towards  high-tech  industry,  this  process  has  become  more  difficult 
tor  the  unskilled.  In  a  narrowing  low-wage  sector,  the  unskilled  workers  have  had  to 
compete  with  ever  growing  in-migrants.  Those  who  lost  their  jobs  in  the  process  of 
industrial  change  have  been  transferred  into  irregular  work  at  a  lower  wage.  The  use 
of  more  sophisticated  machines  (computers,  word  -p  rocessers,  etc)  has  generated  more 
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Subcontractors  or  small  firms. irregular  workers.  Increasing  household  expenditure  and  lower  wages,  have  driven 
women  and  children  to  work,  again  increasing  the  number  of  irregular  workers. 
Indeed,  the  number  of  workers  in  a  family  has  an  inverse  relationship  with  household 
income  (Hyundai  Social  Research  Institute,  1985;  KNHC,  1988;  Kwon  S-W,  et  al, 
1992,  p.  144;  etc).  These  extra  incomes  often  make  the  difference  between  poverty 
and  a  comfortable  standard  of  living. 
Under  such  processes  of  change,  most  labour  markets  in  Korea,  especially  for  low- 
income  groups,  are  characterized  by  high  turn-over  rates  despite  increasing  adoption 
of  the  life-time  employment  system.  Some  interpret  the  very  high  labour  turnover 
rates  as  a  symbol  of  social  mobility,  which  was  partly  true  until  the  late  1970s  when 
the  economic  structure  was  'open'.  Since  then,  high  labour  turnover  rates  can  be 
explained  by  the  industrial  structure  and  changing  employment  patterns.  As  Table  4- 
12  shows,  for  instance,  the  separation  rate  in  small  firms  and  in  particular  in 
manufacturing  industry  is  higher  than  in  larger  firms. 
Table  4-12  Separation  Rate  by  Firm  Size  of  Employees. 
Whole  Industry  Manufacturing  Industry 
10-29  30-99  100-299  300-499  over  500  10-29  30-99  100-299  300-499  Over  500 
1986  3.8  3.9  4.0  3.3  2.9  5.3  5.3  4.6  3.8  3.2 
1987  4.2  3.8  4.0  3.1  3.0  6.3  5.2  4.7  3.7  3.3 
1988  4.4  4.6  4.4  3.0  2.5  6.6  6.7  5.5  3.6  2.7 
Source:  Ministry  of  Labour,  quoted  in  the  Korea  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  (KCCI),  1990a, 
Table  3-63,  p.  353. 
In  the  urban  context,  the  prevailing  ideas  of  containment  of  urban  growth,  were 
epitomized  by  the  Urban  Planning  Act  of  1962,  the  National  Land-use  Management 
Act  of  1963  and  the  adoption  of  Green  Belt  around  13  biggest  cities  in  1971,1972 
and  1973.  According  to  these  Acts,  further  peripheral  growth  has  been  strictly  limited 
by  land  zoning  and  the  Green  Belt.  However,  land  use  control  and  the  containment  of 
the  growth  of  cities  contrasted  to  the  development  strategy  of  'growth  pole  and 
concentrated  decentralisation'.  New  manufacturing  industry  tended  to  locate  in  the 
biggest  cities  because  of  better  acess  to  labour  and  the  benefits  of  infrastructure.  But 
the  sprawling  cities  lacked  many  community  facilities,  resulting  in  serious  congestion 
and  long  journey-to-work  times  and  so  on.  The  problems  of  urban  areas  such  as 
rapidly  increasing  land  prices  and  taxes,  frequent  wage  strikes  supported  by 
university  students,  deteriorating  working  conditions,  evidently  spurred  big  factories 
to  migrate  to  the  suburbs,  the  satellite  towns  or  the  "industrial"  and  "country"  towns 
of  Fothergill  and  Gudgin's  classification  (Fothergill  and  Gudgin,  1982).  The 
movement  of  big  factories  was  accompanied  by  the  following  move  of  many 
subcontracting  firms  or  their  closure.  In  contrast  to  this,  urban  planners  mainly 
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will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  6).  Thus,  despite  overall  economic  growth  and 
employment  prosperity,  the  people  on  low  incomes  have  suffered  more  than  others. 
Many  low-wage  employees  find  it  is  necessary  to  move  either  voluntarily  or  by 
compulsion  to  find  work.  However,  in  Korea,  two  thirds  of  all  jobs  are  acquired  via 
information  obtained  from  friends,  relatives  or  acquaintances.  Formal  methods  of  job 
search  such  as  public  recruitment  accounted  for  32.3  per  cent,  and  introduction  via 
the  school  and  job  centres  were  only  5.7  per  cent  and  2  per  cent  respectively  (Park 
N-K 
,  et.  al.  , 
1990,  p.  3).  Part-time  workers  and  workers  in  subcontractors  find  work 
mainly  through  friends,  relatives  and  acquaintances.  This  informal  channel  of 
recruitment  has  been  reinforced  by  the  changing  industrial  structure.  Thus,  the 
neighbourhood  in  Korea,  especially  in  poor  housing  areas,  often  played  the  role  of 
job  centre.  Therefore,  people  cannot  easily  move  house  unless  they  have  found  a  new 
job  which  guarantees  better  wages  and  security  in  the  future  because  the 
neighbourhood  is  often  their  only  source  of  access  to  jobs.  The  redevelopment  of 
poor  housing  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  low-income  households,  not  only  because 
of  the  increased  costs  in  housing  consumption  and  reduction  in  the  number  of  low 
cost  housing  units,  but  also  because  access  to  informal  recruitment  networks  have 
been  cut  (this  will  be  discussed  in  Chapters  6  and  7). 
In  contrast  to  this,  the  rapidly  changing  industrial  base  towards  high-tech  industry 
and  the  use  of  more  sophisticated  machines  brought  about  a  deficit  in  the  supply  of 
skills,  such  as  those  of  engineers,  technicians,  professionals  and  craftsmen.  Policies 
for  retraining  and  moving  labour  (for  example,  through  labour  exchanges)  could  have 
been  used  as  part  of  a  general  effort  to  adjust  unemployment  and  underemployment 
by  responding  to  the  changing  pattern  of  demands.  However,  priority  in  coping  with 
such  changes  has  been  given  to  higher  and  formal  education.  This  has  increased 
education  costs  for  households.  Low-income  households,  with  declining  real  income, 
have  been  increasingly  marginalised  and  excluded  from  education  as  a  ladder  for 
upward  social  mobility  (this  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section). 
The  service  sector  of  the  economy  includes  activities  such  as  transport  and  the 
distribution  trades,  public  administration,  teaching,  banking  and  insurance,  the  retail 
trade  and  the  provision  of  personal  services.  There  is  a  widespread  assumption  that 
the  service  sector  will  continue  to  expand  in  employment  terms,  and  thus  some  argue 
that  the  service  sector  should  be  reviewed  as  a  strategic  industry  for  the  future. 
Female  employment  is  high  in  the  service  sector  as  a  whole.  It  rose  by  326  per  cent 
between  1970  and  1987,  and  women  accounted  for  60.7  per  cent  of  employment  in 
the  service  sector  in  1987,  while  the  growth  in  male  employment  over  the  same 
period  was  only  221  per  cent  (EPB,  each  year).  Most  of  the  job  losses  in 
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employees.  Thus  the  growth  in  the  service  sector  has  not,  and  will  not,  replace  job 
losses  in  the  low-income  sector  of  manufacturing.  Inmigrants,  to  the  cities  e.  g. 
farmers,  miners  and  fishermen  are  not  likely  to  become  computer  operators, 
complicated  car  assembly  operators,  secretaries  or  accountants. 
It  is  becoming  increasingly  clear  that  a  whole  series  of  mutual  and  overlapping 
factors  are  at  work  and  that  simplistic  explanations  of  the  demise  of  poverty  are 
misleading.  Nevertheless,  economic  growth  disguised  the  problems  of  low-income 
households  in  providing  misleading  data.  The  increase  in  the  number  of  automobiles 
does  little  to  improve  the  welfare  of  low-income  households.  However,  GNP  rises 
with  each  car  produced.  This  example  illustrates  the  illusions  associated  with  the  use 
of  GNP  accounts  as  a  measure  of  welfare.  Official  statistics  show  a  rapid  wage 
increase  in  the  late  1980s.  However,  under  this  industrial  structure  and  the  segmented 
labour  market,  the  wage  increases  have  been  unevenly  distributed  across  firms  of 
different  type,  industries  of  different  capital  intensity,  and  workers  of  different  sex 
and  position.  This  example  also  illustrates  the  illusions  associated  with  the  use  of  full- 
employment  statistics  and  wage  increase  accounts  as  a  measure  of  welfare. 
Problems  of  unemployment,  low-income,  irregular  working,  wage  discrimination, 
wage  exploitation,  etc  tend  to  be  concentrated  on  the  poor  and  on  the  same  families 
and  neighbourhoods.  Yet  jobs  are  a  necessary,  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  the 
reduction  of  household  poverty.  The  concept  of  low  income  may  differ  from  that  of  a 
low-income  household.  For  example,  a  household  with  two  low  income  earners  could 
be  better  off  in  terms  of  household  income  than  a  household  with  one  non-low- 
income  earner.  By  contrast,  a  household  can  be  cast  into  poverty  not  only  because  of 
low  income,  but  also  because  of  high  consumption  expenses.  Therefore,  earnings  and 
expenses  of  households  are  the  opposite  sides  of  the  same  coin,  especially  in  low- 
income  households. 
4.3  Household  Expenditure. 
What  seems  to  have  been  crucial  for  improving  living  conditions  and  maintaining 
social  peace  in  Korea  despite  relatively  low  wages,  harsh  working  conditions  and  no 
social  security  benefits  has  been  the  existence  of  a  large  "informal  sector"  (or 
traditional  sector)  in  the  "open  structure"  of  the  economy  until  the  late  1970s.  Most 
unskilled  or  poorly  educated  inmigrants,  could  learn  skills  and  adjust  to  urban  life 
through  this  sector.  Moreover,  family  ties  have  been  very  strong  in  Korea.  If  any  one 
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poverty  through  mutual  support  on  this  basis.  Indeed  this  has  often  been  noticed  in 
empirical  studies.  Brandt  (1982,  p.  1215)  wrote  the  following  about  one  squatter 
settlement  in  the  1970s; 
"Young  women  in  particular  could  find  work  more  easily  than  men.  They  were 
willing  to  accept  lower  wages  and  less  prestigious  work.  Spending  less  on 
themselves,  they  either  saved  most  of  their  earnings  or  handed  them  over  obediently 
to  their  parents.  As  maids,  seamstresses,  helpers  in  barber  shops  or  beauty  parlours, 
factory  workers,  or  shop  girls  they  worked  long  hours  for  very  little  money,  helping 
to  maintain  their  families  or  to  send  a  brother  to  school  .  ....  and  their  families  were 
soon  able  to  move  out  of  the  squatter  areas  and  into  a  real  house  down  below.  " 
In  1966,  there  were  2,565  persons  living  in  42  institutions  for  the  aged,  increasing 
to  3,159  persons  in  48  institutions  in  1980,  whereas,  the  aged  population  over  65 
years  old  grew  from  961,319  persons  in  1966  to  1,446,114  persons  in  1980.  As  we 
have  seen  in  Chapter  3,  remittance  income  sent  by  urban  relatives  accounted  for  over 
20  per  cent  of  total  rural  household  income.  Rowntree  found  that  in  Britain  in  the 
1930s,  large  families  were  a  main  cause  of  poverty.  In  Korea,  the  most  extreme 
poverty  is  found  in  small  families  or  those  without  children  (KNHC,  1989.10). 
During  the  1960s  and  1970s,  most  urban  in-migrants  could  find  work  within  one 
month  of  their  arrival.  Most  of  them  could  increase  their  income  and  improve  their 
employment  status  as  a  result  of  their  move  (World  Bank,  1979,  p.  56).  Despite  the 
very  obvious  poverty  of  some  in-migrants  to  the  cities,  the  majority  considered 
themselves  better  off  than  their  rural  counterparts.  Many  were  relatively  well  off  and 
helped  their  rural  kin  as  well  as  urban  kin.  The  Korean  government  believed  that  it 
was  the  role  of  education  to  overcome  poverty  by  increasing  social  mobility.  As 
education  has  become  more  widespread,  additional  spending  has  been  invested  for 
backward  rural  areas,  girls,  and  the  poorest  urban  children.  After  leaving  school, 
children  were  able  to  earn  higher  incomes  than  their  parents.  The  incomes  were 
diffused  to  the  other  members  of  the  family  through  strong  family  ties. 
From  the  late  1970s  things  began  to  change.  As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  3 
society  was  moving  towards  a  "closed  structure".  Limited  social  mobility,  especially 
for  low-income  families  has  meant  the  chain  of  movement  from  poverty  has  been  cut 
off  of  for  many  poor  families.  Indeed,  the  decrease  in  the  number  of  the  poor  slowed 
down,  despite  continuing  economic  growth.  Education  policy  began  to  focus  on  high- 
technology  or  special  technology.  It  was  also  oriented  in  ways  which  supported  the 
ambitions  of  the  middle  income  groups  for  their  children.  In  other  words,  the  priority 
of  educational  policy  began  to  be  oriented  to  perceived  economic  needs,  rather  than 
to  broader  social  goals  of  equality  of  opportunity. 
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to  it  is  not  open  or  accessible  (Bowles,  1972,  pp-219-251).  A  higher  portion  of  public 
expenditure  on  higher  education  began  to  offset  previous  redistributive  effects 
because  children  of  poor  parents  have  comparatively  little  opportunity  to  benefit  from 
it  (Choo  H-J  (ed.  ),  1979,  pp.  362-366  and  Dong-A  Ilbo,  June  28th,  1977).  Moreover, 
under  resource  constraints,  educational  expansion,  especially  higher  education,  was 
costly  to  the  government.  As  Table  4-13  shows,  the  government  encouraged  the 
private  sector  to  establish  higher  education  institutions  to  reduce  the  government's 
fiscal  burden  (Yun  C-1,1993,  p.  197)  and  rapidly  increased  tuition  fees  of  public 
schools  of  higher  education,  especially  since  1979.  The  more  education  costs  were 
borne  by  the  family.  The  term  "Cow-bone  tower"  instead  of  "Ivory  tower"  was 
fashioned  by  people  since  the  late  1970s.  It  meant  many  rural  households  sold  a  cow, 
often  their  largest  asset,  in  order  to  pay  the  costs  of  higher  education  for  their 
children.  According  to  Kong  and  Choen's  estimation,  the  proportion  of  the  financial 
burden  of  students  to  the  total  amount  of  public  and  private  expenditure  for  education 
was  about  71  per  cent  in  1990  (requoted  from  Yun  C-1,1993,  p.  205). 
Table  4-13  Percentages  of  Private  and  Public  School  Students  in  Higher  Education. 
Year  College  University  Total 
Private  Public  Private  Public  Private  Public 
1970  56.9  43.1  75.4  24.6  72.0  28.0 
1975  69.8  30.2  72.8  27.2  72.1  27.9 
1980  83.7  16.3  71.4  28.6  75.0  25.0 
1985  90.5  9.5  73.8  26.2  77.1  22.9 
1988  91.1  8.9  75.5  24.5  78.8  11.2 
Source:  Korean  Educational  Development  Institute,  Educational  Indicators  of  Korea,  Seoul,  1988, 
pp.  170-171. 
Furthermore,  as  the  baby  boom  (1956-1960)  age  cohort  advanced,  competition  for 
entry  into  higher  education,  especially  famous  universities,  became  even  keener  and 
private  tutoring  became  more  pervasive.  Entry  into  the  famous,  if  not  all,  universities 
depended  on  the  ability  of  affording  expensive  tutors.  Low-income  households 
couldn't  afford  costs  of  higher-education  and  the  private  tutoring  costs.  Even  the 
middle-income  households  faced  difficulty  in  affording  the  private  tutoring  costs. 
Educational  reform  was  enacted  in  1980,  penalizing  high-income  households  by 
making  private  tutoring  illegal.  Many  studies  consistently  concluded  that  expanding 
access  to  higher  education  primarily  benefited  the  offspring  of  those  on  middle 
incomes.  The  advantages  that  upper-income  groups  held  disappeared  by  making 
private  tutoring  illegal,  but  educational  opportunity  for  the  lower-income  groups  did 
not  substantially  improve  (Kim  Y-H,  1990,  requoted  from  Tun-Jen  Cheng,  1993, 
100 p.  245).  The  moderate  or  middle  income  households  tended  to  regard  society  as  a  kind 
of  ladder,  where  it  was  and  is  possible  to  move  up  utilizing  ability,  initiative  and  hard 
work.  However,  those  who  have  difficulty  in  affording  higher  educational  costs 
tended  to  regard  society  as  a  kind  of  wall,  impossible  to  jump  over. 
Most  children  of  low-income  households  could  not  climb  the  ladder  of  education, 
their  main  chance  for  upward  mobility,  and  so  suffered  from  job  demarcation 
practices  based  strictly  on  educational  background  (Park  F-K,  1993,  p.  63). 
Moreover,  by  the  late  1970s,  secondary  education  had  been  generalized  so  that 
secondary  school  graduates  formed  the  basis  of  the  labour  force  (Kang  M-S  and  Yun 
C-11  1990,  pp.  66-68).  Under  this  educational  inflation,  the  subsidies  of  Private, 
middle  school  and  vocational  training  fees  for  low-income  households  became  less 
effective.  Unskilled  and  manual  workers,  mostly  low-income  households,  had  to 
compete  in  low-skill  labour  markets  and  marry  those  who  were  in  the  same  social 
stratum.  Under  the  breaking  down  of  social  mobility,  the  strong  family  ties  have 
resulted  in  the  poor  helping  the  poor,  and  thereby  becoming  poorer. 
Standards  of  living  may  depend  on  the  purchasing  power  of  money  income  in 
modern  market  places.  If  prices  increase  at  the  same  rate  as  incomes,  standards  of 
living  are  left  unchanged.  Moreover,  if  prices  increase  more  than  incomes,  standards 
deteriorate.  As  we  have  seen  earlier,  the  increases  in  wages  have  been  unevenly 
distributed.  However,  consumer  price  increases  have  an  impact  on  all  people. 
Moreover,  the  government  has  often  used  inflation  as  a  method  of  reducing  the 
burden  of  interest  on  government  bonds,  and  this  has  acted  as  a  tax  on  wage  workers. 
Furthermore,  as  Professor  Donnison  (1991,  p.  3)  pointed  out,  "each  generation 
invents  new  kinds  of  poverty  by  transforming  some  of  the  luxuries  of  its  predecessors 
into  necessities".  Economists  describe  this  using  Say's  Law,  i.  e.  that  supply  creates 
its  own  demand. 
What  are  necessities  is  a  matter  of  social  definition  which  may  change  over  time. 
In  a  rapidly  growing  economy  like  Korea  such  trends  are  fast.  For  example,  until  the 
late  1970s,  colour  TV's  were  classed  as  luxury  goods  with  a  high  luxury  consumption 
tax.  Thus  until  the  late  1970s,  this  luxury  consumption  tax  played  a  role  of  cross- 
subsidization.  Now  they  have  become  necessities  in  modern  urban  life.  All  this  is 
very  satisfactory  for  those  who  can  afford  these  new  necessities.  Professor  Donnison 
has  called  this  "the  rising  tide".  This  is,  as  Saunders  (1990,  p.  149)  pointed  out,  the 
essence  of  Hayek's  metaphor  of  the  'moving  column'  -  the  argument  that  capitalism 
is  unequal  yet  dynamic  and  that  those  at  the  back  of  the  column  will  in  time  come  to 
enjoy  the  standard  of  living  which  those  at  the  front  enjoy  today  (Hayek,  1960). 
Those  on  low  incomes  have  been  deceived  by  the  obvious  and  widespread  symbols  of 
the  new  affluence.  These  have  been  perceived  as  a  symbol  of  improved  living 
101 standards.  However,  spending  habits  are  not  rational,  but  take  place  in  the  context  of 
a  social  system  which  applies  certain  pressure  upon  its  members  (Townsend,  1954). 
Moreover,  rapid  economic  growth  has  led  to  a  more  affluent  middle  income  group 
and  the  subsequent  expansion  of  the  advertising  industry  and  of  credit  purchases. 
Low-income  workers  may  be  unduly  influenced  by  advertisers  and  the  tempting  hire 
purchase  offers,  as  Parker  (1967)  pointed  out,  "the  consumer  is  by  no  means  the  key 
factor  in  the  situation.  Rather,  it  is  the  producer  who  as  a  rule  initiates  economic 
change...  ".  Some  low-income  families  spend  beyond  their  means  and  if  subjected  to 
adverse  economic  pressures,  must  choose  to  work  overtime  or  supplement  their 
income  in  other  ways.  However,  they  have  to  compete  with  new  inmigrants  for  an 
ever  decreasing  number  of  low  income  jobs.  It  has  become  clear  to  people  in  Korea 
that  the  complacent  expectation  that  'a  rising  tide  would  lift  all  boats'  is  illusory, 
rather  'a  rising  tide  sank  some  boats'. 
With  the  increasing  demand  for  new  necessities,  the  Korean  government,  in  order 
to  off-set  the  deficits  of  firms  stemming  from  exports,  distorted  domestic  market 
prices  according  to  the  changes  in  the  international  market.  According  to  Dong-A 
Ilbo  (Korean  newspaper),  domestic  prices  were  2-3  times  higher  than  export  prices 
(24th  November,  1981).  All  Koreans  had  to  buy  at  higher  prices  for  the  growth  of 
the  export  industry.  The  tax  system  based  on  indirect  tax,  contributed  to  increase 
household  expenditure  still  further,  especially  in  low-income  households  (this  is 
discussed  later). 
As  cities  grew,  the  provision  of  amenities  such  as  housing,  transport,  etc  lagged 
behind  and  became  more  expensive.  Whenever  things  are  scarce,  they  become  more 
expensive  and  the  people  with  the  lowest  income  tend  to  suffer  the  most.  Table  4-14 
shows  these  general  changes  in  household  expenditure.  The  consumption  figures  are 
inconclusive  in  their  implications  and  we  have  to  look  at  the  consumption  of  the  more 
important  items  for  low-income  household  expenditure,  e.  g.  rice,  rents  and  medical 
costs.  There  are  no  reliable  estimates  of  that  expenditure.  In  1965,  household 
expenditure  on  foods  accounted  for  over  50  per  cent  of  the  total  in  both  urban  and 
rural  areas.  The  dual  price  system  set  up  in  1969  was  a  double  protection  system, 
supporting  incomes  for  farmers  while  also  reducing  consumption  costs  for  urban 
residents.  However,  household  expenditure  on  food  has  dramatically  decreased  as 
household  income  increases.  These  food  subsidies  also  became  less  effective. 
Expenditure  on  other  items  also  decreased  or  only  increased  slightly.  The  main 
problems  have  occurred  in  housing,  especially  in  urban  areas.  Expenditure  on 
housing  has  continuously  and  rapidly  increased  over  time.  In  particular,  urban 
households'  expenditure  on  housing  began  to  outstrip  spending  on  food  since  the  mid 
1980s.  Moreover,  as  Figure  4-4  shows,  lower-income  households  have  spent  more 
102 over  time,  whereas  high-income  households  have  spent  less  (see  Song  and  Struyk, 
1976,  p.  5).  So  the  increasing  cos,  ts  of  housing  consumption  have  eroded  increased 
household  income,  especially  for  low-income  households  in  urban  areas.  Increasing 
housing  expenditure  has  placed  large  families,  young  households  and  other  vulnerable 
groups  in  low-income  categories. 
Table  4-14  The  Consumption  Expenditure  of  Urban  and  Rural  Households. 
1965  1975  1985  1988 
Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural 
Amount  (f)  98  84  653  514  3987  3909  5830  5026 
Share  (%)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Foods  56.7  53.0  43.6  47.3  29.8  28.4  27.9  26.2 
Clothing  6.5  8.0  8.7  6.9  6.1  4.0  6.7  4.5 
Housing  13.8  11.7  17.5  13.3  27.0  7.6  30.9  9.0 
Education  4.4  4.5  6.5  6.2  6.2  13.0  6.1  11.1 
Medical  1.2  3.0  4.0  3.7  5.7  5.2  7.6  5.8 
Transportation  2.0  1.6  4.1  2.1  5.1  4.1  5.6  4.7 
Others  15.4  18.2  15.6  20.5  20.1  37.6  15.2  38.7 
Note:  Urban  household  expenditure  on  housing  includes  imputed  rental  value  of  Chunsei  (or  Key) 
money  and  owner-occupied  housing. 
Sources:  Computed  from  the  Bank  of  Korea,  Economic  Statistics  Year-book,  1971,1978,1981,  and 
1989;  EPB,  Bureau  of  Statistics,  Annual  Report  on  The  Family  Expenditure  Survey,  1980,1985, 
1988;  MOAF,  Report  on  the  Results  of  Farm  Household  Economic  Survey,  various  years,  quoted 
Byung-Nak  Song,  1990,  p.  150. 
Figure  4-4  Monthly  Average  Housing  Expenditure  as  a  Proportion  of  Income  per 
Household  by  Income  Decile  in  Cities. 
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Note:  excluding  electric,  heating  and  other  maintenance  costs. 
Source:  NSO,  Annual  Report  on  the  Family  Income  and  Expenditure  Survey,  each  year. 
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4.3.1  Taxation. 
After  the  launch  of  the  First  Economic  Development  Plan,  the  Korean  economy 
faced  a  severe  shortage  of  capital.  The  domestic  private  saving  rate  was  very  low  as  a 
result  of  low  income  levels.  Therefore,  the  objectives  of  tax  policy  were  to  raise 
revenue  and  to  mobilize  private  savings  (Kwack  T-W,  1993,  p.  396).  To  promote 
private  saving,  capital  taxation  was  drastically  reduced.  In  particular,  interest  income 
was  almost  untaxed.  The  anonymity  of  bank  accounts  was  guaranteed  since  the  early 
t960s  until  1993.  This  was  justified  in  that  it  supported  industrial  investment 
maximizing  the  mobilization  of  domestic  savings  (ibid,  p.  4t2).  The  history  of  the 
Korean  tax  system  has  seen  wide  variations  and  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  research. 
The  characteristics  of  the  Korean  tax  system  could  be  summarised  by  three  features 
(Han  S-S,  1982;  Kim  M-S,  1987;  Kwack  T-W,  1993).  Firstly,  although  the  total  tax 
burden  relative  to  GNP  has  been  rising  steadily,  from  14.6  per  cent  in  1970  to  19.4 
per  cent  in  1990,  the  total  Korean  tax  burden  relative  to  GNP  is  still  low  (Wieldeý 
1993,  p.  439). 
Secondly,  revenue  has  depended  heavily  on  indirect  taxation,  from  66.1  per  cent  in 
1970  to  75.2  per  cent  in  1984.  In  direct  tax,  although  capital  gains  from  real  property 
sales  were  subjected  to  taxation  at  fairly  high  rates  from  the  mid  1960s,  burdens  for 
property  owners  are  far  lower  than  for  wage  and  salary  earners.  This  was  often 
explained  by  the  lack  of  a  reasonable  and  consistent  asset  value  assessment  system  as 
a  primary  source  of  administrative  difficulties  and,  because  of  the  typical  combination 
of  poor  administration  and  low  compliance,  tax  authorities  did  not  effectively  capture 
the  realized  capital  gains  (Kwack  T-W,  1993,  p.  413).  Speculation  in  real  estate  was 
often  explained  by  this  tax  structure  (Lee  S-K,  1985).  However,  as  shall  be  shown  in 
the  following  chapters,  this  speculation  has  been  the  main  mechanism  for  urban  and 
housing  development.  Capital  gains  were  left  to  individuals  not  because  of  ineffective 
government  administration  but  for  reasons  associated  with  urban  and  housing 
development.  However,  as  Kim  M-S  (1987)  concluded,  using  1985  data,  the  burden 
of  property  tax  exhibits  a  skewed  U-shape  pattern  of  incidence  in  relation  to  income. 
Thirdly,  nominal  statutory  direct  tax  rates  have  been  maintained  at  a  very  highly 
progressive  rate  with  five  bands,  ranging  from  5  per  cent  to  50  per  cent  (exclusive  of 
surcharges).  The  top  marginal  rate  has  been  very  high,  but  the  cases  for  exemption 
have  been  increased.  The  explicit  emphasis  of  the  tax  policy  in  the  1980s  was  moved 
towards  equity  and  neutrality.  A  major  tax  reform  was  carried  out  in  1988, 
penalizing  the  wealthy.  However,  the  tax  structure  based  mainly  on  indirect  tax  has 
not  been  changed.  As  a  result  of  the  tax  reform  in  1988,  about  60  per  cent  of  the 
104 income  earners  in  Korea  are  not  paying  any  income  tax  (Kwack  T-W,  1993,  p-422). 
The  benefits  have  mainly  been  focused  on  the  moderate  and  middle  income  groups  by 
increasing  the  exemption  base.  The  higher  marginal  tax  rate  encourages  both 
employers  and  salaried  employees  to  provide  and  seek  forms  of  income  that  are 
untaxable  or  only  slightly  taxed.  This  has  led  to  the  development  of  a  it  total 
remuneration  package"  which  includes  a  wide  range  of  fringe  benefits  as  mentioned 
earlier.  The  income  tax  burden  for  middle  income  groups  has  reduced  as  a  result  of 
keeping  basic  salaries  low  and  supplementing  them  by  tax  free  benefits. 
Table  4-15  Changes  in  Tax  Structure. 
(percentages) 
Indirect  taxes  Indirect  taxes  Total  taxes 
Year  to  total  taxes  to  GNP  to  GNP 
1970  66.1  9.4  14.6 
1974  70.1  9.4  14.3 
1976  70.4  11.7  16.9 
1978  72.0  12.3  17.3 
1980  74.8  13.4  18.4 
1984  75.2  14.0  19.2 
Source:  EPB  (1989),  cited  from  Kwack  T-W,  1993,  p.  409,  Table  4. 
To  sum  up,  the  burdens  of  taxation  by  income  groups,  as  Figure  4-5  shows,  exhibit 
a  U-shape  pattern  of  incidence.  There  is  a  high  burden  for  the  bottom  income  group 
due  to  relience  on  the  indirect  taxes  and  a  high  burden  for  the  highest  income  group 
because  of  the  progressive  income  and  property  tax  structure.  This  tax  structure  in 
Figure  4-5  shows  where  the  social  and  political  power  lies.  It  is  also  demonstrated 
by  the  Land  Tax  reform  in  1990. 
Figure  4-5  The  Burdens  of  Taxation  by  Income  Groups,  1986,  percentages  of  income. 
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Source:  Shini  S-D  and  Park  I-W,  1989. 
IN  Income  tax  E:  Indirect  tax  1:  1  Others 
105 
>=  >< 
>> Since  the  mid  1980s,  increasing  land  prices  have  given  enormous  windfall  gains  to 
property  owners  who  have  paid  very  low  tax  on  their  gains.  By  contrast,  urban  lands 
have  been  increasingly  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  few  individuals  (see  Table  5- 
10).  Therefore,  the  most  important  single  element  in  the  middle  income  group's 
prevailing  social  discontent  about  equality  does  not  involve  the  distribution  of 
ordinary  income,  but  the  uneven  distribution  of  windfall  gains  due  to  property 
ownership.  Accordingly,  revolutionary  tax  reform  was  implemented  in  1990.  Three 
measures  were  carried  out. 
First,  the  Aggregate  Land  Tax  was  enacted  in  1990.  This  tax  is  levied  on 
"excessive"  capital  gains  accrueing  mainly  to  undeveloped  urban  land  holdings. 
Under  this,  accrued  excessive  capital  gains  compared  to  the  national  average  rate  of 
land  price  increase  are  taxed  at  50  per  cent  every  three  years.  Secondly,  a  ceiling  on 
the  holding  of  residential  land  was  enacted.  Prior  to  this,  a  few  polls  were  taken  and 
most  people  supported  the  introduction  of  the  ceiling.  (Such  a  result  was  fully 
expected  because  the  majority  of  people  do  not  own  land).  The  National  Assembly 
passed  the  bill  to  establish  a  ceiling  on  the  holding  of  residential  land  in  city  areas, 
partly  enacted  in  1990.  A  household  should  not  hold  residential  land  in  excess  of  200 
pyong  (about  660  sq.  m.  )  in  the  six  major  city  areas.  Those  who  want  to  hold  land  in 
excess  of  the  limit  have  to  pay  7  to  II  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the  excessively  held 
land  as  annual  charges  for  the  holding.  The  third  measure  was  the  system  to  capture 
development  profits.  According  to  this,  private  land  developers  have  to  pay  50  per 
cent  of  the  evaluated  profit  from  the  project  to  the  government. 
These  taxes  on  land  may  be  a  very  useful  method  to  reduce  speculation,  but  they 
inevitably  increase  the  land  prices  which  low-income  households  will  have  to  pay. 
The  revenue  from  the  above  goes  directly  into  the  newly  established  Special  Account 
on  Land  Management  and  Balanced  Regional  Development  which  is  mainly  used  by 
and  for  middle-income  groups  (this  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  chapters). 
Therefore,  in  conclusion,  redistribution  through  taxation  in  Korea  has  proceeded 
mainly  by  penalizing  property  wealth  and  the  highest  income  group,  and,  to  some 
extent,  the  lowest  income  group. 
4.3.2  Social  Protection  System. 
As  noted  earlier,  Korea  has  a  small  government  budget  in  comparison  with  other 
countries. 
106 Table  4-16  Government  Consumption  to  GNP  by  Country  and  by  Period. 
Country  Year  Year 
USA  1950-1950  17.9  1986  18.6 
Sweden  1950-1959  16.8  1986  27.2 
Korea  1953-1959  10.6  1986  10.8 
Sources:  Kuznets  (1966,  Table  5.3);  OECD  (1988);  The  Bank  of  Korea  (199  1);  World  Bank  (1988). 
Moreover,  expenditure  on  defence  has  accounted  for  over  40  per  cent  of 
government  final  consumption  for  over  three  decades  (see  Table  2-2).  Under  such 
circumstance,  as  Table  4-17  shows,  although  the  government  expenditure  on  social 
development  has  steadily  increased  over  time,  the  share  of  social  development 
expenditure  outside  education  is  particularly  small. 
Table  4-17  Trends  in  Central  Government  Expenditure  on  Social  Developmentcentral 
(percentages  of  total  goverment  expenditure)IO 
Year  Education  Health  Social  Housing  Others 
security 
1970  17.7  1.4  5.1  0.1  1.5 
1975  14.0  1.0  5.2  1.1  0.8 
1980  17.1  1.2  6.4  1.1  0.8 
1985  18.4  1.4  5.7  1.0  1.1 
1987  18.2  2.6  6.5  0.8  1.0 
Notes;  1)  The  data  used  here  is  the  consolidated  central  government's  expenditures  on  social 
development  using  the  IMF's  Manual  on  Government  Finance,  and  includes  the  social  development 
expenditures  from  each  part  of  the  general  account,  special  account  and  the  social  security  fund;  2) 
social  security  and  welfare;  3)  housing  and  community  amenities;  4)  other  community  and  social 
services. 
Sources:  The  Ministry  of  Finance,  Government  Finance  Statistics  in  Korea,  1970-87,  and  IMF, 
Government  Finance  Statistics  Year-book,  1977-87,  reconstructed  from  Yeon  H-C,  1989,  p.  5  and  p.  7. 
It  would  be  a  mistake  to  look  at  public  spending  in  isolation.  In  practice  the 
provision  of  social  services  for  the  poor  takes  various  forms.  In  some  cases  it  would 
take  the  form  of  public  finance,  or  public  provision.  In  some  cases  social  services  are 
directly  provided  by  the  state  and  a  market  operates.  Even  in  areas  where  both 
provision  of  a  service  is  private  and  it  is  paid  for  privately,  public  sector  regulation 
may  have  very  important  effects.  Moreover,  there  are  many  other  ways  of  achieving 
the  ultimate  aim.  These  include  what  Titmuss  (1958)  identified  as  "fiscal  welfare", 
operating  through  what  have  come  to  be  called  "tax  expenditure,  "occupational 
welfare",  operating  through  employers,  and  "family  welfare",  operating  through 
mutual  support  in  a  family.  These  discussions  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  research. 
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development  suggests  that  it  is  more  important  to  examine  the  way  in  which  such  a 
sum  is  spent.  In  Korea,  there  is  no  national  health  service,  no  unemployment  benefit, 
no  child  benefit,  and  no  public  housing.  The  social  protection  systems  in  Korea 
consist  of  risk  relief  policy  and  anti  poverty  policy. 
Risk-relief  policy. 
The  risk-relief  policy  can  be  subdivided  into  (1)  Pension  Scheme,  (2)  Health 
insurance  and  (3)  Industrial  Accident  Insurance.  The  Pension  Scheme  is  subdivided 
into  four  types.  Type  I  pension  program  is  for  civil  servants,  Type  11  for  military 
personnel,  Type  III  for  private  school  teachers,  and  the  Type  IV  pension  program, 
called  the  National  Pension  Plan,  is  for  those  employed  in  firms  with  10  or  more 
workers  and  it  is  compulsory.  The  contributions  are  charged  equally  to  employees 
and  employers  on  the  basis  of  a  fixed  rate  formula.  The  revenue  of  these  pension 
schemes  consists  of  contributions  from  the  insured  persons  and  their  employers, 
which  accounted  for  96  per  cent  of  revenues  in  1988.  The  four  per  cent  financial 
support  from  the  government  is  supposed  to  absorb  the  administrative  costs  necessary 
to  operate  the  system.  The  contributions  and  profits  accrued  through  the  operation  of 
the  pension  reserve  fund  form  the  main  pension  fund  which  is  used  for  pensioners 
and  the  insured. 
With  regard  to  benefits,  the  first  three  types  are  related  to  earnings.  Under  the 
National  Pension  Scheme,  the  amount  of  pension  received  is  divided  into  two  parts. 
One  is  the  basic  amount  and  the  other  is  the  additional  amount  according  to  the 
contributions.  Benefits  are  basically  associated  to  contributions  and  the  earnings  from 
the  operation  of  the  fund.  Therefore,  the  pension  funds  cannot  be  invested  in  rental 
housing  or  for  the  improvement  of  workers'  living  conditions  unless  they  are 
profitable. 
Irregular  workers,  workers  in  a  firm  which  employs  10  or  less  and  the  self- 
employed  can  be  insured  on  a  voluntary  basis.  However,  the  contributions  to  the 
pension  have  to  be  paid  by  employers  alone  or  by  themselves  in  the  case  of  the  self- 
employed.  Thus,  in  reality,  most  of  them  are  excluded  from  the  National  Pension 
scheme. 
Health  insurance  is  also  subdivided  into  three  types.  In  1977,  the  type  I  health 
program  was  launched,  compulsory  for  all  employees  and  employers  of  firms 
employing  500  or  more  people.  It  was  voluntary  for  others.  The  compulsory  scope 
was  extended  to  firms  with  over  360  employees  in  1979,  over  16  workers  in  1983, 
and  5  or  more  workers  in  1987.  Type  11  is  for  civil  servants,  military  personnel  and 
108 private  school  teachers.  The  other  is  type  III  for  the  self-employed  in  rural  (launched 
in  1988)  and  urban  areas  (launched  in  1989).  Employees  in  small  enterprises  with 
five  or  less  workers  and  pensioners  can  join  the  type  III  health  insurance  program. 
Health  insurance  premium  rates  are  in  the  range  of  3  to  8  per  cent  of  the  insured 
person's  income  or  earnings,  with  the  payment  divided  equally  between  employers 
and  employees.  In  the  case  of  type  111,  a  flat  rate  is  paid  by  the  insured. 
The  benefits  of  health  insurance  in  most  cases  are  provided  by  means  of  medical 
services  in  kind.  Cash  benefits  are  given  in  exceptional  cases.  However,  the  medical 
services  are  not  free.  Patients  pay  the  following:  2,000  Won  (about  f-1.60)  for  a  visit 
to  clinic  (3,000  Won,  about  f2.50,  for  a  visit  to  a  university  infirmary);  30  per  cent 
of  fees  (55  per  cent  of  fee  in  a  university  infirmary)  in  the  case  of  total  medical  costs 
exceeding  10,000  won  (about  f  8.30).  Therefore,  the  low-income  households  who 
cannot  contribute  are  not  entitled  to  medical  assistance.  Even  when  they  are  entitled, 
they  can  hardly  seek  hospital  treatment  because  the  fees  are  too  expensive. 
The  Industrial  Accident  Compensation  Act  of  1963  (most  recently  amended  in 
1988)  compulsorily  applies  to  enterprises  with  5  or  more  employees.  Contributions 
are  paid  by  employers  alone  to  the  central  fund.  The  rate  of  contribution  differs 
according  to  the  industries'  frequency  of  accidents.  The  government  bears  the  cost  of 
administration  which  accounts  for  1.2  per  cent  of  total  expenditure. 
In  the  case  of  temporary  disability,  medical  treatment  along  with  70  per  cent  of 
wages  are  provided  while  under  medical  treatment.  After  medical  treatment,  a  lump 
sum  is  paid  according  to  the  degree  of  disability.  In  the  case  of  permanent  disability, 
a  choice  is  given  between  a  pension  equal  to  138-329  days'  average  earnings  and  a 
lump  sum  payment  equal  to  55  to  1474  days'  earnings  according  to  the  degree  of 
disability.  In  the  case  of  death,  a  lump  sum  payment  equal  to  1,300  days'  average 
earnings  or  a  pension  is  provided  to  the  surviving  family  together  with  a  funeral 
grant.  This  insurance  also  excludes  irregular  workers  and  the  self-employed.  It 
covered  only  41.8  per  cent  of  employees  in  1990.  Since  the  compensation  for 
industrial  accidents  and  the  contribution  of  other  insurances  are  calculated  by  the 
basic  wage  or  salary,  employers  have  been  keen  to  keep  basic  wages  or  salaries  as 
low  as  possible,  increasing  other  fringe  benefits  which  are  untaxed  instead. 
Poverty-relief  policy. 
The  components  of  the  poverty-relief  programs  are  generally  subdivided  into  the 
Livelihood  Protection  Program  (LPP),  and  the  Medical  Assistance  Program.  The 
assistance  for  subsistence  according  to  the  LPP  is  the  most  direct  means  of  helping 
the  poor  in  Korea.  Under  this  program,  the  poor  are  defined  by  five  categories;  (i) 
109 those  unable  to  work  (over  65  years  old,  under  18  years  old,  mentally  or  physically 
handicapped,  pregnant  women);  (H)  those  able  to  work  but  deemed  absolutely  poor; 
(iii)  in  both,  a  person  who  does  not  have  a  legal  guardian,  or  the  legal  guardian  is  not 
able  to  support  that  person;  (iv)  a  person  whose  income  and  wealth  do  not  exceed  the 
ceilings  set  by  the  government  each  year;  and  (V)  those  who  have  lived  about  one 
year  in  the  same  administrative  district. 
The  beneficiaries  of  this  program  are  selected  by  local  government  according  to  the 
criteria  provided  annually  by  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Affairs  (MOHSA). 
As  Table  4-18  shows,  5.5  per  cent  of  the  population  on  average  have  received 
benefits  from  this  program  during  the  last  10  years.  The  estimations  of  absolute 
poverty  by  EPB  and  the  working  poor  by  MOHSA  have  until  recent  years  far 
exceeded  this  figure. 
Table  4-18  Proportion  of  Benefit  Recipients  by  the  Livelihood  Protection  Program 
(MOHSA)  and  Poverty  (EPB)  in  Population. 
Year  1970  1976  1980  1985  1987  1989 
Benefit  Recipients(MOHSA) 
Absolute  Poverty  (EPB) 
--5.3 
23.4  14.8  9.8 
5.5 
6.8 
5.7 
6.2 
5.4 
5.3 
Sources:  MOHSA  and  EPB. 
The  types  of  subsistence  assistance  have  become  quite  diverse  during  the  last  three 
decades.  The  components  of  the  assistance  are;  in-kind  assistances  such  as  food  given 
to  those  unable  to  work;  cash  assistance  for  fuel  expenses;  exemption  from  children's 
middle  school  tuition  fees;  cash  income  supplements,  ranging  from  39,000  Won 
(about  02.50)  to  48,000  won  (about  f40)  per  month;  and  free  medical,  maternity 
and  funeral  services  are  provided.  Under  the  subsistence  protection  program,  80  per 
cent  of  the  expenses  are  met  by  the  central  government,  except  in  the  case  of  Seoul  in 
which  more  than  50  per  cent  of  the  expenses  have  to  be  met  by  the  city  government 
(Lee  M-W,  1993,  p.  117). 
Since  the  introduction  of  the  Medical  Insurance  Program  in  1977,  the  Medical 
Assistance  Program  was  also  formulated  to  help  the  poor  who  are  protected  under  the 
Assistance  for  Subsistence.  It  covered  about  7.7  per  cent  of  the  population  in  1990, 
including  benefit  recipients  of  LPP.  All  medical  services  are  free  for  those  who  are 
unable  to  work,  but  those  who  can  work  pay  50  per  cent  of  hospital  expenses  in 
larger  cities  and  40  per  cent  in  other  areas,  with  the  exception  of  out-patient  care 
which  is  free. 
In  addition  to  this,  after  1964  the  government  has  launched  many  public  works 
projects  on  the  basis  of  self-help  ideology,  including  road  construction  or 
improvement,  cleaning  of  small  rivers  and  streams,  construction  of  rural  irrigation 
110 facilities,  and  miscellaneous  urban  construction  to  offer  temporary  employment 
opportunities  and  additional  incomes.  Current  wage  rates  under  the  program  are 
8,000  Won  (about  f6.70)  per  day  which  is,  of  course,  far  below  the  average  market 
wage  (Lee  M-W,  1993,  p.  117).  Moreover,  the  ceiling  of  working  days  per 
participating  household  declined  from  35  days  per  year  in  1974-75  to  less  than  8  days 
in  recent  years.  This  program  has  been  used  as  an  absorbing  measure  in  economic 
downturns.  For  instance,  in  the  years  1974-75  those  temporarily  employed  reached  a 
high  point  to  absorb  the  impact  of  the  first  oil  price  shock,  and  again  in  1979  just 
after  the  second  oil  price  shock. 
Another  program  is  Vocational  training  and  financial  assistance  for  the  education  of 
the  poor  and  their  children.  The  government  provides  subsidies  for  poor  trainees, 
paying  each  of  them  20,000  Won  (about  f  16.70)  for  training  preparation,  50,000 
Won  (about  f-41.70)  as  a  monthly  subsistence  allowance  and  50,000  Won  as  a  special 
adjustment  fund  for  the  initial  period  of  employment  to  those  who  graduate  from 
vocational  training  courses.  At  the  same  time,  after  1979,  the  government  has  also 
exempted  tuition  fees  for  middle  school  students  of  poor  families.  The  public  works 
projects,  vocational  programmes  and  the  exemption  of  middle  school  tuition  fees  are 
not  confined  to  the  benefit  recipients  of  LPP.  The  beneficiaries  of  these  programs 
vary  according  to  changing  circumstances,  mainly  according  to  the  allocation  of 
budget  to  that  program. 
Table  4-19  The  Ratio  between  Risk-relief  Policy  and  Poverty-relief  Policy  in  Government 
Expenditure. 
(billion  Korean  Won) 
1970  1980  1985  1989 
Risk-relief  policy 
Pension  insurance  12.2  183.1  444.9  1,002.6 
Health  insurance  -  148.2  633.6  1,454.1 
Industrial  Accident  insurance  2.2  72.0  201.9  395.7 
Sub  Total  (A)  14.4  403.3  1,280.4  2,852.4 
Poverty  relief  policy 
Livelihood  Protection  4.7  58.1  116.9  221.7 
Medical  Assistance  -  14.2  65.9  219.4 
Sub  Total  (B)  4.7  72.3  182.8  441.1 
A/B3.06  5.58  7.00  6.47 
Total  Expenditure  19.1  475.6  1,463.2  3,293.5 
As  percentage  of  GNP  0.69  1.29  1.87  2.32 
Notes;  Livelihood  Protection  expenditure  include  education  assistance,  vocational  training  and  public 
work  projects  and  the  1970  data  of  it  include  disaster  relief. 
Sources:  Ministry  of  Finance,  Summary  of  Financial  Implementation  for  Fiscal  Year,  various  issues 
and  years;  Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Affairs;  and  EPB,  government  Finance  Statistics  Year-book, 
various  years. 
111 Table  4-19  shows  the  trends  of  public  expenditure  on  risk-relief  programs  and  on 
poverty-relief  programs.  Although  public  expenditure  on  these  programmes  has 
increased  over  time,  more  priority  has  been  given  to  the  risk-relief  programs  in  which 
the  beneficiaries  make  a  contribution  for  compensation  and  benefits  according  to  their 
incomes.  Thus,  increased  government  expenditure  has  been  channelled  to  those  who 
have  already  satisfied  their  subsistence  needs.  Whereas  the  poverty-relief  programs  in 
which  the  beneficiary  does  not  make  a  contribution  for  compensation,  and  thereby  the 
compensation  is  made  mainly  from  tax  revenue,  have  become  marginalized.  Thus, 
poverty-relief  policy  has  made  only  a  small  contribution  to  the  reduction  of  poverty 
(Lee  M-W,  1993,  p.  127). 
Why  has  there  been  such  a  limited  social  policy  for  the  poor?  Answers  have  been 
given  on  various  grounds,  starting  with  the  Confucian  ethics  of  Korea  (Kwon  S-W, 
1992)  p.  1).  A  family  or  employer  must  be  responsible  for  the  misfortune  of 
individuals.  The  provision  of  social  services  by  the  state  would  conflict  with  the 
traditional  ethic  of  self-relience.  Indeed,  in  the  case  of  family  income  supplements  in 
LPP,  the  take-up  ratio  of  the  policy  is  only  50  per  cent.  In  the  case  of  non-monetary 
compensation  such  as  free  welfare  food,  the  take-up  ratio  is  as  low  as  4  per  cent  (Lee 
M-W,  1993,  p.  134). 
Secondly,  there  has  been  only  a  small  proportion  of  elderly  in  the  population,  thus 
enabling  Korea  to  spend  a  smaller  proportion  of  its  GNP  on  social  security  benefits 
than  most  countries  (Kwon  S-W,  1988,  p.  8).  In  1960,  Koreans  who  were  65  or  older 
accounted  for  3.7  per  cent  of  the  total  population  -a  figure  which  rose  to  5.1  per  cent 
in  1990,  but  is  still  low  compared  with  other  countries. 
Thirdly,  until  the  1960s  Korea  was  a  relatively  equal  society,  but  a  very  poor 
country.  As  Lewis  and  Ulph  (1988,  p.  117)  pointed  out,  "in  a  society  in  which 
average  income  is  above  the  poverty  line,  the  removal  of  inequality  will 
simultaneously  abolish  poverty,  so  the  elimination  of  these  two  problems  are 
complementary  objectives  of  society.  However,  when  average  income  is  below  the 
poverty  line,  eliminating  all  inequality  necessarily  makes  everyone  poor".  Social 
policies  were  designed  in  relation  to  national  growth  and  were  not  much  concerned 
with  redistribution.  They  were  designed  to  achieve  redistribution  "through  the  growth 
of  income".  Hard  work  and  saving  have  been  seen  as  the  essence  of  national  growth 
in  a  country  in  which  national  resources  are  limited.  It  was  often  assumed  that  a 
wider  range  of  social  policy  by  the  state  would  produce  a  decline  in  individual 
initiative  and  a  reduction  of  personal  and  family  responsibility,  and  would  lead  to  too 
high  a  level  of  taxation  which  would  act  as  a  disincentive  to  further  investment  as 
well  as  to  work.  This  was  summed  up  well  by  Whang  IJ  (19869  p.  27),  "The  Korean 
model  of  a  weyare  state  should  not  necessarily  be  oriented  to  the  Western  Model,  in 
112 order  to  avoid  the  undesirable  by-products  of  the  Western  approach.  Korea  as  a  late 
starter  in  modernization  should  try  to  maximize  the  ben47ts  of  the  Western 
experience,  both  positive  and  negative,  in  national  development".  An  alternative 
approach  was  to  subsidize  items  that  were  particularly  important  for  poor  people.  For 
instance,  school  feeding  in  primary  schools  and  grain  rations  for  the  poor,  subsidies 
on  transport  fares  and  public  facility  fares  and  public  projects  to  give  extra  income  to 
the  self-help  poor.  Social  policies  were  developed  in  con  unction  with  structural 
adjustment  measures  to  avoid  negative  incentive  effects  on  work  and  investment  (Suh 
S-M  and  Yeon  H-C,  1986,  p.  7  and  Yeon  H-C,  1989,  p.  8). 
These  may  explain  why  social  policy  is  undeveloped  in  Korea,  but  do  not  give  an 
answer  for  why  the  benefits  of  social  policies  have  been  concentrated  on  middle 
income  salary  workers?  (In  Korea  they  are  collectively  called  Salarymen).  Since  the 
military  revolution  in  1960,  the  military  governments  have  not  been  widely  supported 
by  the  population  and  have  always  been  challenged  by  students  and  production 
workers.  Enhancing  the  middle  groups  has  been  seen  as  a  way  to  achieve  political 
security.  The  meritocratic  system  has  become  the  main  mechanism  for  recruitment, 
promotion  and  reward  in  the  society.  In  a  similar  vein,  the  government's  policies 
have  focused  on  those  who  have  ability  and  who  are  hard  working.  Since  the  late 
1970s,  the  centralisation  of  the  national  economy  generated  another  bureaucracy,  the 
private  bureaucracy.  It  has  enhanced  its  power  through  industrial  restructuring.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  until  the  mid  1970s,  most  social  security  systems  were  targeted  at 
public  bureaucrats,  such  as  civil  servants,  military  personnel  and  teachers,  and  were 
then  expanded  to  the  private  bureaucrats,  such  as  the  type  IV  pension  program  and 
the  health  insurance,  etc.  Then  "white  collar  politics"  of  two  bureaucracies  have  led 
the  Korean  economy  and  society  reluctantly  towards  an  egalitarian  society  but  with 
active  opposition  to  high  taxation. 
As  a  result,  the  Korean  tax  structure,  as  we  have  seen  earlier,  exhibits  a  U-shape 
pattern  of  incidence  by  income  groups.  Whether  social  policy  is  through  public 
finance  or  public  provision,  it  is  largely  financed  by  tax  revenues.  A  small  tax 
revenue  has  limited  the  government's  expenditure.  These  circumstances  brought 
about  the  idea  emphasized  by  Lee  M-W  (1993,  p.  132); 
"In  a  country  like  Korea  where  there  is  a  demand  for  excessive  expenditure  on 
social  development  and  national  defense,  it  is  desirable  to  rely  on  the  social 
insurance  system.  For  the  poor  who  do  not  benefit  fi-om  the  social  insurance  system, 
f  it  is  desirable  to  utilize  social  benefits  based  on  a  strict  means-test'  . 
Under  these  circumstances,  social  service  planners  have  found  it  very  difficult  to 
pursue  social  welfare  policies  because  they  neither  encourage  nor  enhance  Korea's 
productive  capacities.  Therefore,  they  have  to  pay  special  attention  to  locally 
113 available,  readily  mobilizable  or  marginal  resources  to  whatever  extent  possible.  For 
example,  newly  qualified  doctors  are  forced  to  serve  in  rural  areas  for  three  years  as 
a  legal  obligation  before  engaging  in  private  medical  practice  in  urban  areas.  For 
another  example,  some  nurses  are  retrained  to  become  community  health  practitioners 
entitled  to  provide  simple  medical  care  as  well  as  preventive  care  for  residents  in 
remote  rural  areas.  Another  way  to  reduce  the  cost  of  social  provision  was  to  pass  the 
burden  towards  employers.  Indeed,  in  Korea,  a  large  part  of  social  protection  and  the 
social  insurance  system  is  financed  through  prior  contributions  by  employers. 
In  a  self-sufficient  economy,  an  automobile  worker  helps  in  the  production  of 
motor  cars  and  he  probably  drives  a  car  himself.  Thus,  he  is  both  a  producer  and  a 
consumer  on  whom  the  decisions  about  the  product  depend.  In  the  long  run,  the 
production  of  goods  and  services  will  be  determined  by  the  effective  demand  of  the 
people.  However,  in  export-oriented  industry,  the  main  consumers  are  not  domestic 
households  but  foreigners.  Employers  do  not  see  their  production  workers  as 
consumers  of  their  products. 
There  was  a  plentiful  supply  of  labour  from  population  growth  and  inmigration. 
Since  the  mid  1970s,  this  almost  infinitive  labour  supply  turned  into  a  deficit  in  terms 
of  workers  required  as  a  result  of  changes  in  the  industrial  structure.  Employers 
began  to  offer  production  workers  private  welfare  in  order  to  attract  the  required 
labour  (Lee  K-C,  1985,  p.  86).  Furthermore,  in  order  to  cope  with  the  deteriorated 
economic  conditions  before  and  after  1980,  the  government  launched  a  low-wage 
policy.  As  a  means  of  compensation  for  the  low-wage  policy,  the  government  legally 
forced  employers  to  establish  welfare  facilities  in  workshops  and  expanded  various 
social  insurance  policies  to  which  employers  had  to  contribute.  The  government 
transferred  a  large  part  of  social  welfare  costs  to  employers.  As  mentioned  in  Chapter 
3,  the  development  of  the  private  bureaucracy  has  made  this  possible,  with  no 
investment  in  terms  of  government  budget  outlay. 
Employers  have  been  keen  to  increase  fringe  benefits  and  employ  more  irregular 
workers  to  avoid  the  burden  of  the  social  welfare  of  their  employees.  According  to 
Lee  (ibid,  p.  88),  in  Korea,  fringe  benefits,  most  of  which  are  out  of  tax,  accounted 
for  21.5  per  cent  of  total  labour  costs  in  1979,  far  higher  than  in  Britain  which  stood 
at  17.4  per  cent  in  1978.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  those  employed  by  large 
enterprises  (Kwon  S-W,  1992,  p.  7)  and  those  who  are  regular  workers.  In  these 
aspects,  the  interests  of  employers  and  the  private  bureaucracy  has  been  reconcilable. 
As  Olson  (1982,  p.  178)  argues  convincingly,  "economic  liberty  requires  vigilant 
authoritative  intervention  to  protect  it  from  the  tendency  of  market  participants  with 
similar  interests  to  combine  in  distributional  coalitions".  Social  welfare  schemes 
tended  to  overlap  or  totally  exclude.  Better-off  workers  who  have  stable  jobs  could 
114 afford  to  contribute  to  insurance  and  pension  schemes,  but  irregular  workers  not  only 
cannot  join  the  schemes,  they  cannot  spare  the  money  for  subscriptions  to  such 
schemes. 
The  lack  of  social  welfare  services  provided  by  the  state  and  by  entrepreneurs  has 
in  fact  helped  to  increase  in  low-income  households'  expenditure.  For  example, 
according  to  a  comparative  study  between  a  low-income  housing  area  and  a  middle- 
income  housing  area  in  1982  (Byun  C-H,  Suh  M-H  and  An  S-K,  1982),  the  incidence 
of  disease  in  the  low  income  housing  area  was  higher  (22  per  cent  compared  to  15 
per  cent).  The  low-income  households  opted  mostly  to  use  a  pharmacy  rather  than  a 
hospital  to  treat  the  disease  because  the  costs  were  cheaper.  Those  from  the  more 
affluent  area  used  hospital  treatment.  Doctors,  therefore,  preferred  to  open  in  better 
off  residential  areas  where  people  tended  to  use  the  hospital  to  treat  disease. 
Nevertheless,  household  expenditure  on  health  in  the  low-income  households  as 
percentages  of  their  income  was  about  2  times  higher  (8.5  per  cent)  than  the  middle- 
income  households  (4.5  per  cent). 
Under  such  circumstances,  hardship  in  old  age  with  no  relatives  or  poor  relatives 
may  be  especially  distressing  because  there  is  so  little  chance  of  things  ever  getting 
better.  People  just  wait  for  the  end,  living  on  the  barest  subsistence  assistance. 
4.5  Conclusion. 
Thanks  to  the  economic  growth  of  the  last  three  decades,  the  pleasures  of  life  and 
the  benefits  of  civilisation  have  been  available  to  more  people  than  ever  before. 
Clearly  more  Koreans  are  immensely  better  off  with  each  passing  decade.  However, 
it  is  also  clear  that  economic  growth  has  failed  to  benefit  those  in  greatest  need. 
Korea  achieved  nearly  full  employment  due  to  the  increase  in  irregular  workers. 
Unskilled  people  have  to  compete  with  ever  growing  in-migrants  to  the  cities  and 
newly  trained  labour  for  a  declining  number  of  low-income  jobs.  As  economic 
growth  has  continued,  wages  have  increased,  but  the  increase  in  wages  has  been 
unevenly  distributed  across  firms  of  different  types,  industries  of  different  capital 
intensity  and  workers  of  different  sex  and  position.  Problems  of  unemployment,  low 
income,  irregular  working,  wage  descrimination,  etc.,  tend  to  be  concentrated  on  the 
poor  and  the  same  families.  Moreover,  the  poor  have  remained  relatively  poor  as 
their  greater  income  has  been  relatively  less  valuable  as  a  means  for  security,  and 
gaining  access  to  scarce  urban  resources  and  facilities. 
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work  situation  alone  is  perhaps  too  limited.  It  has  been  well  illustrated  by  Konrad  and 
Szelenyi  (1969),  in  Eastern  Europe,  that  attempts  to  redistribute  resources  in  favour 
of  less-skilled  workers  were  frustrated  by  the  distributional  effects  of  an  urban  system 
which  appeared  to  be  creating  new  or  deeper  patterns  of  inequality.  This  can  be 
identified,  as  noted  earlier,  by  the  perceived  income  distribution  prevailing  in  Korea. 
Therefore,  perceived  income  distribution  and  deteriorating  living  conditions  are  not  a 
result  of  high  expectations,  as  Hirshchman's  tunnel  effect  suggests,  but  of  real 
experience. 
The  fundamental  difficulty  is  that  problems  of  earnings  and  household  expenditure 
tend  to  be  concentrated  on  the  poor,  on  the  same  families  and  at  the  same  time  in  the 
most  difficult  periods,  resulting  in  the  breaking  down  of  social  mobility.  Under  these 
circumstances,  strong  family  ties  resulted  in  the  poor  helping  the  poor,  and  thereby 
becoming  poorer.  It  is  certain  that  inequalities  of  condition  at  any  one  point  in  time 
create  inequalities  of  opportunity  for  further  achievement.  Education  reform  was 
oriented  in  ways  which  supported  the  ambitions  of  the  middle  income  groups  for  their 
children.  A  U-shaped  tax  revenue  has  been  mainly  invested  through  social  policies 
for  the  benefit  of  middle  income  groups,  not  for  low-income  groups.  Redistribution 
has  proceeded  by  penalizing  the  top  income  group,  not  by  lifting  the  bottom  income 
group,  and  expanding  more  benefits  to  middle-income  groups  and  their  children. 
Figure  4-6  demonstrates  all  these  patterns. 
Figure  4-6  Frequency  in  Household  Incomes,  in  cities  (1985,1988). 
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Source:  Kwon  S-W  et  al.,  1992,  p.  75. 
The  above  Figure  also  implies  that  equality  may  be  a  necessary  step  towards 
improving  the  living  standards  of  low-income  households,  but  not  a  sufficient  one. 
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1234 The  lowest  quartile  of  income  earners  has  seen  how  the  benefits  of  rapid  economic 
growth  trickled-up  rather  than  trickled-down.  It  has  often  been  pledged  that  their 
sacrifice  would  be  compensated  when  the  cake  becomes  larger.  But  the  poor  have 
become  poorer,  relatively  in  some  households,  absolutely  in  others.  The  poorer 
households  have  gained  little  or  no  substantial  advantage  from  rapid  economic 
growth. 
Note. 
The  patriarchism  is  found  in  wage  management  and  even  in  promotion.  To  be  sure,  labour  unions 
everywhere  object  to  merit  systems.  Park  S-1  (1988)  express  it  by  following  manner:  "Hence, 
employers  are  afraid  of  damaging  employee  morale  and  the  sense  of  fairness'  by  a  strict 
application  of  performance  appraisals  "  (p.  104). 
117 CHAPTER  5.  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  HOUSING  POLICY. 
5.1  Introduction. 
The  last  three  chapters  have  discussed  low-income  households  and  their  place 
within  the  changing  economic,  social  and  political  structures  of  a  rapidly  developing 
country.  The  rest  of  this  thesis  focuses  more  closely  on  housing. 
This  chapter  investigates  how  changes  in  economic,  social  and  political  structures 
have  affected  housing  policies.  The  evolution  of  Korean  housing  policy  is  reviewed  in 
section  2  which  considers  how  housing  problems  have  changed  and  how  the 
government  has  coped  with  those  changes  within  a  rapidly  changing  economic,  social 
and  political  environment.  The  next  section  explores  the  changing  housing  conditions, 
and  the  achievements  of  housing  policy  in  relation  to  other  social  aims  and  the 
mechanisms  used  for  these  achievements.  In  discussing  the  evolution  of  housing 
policies  the  emphasis  will  be  on  their  patterns  and  trends  rather  than  on  the  specifics 
of  particular  programs  and  their  results.  This  chapter  is  designed  to  set  out  the 
broader  framework  and  trends  of  housing  policy  in  Korea,  and  to  provide  an 
overview  for  the  subsequent  chapters  which  deal  with  the  housing  system  and 
changing  housing  markets  in  relation  to  low-income  households  in  detail. 
5.2  Housing  Policy  Overview. 
Housing  in  Korea  was  not  an  issue  in  political  and  social  debate  at  least  until  the 
early  1940s.  Korea  was  a  society  where  people  built  their  own  houses  using  raw 
materials  collected  and  processed  by  themselves  with  the  help  of  friends  and 
neighbours,  utilizing  various  traditional  saving  schemes  to  mobilize  the  necessary 
resources,  such  as  "Gae",  referring  to  a  neighbourhood-based  informal  saving 
association  which  had  various  purposes.  The  quality  of  housing  was  limited  by  the 
availability  of  materials  and  the  skills  of  self-builders  but  homelessness  and  housing 
tenure  were  unlikely  to  be  a  problem. 
After  independence  from  Japan  and  the  subsequent  partition  in  1945,  a  large 
number  of  repatriated  Koreans  from  Japan  and  elsewhere,  and  refugees  from  North 
Korea  entered  the  country.  The  symptom  of  this  influx  was  the  emergence  of 
"S  angj  aj  ip  it,  a  kind  of  poor  housing,  made  of  cardboard  and  the  like.  It  was 
common  for  between  2-10  households  to  be  sharing  a  house  (MOC,  1987,  p.  932). 
However,  at  that  time,  the  government,  the  individual  household,  and  the  house 
builder  were  all  unable  to  cope  with  the  housing  shortage.  The  revenue  of  the 
government  depended  heavily  on  aid  from  overseas.  Most  of  the  population  were  in 
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social,  political  and  economic  problems  took  precedence  over  housing.  The 
construction  of  crude  refugee  camps  was  the  only  initiative  taken  by  the  government. 
To  make  matters  worse,  the  Korean  War  (1950-1953)  destroyed  or  made 
uninhabitable  about  600,000  housing  units,  equivalent  to  18  per  cent  of  the  housing 
stock  (MOC,  1987,  p.  932),  and  a  further  million  were  estimated  to  be  damaged  to  a 
lesser  extent.  Moreover,  refugees  from  the  North  added  to  the  serious  housing 
problems.  Although  no  clear  statistics  are  available,  over  1  million  refugees  fled  from 
North  Korea.  According  to  a  1961  North  Korean  source,  the  total  reduction  in  the 
northern  population  from  1949  until  1953  was  1.13  million,  or  some  12  per  cent  of 
1949's  9.6  million  population  (quoted  in  Henderson,  1974,  p.  61).  Moreover, 
unexpected  typhoons  and  floods  took  away  about  30,000  housing  units  per  year 
during  the  second  half  of  the  1950s  (MOC,  op.  cit,  p.  932).  The  term  Sangjajip  was 
replaced  by  Panjajip  made  of  wooden  boards  which  came  into  Korea  with  foreign 
troops.  Every  night,  stations  were  full  of  homeless  people. 
Refugee  camps  or  temporary  shelters  were  built  with  the  aid  of  UNKRA,  AID,  etc 
to  accommodate  the  refugees  and  the  roofless.  They  were  no  better  than  self-built 
shelters  in  terms  of  standards.  Housing  standards  and  environments  were  not  a 
concern.  Urban  planners  had  little  opportunity  to  put  their  ideas  into  practice. 
Wooden  boards  and  bricks  were  laid  in  a  hurry  on  any  open  space  to  shelter  people 
from  the  severe  climate.  Until  the  early  1960s  poor  housing  was  largely  ignored  by 
the  government.  It  would  have  been  foolish  to  tear  down  existing  houses,  however 
bad  they  were,  when  there  was  a  serious  problem  with  rooflesness. 
The  house  is  an  extremely  important  aspect  of  human  life,  but  next  to  nurishment. 
In  1960,  about  43  per  cent  of  the  urban  population  were  still  living  in  subsistence 
conditions  (EPB)  and  the  official  unemployment  rate  was  recorded  as  17.3  per  cent 
('60  Population  and  Housing  Census).  Nevertheless,  the  population  was  growing 
more  rapidly  than  before.  Housing  problems  were  far  behind  unemployment  and 
hunger  in  terms  of  priorities.  Moreover,  for  those  who  experienced  the  war,  today's 
concepts  of  housing  need  would  have  been  a  luxurious  idea.  Food,  clothing,  and 
therefore  economic  growth  were  more  urgent  and  necessary  requirements. 
Although  housing  was  scarce  and  of  a  poor  quality  as  a  whole,  the  assumption  of 
the  government  was  that  increased  household  income  would  be  transferred  into 
effective  demands  for  new  decent  housing  which  builders  would  supply,  increasing 
the  number  of  households  accommodated  in  decent  houses.  Hereafter,  this  will  be 
called  the  "filtering  up"  process  as  a  working  definition  in  this  research.  Schwabe's 
law  of  rent  demonstrating  that  the  proportion  of  income  devoted  to  housing  would 
fall  as  household  income  rose  was  the  implicit  background  for  such  an  assumption. 
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poor  and  their  housing  has  continuously  been  focused  on  "through  the  growth  of  the 
economy". 
Given  the  constraints  of  defence  expenditure,  the  housing  sector  had  to  be  insulated 
from  other  investment  for  economic  growth.  This  lack  of  money  available  for 
expenditure  on  housing  by  the  government  has  constrained  Korea  in  coping  with 
housing  problems  to  more  negative  means,  such  as  regulations  and  controls,  rather 
than  by  positive  means,  such  as  direct  supply  or  subsidies.  The  lack  of  resources  also 
conditioned  the  public  sector  into  closer  collaboration  with  the  market.  The 
government  adopted  the  private  ownership  solution  mainly  because  there  was  no 
money  available.  Freehold  property  ownership  in  urban  areas  was  to  be  the  main 
tenure  in  the  housing  system.  That  was  justified  by  the  assumption  that  strong 
restrictions  on  the  right  of  the  private  landlord  would  not  only  halt  housing  supply  but 
also  dry  up  the  stock  of  privately  rented  accommodation. 
Since  the  launch  of  the  Economic  Development  Five-year  Plan  in  1962,  new 
industries  were  built  up,  partly  by  the  expansion  of  domestic  markets  but  crucially  by 
the  expansion  of  exports.  An  internationally  competitive  economy  had  to  be 
sustained,  and  that  called  for  control  of  wages,  prices,  production  and  investment.  At 
this  stage,  in  most  Western  countries  and  some  other  countries,  social  or  public 
housing  became  a  key  element  in  housing  provision.  It  had  on  the  one  hand  to  be 
closely  controlled  and  provided  relatively  decent  houses  for  workers  at  costs  which 
did  not  encourage  rapid  wage  inflation.  On  the  other  hand,  it  did  increase  labour 
productivity  in  European  countries  (Harloe,  1988),  and  it  contributed  to  the  low-wage 
economy  with  high  productivity  in  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  (Castells,  et  al.,  1990). 
As  Ball  (1978,  p.  92)  similarly  puts  it,  the  prime  function  of  public  housing  is  to 
house  the  workers  adequately  as  cheaply  as  possible. 
As  a  means  of  keeping  living  costs  and  wages  under  control  and  raising  labour 
productivity,  the  Korean  government  adopted  food  subsidies  and  mass  investment  in 
education,  rather  than  subsidising  housing.  Since  1969,  for  instance,  the  government 
launched  the  "dual  grain  price  programme",  buying  at  higher  prices  from  farmers  and 
selling  at  lower  prices  to  urban  workers.  At  that  time,  those  policies  were  more 
efficient  given  local  circumstances.  Until  the  1970s,  household  expenditure  on  foods 
accounted  for  over  50  per  cent  of  household  income,  while  that  on  housing  accounted 
for  less  than  15  per  cent;  over  60  per  cent  of  urban  households  were  owner- 
occupiers;  there  were  surplus  uneducated  and  unskilled  work  forces  until  the  mid 
1970s  and  the  shortage  was  among  skilled  and  educated  labour  for  further 
industrial  isation.  Moreover,  there  was  no  serious  social  stratification  or  conflict 
between  social  groups.  The  issue  in  Korean  society  was  the  creation  of  income.  With 
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rather  than  on  the  urban  system  and  housing  or,  in  Marxist  terms,  "social 
consumption".  Under  these  circumstances,  to  some  extent,  it  would  be  an 
exaggeration  to  argue  that  owner-occupation  was  a  deliberate  strategy  for  dividing  the 
working  class,  or  an  inducement  to  workers  to  identify  with  bourgeois  values  on 
ideological  grounds. 
Housing  policy  during  the  1960s  can  be  characterized  by  the  term  "laissez-faire". 
Private  builders,  however,  could  not  supply  enough  houses  to  keep  pace  with  rapid 
urbanisation  and  household  increases  coupled  with  the  trends  towards  the 
nuclearisation  of  the  family.  Houses  began  to  be  a  target  of  speculation,  especially  in 
1967  and  1968.  It  was  at  this  point  that  housing  became  a  commodity  to  be  produced 
for  profit,  that  is,  for  its  exchange  value  rather  than  its  use  value.  The  importance  of 
housing  as  an  exchange  good  was  partly  a  reflection  of  migration  and  partly  a 
reflection  of  the  economic  growth  by  which  surplus  capital  held  by  individual 
households  began  to  grow.  Accordingly,  house  builders  also  began  to  change  from 
small  artisans  to  become  mass  productive enterprises  (Kim  J-Y  and  Kim  I-T,  1984 
and  Ko  E-A,  1993,  p.  24).  This  trend  was  further  accelerated  by  the  change  in  fuel 
for  heating  and  cooking  from  timber  to  coal  and  gas.  The  change  in  fuel  was 
accompanied  by  changes  in  the  housing  design  and  structure.  Most  self-builders  and 
artisans  who  possessed  traditional  skills  was  being  squeezed  out.  This  meant  that  the 
standard  of  housing  enjoyed  by  a  family  depended  on  what  it  could  afford  rather  than 
what  a  household  could  build  for  itself.  The  supply  of  housing  increasingly  reflected 
effective  demand  rather  than  need.  Housing  prices  were  increasing  faster  than  general 
price  increases  and  household  income  growth.  There  was  a  significant  gap  between 
the  price  of  decent  accommodation  and  the  rent  that  could  be  afforded  by  a  large 
number  of  the  inmigrants  to  the  cities. 
The  Korean  government  relied  heavily  on  local  government  for  action  dealing  with 
low-income  households,  mainly  for  those  displaced  by  the  clearance  programmes 
which  were  largely  the  result  of  unplanned  settlements  built  during  the  late  1940s  and 
the  1950s.  However,  until  the  early  1970s,  the  housing  authorities  failed  to  tackle  the 
low-income  housing  problems.  It  was  clear  that,  given  limited  public  spending  and 
under  the  circumstances  of  massive  inmigration,  public  intervention  in  housing  was 
not  only  inefficient  but  also  ineffective.  By  contrast,  most  academic  studies  showed 
that  although  physical  standards  were  very  low  in  low-income  neighbourhoods, 
overcrowding  and  squalor  did  not  breed  disease  and  crime.  Moreover,  a  great 
number  of  poor  houses  had  been  improved  by  the  occupants  themselves  as  their 
income  grew,  rather  than  by  public  interventions.  Public  services  were  considered 
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in  the  lack  of  provision  of  basic  services,  such  as  piped  water,  sewage  systems,  etc. 
The  idea  of  housing  as  a  "merit  good"  -  whose  consumption  by  the  poor  is  readily 
supported  by  society  partly  because  of  negative  externalities  usually  from  bad  housing 
-  was  not  developed  in  Korea.  Economic  conditions  were  seen  as  being  more 
important  for  individuals  and  the  state  than  housing.  Therefore,  although  housing 
began  to  be  an  issue  in  political  and  social  debates,  the  housing  problem  mainly 
consisted  of  the  fact  that  there  were  far  more  households  than  there  were  dwellings. 
To  make  matters  worse,  in  1970,  the  Wa-Woo  citizen's  flat  -a  five-storey  block 
built  by  the  Seoul  local  government  for  displaced  low-income  households  -  collapsed, 
killing  34  residents.  Gwangiu  new  town  project  planed  to  accommodate  displaced 
squatters  from  Seoul  caused  a  riot  in  1971  (this  will  be  further  discussed  in  the  next 
chapter).  This  signalled  a  shift  of  government  policy  from  even  the  residual  direct 
supply  of  houses  for  low-income  households  towards  a  general  filtering  strategy.  The 
government  emphasized  owner-occupation  even  more  than  before  as  an  attempt  to 
disengage  itself  from  involvement  in  housing.  The  Korean  National  Housing 
Corporation,  operating  on  the  basis  of  independent  balance  sheets,  began  to  expand 
its  role  for  moderate-income  households  on  the  basis  of  the  filtering  up  assumption 
(KNHC,  1979,  p.  328). 
The  First  Housing  Construction  Ten-year  Plan(1972-81)  was  established,  setting  a 
target  for  the  completion  of  2.5  million  housing  units  within  10  years,  accompanied 
by  slogans  such  as  "every  household  its  own  house"  and  "one  household  one  house". 
The  Housing  Construction  Acceleration  Act  of  1972  was  enacted  for  the  plan.  The 
main  component  of  the  Act  was  to  encourage  housing  supply  through  the  smooth 
working  of  the  market  mechanism  (Rho  Y-H,  1984,  p.  16).  Housing  bonds,  a  housing 
lottery  and  borrowing  from  overseas  for  housing  construction  were  initiated.  Given 
limited  public  investment,  the  Korean  government  relied  heavily  on  the  private 
sector.  Instead,  the  imposition  of  building  regulations,  and  the  control  of  building 
plots  and  street  layout  were  emphasized  to  prevent  environmental  deterioration.  As 
president  Park  indicated  (1973,  p.  7),  "If  the  cities  form  without  planning,  some  time 
or  other  they  will  have  to  be  corrected,  which  will  require  mass  national  resources. 
Therefore,  urban  planning  and  controls  over  city  development  must  be  increasingly 
applied  in  order  to  reduce  further  spending". 
Housing  was  a  part  of  town  planning  which  was  a  part  of  a  national  land  use  plan 
which  was  a  part  of  the  national  economic  development  plan  which  was  dominated  by 
an  economist-planners'  view.  Therefore  urban  development  took  the  form  of 
cleverly-planned  savings  of  indirect  costs  and  an  overall  strategy  for  economic 
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Choi  (1976,  p.  52)  described  such  circumstances  in  the  following  way: 
"While  the  Ministry  of  Construction  (MOQ  was  struggling  with  voluminous 
paperwork,  EPB  (Economic  Planning  Board)'s  economic  planning  activities  became 
the  most  powerful  reference  point  above  all  other  national  sectoral  plans.  As 
national  priority  and  resource  allocation  expressed  in  the  Economic  Development 
Five-year  Plan  seemed  to  dictate  the  fundamental  course  of  actions,  other  planning 
efforts  like  MOC's  regional  planning  (including  town  planning)  were  regarded  to  be 
peripheral  or  technical  aid  to  economic  planning.  MOC's  regional  development 
planning  almost  lost  its  ground  under  the  strong  shadow  of  the  prestigious  aggregate 
economic  plan  " 
Production  targets  and  the  numbers  game  became  a  familiar  aspect  of  the  politics  of 
housing.  The  number  of  houses  built  was  to  be  a  major  measure  of  housing  policy. 
Central  and  local  government  planning  control  set  overall  targets,  in  terms  of  the 
number  of  dwellings  to  be  built  or  approved  in  the  year  in  association  with  land  use 
controls.  The  dominant  objective  was  consistently  to  increase  housing  numbers,  and 
the  clearance  of  poor  housing  was  held  in  abeyance.  From  that  time  onwards, 
housing  policy  in  Korea  can  be  characterized  as  a  "quantitative  policy"  or  "high- 
output  policy"  as  termed  by  professon  Kwon  T-J  (1988)  and  by  the  Ministry  of 
Construction  (1993,  p.  1).  Home  ownership  was  to  be  seen  as  an  essential  response  to 
the  problems  of  housing  providers  for  mass  housing  supply. 
Housing  policy  placed  more  emphasis  on  the  construction  of  high-rise  flats.  A  pre- 
fabricated  flat  was  first  shown  by  the  Korean  National  Housing  Corporation  in  1972 
(KNHC,  1979,  p.  331).  However,  the  first  oil  crisis  of  1973  resulted  in  a  rapid 
decline  in  private  housing  construction.  Since  then,  the  role  of  public  agents  began  to 
expand  greatly  as  an  instrument  of  the  high-output  policy  and  a  means  to  counteract  a 
down-turn  in  private  building  and  in  the  economy  generally  (see  Figure  5-6,  p.  146). 
The  oil  price  shock  in  1973  also  had  a  great  impact  on  housing  consumption 
patterns  of  Korea.  Until  then,  demands  for  housing  were  mostly  for  detached  houses 
based  on  tradition,  and  many  flats  built  were  unsold  and  unpopular.  The  rapid 
increase  in  oil  prices  was  accompanied  by  high  maintenance  costs  such  as  for  heating 
in  detached  houses.  Since  then,  flats  and  high-rise  apartments  with  lower  costs  than 
houses  began  to  be  more  popular  in  Korea,  especially  in  urban  areas  and  among 
middle-income  households  (KCCI,  1990b,  p.  51).  Such  trends  have  been  reinforced 
by  the  increase  in  women's  participation  in  the  non-domestic  economy  and  the  second 
oil  price  shock  in  1979. 
Until  the  late  1970s,  government  housing  policy  operated  a  "supply-oriented 
approach"  intervening  with  supply  side  solutions  to  supplier  problems.  For  instance, 
standardization  of  construction  materials,  the  expansion  of  housing  finance  and 
various  tax  benefits  were  given  to  housing  suppliers.  Nevertheless,  private  and  quasi- 
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resources,  to  accommodate  the  increased  number  of  households.  Housing  prices 
continuously  increased  as  a  result.  Houses  had  been  empirically  proved  to  be  the  best 
investment  option.  In  addition  to  this,  wages  began  to  increase  more  rapidly  after  the 
mid  1970s,  especially  fuelled  by  the  Middle  East  construction  boom  since  1977, 
which  raised  households'  income.  Furthermore,  the  generation  born  during  the  baby 
boom  of  1955-60  began  to  form  their  own  households.  In  contrast  to  this,  the 
development  of  heavy  and  chemical  industries  and  new  industrial  cities  drained 
housing  funds,  materials  and  labourers.  Moreover,  the  Middle  East  construction 
boom  drew  housing  construction  materials  and  labourers  away  from  Korea.  Housing 
prices  began  to  rocket  owing  to  a  combination  of  demand-push  factors  coupled  with 
cost-push  factors. 
Although  real  household  income  increased,  the  increase  in  housing  prices  was  far 
higher  than  that.  For  instance,  between  1971  and  1978,  the  average  urban 
household's  income  increased  by  4.24  times  and  the  general  price  level  increased  by 
2.99  times,  whereas  housing  prices  increased  by  19.04  times  (KNHC,  Housing 
Statistical  Year-book  and  EPB,  Major  Statistics  of  the  Korean  Economy).  Enormous 
fortunes  were  made  from  housing  which  led  to  more  speculation  which  in  turn 
accelerated  housing  price  increases.  As  the  number  of  people  with  serious  housing 
difficulties  increased,  not  only  in  low-income  households  but  also  middle  and  even 
some  high-income  households,  the  housing  issue  rose  up  the  political  agenda. 
The  Korean  house  building  industry  was  highly  labour  intensive.  A  large  majority 
of  house  building  firms  had  weak  asset  structures  (Kim  J-Y  and  Kim  I-T,  1984, 
pp.  26-27).  Profits  varied  widely  depending  on  cyclical  changes  in  the  housing 
market.  Sustaining  business  operations  was  not  easy.  There  was  a  high  turnover  of 
companies  in  the  construction  industry  (Kim  J-H,  1990,  p.  11)  and  a  considerable  lack 
of  coordination  as  a  result  of  the  large  number  of  small  firms.  All  these  combined  to 
make  the  building  industry  unstable.  In  addition  to  this,  one  of  the  difficulties  in  the 
house  building  industry,  as  the  direct  general  of  the  Housing  Bureau  in  the  MOC 
(Lee  D-S,  1990)  pointed  out,  was  the  frequent  shortage  of  building  materials,  which 
made  it  difficult  for  the  industry  to  improve  productivity  and  stabilize  production. 
These  shortages  were  a  result  of  various  big  public  projects  such  as  motorways, 
airports  and  harbour  construction,  etc. 
Therefore,  housing  starts  were  not  dependent  on  prices  alone.  In  fact,  as  Figure  5-1 
shows,  despite  the  rapid  rise  in  house  prices  during  the  first  half  of  the  1970s, 
housing  construction  each  year  in  the  private  sector  was  unchanged.  If  households 
could  not  afford  privately  constructed  houses,  construction  firms  could  not  extend.  In 
other  words,  unless  their  incomes  exceeded  the  increase  in  construction  costs,  private 
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the  mid  1970s  was  a  "push"  phenomenon  linked  to  the  scale  and  depth  of  rural 
poverty.  These  rural  people  could  not  afford  to  purchase  new  houses. 
As  housing  prices  were  steadily  increasing,  the  effective  demand  for  new  houses 
was  reduced  despite  the  growing  housing  shortage.  Questions  of  efficiency  on  the 
supply  side  and  price  and  affordability  on  the  consumption  side  were  at  the  centre  of 
the  housing  problem  in  technical  terms.  In  political  terms,  ownership  rates  began  to 
fall,  and  housing  price  inflation  gave  great  capital  gains  to  homeowners.  This  became 
a  great  cause  of  inequality  between  property-haves  and  have-nots.  Nevertheless, 
housing  construction  was  sustained  by  a  speculative  process  generated  by  demand  for 
property  from  house  owners  anxious  to  make  a  small  capital  investment  as  a  defence 
against  menacing  inflation.  This  kind  of  inequality  was  intolerable  to  the  meritocratic 
bureaucracy.  Inequal  distribution  of  capital  gains  was  the  core  of  housing  problem  for 
the  Korean  government  (MOC,  1987,  p.  946).  One  can  certainly  see  the  influence  of 
middle-income  group  organizations  and  interests  in  the  efforts  of  some  of  the  housing 
ownership  movements:  enormous  Kunchuk  Johap,  or  building  associations,  formed 
on  the  basis  of  occupations  were  generated  at  this  time.  A  large  portion  of  capital 
which  would  otherwise  have  been  invested  in  industry  began  to  flow  into  real  estate 
markets  speculatively  (see  Table  5-7,  p.  135). 
Figure  5-1  The  Index  of  House  Prices  and  Housing  Completion  by  Private  Builders, 
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Until  then,  government  housing  policies  had  always  been  fragmentary  and 
pragmatic  in  character,  that  is  a  series  of  ad  hoc  responses  to  particular  problems 
only  under  the  general  principle  of  "high  output".  However,  market  failure  or  at  least 
the  presumption  of  market  failure  seemed  clear  -  more  precisely  the  inability  of  the 
market  to  cope  with  decreasing  ownership  rates  -  given  the  circumstances  of  housing 
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action  within  economic  constraints.  If  household  incomes  were  low,  in  theory  they 
could  be  raised  to  allow  increased  housing  consumption  but  that  was  practically 
impossible  because  it  meant  intervening  in  the  labour  market  and  raising  wages 
substantially,  undermining  the  very  basis  of  international  competition.  The  only 
option  open  was  to  reduce  housing  costs  and  prices. 
There  was  a  drastic  amendment  of  the  Housing  Construction  Acceleration  Act  in 
1977.  Through  the  amendment  liberal  housing  markets  were  put  under  control  of  the 
government  (Ha  S-K  and  Kim  Y-M,  1991,  p.  29).  Since  then  government  housing 
policy  shifted  from  a  "supply-oriented  approach"  towards  a  "consumption-oriented 
approach"  in  which  the  government  intervened  to  deliver  solutions  to  consumer 
problems. 
The  government  had  to  become  more  interventionist  in  order  to  promote 
'effectiveness'  and  'efficiency'  in  housing  construction.  The  problems  in  housing 
provision  were  viewed  for  the  most  part  as  an  institutional  problem.  Through  the 
amendment  of  the  Housing  Construction  Acceleration  Act,  the  building  industry  was 
re-organized.  The  private  building  firms  were  divided  into  designated  builders, 
registered  builders  and  small-sized  non-registered  builders,  on  the  basis  of  firm  size 
and  their  output  (Lee  D-S,  1990).  Under  Korea's  strong  government,  the  act  laid 
down  the  framework  of  rules  defining  the  rights  and  obligations  of  enterprise  and 
their  relative  status,  ranging  from  credit  allocation  to  planning  permission.  It  was  the 
familiar  logic  of  a  "big  push".  From  the  government's  view,  small  house  builders 
were  too  volatile  during  recessions  to  stabilize  housing  output  and  prices.  Moreover, 
many  of  them  were  irresponsible  about  the  environment,  town  planning  and  the 
installation  of  basic  infrastructures. 
The  government's  assistance  or  benefits  were  mainly  focused  on  encouraging  the 
establishment  of  larger  house  builders.  These  trends  were  fuelled  by  the  Middle  East 
construction  boom  (Do  J-H,  1984).  In  order  to  earn  foreign  currencies,  the 
government  encouraged  (or  rather  forced)  Chaebols  to  take  part  in  the  construction 
industry  and  the  Middle  East  construction  market  for  reasons  of  their  marketing  skills 
and  capital.  To  support  this,  the  Overseas  Bureau  was  established  in  the  Ministry  of 
Construction  in  August,  1976.  Since  then,  Chaebols  began  to  extend  and  expand  their 
activities  into  the  house  building  industry  and  big  construction  firms  began  to  grow 
rapidly  with  the  support  of  the  government.  Once  the  Chaebols  established 
construction  firms  as  one  of  their  affiliates,  they  continued  to  grow  by  siphoning 
capital  within  the  Chaebol  group.  In  contrast  to  this,  the  "self-build"  sector  and  small 
firms  were  being  restricted  to  producing  a  diversified  output  on  smaller  sites  or  in 
rural  areas,  and  to  be  subcontractors  for  larger  firms  (Korean  Construction 
126 Association,  1978,  p.  12).  These  trends  were  accelerated  by  rapid  increases  in  land 
prices,  construction  costs,  the  development  of  a  piped  water  and  a  sophisticated  gas 
system.  Small  builders  with  traditional  construction  skills  and  only  a  small  amount  of 
capital  were  expelled  from  competition  in  new  housing  markets. 
To  create  an  active  lender  in  the  form  of  an  official  financial  institute,  money  had 
to  be  attracted  from  households,  yet  this  depended  heavily  upon  fluctuations  in  the 
attractiveness  of  other  investment.  Hence  the  capacity  to  lend  to  suppliers  varied 
enormously  through  time  in  ways  that  bore  no  relation  to  the  demands  from  housing 
suppliers.  Furthermore  when  money  was  scarce,  interest  rates  to  lenders  had  to  be 
raised  to  attract  funds.  This  was  accompanied  by  the  raising  of  rates  to  borrowers 
which  in  turn  caused  increases  in  production  costs,  and  then  housing  prices, 
increasing  the  number  of  people  who  might  find  difficulty  in  paying.  A  stable  supply 
of  housing  funds  could  be  sustained  if  the  government  itself  had  moved  in  to  supply 
funds,  but  the  Korean  government's  limited  budgets  and  strong  demand  from  other 
sectors  which  needed  more  money  circumscribed  the  government's  expenditures  on 
housing.  This  produced  frictions  between  builders  who  wanted  secure  finances  and 
consumers  who  wanted  stable  and  affordable  housing  prices,  and  the  government  who 
wanted  quantity  under  given  constraints  of  quality. 
The  first  housing  exchange  bond,  which  was  later  substituted  by  the  Housing 
Related  Saving  Scheme,  was  issued  by  the  public  sector  housing  suppliers  and  the 
designated  builders  in  1977.  Price  controls  were  launched  initially  in  Seoul  in  1977 
with  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Scheme  which  entitled  account  holders  of  savings  to 
preferential  purchase  rights  of  new  apartment  units  at  controlled  prices  of  a  half  to 
one  third  of  open  market  prices  and  entitled  holders  to  housing  mortgages  when  they 
purchased  a  house  of  85  sq.  in  or  less  in  size.  Hence  the  scheme  could  effectively 
draw  savings  from  households  into  housing  funds  at  low  interest  rates,  and  could 
supply  cheap  loans  to  housing  suppliers,  and  allocate  houses  at  controlled  prices  to 
the  account  holders.  This  scheme  was  to  become  the  main  source  and  instrument  of 
housing  finance. 
The  most  important  aspect  of  the  housing  related  saving  scheme  is  not  the  raising 
of  housing  funds  but  the  ideology  of  the  queue.  Those  at  the  top  of  the  waiting  list 
according  to  the  amount  and  period  of  their  savings  are  rewarded  for  their  fortitude 
by  being  able  to  buy  a  decent  home  at  cheaper  prices  than  the  market  price.  It  was  an 
idea  devised  not  by  politicians  but  by  the  public  bureaucracy,  and  was  widely 
accepted  by  the  white-collar  group,  its  main  beneficiaries.  The  key  point  is  that  the 
ideology  of  the  queue  serves  to  displace  resentment  at  the  failure  of  the  government 
to  provide  sufficient  housing.  It  reduced  the  problems  of  the  housing  deficit,  in 
political  terms,  and  thus  of  investment  needs  in  the  housing  sector,  thereby  easing  the 
127 constraints.  Moreover,  it  gave  people  a  discipline  of  hard  work  and  high  savings.  It 
taught  Korean  the  idea  that  responsibility  for  housing  standards  lies  with  the 
individual. 
The  Ceiling-price  and  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Scheme  were  first  confined  to 
the  apartment  units  constructed  by  the  public  sector  of  85  sq.  m.  size  or  less  in  1977 
and  then  extended  to  private  sector  apartments  in  1978.  However,  the  extension  of 
the  ceiling-price  set  at  half  to  one  third  of  market  prices  to  private  builders  producing 
apartments  of  85  sq.  m.  or  less  in  size  inevitably  resulted  in  less  construction  of  small 
apartment  units,  which  led  the  government  to  impose  a  quota  system  on  builders. 
Over  50  per  cent  of  their  total  construction  of  floor  areas  had  to  be  constructed  in  the 
form  of  apartments  of  85  sq.  m.  size  or  less. 
The  extension  of  the  ceiling  price  increased  effective  demand,  resulting  in  the 
explosive  housing  boom  of  1978  (Kim  K-S,  1979,  p.  99).  In  that  sense  the  policy  did 
reach  a  group  who  otherwise  would  not  have  become  owner-occupiers.  The  ratio  of 
housing  investment  to  GNP  reached  the  highest  point  of  6.8  per  cent  in  1978  (see 
Table  5-7).  Then  came  the  "hard-hand"  program  against  speculation,  launched  in 
1978,  the  so-called  8.8  measurements  which  increased  the  rate  of  the  capital  gain  tax 
and  compelled  people  to  report  their  land  transactions  to  the  government,  and  the 
housing  market  entered  a  slump.  Moreover,  as  a  result  of  the  effects  of  economic  and 
political  crisis  in  1979,  the  second  oil  crisis  and  the  assassination  of  President  Park, 
economic  growth  slowed  down  and  in  1980  the  first  recorded  negative  growth 
occurred  since  the  end  of  the  Korea  War. 
The  Korean  government  began  to  encourage  urban  renewal  as  a  counter-measure 
against  the  economic  downturn  (this  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  6  in  detail).  After 
then,  general  price  inflation  led  by  a  real  estate  boom  recorded  the  highest  level  in  a 
decade.  Land,  office  buildings,  and  real  estates  in  general  were  demanded  not  only 
for  use  but  also  for  proving  wealth.  A  large  portion  of  domestic  savings  were  being 
switched  from  investment  in  industry  to  speculative  investment  in  real  estate. 
Moreover,  government  regulations  over  housing  prices  and  housing  standards  etc 
created  conditions  in  which  management  of  house  builders  focussed  increasingly  on 
the  speculative  skills  of  buying  land,  selling  at  the  right  time,  arranging  favourable 
deals  with  sub-contractors,  and  lobbying  to  change  land  use  under  the  name  of  "land 
banking  "- 
Paradoxically,  the  larger  builders  were  even  more  enthusiastic  speculators  in  land 
than  smaller  ones  and  usually  held  very  extensive  land  banks  in  the  hope  of 
development  and  windfall  gains.  The  efforts  to  increase  productivity  were  pushed 
aside  and  house  builders  became  more  concerned  with  windfall  gains  from  land 
speculation,  and  land  development  gains.  The  speculative  building  companies  were 
128 keen  to  reduce  their  fixed  labour  force  and  to  sub-contract  as  much  as  possible.  Land 
speculation  was  increasingly  seen  as  a  major  facet  of  low  productivity,  falling  output 
and  deteriorating  cost  control.  A  further  instrument  used  by  the  government  has  been 
powers  for  land  development  since  the  enactment  of  the  Housing  Estate  Development 
Acceleration  Act  of  1980.  Since  then  most  large  land  developments  have  been 
monopolized  by  the  public  sector  (Hwang  M-C,  1985,  p.  208;  Cho  J-H,  1990  and  Lee 
T-I  and  Choi  H-J,  1991,  p.  23).  It  was  a  signal  that  control  of  urban  land 
development  also  had  shifted  from  the  market  mechanism  towards  the  political 
process. 
High  inflation  under  the  staggering  economy  led  the  government  to  give  the  highest 
priority  in  national  policy  to  price  stabilization  from  1979.  In  order  to  stabilize  price 
increases,  the  government  launched  a  tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policy.  As  a  result  of 
the  policy,  public  sector  housing  suppliers  faced  a  serious  scarcity  of  funds.  With 
respect  to  the  consumption  side,  demands  for  owner-occupation  were  declining 
because  of  deteriorating  economic  conditions,  especially  in  moderate-and  middle- 
income  sectors.  The  housing  boom  began  to  cool  and  the  worst  housing  output  since 
1974  was  recorded  in  1981.  The  National  Housing  Fund  (NHF)  was  established  in 
1981  for  public  sector  housing  suppliers.  In  1982,  to  reduce  affordability  problems 
for  first-time  buyers,  rented  houses  leased  for  five  years  with  an  option  to  buy  began 
to  be  supplied  with  various  government  indirect  subsidies  such  as  cheap  land  supply, 
tax  exemption  or  deduction  and  low  interest  loans.  The  ceiling  price  system  was 
extended  to  apartments  of  over  85sq.  m.  size. 
Housing  entered  a  boom  period  once  again  and  the  government  launched  the  Bond 
Bidding  system  in  1983.  Thereafter  those  who  intended  to  purchase  apartments  with 
floor  space  exceeding  85  sq.  m.  in  size  in  certain  areas  designed  as  speculative  areas 
by  the  government  had  to  join  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Scheme  and  bid  to  buy 
National  Housing  Bonds.  New  apartments  built  were  allocated  to  those  who  held  the 
housing  related  saving  accounts  and  bid  the  highest  amounts  to  buy  the  National 
Housing  Bonds,  one  of  the  main  sources  in  the  National  Housing  Fund  raising,  and 
they  were  obliged  to  purchase  the  bond  before  the  house  was  officially  allocated. 
These  were  aimed  at  discouraging  speculative  motives  as  well  as  to  recapture  a  large 
portion  of  windfall  gains  and  to  raise  the  National  Housing  Funds. 
Under  controlled  prices,  however,  increasing  land  and  construction  costs  gradually 
decreased  profits  of  house  builders,  which  necessarily  led  to  a  relative  lag  in  housing 
supply  and  the  quality  of  housing  tended  to  decrease,  especially  in  the  biggest  cities. 
By  contrast,  continuing  economic  growth  expanded  effective  demands  under  the 
controlled  prices.  The  queue  of  waiting  households  with  a  large  amount  of  deposits  or 
instalments  in  the  housing  related  saving  accounts  gradually  lengthened.  Government 
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of  the  market  mechanism. 
As  outlined  in  Chapter  4,  temporary  and  irregular  workers  with  low-  and  insecure- 
incomes  were  increasing,  as  were  professional,  technical  and  white-collar  workers 
with  high  salaries  and  secure  jobs.  Trade  unions  mobilised  support  from  the  mid 
1980s.  Their  main  aim  was  to  secure  and  maximize  wages  for  their  members  who 
were  mostly  regular  workers  and,  in  fact,  wages  did  increase  more  rapidly  than  ever 
before  in  this  period.  More  people  could  participate  in  the  housing  market  as  buyers 
under  the  controlled  prices  and  more  people  could  take  part  in  the  owner-occupied 
housing  market. 
Political  conditions  were  in  favour  of  expanding  owner-occupation  rather  than 
social  rented  housing.  Housing  problems  were  not  only  related  to  the  gap  between 
housing  prices  and  affordability,  but  also  to  a  lagged  supply.  Later  commentators 
were  to  highlight  the  well-known  feedback  effects  of  price  control  (Kim  K-H,  1987; 
Kim  J-H(a),  1991;  Kim  J-H(b),  1991;  Yoo  J-H,  1991;  Lee  J-H,  1992;  Cho  D-H, 
1993;  etc).  The  inelastic  supply  was  often  incorrectly  seen  as  simply  a  failure  of  state 
intervention.  Models  derived  from  idealised  views  of  the  market  process  gained 
greater  sway,  in  that  competition,  the  very  nature  of  the  market  mechanism,  was  seen 
as  a  spur  to  efficiency  and  customer-orientations.  As  a  consequence  of  the  changing 
social,  economic  and  political  environments,  price  control  was  shifted  from  the 
Ceiling-price  system  towards  the  Cost-linking  Price  system  which  guaranteed  an 
appropriate  profit  to  the  supplier  in  1989,  resulting  in  a  rapid  increase  in  housing 
starts  as  well  as  housing  prices. 
Table  5-1  Changing  Housing  Prices  and  Housing  Construction. 
Year  1983  1985  1987  1989  1990 
Housing  Prices  100.0  102.8  107.2  139.0  159.1 
(in  cities) 
Housing  225,990  227,362  244,301  462,159  750,378 
construction 
Housing  output 
per  1000  inhabitants  n.  a.  5.6  n.  a.  n.  a.  17.2 
Housing  Price  to 
income  Ratio  n.  a.  n.  a.  5.63  6.46  8.08 
(in  cities) 
Note:  1988  data. 
Sources;  KHB,  The  Survey  on  the  Changing  Housing  Prices  in  Cities,  each  year,  and  Housing 
Economic  Statistical  Year-book,  1993,  p.  375;  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  1985 
and  1990;  Data  for  the  housing  price  to  income  ratio  are  cited  from  the  MOC  (1993,  p.  35). 
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5.3.1  Changing  Housing  Conditions. 
The  achievements  of  housing  policy  can  be  examined  through  the  change  in  the 
quantity,  e  quality  and  the  price  of  housing.  The  rise  in  housing  costs  as  a  share  of 
household  expenditure  has  been  seen  in  Chapter  4  in  brief,  and  the  change  in  house 
prices  and  rents  will  be  explored  in  Chapter  7  in  more  detail. 
For  a  long  time,  the  supply  of  new  housing  each  year  has  continued  at  a  high  rate, 
especially  in  urban  areas,  as  Table  5-2  shows.  But,  as  Table  5-3  shows,  advances  in 
the  ratio  of  dwellings  to  people  have  not  necessarily  been  great  between  1960  and 
1990.  The  rate  of  population  growth  has  risen  rapidly  in  urban  areas.  The  quantity  of 
houses  has  always  been  below  the  number  of  households,  as  Figure  5-2  shows,  i.  e. 
growth  in  households  has  outpaced  the  growth  in  dwellings.  Too  many  households 
have  meant  that  many  households  have  to  share  with  others.  The  steady  deficit  of 
houses  over  households  has  made  it  difficult  to  satisfy  demands  and  meet  needs  over 
the  past  three  decades  in  Korea. 
Table  5-2 
Year  1960 
The  Growth  in  Dwellings  ('000). 
Whole  country 
Urban 
Rural 
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
3,464  4,360  4,734  5,319  6,274  7,160 
783 
2,681 
1,398 
2,962 
1,809 
2,925 
2,468 
2,851 
3,428 
2,846 
4,646 
2,514 
Annual  growth 
rate  (1960-90) 
2.5 
6.1 
-0.2 
Sources:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  each  year. 
Table  5-3  Population,  Population  Growth  and  Quantity  of  Dwellings. 
Population 
(millions) 
1960  1990 
Average  annual 
rate  of  change 
per  1,000 
1960-  1990 
Number  of 
dwellings  per 
1,000  inhabitants 
1960  1990 
Percentage 
change 
1960-  1990 
Whole  country  25.0  43.4  19.2  139  165  +19 
Urban  7.0  32.3  54.2  112  144  +29 
Rural  18.0  11.1  -16.5  149  226  +52 
Sources:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  1960  and  1990 
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Increases  in  the  population  have  begun  to  slow  down  (see  Figure  2-1).  As  Table  5- 
4  shows,  the  number  of  people  in  households  has  declined,  and  the  composition  of 
generations  in  the  households  has  also  changed  resulting  from  nuclearisation  of 
families.  This  is  the  main  reason  for  the  faster  growth  in  the  number  of  households 
than  in  population.  Thus,  the  demand  for  new  houses  is  not  likely  to  slow  down 
because  of  an  increase  in  households,  especially  one  person  households  which  were 
excluded  from  official  statistics,  not  being  regarded  as  an  ordinary  household 
(Population  and  Housing  Census). 
1990 
Table  5-4  Changes  in  Family  Type  in  Ordinary  Households  and  in  Cities. 
(percentages) 
Year  1960  1970  1980  1990 
Average  household  size  (persons)  5.4  4.9  4.5  3.7 
Generations  in  household 
One  generation  households. 
Two  generation  households. 
Three  generation  households. 
More  than  three  generation. 
One  person  households. 
Not  blood  relationship. 
Total 
117  (9.3)  218  (9.2)  422  (9.0) 
899  (71.6)  1,793  (75.4)  3,335  (71.4) 
232  (18.5)  354  (14.9)  591  (12.7) 
8  (0.6)  12  (0.5)  14  (0.3) 
-  -  220  (4.7) 
88  (  1.9) 
814  (9.6) 
5,876  (69.4) 
896  (10.6) 
18  (0.2) 
724  (8.6) 
135  (  1.6) 
1,257(100.0)  2,377(100.0)  4,670(100.0)  8,463(100.0) 
Note:  Data  for  1960  and  1970  excluded  institutional  households  and  foreign  households. 
Sources:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  each  year. 
It  is  a  fact  that  the  quality  of  houses  supplied  over  time  has  improved,  as  Table  5-5 
shows.  However,  as  Table  5-6  shows,  over  2.4  million  urban  households,  equivalent 
to  28.8  per  cent  of  urban  households,  are  still  using  only  one  room  for  their  whole 
family  of  3.7  persons  on  average.  In  comparison,  between  1960  and  1990,  while  the 
132 proportion  of  households  using  one  room  for  a  whole  family  had  decreased,  their 
absolute  numbers  have  dramatically  increased  despite  the  high  output  of  housing 
during  the  last  three  decades. 
Table  5-5  Trends  in  Dwelling  Space,  in  cities,  sq.  m. 
1960  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
Floor  area  Per  housing  unit  n.  a.  50.4  65.6  77.3  81.7  91.6 
Per  household  n.  a.  27.1  35.8  41.1  43.6  n.  a. 
Per  capita  n.  a.  5.7  7.4  9.3  10.7  13.5 
No.  of  room  Per  housing  unit  n.  a.  3.3  3.5  3.8  4.0  4.5 
Per  household  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.5 
Persons  per  room  n.  a.  2.7  2.5  2.2  2.0  1.5 
Sources:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  each  year. 
Table  5-6  Number  of  Households  by  Number  of  Rooms  Used  ('000). 
Year  1960  (  %)  1980  (%)  1985  (%)  1990  (%) 
I  room 
2  rooms 
3  rooms 
4  rooms 
5  rooms 
6  and  over 
Unknown 
600(46.1) 
592(45.5) 
102  (7.9) 
7  (0.5) 
1,963  (42.0) 
1,495  (32.0) 
780  (16.7) 
277  (5.9) 
104  (2.2) 
51 
2,452  (38.7) 
1,980  (31.3) 
1,181  (18.6) 
472  (7.5) 
171  (2.7) 
74  (1.2) 
2,436  (28.8) 
2,209  (26.1) 
1,904  (22.5) 
1,220  (14.4) 
520  (6.1) 
174  (2.1) 
Total  1,301(100.0)  4,670  (100.0)  6,331  (100.0)  8,463(100.0) 
Sources:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  each  years. 
According  to  the  Population  and  Housing  Census  (1990),  there  were  35.6  per  cent 
and  58.6  per  cent  of  urban  households  living  without  a  flushed  W.  C.  and  hot  water. 
There  were  about  583,000  households,  equivalent  to  6.9  per  cent  of  households  in 
cities,  living  without  piped  water  system.  Furthermore,  there  were  160,767 
households  living  in  the  buildings  not  intended  for  human  habitaion,  about  75,000 
households  without  a  kitchen  and  about  41,000  households  without  even  a  toilet  in 
cities.  There  has  been  a  continuous  absolute  housing  shortage  and  the  consumption  of 
housing  has  depended  upon  a  household's  ability  to  pay.  As  a  result,  all  sorts  of 
deficits  are  concentrated  on  low-income  households. 
For  urban  low-income  households,  the  most  pressing  housing  problems  are  now  of 
a  different  kind.  Most  houses  have  been  supplied  for  owner-occupation  by  the  private 
as  well  as  the  public  sector.  Moreover,  a  large  part  of  the  improved  housing 
133 conditions  have  been  achieved  by  replacing  poor  houses  with  high-standard  houses 
through  clearances  (this  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter).  This  implies 
that,  in  contrast  to  the  middle  and  upper-income  households,  the  choice  available  to 
low-income  households  has  been  narrowing  with  rapidly  increasing  rents  over  time 
for  the  urban  poor.  Thus,  higher  income  households  have  paid  less  and  less,  as  a 
share  of  their  household  expenditure,  for  housing  consumption  costs  for  better  houses 
and  lower  income  households  have  had  to  pay  more  and  more  for  worsening  housing 
conditions  over  time. 
5.3.2  Housing  Policy  and  Other  Social  Aims. 
In  Korea,  housing  policy  has  been  often  used  as  an  instrument  by  which  wider 
social  aims  can  be  achieved.  For  example,  a  priority  in  the  allocation  of  new  houses 
built  was  given  to  those  who  practiced  contraception  when  the  government  launched  a 
strong  family  planning  campaign.  For  another  example,  when  the  Middle  East 
construction  boom  started,  another  priority  was  given  to  those  who  worked  overseas. 
This  section  was  not  designed  to  investigate  all  these  programmes  and  their  effects  in 
detail,  but  to  explore  general  directions  in  housing  policies. 
As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  2  regarding  the  structure  of  national  planning,  the 
Korean  government's  investment  in  the  housing  sector  has  consistently  reflected  the 
view  that  resources  should  be  used  effectively,  i.  e.  not  whether  the  returns  to  housing 
investments  are  high,  but  whether  they  are  higher  than  returns  to  alternative  uses  of 
the  resources.  Although  improved  housing  raises  the  welfare  of  individual 
households,  housing  investment  does  not  necessarily  increase  productivity  more  than 
other  investment  at  national  level.  So  housing  has  been  given  low  priority  in  the 
allocation  of  national  resources. 
Indeed,  as  Table  5-7  and  5-8  show,  during  the  period  1960-1990,  the  ratio  of 
housing  investment  to  GNP  was  a  mere  3.9  per  cent  and  government  investment  in 
the  housing  sector  accounted  for  only  1.4  per  cent  of  the  government's  budget 
(MOC).  A  study  (Pyo  H-K,  1988)  that  integrated  national  account  data,  National 
Wealth  Survey  data  and  sectoral  censuses  to  measure  the  evolution  of  the  various 
components  of  the  capital  stock  between  1960  and  1985  also  shows  the  low  priority 
of  the  housing  sector.  The  national  real  gross  capital  stock  expanded  at  an  average 
rate  of  9.72  per  cent,  whereas  the  dwelling  stock  grew  the  slowest  of  all  major 
economic  sectors  at  6.85  per  cent,  or  30  Per  cent  less  than  the  total  capital  stock. 
134 Table  5-7  Housing  Investment 
The  ratio  of 
housing  investment 
to  GNP 
The  ratio  of 
housing  investment 
to  fixed  capital 
The  ratio  of 
housing  investment 
to  GNP 
The  ratio  of 
housing  investment 
to  fixed  capital 
1962  1.3  12.0  1976  5.1  21.5 
1963  1.3  10.9  1977  5.6  20.6 
1964  1.4  13.9  1978  6.8  20.6 
1965  1.5  12.2  1979  5.8  17.1 
1966  1.9  10.8  1980  5.2  17.2 
1967  2.3  11.4  1981  3.9  14.2 
1968  3.0  12.0  1982  4.6  16.3 
1969  2.7  9.9  1983  5.5  18.8 
1970  3.4  13.4  1984  4.7  15.6 
1971  3.3  13.5  1985  4.4  15.0 
1972  3.5  17.8  1986  4.5  15.6 
1973  4.1  19.0  1987  4.4  14.6 
1974  6.1  26.7  1988  4.7  15.6 
1975  5.7  24.9  1989  5.4  16.4 
Sources:  KHB,  1982  Statistical  Yearbook,  1983,  p.  373  and  Housing  Economic  Statistical  Yearbook, 
1993,  p.  368. 
Table  5-  8  Ratio  of  Government  Investment  in  the  Housing  Sector. 
(million  Korean  Won) 
Government  Investment  in  the  B/A  Government  Investment  in  the  B  /A 
Budget(A)  Housing  Sector  (B)  %  Budget(A)  Housing  Sector  (B)  % 
1972  701,143  4,155  0.6  1981  8,040,001  180,369  2.2 
1973  655,433  5,935  0.9  1982  9,313,725  153,175  1.6 
1974  1,013,915  2,695  0.3  1983  10,416,710  152,611  1.5 
1975  1,586,931  39,924  2.5  1984  10,966,710  105,909  1.0 
1976  2,258,511  26,191  1.2  1985  12,275,115  80,478  0.7 
1977  2,869,956  26,528  0.9  1986  13,800,532  212,572  1.5 
1978  3,157,036  55,310  1.8  1987  13,805,547  204,066  1.5 
1979  5,213,436  93,519  1.8  1988  18,429,079  271,480  1.5 
1980  6,466,756  140,947  2.2  1989  22,046,825  532,038  2.4 
Source:  KHB,  Housing  Economic  Data  Book,  1990,  p.  394. 
Housing  need  may  be  defined  as  the  quantity  of  housing  that  is  required  to  provide 
accommodation  (of  an  agreed  minimum  standard  and  above)  for  a  family  (given  its 
size,  household  composition,  age  distribution  etc.  )  without  taking  into  account  the 
individual  household's  ability  to  pay  for  the  housing  assigned  to  it  (Robinson,  1979, 
pp.  55-6).  However,  in  Korea,  the  Ministry  of  Construction  first  established  the 
minimum  standard  of  housing  sizes  for  the  guide-line  of  public  housing  provision  in 
1985.  As  Table  5-9  shows,  the  minimum  housing  sizes  were  distinguished  between 
housing  for  owners  and  for  tenants,  and  between  income  groups,  according  to  the 
numbers  of  people  in  a  household  on  the  basis  of  ability  to  pay,  rather  than  need. 
135 This  is  partly  because  the  dangers  inherent  in  a  system  where  the  planners  who  set 
standards  are  also  responsible  for  their  attainment  (Needleman,  1965,  p.  36).  This,  he 
argued,  may  well  lead  to  excessive  caution  in  defining  standards. 
Table  5-9  The  Guide-line  of  Public  Housing  Provision  by  Size. 
Classification  Rental  housing  Owner-occupation  housing. 
No.  of  size  Proportion  E167  -  E250  f250  -033 
household  size  pro.  size  pro. 
2  24.5  4.0  40.3  4.0  44.3  4.0 
3  28.4  10.8  43.6  10.8  47.6  10.8 
4  32.1  26.9  47.3  26.9  51.2  26.9 
5  36.4  31.4  50.9  31.4  54.5  31.4 
6  40.0  18.3  54.2  18.3  58.2  18.3 
7  44.0  8.6  57.9  8.6  61.5  8.6 
Average  35.  Om  100.0  49.9m  100.0  53.9m  100.0 
source;  Ministry  of  Construction,  1985,  p72. 
As  a  consequence,  in  Korea,  there  has  been  no  direct  subsidy  on  dwellings,  such  as 
council  housing  in  Britain,  therefore  there  has  been  no  need  to  use  public  money  for 
maintenance  or  repair  of  public  housing,  and  no  direct  payment  to  occupiers  as  were 
housing  benefit  subsidy  or  rent  rebates  and  allowances. 
In  terms  of  housing  as  a  means  of  redistribution,  housing  has  been  seen  by  many  as 
a  key  means  to  achieve  the  redistribution  aim,  in  other  words,  as  an  instrument  of 
"trickle  down  policies".  Those  in  favour  of  owner-occupation  argue  that  it  is  not  only 
cheaper  for  society  and  extends  freedom,  but  also  that  it  would  redistribute  wealth. 
Stretton  (1975,  p.  15)  argued  in  Britain,  "The  diffusion  of  house  ownership  has  been 
the  main  and  almost  the  only  means  of  diffusing  capital  ownership  in  this  century" 
and  Atkinson  and  Harrison  (1978)  and  Saunders  (1990)  have  identified  the  way  in 
which  the  increase  in  owner-occupation  has  led  to  a  reduction  in  the  degree  of 
concentration  of  wealth  in  Britain.  In  contrast  to  this,  Forrest  and  Murie  (1989)  have 
reassessed  their  previous  work  on  wealth  inheritance  through  owner-occupation, 
concluding  that  the  increase  in  home-ownership  does  not  in  fact  lead  to  a 
'democratisation'  of  wealth.  'Ultimately',  they  say,  'the  process  of  intergenerational 
transfers  of  housing  wealth  may  have  more  oligarchic  than  democratic 
consequences'(pp.  37-8). 
In  a  simple  comparison  with  other  assets,  although  there  is  no  available  information 
to  cover  the  last  three  decades  and  no  census  data  about  housing  in  relation  to  income 
groups  (MOC,  1993,  p.  5),  housing,  at  the  first  glance,  seems  to  have  contributed  to 
the  reduction  in  the  degree  of  concentration  of  wealth  in  Korea  in  relative  terms.  As 
Table  5-10  shows,  the  top  30  per  cent  of  people  possess  over  93  per  cent  of  the 
136 private  land  in  Korea  and  88  per  cent  of  the  monetary  assets,  whereas  the  bottom  30 
per  cent  of  people  own  0.5  per  cent  of  the  land  and  nothing  in  monetary  assets.  In 
contrast  to  this,  as  Table  5-11  shows,  about  36  per  cent  of  low-income  households 
possess  their  own  houses.  Of  course,  if  the  quality,  prices,  etc.,  were  considered, 
homeownership  alone  may  not  indicate  any  major  redistribution  of  wealth. 
Table  5-10  Distribution  of  Lands  and  Monetary  Assets  in  Korea  by  Income  Decile  in  1988. 
Income  Possession  rates  Possession  rates  of 
Decile  of  Lands  (%)  Monetary  assets  (%) 
(Top  10  %)  1  76.9  61 
2  10.8  17 
3  5.4  10 
4  3.2  6 
5  1.9  4 
6  1.0  2 
7  0.5  0 
8  0.3  0 
9  0.2  0 
(Bottom  10%)  10  0  0 
Sources:  Data  for  lands;  Commission  on  the  Public  Concept  of  Land  Ownership,  Report  on  the  Public 
Concept  of  Land  Ownership,  1989,  and  the  data  for  the  monetary  assets;  Kwon  S-W,  et  al.,  1992, 
p.  174. 
Table  5-11  Housing  Tenure  Division  by  Income  Groups  in  Seoul,  1980. 
Tenure  form  Low-income  Middle-income  High-income 
Owner-occupation  35.7%  63.6%  90.0% 
Tenancy  62.7%  35.0%  9.2% 
Other  1.6%  1.4%  0.8% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source:  Kwon  W-Y,  1985,  p.  188. 
By  contrast,  as  Figure  5-3  shows,  until  1960  the  house  ownership  rate  was 
generally  consistent  with  the  housing  supply  rate  (housing  units/households).  This 
implies  one  household  possessed  a  house.  However,  since  then  the  ownership  rate  has 
been  diverging  from  the  supply  rate.  This  implies  that  the  number  of  households  who 
possess  more  than  one  house  has  been  increasing.  In  this  aspect,  housing  in  Korea  has 
reinforced  a  concentration  of  wealth.  Thus,  at  this  point,  it  is  difficult  to  say  whether 
housing  contributed  to  the  redistribution  of  wealth  or  whether  it  reinforced  the 
concentration  of  wealth.  (This  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  the  following  chapters). 
137 Figure  5-3  Housing  Supply  Rate  and  Ownership  Rate,  in  cities  (percentages). 
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In  addition  to  the  very  low  level  of  government  investment  in  the  housing  sector, 
no  mortgage  markets  have  developed  in  Korea.  Despite  these  factors,  housing  stocks 
in  urban  areas  have  continuously  increased  at  over  6  per  cent  per  year  during  the  last 
three  decades.  Moreover,  as  Figure  5-4  shows,  housing  in  Korea  has  performed  the 
role  of  an  economic  regulator  even  in  the  periods  of  apparently  falling  demand,  e.  g. 
in  1975  and  in  1980.  The  Korean  economy  slipped  into  stagnation  and  unemployment 
rates  grew,  the  housing  sector  absorbed  the  impacts. 
Figure  5-4 
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138 In  Korea,  as  outlined  in  Chapter  2,  a  larger  part  of  the  construction  of  built 
environment  has  been  left  to  be  financed  by  individuals  and  households  in  hopes  of 
capital  gains.  It  was  speculation  which  attracted  money  to  construct  the  physical 
infrastructure  with  small  amounts  of  public  spending.  The  origin  of  the  speculative 
urban  development,  mainly  for  residential  land  development,  has  a  root  in  1937 
through  the  launch  of  the  Land  Readjustment  Project  (LRP).  After  the  late  1960s  as 
rapid  urbanisation  began  to  start,  the  LRP  became  a  major  instrument  in  the 
development  of  cities. 
Local  governments  designated  a  certain  area  as  the  LRP  area  according  to  the  city 
development  plan;  the  project  carrier,  usually  local  government  and  a  quasi-public 
institution,  developed  the  area,  constructing  roads,  installing  a  sewage  system  and 
public  facilities,  setting  up  schools,  parks,  etc  and  providing  residential  sites  for  low- 
income  households.  The  developers  then  took  away  certain  proportions  of  land  from 
each  land-owner  in  the  area  in  order  to  recover  the  development  costs.  The  sale  of  the 
cost-equivalent  land  was  carried  out  through  a  public  auction.  The  rest  of  the 
developed  land  was  returned  to  the  land-owners  at  its  original  location  as  closely  as 
feasible.  Approximately  40  per  cent  of  the  developed  land  was  taken  from  land- 
owners  to  cover  the  project  costs  and  for  public  uses  (Hwang  M-C,  1976,  p.  53  and 
Ha  S-K,  1984,  p.  180).  Thus,  most  of  the  costs  in  such  a  development  were  borne  by 
the  land-owners.  According  to  Hwang  M-C's  study  (1976,  p.  58),  the  total 
contribution  from  the  land-owners  comprises  almost  94  per  cent  of  the  total  costs  of 
the  project.  After  the  completion  of  the  development  and  reallocation,  owners  could 
construct  their  own  houses,  or  other  structures  on  their  reallotted  land  according  to 
the  Construction  Act.  However,  developers  were  often  faced  with  enormous 
difficulties  in  carrying  out  a  project  when  the  land-owners  were  unwilling  to 
contribute  their  land  to  the  project.  To  counteract  this,  the  government  launched 
"stick  and  carrot"  measures. 
Since  1962,  with  the  passage  of  the  Land  Expropriation  Act,  the  Korean 
government  has  empowered  itself  with  enormous  powers  of  land  acquisition.  This 
power  was  softened  by  the  1975  Special  Act  on  Public  Land  Acquisition  as  the  LRP 
were  being  halted.  The  carrot  measure  for  the  development  was  to  encourage 
speculation.  For  instance,  the  participation  in  the  auction  for  the  sale  of  the  cost- 
equivalent  land  did  not  exclude  the  land  speculators,  rather  they  were  encouraged.  In 
order  to  recover  investment  quickly,  the  developers  sold  the  cost  equivalent  lands  to 
speculators,  rather  than  end  users  (Kwon  T-J,  1972).  The  possible  land  speculation 
pushed  up  the  auction  price,  and  the  developers  easily  recovered  their  costs  and  the 
land-owners  could  receive  greater  gains.  Indeed,  as  Table  5-12  shows,  in  Seoul,  the 
139 average  increase  in  the  value  of  the  land  was  about  six  times  after  the  project.  Urban 
development  was  often  carried  out  by  voluntary  land-owners. 
Table  5-12  Land  Value  Increase  after  the  Land  Readjustment  Project. 
(post  development  value  as  a  multiple  of  pre  development  value) 
Value  Increase  after  the  project 
City  Average  Highest  Lowest 
Seoul  5.8  13.1  2 
Daegu  2.7  4  1.7 
Kwang-Ju  2.5  2.8  2 
Source:  MOC.  Data  collected  by  Hwang  M-C  and  Boebele,  W.  A.,  Land  Read  usunent,  Lexington:  i 
Lexington  Books,  1982,  p.  143.  (requoted  in  Ha  S-K,  1984,  p.  18  1). 
Using  this  method  and  at  virtually  no  cost  the  Korean  government  was  able  to 
develop  over  50  per  cent  of  built-up  areas  in  Seoul,  over  30  per  cent  in  Kwang-Ju 
(Hwang  M-C,  1976,  p.  52)  and  over  40  per  cent  in  Pusan  (Pusan  Municipal 
Government,  1992,  p.  552)  and  the  like  in  other  cities  by  1975.  However,  such 
methods  resulted  in  speculation  fever  in  real  estate  in  1977  (MOC,  1987,  p.  52  1). 
Over-investment  in  housing  and  land  resulted  in  the  exhaustion  of  its  potential  for 
production  purposes.  Therefore,  the  control  of  over-investment  was  also  a  necessary 
condition.  The  government  enacted,  as  mentioned  earlier,  the  Housing  Estate 
Development  Acceleration  Act  of  1980.  Since  then  most  large  land  developments  and 
construction  of  housing  have  been  monopolized  by  the  public  sector,  using  two 
schemes  named  "Public  Purchase  and  Development"  and  "Housing  Lot. 
Development".  These  two  methods  have  many  differences  in  detail,  but  in  principle 
the  developments  have  been  monopolized  by  the  public  sector. 
In  the  housing  sector,  as  Figure  5-5  shows,  encouraging  speculation  and  then 
discouraging  it  in  association  with  the  general  economy  was  the  main  mechanism  of 
housing  policy  in  Korea.  Thus,  the  patterns  of  house  price  increases  are  often 
referred  to  as  leap-frogging  increases  (KRIHS,  1990,  p.  8). 
This  mechanism  has  some  benefits  for  the  general  economy.  When  a  recession 
occurred,  the  government  deliberately  encouraged  speculative  investments  in  housing 
through  regulatory  rules,  using  curb  markets  and  other  devices  and  thereafter 
successive  economic  growth  itself  expanded  effective  demand,  then  anti-speculative 
measures  were  in  turn  launched.  A  boom  in  the  housing  market  (or  the  real  estate 
market  in  general)  could  help  to  keep  economic  growth  going.  The  boom  in  the 
construction  industry  itself  helped  to  stimulate  a  boom  in  the  steel  industry,  the  car 
industry,  the  energy  supply  industry  and  so  on.  Such  new  investment  itself  stimulated 
fresh  demand  for  the  products  of  industrial  capital  and  could  use  vast  unemployed 
capital.  It  helped  to  overcome  blockages  in  the  circulation  of  industrial  capital. 
140 As  a  result,  when  industry  was  in  recession,  and  unemployment  was  rising,  house 
prices  were  also  rising.  Low-income  households  have  faced  even  more  difficulty  in 
housing  under  harsh  economic  circumstances.  Structural  poverty  was  beginning  to 
emerge  in  Korea.  This  is  why  owner  occupation  in  Korea  has  become  so  costly  in 
relation  to  speculation. 
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Prohenis,  1989,  pp.  65-69. 
In  the  US  and  in  Britain,  in  the  wake  of  the  Depression  and  once  the  more  urgent 
needs  had  been  met  after  the  Second  World  War,  government  policies  had 
encouraged  home-ownership  as  an  end  in  itself  and  as  a  method  to  stimulate  the 
construction  industry  (Agnew,  1981,  p.  73).  Clearly')  though,  the  possibility  of 
owning  has  been  much  extended  in  the  US  and  Britain  by  government  policies 
encouraging  private  approaches  to  the  housing  of  their  nations  (Mellor,  1977,  p.  58 
and  Friedland,  1982,  p.  69).  These  spurts  were  financed  by  building  societies  with 
encouragement  from  national  and  local  governments  (Boddy,  1976).  Home  ownership 
was  transferred  into  a  mass  phenomenon,  at  least  in  part,  by  the  activities  of  building 
societies  (Pawley,  1978,  pp.  65-69).  The  development  of  mortgages  helped  to  solve 
tile  income-housing-cost  problem.  Of  course,  it  may  have  been  not  only  because  of 
the  development  of  mortgages.  In  some  measure,  as  Jackson  (1973,  p.  35)  pointed 
out,  "this  was  a  response  to  relaration  by  certain  building  societies,  but  it  is  also 
reflected  the  increasing  prosperity  and  size  of  the  middle  classes". 
In  Korea,  it  is  certain  that  continuing  economic  growth  over  the  last  three  decades, 
which  increased  real  and  money  income  of  households,  increased  effective  demand. 
Meanwhile  demographic  growth  and  migration  also  increased  the  number  of  potential 
first-time  buyers  in  urban  housing  markets.  In  Korea,  however,  there  are  no  building 
141 societies,  and  no  mortgage  markets.  Most  households  have  to  buy  a  house  outright. 
Nevertheless,  as  Table  5-2  showed,  Korean  housing  construction  has  sustained  a  high 
output  for  over  three  decades  without  any  sizable  injection  of  public  spending.  This 
was  due  to  the  "policy  of  speculation"  combined  with  the  "policy  of  owner- 
occupation". 
Owner-occupation  and  absolute  property  rights  were  a  prerequisite  for  those 
housing  policies.  Given  limited  housing  resources,  outright  owner-occupation  was  the 
best  tenure  to  economize  the  use  of  public  resources  and  to  insulate  the  housing  sector 
from  the  rest  of  the  economy,  by  shifting  the  burdens  of  housing  finance  towards  the 
private  sector  and  the  urban  household  itself.  House  builders  could  sustain  their 
construction  activities  by  the  high  turn-over  of  money.  It  was  only  possible  by  selling 
to  owner-occupiers  rather  than  for  renting. 
The  desire  for  owner-occupation  has  been  sustained,  not  only  by  the  tradition  of 
Koreans  but  also  by  government  policies  which  gave  a  concrete  hope  of  capital  gains 
to  speculators,  combined  with  changed  labour  markets.  As  Professor  Maclennan 
(1982,  p.  183)  suggests,  "The  concept  of  tenure  essentially  relates  to  the  legal 
arrangements  existing  between  properties  and  their  owners  and  inhabitants,  thus 
tenure  differences  are  essentially  variations  in  the  property  rights  and  obligations  of 
propeny  owners  and  inhabitants".  Aspirations  are  based  on  societal  norms.  Attitudes 
towards  specific  housing  tenures  are  partly  a  function  of  the  presence  or  absence  of 
constraints  on  the  achievement  of  aspiration.  House  ownership  does  mean  individual 
control  over  a  unit  of  that  commodity,  and  purchase  is  undertaken  on  terms  and 
conditions  that  individuals  find  acceptable  subject  to  the  relevant  constraints  and 
alternatives. 
Although  the  origin  is  not  clear,  the  differentiation  between  owner-occupation  and 
tenancy  began  to  emerge  on  the  introduction  of  the  legal  system  of  Japan,  and  then 
the  first  republic  of  Korea  supported  by  America  in  1948.  However,  until  the  early 
1960s,  households  desired  for  home-ownership  on  the  basis  of  the  tradition.  Since 
1960  housing  became  a  scarce  necessity,  and  the  possession  of  a  house  became 
another  life  chance,  whether  for  capital  gain  or  rental  income.  Speculation  in  housing 
first  emerged  in  the  late  1960s.  As  the  economy  grew,  more  people  could  accumulate 
small  amounts  of  capital.  However,  nationalisation  of  commercial  banks, 
undeveloped  stock  markets  and  continuing  high  inflation  proved  that  housing  was  the 
best  investment  option  for  ordinary  people. 
Many  behavioural  studies  of  demand  (Song  and  Struyk,  1976;  Follain,  Lim  and 
Renaud,  1980;  Lim,  Follain  and  Renaud,  1980;  Kim  J-H(a),  1982;  Kim  C-S,  1984; 
Kim  K-Y,  1988  and  Gyourko  and  Han,  1989),  although  they  didn't  search  for  the 
causes  of  the  desire  for  homeownership,  consistently  confirmed  (or  rather 
142 represented)  that  Koreans  are  responsive  to  income  and  price  incentives  for 
homeownership,  but  restrictions  from  the  cost  structure  and  the  financial  structure 
reduced  homeownership  opportunities.  The  government  has  controlled  the  investment 
in  housing  through  changing  the  cost  and  financial  structures.  (This  will  be  discussed 
in  detail  in  the  next  Chapter) 
Clearly  governmental  promotion  of  owner-occupation  was  a  response  to  popular 
demand  which  was  largely  determined  by  the  state  of  the  economy  and  the  legal 
system.  It  would  have  been  a  nonsense  for  policy  makers  to  ignore  such  demands. 
During  the  last  three  decades,  even  under  authoritarian  military  regimes  (from  1960 
to  1991),  the  Korean  leadership  has  consistently  faced  periodic  electoral  challenge. 
So  the  expansion  of  middle  income  groups  was  consistently  required  as  a  political 
buttress.  Under  this  political  reasoning  owner-occupation  has  been  consistently 
emphasized  (Suh  S-M  and  Yeon  H-C,  1992,  p.  301),  as  it  was  assumed  that 
homeowners  would  have  an  interest  in  protecting  the  social  and  economic  system  in 
order  to  protect  their  property. 
There  was  really  no  supply  of  new  rented  houses  by  the  private  as  well  as  the 
public  constructors  largely  because  structurally  they  could  not  sustain  their  activities 
unless  houses  built  were  sold  to  effective  demanders  (this  will  be  discussed  in  the 
next  chapter).  In  other  words,  owner-occupation  was  chosen  as  the  only  alternative  to 
renting. 
Owner-occupation  could  be  transferred  from  other  tenures;  a  process  frequently 
described  as  gentrification.  However,  in  Korea,  house-builders  did  not  lose  part  of 
their  market  because  most  landlords  let  a  part  of  their  home,  which  is  also  due  to  the 
low  supply  of  rented  houses.  Therefore,  the  strong  desire  for  owner-occupation 
resulted  in  a  high  output  of  houses.  Given  the  absolute  housing  shortage  and  limited 
housing  funds,  this  housing  market  structure  was  consistent  with  the  high-output 
policy,  and  the  government  was  increasingly  keen  to  encourage  home-ownership. 
However,  the  fatal  fact  by  which  such  mechanism  could  be  sustained  was  a 
scarcity.  Thus  a  chronic  housing  shortage  over  the  last  three  decades  was  an  inherent 
result  of  the  Korean  housing  system. 
5.4  Synthesis. 
The  term  policy  generally  relates  to  a  particular  problem  which  it  is  intended  to 
solve  or  ameliorate  in  pursuit  of  some  objective  (MOC,  1993,  p.  1).  However,  in 
practice,  a  technical  definition  of  housing  problems  reflects  the  political  power  of 
143 those  who  stand  to  benefit  from  such  a  definition:  Different  problems  all  have 
different  technical  solutions.  The  selection  of  problems  for  solution  is  a  function  of 
government  policy.  During  the  last  three  decades,  the  first  priority  in  the  national 
planning  has  been  economic  development.  In  the  housing  field,  the  first  housing 
problem  has  been  an  absolute  shortage  of  housing.  There  was  general  agreement  that 
there  was  a  need  for  high  levels  of  housing  production,  in  order  to  eliminate 
shortage,  to  remove  the  poor  houses  and  to  provide  for  the  rapidly  growing  number 
of  households.  In  fact,  Korea's  economic  growth  has  few  parallels  in  the  world. 
There  has  been  a  very  high  housing  output. 
The  failure  of  the  low-cost  housing  provision  has  often  been  attributed  to 
speculation  and  land  shortages.  However,  the  evidence  provided  by  this  chapter  are; 
first  that  housing  supply  in  Korea  has  largely  depended  upon  speculative  money, 
especially  in  the  period  of  economic  crisis.  Secondly,  as  Table  5-1  showed,  since 
1989  just  after  the  shift  of  the  ceiling  price  system  towards  the  costs  linking  system, 
housing  completion  was  nearly  doubled.  It  seems  to  be  certain  that  low  housing  out- 
put,  in  relative  terms,  was  not  a  question  of  land  shortage  but  a  question  of  profit 
shortage  for  the  supplier  in  the  Korean  housing  system.  Thirdly,  until  the  mid  1970s, 
the  Korean  economy  and  society  was  an  open  structure  in  which  if  people  worked 
harder,  they  could  be  better  off.  Under  that  structure,  home-ownership  was  not 
problematic.  Rather  it  seemed  to  be  a  better  policy  to  encourage  people  to  save  and 
work  hard.  However,  as  the  structure  of  the  economy  and  society  became  more 
closed  since  the  mid  1970s,  ownership  rates  diverged  from  the  housing  supply  rates. 
The  policy  of  speculation  contributed  to  the  high  output  of  houses  and  the  health  of 
the  economy,  but  the  fruits  of  them  have  been  unevenly  distributed. 
The  Korean  government  tried  price  controls  and  unique  allocation  methods,  etc  (the 
existing  housing  system  of  Korea  is  considered  in  detail  in  the  next  Chapter  and  only 
the  mechanism  was  presented  earlier)  to  encourage  home  ownership  for  more 
households.  The  various  government  controls  and/or  regulations  provided  played  a 
kind  of  subsidy  to  consumers  at  the  expense  of  builders.  For  example,  the  price 
control  involves  direct  subsidy  from  the  builders  to  consumers,  equal  to  the 
difference  between  the  market  price  and  the  controlled  price.  However,  such 
subsidies  are  based  on  the  consumption  of  housing.  They  are  not  related  to 
households  in  different  economic  circumstances  and  with  different  housing  needs. 
It  has  unfortunately  proved  impossible  to  achieve  much  redistribution  without 
tackling  severe  inequalities  in  wealth  and  income  at  the  same  time.  In  practice,  what 
has  happened  in  a  number  of  countries,  such  as  Britain  (see  Le  Grand,  1982),  is  that 
general  consumption  subsidies  have  benefited  the  better  off  more  than  the  poor.  The 
144 reason  is  simply  that  the  better-off,  including  their  offspring,  consume  more  than  the 
poor. 
Such  subsidies  in  Korea  have  represented  a  direct  boost  to  demand  for  owner- 
occupation,  as  seen  in  1978  and  1982  just  after  the  expansion  of  price  controls, 
resulting  in  higher  housing  prices  as  a  whole.  Thus,  the  beneficiaries  in  housing  price 
inflation  were  existing  home  owners,  landlords,  land  owners  and  potentially  the 
holders  of  housing  related  saving  accounts.  Among  them,  the  main  beneficiary  of  the 
subsidy  was  the  household  who  was  allocated  a  new  housing  unit  at  less  than  the 
market  price,  irrespective  of  their  need  or  income. 
In  the  longer  run,  higher  house  prices  had  only  a  marginal  impact  on  new 
construction  because  the  main  beneficiaries  have  been  others,  not  builders.  Thus 
house  builders  could  not  sustain  their  output  enough  to  cope  with  increases  in 
households.  Moreover,  the  increased  demand  for  housing  simply  resulted  in  a  transfer 
of  income  from  tenants  to  landlords  or  houseowners.  Although  the  housing  related 
saving  scheme  was  mainly  confined  to  tenants,  this  led  to  inequity  between  tenants  in 
different  financial  circumstances.  Under  these  circumstances,  improving  the 
purchasing  power  of  the  low-income  households  does  not  necessarily  improve  their 
ability  to  secure  decent  housing. 
In  Britain,  the  provision  of  public  housing  has  been  the  main  factor  by  which  the 
association  between  the  deficit  of  houses  and  poverty  and  bad  housing  has  been 
weakened  by  diverting  housing  resources  towards  those  most  needing  help.  In  Korea 
in  the  past,  public  housing  which  is  defined  as  publicly  developed  but  built  by  private 
construction  firms  on  contract  and  delivered  according  to  the  Decree  on  Housing 
Allocation,  tended  to  be  particularly  encouraged  at  times  when  the  whole  economy 
was  in  recession  and  the  private  sector  was  in  a  downturn. 
The  advantage  of  the  public  provision  of  housing  was  that  it  guarantieed  a  stable 
supply  of  housing  that  might  otherwise  not  have  been  provided  (Chung  H-S,  1985, 
p.  341),  and  thereby  contributed  to  stabilize  house  prices,  and  help  cope  with  the 
general  economic  cycle.  As  Figure  5-6  shows,  in  the  long  term,  the  number  of 
housing  units  constructed  by  the  public  sector  has  risen,  especially  since  1.972, 
whereas  the  private  sector  has  dipped,  especially  since  1978,  as  a  consequence  of 
price  controls.  It  should  not  be  denied  that  such  massive  public  housing  provision 
certainly  provided  more  households  with  better  living  conditions  than  private  building 
alone  would  have.  However,  such  public  houses  have  been  allocated  according  to  the 
allocation  policy  noted  earlier  on  the  basis  of  ability  to  pay  rather  than  need.  So, 
public  housing  mainly  contributed  to  the  concentration  of  the  limited  housing 
resources  in  moderate  and  middle-income  households. 
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Source:  The  Ministry  of  Construction. 
Moreover,  the  government's  little  direct  Intervention  into  the  housing  sector  has 
given  it  a  flexibility  in  the  control  of  housing  markets.  That  is,  housing  markets  could 
easily  be  changed  by  a  small  injection  of  public  spending.  The  Korean  government 
could  use  the  housing  market  as  an  instrument  by  which  wider  economic  aims  could 
be  achieved.  Housing  policy  mainly  focused  on  a  "health  of  the  economy"  and  on 
catering  for  the  middle  income  groups.  Government  involvement  in  the  housing 
sector  was  not  primarily  intended  to  compensate  those  who  were  excluded  from  the 
changing  economic  and  social  structure. 
The  massive  housing  supply  since  1989  successfully  met  most  effective  demands 
for  owner-occupation,  pushing  housing  issues  down  the  political  agenda  as  defined  by 
parliament  and  the  mass  media.  How  were  the  housing  issues  dropped  so  suddenly 
when  28.8  per  cent  of  urban  households,  equivalent  to  about  2.4  million  households, 
were  still  using  only  one  room  for  their  whole  family  of  3.7  persons  per  household 
on  average?  Housing  consumption  costs  as  share  of  household  expenditure  are  still 
increasing.  Moreover,  low-income  households  are  paying  more  and  more  for  housing 
which  is  little  or  no  better  than  before  (KRISH,  1990,  p.  24).  Furthermore,  new 
squatter  settlements  began  to  re-emerge  in  the  biggest  cities  in  the  late  1980s. 
The  answer  to  those  question  must  be  sought  in  the  social  structure  of  Korea  (see 
Chapter  3),  just  as  in  the  case  of  other  social  policies  (see  Chapter  4).  As  Byrne  and 
Damer  have  argued  in  Britain,  "  For  the  state  the  housing  problem  at  the  level  of 
physical  reproduction  was  the  housing  conditions  of  those  who  were  worst  housed. 
The  political  problem  in  terms  of  articulated  political  pressure  came  from  the  better 
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----------------------------- housed  in  the  working  class  who  wanted  cheap  high  quality  council  housing" 
(requoted  from  Malpass  and  Murie,  1990,  p.  15). 
To  conclude,  Housing  policies  are  reflecting  wider  economic,  social  and  political 
structures  rather  than  a  response  to  the  needs  of  poorer  people.  In  line  with  the 
changes  in  economic,  political  and  social  structure,  in  1977,  the  government 
dramatically  amended  the  Housing  Construction  Acceleration  Act  which  brought  the 
liberal  housing  markets  under  political  influence.  The  Ceiling  price  system,  the 
Housing  Related  Scheme  and  the  special  allocation  systems  certainly  benefited 
moderate  and  middle-income  groups,  but  the  system  itself  played  the  role  of 
gatekeeper  against  the  low-income  households  in  the  owner-occupation  market.  (This 
will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter  in  detail).  General  policies  to  overcome  the 
problem  of  income  inequality  have  been  increasingly  undermined  by  housing  policies. 
In  contrast  to  this,  large  and  luxury  housing  construction  was  strictly  controlled,  and 
taxed  heavily  from  1967.  Since  1976,  luxury  housing  in  which  floor  space  exceeded 
200  pyong  (about  662  sq.  m.  )  was  taxed  at  a  rate  7.5  times  higher  than  other  housing 
(KHB,  1991,  p.  72).  In  this  context,  general  policies  to  overcome  the  problem  of 
income  inequality  have  been  helped  by  the  high  tax  on  luxury  houses. 
The  important  point  to  be  established  here  is  that  even  given  the  prevalence  of 
the  "welfare  state"  launched  in  1987,  there  has  been  no  attempt  to  give  an  explicit 
definition  of  acceptable  minimum  standards,  or  establish  unambiguous  rights  to 
housing. 
In  the  overall  context  of  housing  policy  in  Korea  since  1960,  the  late  1980s 
represents  the  most  important  period  of  re-orientation,  in  which  the  private  sector  was 
increasingly  set  free  and  given  the  dominant  role  in  housing  provision.  What  is 
certain  is  that  the  increasing  role  of  the  private  sector  is  in  contradiction  with  the 
decline  in  the  ability  of  this  sector  to  provide  decent  and  affordable  housing  for 
considerable  sections  of  the  population  within  the  changing  industrial  structure, 
reinforcing  the  exclusion  and  isolation  of  low-income  households  even  in  housing 
politics.  This  will  result  in  a  more  homogeneous  poor  housing  community.  Indeed  it 
is  already  doing  so.  It  must  be  at  this  point  that  housing  problems  shift  from  being  a 
question  of  shelter  for  an  individual  household  towards  being  a  question  of  conflict 
between  social  groups.  This  will  be  explored  in  the  next  chapters. 
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6.1  Introduction. 
Chapter  5  demonstrated  that  housing  policies  cannot  be  divorced  from  the  changing 
economic  and  social  structure.  The  Korean  government  have  not  been  prepared  to 
leave  the  provision,  finance  and  allocation  of  housing  entirely  to  the  free  play  of 
market  forces.  Nevertheless,  housing  has  never  been  a  social  service  for  those  who 
are  excluded  from  the  changing  economic  and  social  structures. 
In  most  cases  the  new  housing  provision  seems  to  have  made'  a  little  impact  on  the 
lower  income  households.  For  them,  the  most  serious  housing  problems  are  often 
caused  not  by  the  exclusion  from  the  new  housing  provision,  but  by  the  change  in 
their  existing  living  environments.  During  the  last  three  decades,  substantial  attention 
has  been  focused  upon  poor  housing.  Those  problems  were  a  result  of  the 
development  process  characterized  by  explosive  population  growth  and  urbanisation 
with  the  resulting  pollution,  floods,  land  slides,  fires,  chaotic  land  use,  etc.  In 
consequence,  the  government  has  introduced  a  number  of  measures,  ranging  from  the 
provision  of  sites  and  services  to  clearance.  The  poor  housing  areas  were 
characterised  by  a  variety  and  diversity  in  both  dwellers  and  function.  However,  as 
time  went  by,  a  number  of  common  charateristics  and  difficulties  were  noted.  They 
suffer  from  the  declining  economic  and  industrial  base,  physical  decay  and  adverse 
social  conditions.  This  change  is  clearly  different  from  the  experience  of  others  in 
Korea  who  have  benefited  from  rapid  and  sustained  growth  accompanied  by 
substantial  decreases  in  inequality. 
This  chapter  first  explores  the  structure  of  new  housing  provision  and  allocation  in 
the  Korean  housing  system  and  the  changes  that  have  occurred  to  housing  for  low 
income  groups.  The  underlying  issue  linking  this  chapter  is  the  impacts  of  the 
changed  economic  and  social  structures  on  new  housing  provision  and  the  effects 
these  have  had  on  low  income  housing  in  particular. 
6.2.  The  Housing  System  of  Korea. 
Korea  had  a  major  and  consistent  crisis  of  housing  scarcity  as  a  result  of  wartime 
destruction  and  rapid  urban  growth,  etc.  Nevertheless,  to  achieve  rapid,  continuing 
industrial  isation,  housing  had  to  be  insulated  from  the  rest  of  the  economy.  Prior  to 
the  late  1970s,  the  government's  intervention  in  the  housing  sector  had  mainly  been 
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operation  of  the  market  mechanism.  However,  housing  shortages  have  deteriorated 
over  time.  Under  these  circumstances,  in  order  to  produce  the  required  houses 
quickly  it  was  necessary,  in  some  way  or  other,  to  harvest  large  amounts  of  small 
savings  and  tax  payments  from  large  numbers  of  people  and  to  invest  this  money  in 
housing  -  despite  many  other,  competing,  demands  for  capital. 
The  Korean  government  perfected  unique  and  original  ways  of  doing  this  through 
the  amendement  of  the  Housing  Construction  Acceleration  Act  in  1977.  These 
methods  built  on  a  culture  which  made  high  rates  of  saving  within  family  units 
possible  if  incentives  could  be  provided.  As  Chapter  5  demonstrated,  the  housing 
system  of  today  originated  from  the  amendment  of  the  Act.  Although  the  housing 
system  in  detail  has  changed  many  times  -  for  instance,  the  Decree  on  Housing 
Allocation  was  enacted  in  May  of  1978,  and  thereafter  it  was  amended  twenty  times 
by  1990  -  the  basic  structure  in  terms  of  general  finance,  provision  and  delivery  has 
continued  without  fundamental  changes.  This  section  focuses  on  the  basic  structure. 
The  Figure  6-1  overleaf  shows  the  Korean  housing  system  in  comparison  with  the 
typical  Western  housing  financial  system  in  general.  The  Korean  housing  system 
gives  the  first  priority  to  tenant  households  in  the  allocation  of  new  houses  built. 
People  join  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Schemes,  either  through  depositing  a  lump 
sum  of  money  or  through  monthly  instalments.  People  must  then  wait  until  new 
houses  are  allocated  to  them.  These  deposits  or  instalments  are  the  main  source  of 
housing  funds.  The  funds  are  mainly  allocated  to  house  builders  for  construction. 
New  houses  are  allocated  (precisely,  a  preferential  purchase  right)  to  those  who  have 
contributed  to  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Schemes  at  controlled  prices  and,  at  the 
same  time,  the  loans  to  builders  are  converted  into  mortgages  to  the  purchasers  of  the 
new  houses.  Households  then  repay  the  mortgages. 
Financial  institutions  for  housing  are  divided  into  the  formal  sector  and  the 
informal  sector.  The  formal  sector  is  sub-divided  into  three  institutes.  Firstly,  the 
Korea  Housing  Bank  (KHB)  established  in  1967  is  the  main  institute  for  housing 
finance  in  Korea.  Most  of  the  housing  loans  are  allocated  through  the  Korea  Housing 
Bank.  Secondly,  the  National  Housing  Fund  (NHF)  established  in  198  t  through  the 
amendment  of  the  Housing  Construction  Promotion  Act  mainly  supplies  housing 
finance  for  public  housing  construction  and  other  public  objectives  such  as  housing 
renewal.  It  is  managed  by  the  Korea  Housing  Bank  under  the  direction  of  the 
Ministry  of  Construction.  Thirdly,  there  are  a  number  of  different  institutions 
including  the  National  Agricultural  Cooperatives  Federation,  the  Citizens  National 
Bank,  commercial  banks  and  life  insurance  companies,  who  constitute  the  rest  of  the 
housing  financial  system.  Their  main  role  is  to  make  loans  to  housing  purchasers. 
149 They  finance  the  purchase  of  larger  and  more  expensive  dwellings  with  high  interest 
rates  (over  16  per  cent)  and  short  terms  (2-15  years). 
Figure  6-1  Housing  System  of  Korea. 
(1)  Typical  Western  System  of  Housing  Finance. 
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150 Table  6-1  The  Share  of  Housing  Loans  Outstanding  by  Institutions,  1990. 
Total  100.0 
NHF  45.1  % 
KHB  41.3  % 
Others  13.6  % 
Source:  The  Korea  Housing  Bank, 
As  an  invisible  reality,  curb  markets  play  a  great  role  in  housing  finance.  But, 
unfortunately,  few  studies  have  been  made  of  these  curb  markets  in  housing  finance. 
Informally,  it  has  been  estimated  that  hidden  financial  assets  may  amount  to  10-25 
per  cent  of  all  financial  accounts  and  20-30  per  cent  of  GNP  (the  Financial  Times, 
October  11 
1 
1993,  p.  4),  and  about  30  -  40  per  cent  of  finance  in  housing  construction 
firms  is  provided  by  the  curb  market.  These  figures  have  been  decreasing  over  time. 
With  limited  national  resources  and  persistent  housing  shortages  (housing  units  to 
households),  the  Korean  government  viewed  funds  for  construction  as  more  efficient 
than  funds  for  consumption.  Housing  funds  paid  directly  to  builders  have  the  effect  of 
expanding  supply  directly,  whereas  funds  for  consumption  would  increase  prices 
before  they  affect  output.  In  addition  to  this  theoretical  background,  loans  to  builders 
were  more  easy  and  economic  for  financial  institutions  to  administer  than  loans  to 
consumers. 
The  price  of  the  new  house  built  is  set  by  the  government.  Thus,  changing  prices 
has  been  one  of  instruments  by  which  the  government  has  controlled  the  housing 
market.  Just  after  the  launch  of  price  controls  and  the  Housing  Related  Saving 
Scheme,  the  Decree  on  Housing  Allocation  was  enacted  in  1978.  According  to  the 
decree,  the  output  of  new  housing  has  a  dual  structure;  regulated  housing  and 
unregulated  housing.  Any  new  housing  construction  with  more  than  twenty  housing 
units  has  to  be  priced  at  the  level  set  by  the  government  and  allocated  to  the  housing 
related  saving  account  holders.  The  price  was  set  generally  at  half  to  one  third  of 
market  prices.  The  difference  between  the  controlled  prices  and  market  prices  is  the 
main  mechanism  by  which  the  government  could  harvest  a  lot  of  small  savings  from 
large  numbers  of  people.  The  interest  rates  and  the  amount  of  the  loan  are  regulated 
by  the  government,  and  thereby  has  been  one  of  instruments  by  which  the 
government  has  controlled  housing  demand. 
Single,  detached  houses  and  row  houses  built  with  less  than  twenty  units  have  not 
been  subjected  to  the  regulation.  Therefore,  there  has  been  no  systematic  housing 
finance  for  the  construction  of  these  houses,  and  they  are  sold  directly  to  any 
household  at  open  market  prices  without  regulation  of  their  allocation.  However,  the 
construction  of  these  houses  has  been  strongly  controlled  not  only  by  housing 
151 finance,  but  also  by  planning  permission,  land  use  planning,  etc.  The  proportion  of 
regulated  housing  in  the  new  housing  supply  has  varied  widely  from  city  to  city  and 
from  time  to  time,  but  more  than  60  per  cent  of  new  houses  in  cities  were  supplied 
under  the  regulation  in  1990  (KHB,  1993). 
The  Housing  Related  Saving  Scheme  is  divided  into  two  categories.  Under  one, 
qualified  households  pay  a  lump  sum  deposit  at  one  time.  Then,  they  are  entitled  to 
second  priority  after  twelve  months  and  first  priority  after  twenty  months.  Housing 
Subscription  Time  Deposits(HSTD)  fall  into  this  category.  The  other  category 
includes  those  participants  who  make  monthly  instalments,  entitling  them  to  second 
priority  after  twelve  monthly  instalments  and  first  priority  after  24  monthly 
instalments.  The  National  Housing  Subscription  Savings  Deposits  (NHSS  D),  which  is 
the  main  source  for  the  National  Housing  Fund,  and  Housing  Instalment Savings 
Deposits(HISD)  created  in  1989  fall  into  this  category.  In  reality,  the  length  of  the 
waiting  period  before  a  house  is  allocated  to  the  account  holder  depends  on  the 
number  of  competitors  and  the  number  of  houses  supplied. 
Houses  built  by  the  public  sector  or  using  the  National  Housing  Funds  are  allocated 
to  the  holders  of  the  NHSSD.  Thus  the  NHSSD  emphasises  redistributional  effects. 
By  contrast,  houses  built  by  the  private  sector  are  allocated  to  the  holders  of  the 
HSTD  and  the  HISD,  therefore  emphasising  the  raising  of  housing  funds.  The 
common  qualification  for  joining  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Scheme  is  that  a 
household  must  be  registered  as  a  separate  household  in  legal  terms.  Since  the  launch 
of  this  housing  system,  the  increase  in  the  number  of  single  households  was  not  only 
the  general  trend  produced  by  the  nuclearisation  of  the  family,  but  also  an  affirmation 
of  their  right  to  enter  their  names  onto  the  housing  related  saving  schemes. 
In  the  NHSSD,  the  household's  monthly  income  should  not  exceed  the  average 
income  of  all  households  in  the  city  they  are  located  in  and  the  household  is  required 
to  have  lived  as  tenants  at  least  for  five  years  before  joining  this  scheme.  In  the 
HSTD  and  the  HISD,  every  household  can  join,  but  the  first  priority  is  given  to 
tenant  households  in  the  allocation  of  new  houses.  This  is  based  on  the  view  that 
moves  by  owner-occupiers  do  not,  in  general,  alter  the  balance  of  demand  and  supply 
very  significantly,  since  the  purchase  of  a  house  involves  the  simultaneous  release  of 
another.  In  essence,  therefore,  the  change  in  the  balance  of  supply  and  demand 
depends  on  the  rental  sector.  Moreover,  the  government  believed  that  movements 
within  the  owner  occupied  market  have  little  impact  from  inflation  of  housing  prices 
since  the  rising  prices  affect  the  price  at  which  the  owner  sold  his  own  house  as  well 
as  that  of  the  one  being  purchased.  The  change  of  the  priority  periods  for  preferential 
purchase  is  another  means  by  which  the  government  controls  demand  for  new 
housing. 
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to  the  size  of  the  house  which  a  household  wishes  to  be  allocated.  The  interest  rates 
earned  on  these  deposits  differ  according  to  the  deposit  and  saving  amounts,  from  2.5 
per  cent  to  10  per  cent.  This  is  quite  low  compared  with  inflation  (generally  8  per 
cent)  and  the  interest  rate  of  curb  markets  (a  bit  over  20  per  cent).  Under  the 
circumstances  of  high  inflation  and  chronic  housing  shortage,  this  preferential 
purchasing  right  of  new  houses  at  controlled  prices  means  an  ensured  capital  gain  in 
the  near  future.  The  compensation  for  the  low  interest  rates  is  then  realized  by  the 
difference  between  market  price  and  controlled  price  of  the  new  dwellings. 
Table  6-2  Housing-related  Saving  Schemes. 
Interest  Rate  Maturity 
(%  per  year) 
Housing 
Subscription  4-10  1-36 
Time  Deposits  Months 
(HSTD) 
Saving  Amount 
Lump-sim  deposits 
of  2-15  million  Won 
Differentiated  amount 
according  to  size  and 
cities 
Benefit 
-  Preferential  purchase 
right  of  private 
sector  housing 
Housing  -  Monthly  instalments  -  Preferential  purchase 
Instalment  10  1,2,3,  of  30  -  300  thousand  right  of  private 
Savings  4,  or  5  Won,  according  to  size  sector  housing 
Deposits(HISD)  years  -  Created  in  1989 
National  House  size  of  40m  or  -  Major  revenue  source 
Housing  2.5-8  When  the  less;  20-50  thousand  Won  of  the  NHF 
Subscription  depositor  House  size  of  more  -  Preferential  purchase 
Saving  purchases  than  40m;  55-100  right  of  public 
Deposit(NHSSD)  a  house  thousand  Won  sector  housing 
-  Monthly  instalments 
source:  The  Ministry  of  Construction. 
Through  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Scheme,  the  Korean  government  has  tried  to 
achieve  both  redistribution  effects  and  provide  a  solution  for  financial  problems  in  the 
housing  sector  by  connecting  household  savings  with  the  allocation  system.  Since  the 
launch  of  the  housing  related  savings,  the  overall  scale  of  public  finance  for  housing 
has  expanded  and  by  1990  it  accounted  for  over  50  per  cent  of  housing  funds  raised 
(KHB,  1991). 
Over  two  thirds  of  the  raised  funds  are  allocated  to  builders  via  the  Korea  Housing 
Bank.  However,  the  volume  of  the  supply  of  housing  loans  has  been  meagre, 
amounting  to  only  28.6  per  cent  of  the  total  amount  of  housing  investment  during  the 
1967-1989  period.  The  housing  loans  to  builders  for  construction  have  been  allocated 
mostly  for  high-rise  flat  construction  of  apartments  less  than  85  sq.  m.  in  size.  The 
allocation  of  housing  funds  has  also  been  one  of  the  instruments  by  which  the 
153 government  has  influenced  the  housing  market.  Most  house  builders  were,  however, 
increasingly  over-burdened  with  financial  difficulties  as  construction  costs  increased. 
This  consideration  led  the  government  to  devise  another  measure  to  alleviate  the 
difficulties.  The  Korean  government  decreed  that  house  builders  could  be  allowed  to 
sell  apartment  units  as  soon  as  10  (for  designated  house  builders)  or  20  per  cent  (for 
registered  house  builders)  of  the  construction  was  completed.  The  housing  related 
saving  account  holders  who  are  selected  as  the  privileged  purchasers  of  new 
dwellings  pay  20  per  cent  of  the  purchase  price  at  this  stage  and  pay  60  per  cent  of 
the  proceeds  in  instalments  by  the  time  of  housing  completion.  The  remaining  20  per 
cent  is  paid  when  the  unit  is  ready  to  be  occupied.  In  houses  of  85  sq.  m.  size  or  less, 
housing  loans  allocated  to  builders  are  converted  into  a  mortgage  at  the  point  when 
the  houses  are  completed,  and  the  builders  offset  the  remaining  purchasing  prices  by 
the  mortgages.  Under  this  device,  the  house  buyers  are  financing  the  house  builders 
during  the  construction  period  with  no  interest  charge. 
Table  6-3  The  Sources  of  Housing  Funds,  1985. 
NHF  KHB  Others 
NHPSD.  27.3%  General  Deposits.  22.2%  General 
National  Housing  Bonds.  29.4%  Housing  related  savings 
Housing  Lottery.  1.4%  saving  scheme.  43.5% 
National  Housing  Fund  Bonds.  10.2%  Fund  Carried  Over.  24.2% 
Borrowing  from  Government.  0.1  %  Loan  Collection.  10.3% 
Loan  Collection.  16.4%  Housing  Bonds.  3.7% 
Funds  Carried  Over.  28.7%  Others.  6.9% 
Others.  7.1% 
Tota1  100%  Tota1  100% 
Source:  KHB. 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  National  Housing  Funds  (NHF)  in  1981,  most 
government  contributions  have  been  injected  into  the  housing  sector  through  the 
NHF.  Thus  the  NHF  are  classified  as  public  funds.  The  housing  units  constructed  by 
using  the  NHF  are  called  "public  housing"  and  are  allocated  to  those  holders  of 
NHSSD.  Public  housing  in  Korea  refers  to  houses  constructed  by  using  the  NHF 
which  are  85  sq.  m  or  less  in  size.  This  is  regardless  of  whether  they  were  built  by  the 
public  sector  or  the  private  sector.  The  loans  allocated  to  builders  for  construction  of 
new  apartments  of  less  than  85  sq.  m.  in  size  are  converted  into  mortgages  and  passed 
on  to  purchasers  at  11.5  per  cent  interest  rates  for  20  years.  The  mortgage-to- 
control  led-pr  ice  ratio  is  approximately  30  per  cent.  So  house  buyers  are  confined  to 
those  who  can  afford  the  rest  of  the  amount.  Moreover,  in  houses  over  85  sq.  m., 
there  is  no  systemic  channel  to  provide  loans  to  suppliers,  and  thereby  mortgages  to 
154 consumers.  Therefore,  housing  over  85  sq.  m.  (roughly  equivalent  to  an  average  3- 
bedroom  council  house  in  Britain)  is  beyond  the  reach  of  even  average  income 
households. 
The  main  differences  between  the  Korean  housing  system  and  typical  western 
systems  in  terms  of  finance  and  delivery  in  the  new  housing  markets  include  the 
following.  First,  housing  markets  in  Korea  are  clearly  separated  between  the  second 
hand  housing  market  and  the  new  housing  market.  For  second  hand  housing,  buyers 
and  sellers  rely  on  the  market  mechanism.  The  government's  intervention  is  mainly 
focused  on  new  housing. 
Secondly,  the  most  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  Korean  housing  system  is  that 
it  is  a  self-sustaining  system.  All  aspects  of  the  provision  of  new  housing,  ranging 
from  housing  finance,  construction  and  delivery  to  consumption  are  closely  connected 
with  each  other.  With  such  a  package,  housing  finance  in  general  is  insulated  from 
the  rest  of  the  economy.  Indeed  in  1989,  the  ratio  of  mortgage  debt  (debt  of  housing 
loan,  in  Korea)  to  GDP  was  a  meagre  3.9  per  cent  (KHB,  1990).  Comparable  figures 
in  1989  for  other  countries  were  58  per  cent  in  Britain,  45  per  cent  in  the  USA,  25 
per  cent  in  Japan  and  21  per  cent  in  France  (Maclennan,  Gibb  and  More,  1993, 
p.  13).  This  indicates  that  the  Korean  government  has  been  able  to  use  interest  rates  as 
a  vehicle  for  economic  regulation  with  more  flexibility.  In  other  words,  public  policy 
for  housng  in  Korea  can  be  insulated  from  public  policy  for  interest  rates. 
Thirdly,  in  connection  with  the  role  of  the  state,  in  Korea,  there  are  no  monetary 
subsidies  for  housing  suppliers  and  consumers,  no  tax  relief  and  no  rent  allowance. 
There  is  no  public  rented  housing  of  the  kind  familiar  in  Britain,  and  therefore  no 
rent  rebates.  Nevertheless,  the  Korean  government  has  strongly  influenced  housing 
markets  through  the  arrangement  of  the  housing  package  mentioned  earlier  by 
changing  preferential  interest  rates,  preferential  loans  allocation,  changing  building 
codes,  changing  the  status  of  builders,  changing  the  controlled  price,  changing  the 
delivery  system  and  mortgages,  changing  the  qualification  of  preferential  purchase 
rights,  etc  and  changing  the  combination  of  these. 
The  Korean  housing  system  is  in  many  ways  very  efficient.  Under  this  system,  a 
crisis  in  the  mortgage  market  does  not  result  in  a  financial  crisis  for  the  whole 
economy  in  general  and  vice  versa.  The  system  requires  buyers  to  pay  partly  for 
housing  before  purchase.  This  implies  that  a  large  part  of  the  risk  of  falling  housing 
prices  has  already  been  absorbed  before  the  housing  purchase.  Moreover,  mortgage 
defaults  or  arrears  would  mean  giving  up  the  differences  between  market  prices  and 
controlled  prices. 
There  are  also  significant  savings  to  be  made  by  not  requiring  legal  and  real  estate 
agency  fees,  plus  the  considerable  monetary  and  non-pecuniary  costs  of  searching  for 
155 a  home  because  new  houses  are  automatically  allocated  to  the  housing  related  saving 
account  holders.  In  addition  to  this,  savings  are  made  in  the  process  of  mortgage 
borrowing  as  well  as  lending.  The  loans  are  allocated  to  builders  and  converted  ii1to 
mortgages  for  buyers  to  repay.  At  a  national  level,  enormous  transaction  costs  can  be 
saved  both  in  terms  of  money  and  labour. 
Above  all,  the  housing  system  acts  as  one  of  the  key  mechanisms  for  social 
stability.  The  increase  in  housing  prices  in  Korea  has  outstripped  household  income 
(this  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  Chapter).  Moreover,  there  are  no  mortgage  markets 
as  in  western  countries  which  reduce  income-housing-cost  problems.  However, 
houseowners,  over  40  per  cent  of  urban  households  in  1990,  have  been  able  to  enjoy 
enormous  capital  gains  through  housing  price  inflation.  For  the  tenants  who  joined 
the  housing  related  saving  schemes,  over  30  per  cent  of  urban  households  in  1990, 
the  increasing  housing  prices  mean  greater  windfall  gains  because  the  increasing 
housing  prices  have  widened  the  differences  between  controlled  prices  and  open 
market  prices.  They  will  benefit  from  windfall  gains  in  the  near  future.  For  them,  the 
problem  is  a  matter  of  time  and  an  inelastic  housing  supply.  So,  under  this  system 
housing  price  inflation  is  not  problematic  for  the  majority  of  households. 
A  dilemma  for  the  Korean  government  is  how  to  keep  interest  rates  low  enough  to 
hold  down  construction  costs  whilst  at  the  same  time  attract  households  to  join  the 
housing  related  saving  scheme.  In  order  to  attract  more  households  to  join  the  scheme 
and,  to  some  extent,  to  make  the  advanced  sale  workable,  some  speculation  which 
widens  the  difference  between  controlled  prices  and  market  prices  is  necessary.  In 
fact,  as  the  Figure  below  shows,  when  open-market  housing  prices  soared,  the  inflow 
of  housing  funds  increased. 
Figure  6-2  Fund  Raising  in  KHB  and  NHF  and  House  Price  Index,  in  comparison  with  the 
last  year. 
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156 Speculation  may  be  possible  in  circumstances  where  the  house  is  a  scarce 
commodity.  Therefore,  the  main  factor  which  has  sustained  the  housing  system  has 
been  a  chronic  housing  shortage.  It  is  not  an  exageration  to  say  that  paradoxically  a 
very  high  housing  output  has  been  achieved  by  a  chronic  housing  shortage  under  the 
Korean  housing  system. 
Through  the  evolution  of  the  housing  system  in  Korea,  choices  and  the  price 
mechanism  have  been  crucially  distorted,  and  have  given  free  market  advocates  a 
ground  for  criticism  against  government  control  of  the  housing  market.  Owner- 
occupier's  upward  residential  mobility  through  new  housing  has  been  constrained  by 
the  system  itself.  First  time  buyers  are  looking  for  new  housing  not  on  the  basis  of 
their  need  or  taste,  but  on  the  basis  of  when  and  which  houses  give  them  the  greatest 
windfall  gains.  As  many  studies  have  shown,  for  instance,  the  elasticity  of  consumer 
demand  for  housing  to  both  price  and  income  has  been  very  uneven  over  time, 
ranging  from  0.027  (Mills  and  Song,  1979)  to  1.73  (Kim  K-Y,  1988)  in  income 
elasticity  and  from  -0.05  (Follain,  Lim  and  Renaud,  1979)  to  -4.0  (Baek  G-H,  1982) 
in  price  elasticity.  Although  the  methods  and  statistics  used  might  have  brought  about 
different  results,  the  differences  are  very  large.  That  can  be  more  appropriately 
explained  by  the  finding  of  many  studies  which  have  consistently  confirmed  that  the 
housing  cycle  in  Korea  depended  on  government  policies  (KHB,  1992,  p.  41). 
Moreover,  it  has  consistently  distorted  the  distribution  of  housing  stock  in  terms  of 
size,  type  and  location  in  no  relation  to  the  change  in  households'  demands  and 
needs. 
The  output  of  housing  is  determined  by  a  variety  of  factors  but  especially  by 
expected  profitability,  which  in  turn  may  depend  on  the  difference  between  expected 
price  and  the  cost  of  building,  which  may  depend  on  land,  credit,  material,  labour 
and  overhead  costs,  and  on  the  profitability  of  other  construction  work.  Where 
production  is  motivated  by  profit,  builders  maximize  the  difference  between  selling 
price  and  costs.  However,  housing  suppliers  couldn't  set  the  price  on  their  own.  They 
have  had  to  abide  by  the  prices  "uniformly"  set  by  the  government  and  the  houses 
built  are  automatically  allocated  to  the  housing  related  saving  account  holders 
according  to  the  priority  set  by  the  decree.  So  the  extra  profits  have  been  removed 
from  housing  builders,  but  so  has  much  of  the  risk  normally  associated  with  the 
industry  - 
In  addition  to  this,  the  entire  process  of  the  supply  of  urban  land  has  been  strictly 
regulated  by  the  central  government.  Each  local  government  estimates  the 
approximate  amount  of  land  needed  for  residential,  commercial  and  industrial 
purposes  and  requires  the  Ministry  of  Construction  (MOC)  to  change  land  zonings. 
Land  needed  for  various  purposes  is  co-ordinated  within  the  framework  of  the  ten 
157 year  National  Land  Use  Plan.  The  Ministry  of  Construction  reassesses  the 
requirements  and  changes  the  land  use  zonings  accordingly.  Land  use  conversions  of 
any  sort  must  be  approved  by  the  Ministry  of  Construction.  Therefore,  new  land 
developments  which  must  be  accompanied  by  the  conversion  of  land  use  zoning  have 
depended  on  the  government.  Although  more  studies  may  be  required,  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  this  land  use  control  helped  to  encourage  speculation. 
The  ratio  of  aggregate  land  value  to  GNP  has  been  rising  rapidly  from  1.66  in 
1975  to  2.16  in  1985.  It  was  as  high  as  2.5  times  that  of  the  U.  S.  -  0.81  in  1984  - 
(Renaud,  1993,  p.  302).  Consequently,  the  price  of  residential  land  in  urban  areas 
rose  by  1,582  per  cent  between  1979  and  1985,  about  three  times  higher  than  the 
increase  of  the  retail  price  index.  The  relative  share  of  land  in  the  composition  of 
housing  construction  costs  has  risen  sharply;  it  grew  from  8.8  per  cent  in  1970  to 
38.5  per  cent  in  1985  for  a  high-rise  apartment  and  from  less  than  20  per  cent  to 
almost  70  per  cent  for  a  detached  house  over  the  same  period  (Kim  J-H,  1990,  p.  6). 
Therefore,  continuous  increases  in  the  price  of  residential  land  have  persistently 
constrained  housing  construction,  which  in  turn  has  further  increased  house  prices, 
and  pushed  up  housing  consumption  costs  and  placed  pressure  on  workers  to  demand 
wage  increases. 
The  economic  technocrats  began  to  worry  about  the  possibility  of  a  "bubble 
economy"  (Lee  J-S,  1991,  p.  51).  As  a  result  the  government  issued  permission  for 
public  agencies  to  take  control  of  most  land  development  projects  in  order  to  prevent 
speculation  and  recapture  the  "development  gains"  which  could  be  reinvested  in  other 
land  development  projects.  The  Korea  Land  Development  Corporation  (KLDC) 
established  in  1979,  and  other  quasi-governmental  bodies  such  as  the  KLDC,  the 
Korea  National  Housing  Corporation  and  the  local  government  were  increasingly 
authorized  to  participate  in  the  large  scale  residential  land  development  process  since 
1980. 
These  institutes  purchased  large  amounts  of  cheap  agricultural  or  green  land  at 
appraised  prices,  using  the  power  of  land  expropriation  when  necessary,  to  convert  it 
into  residential  use.  Improvements  were  made  on  the  land,  and  the  serviced  lands 
were  sold  either  to  public  entities  such  as  the  KNHC  and  local  governments  at  cost 
price  or  to  private  builders  at  the  market  equivalent  price.  The  sale  price  of  land 
developed  by  public  or  quasi-public  institutions  has  been  directly  tied  into  housing 
price  controls  which  were  based  on  estimated  land  value  and  other  construction  costs. 
This  process  excluded  land  owners,  private  builders  and  developers  from  land 
development  gains.  In  addition  to  this,  in  order  to  stabilize  land  prices,  the 
government  established  a  "real  estate  transfer  income  tax",  but  it  was  accompanied  by 
"lock-in  effects"  and  substantially  reduced  the  supply  of  residential  land.  The 
158 government  imposed  another  measure  of  "vacant  land  tax",  which  had  the  reverse 
effect  of  making  "land  banking"  by  builders  more  difficult. 
The  consequences  of  these  policies  on  the  housing  system  were;  first,  as  Duncan 
concluded  in  his  article  "House  Building,  Profits  and  Social  Efficiency  in  Sweden  and 
Britain"  (1986,  p.  30),  "In  Britain  land  development  gains  and  speculative  extra 
profits  are  significant  profit  sources  for  house-builders.  Making  profits  through 
building  itsey"is  neglected  ........  In  Sweden  house-builders  do  not  have  easy  access  to 
land  development  gains  or  extra  profits  .....  They  are  pushed  onto  the  road  of  making 
profit  through  increasing  labour  productivity  and  through  product  improvement". 
Although  the  source  of  profits  varies  between  builders  and  between  timesl  the  Korean 
housing  system  contributed  to  increasing  the  productivity  of  house  builders  because 
the  builders  could  get  profit  mainly  by  increasing  productivity.  Indeed,  value  added 
per  person  in  the  house  building  industry  increased  about  4.8  per  cent  per  year 
between  1975  and  1985  (KRIHS,  1989.12,  p.  68).  Although  this  was  a  lower  rate  of 
increase  than  that  in  manufacturing  which  grew  at  about  11.4  per  cent  per  year  over 
the  same  period  (Song  B-N,  1990,  p.  74),  it  was  very  high  in  comparison  with  most 
other  countries  where  a  2-3  per  cent  increase  per  year  might  be  expected  (KRIHS, 
1989.12,  p.  67). 
Secondly,  the  builders  were  keen  to  construct  standardized  apartments  because  they 
had  to  minimize  costs  under  the  ceiling-price.  Therefore,  standardized  design, 
procedures  and  products  were  introduced  in  order  to  operate  economically.  Housing 
construction  costs  have  continued  to  rise  even  at  times  when  the  whole  economy  has 
stagnated  or  even  fallen  (Lee  J-H,  1992).  Industrialized  large  firms  have  tended  to 
build  mainly  standardised  high-rise  apartments  at  high  densities  in  order  to  cope  with 
the  increased  construction  costs.  Furthermore,  the  government  has  encouraged 
(compelled  rather,  through  the  construction  permission  and  housing  finance)  the 
public  sector  as  well  as  the  private  sector  to  supply  high-rise  houses.  This  can  be  seen 
by  examining  trends  in  government  permission  for  housing  construction,  a  method  by 
which  the  government  controls  housing  provision.  The  number  of  detached  dwelling 
units  permitted  for  construction  by  the  government  was  131,850  units,  or  73.3  per 
cent  of  the  total  dwelling  units  permitted  in  1975.  The  number  of  housing  units  in 
high-rise  apartments  (over  5  storeys)  was  37,828,  accounting  for  21 
.0  per  cent  of  the 
total  dwelling  units  permitted  that  year  (row  flats  up  to  5  storeys  accounted  for  5.7 
per  cent  of  the  total).  In  1990,  while  detached  dwelling  units  accounted  for  only  14.1 
per  cent,  high-rise  apartments  accounted  for  66.8  per  cent  and  row-flats  accounted 
for  19.2  per  cent. 
Thus  the  domination  of  high-rise  development  in  the  private  sector  as  well  as  the 
public  sector  was  largely  a  consequence  of  the  combination  of  inherent  profitability 
159 of  builders  under  the  Korean  housing  system  and  the  government's  policy  of 
attempting  to  reduce  the  housing  shortage  as  quickly  as  possible.  These  trends 
accelerated  the  collapse  of  the  traditional  self-build  sector  in  housing  provision.  As  a 
result  of  the  expansion  of  the  construction  of  high-rise  apartments,  the  share  of  high- 
rise  apartments  as  a  percentage  of  total  housing  units  has  steadily  increased  from  7.0 
per  cent  in  1980  to  22.6  per  cent  in  1990. 
Thirdly,  house  builders  were  unwilling  to  build  rented  houses  mainly  because  of 
the  lack  of  financial  incentive.  They  could  not  be  financed  from  purchasers  during  the 
construction  period,  by  selling  houses  in  advance,  and  could  not  pass  the  burden  of 
the  loans  of  housing  funds  on  to  purchasers  by  switching  them  into  mortgages. 
Moreover,  the  rate  of  return  on  rented  housing  construction  was  too  low.  Prior  to  the 
launch  of  price  control,  this  was  compensated  by  the  gains  from  the  difference 
between  historic  costs  and  current  market  values  of  property  after  rental  periods  due 
to  the  rapid  increases  in  the  housing  price.  However,  since  the  launch  of  the  price 
control')  builders  could  not  sell  the  rented  houses  at  open-market  prices.  The  Ministry 
of  Construction  established  a  guide-line  for  the  sale  prices  of  the  rented  houses  after 
renting  roughly  at  compromised  prices  between  historic  costs  and  market  prices. 
Fourthly,  until  1985,  the  ceiling  price  was  set  at  two  levels:  1.05  million  Won 
(about  f875)  per  pyong  (about  3.036  sq.  m)  for  apartments  of  85  sq.  m.  or  less  in  size 
and  1.34  million  Won  per  pyong  in  the  over  85  sq.  m.  Thus,  builders  were  disinclined 
to  build  small  size  housing  units  since  the  controlled  price  per  unit  of  floor  space 
rises  with  size  while  the  cost  per  unit  of  floor  space  decreases  with  the  size  of  floor 
space,  as  the  Table  below  shows.  In  October  1985  the  price  of  small  units  increased 
to  1.34  million  Won  per  pyong.  Nevertheless,  builders  had  to  be  compensated  for  the 
costs  in  small  size  housing  construction  by  building  large  houses.  In  other  words, 
under  the  Korean  housing  system,  large  size  housing  buyers  subsidized  small  size 
buyers. 
Table  6-4  House  Size  and  Construction  Costs. 
Under  5  Stories  I  High-rise  Flats 
Pyong  22  Pyong  29  Fy-ong  1  17  Pyong  33  Pyong  57 
Construction  costs  E708  E641  E625  E608  E658  E625  E575 
per  Pyong 
II 
Notes;  With  central  heating,  land  costs  excluded 
A  Pyong  is  equvalent  to  3.306  sq.  m. 
Source:  Korean  National  Housing  Coporation,  (requoted  from  KHB,  1989,  p.  46) 
Through  the  monopolization  of  land  development,  the  government  imposed 
restrictions  on  land  developers  to  allocate  the  lands  developed  at  the  cheapest  prices 
160 for  the  construction  of  rented  houses,  at  costs  for  the  construction  of  public  houses 
and  at  appraised  prices  for  that  of  private  houses.  The  loss  by  selling  lands  for  rented 
houses  and  public  houses  was  covered  by  profits  from  selling  for  private  housing. 
Through  this  cross-subsidizing  mechanism,  the  government  encouraged  the 
construction  of  rented  houses  and  small  houses. 
By  contrast,  the  construction  of  large  size  houses  has  been  strongly  controlled  by 
housing  finance,  planning  permissions,  executive  power,  and  even  by  mass  media. 
For  example,  the  conditions  of  housing  loans  to  builders,  such  as  interest  rates, 
repayment  periods  and  methods  differ  according  to  the  size  of  the  house.  The  smaller 
the  house,  the  better  conditions  of  the  loans.  The  Housing  Construction  Promotion 
Act  stipulates  that  housing  sizes  eligible  for  the  NHF  loans  must  not  exceed  85  sq.  m, 
but  in  effect,  the  loans  are  mainly  provided  for  housing  units  of  60  sq.  m  or  less  by 
the  operational  guide-line  of  the  Ministry  of  Construction  (KHB,  1992,  p.  29). 
However,  as  the  national  economy  has  grown  and  households'  incomes  have 
increased,  more  people  have  demanded  larger  and  higher-standard  houses.  In  theory, 
if  people  were  able  to  buy  more  at  the  same  price,  their  demand  for  the  housing 
would  increase  in  proportion.  The  price  control  has  allowed  households  to  be  able  to 
buy  more.  But  unbalanced  supply  of  housing  size  in  conjunction  with  these  changes 
has  boosted  the  price  inflation  of  larger  sized  houses.  It  has  already  been  shown  in 
the  1981-2  period  that  while  many  small  size  houses  were  unsold,  the  competition  for 
larger  size  houses  was  intense.  For  example,  comparison  of  the  market  prices  of 
apartments  located  in  Bun-dang  new  town  with  the  controlled  sales  price  reveals  that 
the  differences  between  them  was  173  per  cent  for  average  apartments  but  the 
difference  between  the  largest  units  was  219  per  cent  (Kim  C-H  and  Kim  K-H,  1993, 
p.  11).  Thus,  the  subsidy  by  large  size  housing  buyers  to  small  size  housing  buyers 
was  compensated  for  by  these  windfall  gains. 
Finally,  there  has  been  a  shift  in  the  pattern  of  housing  investment  away  from  those 
areas  which  have  the  greatest  housing  needs  as  well  as  demands,  in  favour  of  areas 
where  the  ability  to  generate  profit  is  greater,  such  as  peripheral  areas.  Some  builders 
switched  to  building  a  much  more  narrow  range  of  housing,  concentrating 
particularly  on  the  more  expensive  end  of  the  market,  building  luxury  houses,  often 
in  return  for  opportunities  of  building  small  houses.  At  a  macro  level,  as  a  result  of 
price  control,  the  supply  of  new  houses  has  decreased  in  the  biggest  cities  in  which 
most  housing  problems  were  concentrated  (the  Land  and  Construation,  December, 
1989,  p.  24).  The  decline  in  new  housing  supply  was  accompanied  by  increases  in 
house  prices,  particularly  in  the  biggest  cities  (Kim  J-H,  1990,  p.  9). 
The  problem  is  not  only  the  distortion  of  choices  and  market  mechanisms  but  also, 
more  importantly,  the  exclusion  of  low-income  households  from  the  housing  system. 
161 The  system  helps  first-time  buyers,  yielding  great  advantages  to  owner-occupiers  who 
start  buying  at  below  market  prices  with  some  portion  of  mortgages.  The  main 
beneficiaries  are  the  households  who  can  afford  to  join  the  housing  related  saving 
schemes  and  can  afford  about  60-70  per  cent  of  housing  prices  outright,  irrespective 
of  the  household's  need  or  income  after  expenditure  on  necessities.  In  fact,  KRIHS's 
survey  in  1983  showed  that  only  33.9  per  cent  of  rental  households  were  able  to 
afford  the  housing  of  43.6  sq.  m  provided  by  the  public  sector  and  20.7  per  cent  of 
rental  households  were  unable,  for  lack  of  income  and  wealth,  to  afford  the  housing 
even  though  the  privileged  public  houses  were  allocated  to  them  (KNHC,  1983, 
pp.  115-6). 
This  housing  system  may  have  more  or  less  contributed  to  the  decentralization  of 
wealth  by  excluding  high-income  households  and  owner-occupiers  from  the  new 
housing  market  and  by  creating  a  cross  subsidy  structure  from  larger  size  purchasers 
towards  small  size  purchasers.  This  system  also  contributed  to  maintain  social  and 
political  stability  for  a  large  sector  of  the  population  by  offering  a  dream  of  owner- 
occupation  in  the  near  future.  However,  it  divided  society  on  the  basis  of  tenure. 
Through  the  working  of  the  housing  system,  housing  tenure  divisions  in  Korea 
strongly  represent  a  household's  income  and  living  conditions,  since  those  who  could 
join  the  housing  related  saving  scheme  have  been  becoming  owner-occupiers  of 
decent  houses,  while  those  who  could  not  mainly  remained  in  the  rental  sector.  Thus, 
non-ownership  began  to  become  synonymous  with  the  negative  social  status  of  being 
unable  to  afford  even  the  meagre  housing  related  savings.  More  importantly  the 
distinction  between  the  owner  and  the  tenant  involved  differences  in  security,  and 
freedom.  Citizens  in  the  modern  "welfare  state"  may  be  equal  before  the  law,  but  as 
far  as  housing  is  concerned  they  are  not  subject  to  the  same  laws.  (This  will  be 
discussed  in  the  next  section). 
However,  by  1991,  over  3  million  households  had  joined  the  housing  related 
saving  scheme  and  were  awaiting  new  housing  construction.  Furthermore,  their 
contribution  was  the  main  source  of  housing  funds.  Their  willingness  to  contribute 
was  induced  partly  by  hopes  -  often  realised  -  of  large  speculative  gains  as  land  and 
house  prices  rose.  But  that  is  an  inducement  which  cannot  continue  indefinitely. 
Already  these  prices  have  risen  to  levels  which  exclude  more  and  more  people  from 
any  hope  of  owning  -  or  even  in  some  cases  renting  -a  house.  Social  and  political 
stability  will  be  threatened  if  the  numbers  excluded  increase  much  further.  It  will 
therefore  be  very  difficult  for  the  government  to  change  this  system  in  any  direction. 
The  government  began  to  emphasize  the  smooth  working  of  the  market  mechanism 
still  further  (see  Hur  S-M,  1992) 
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The  generally  accepted  problem  in  the  public  sector  was  that  public  expenditure  on 
housing  was  too  small  to  supply  housing  for  all  the  poor  and  mass  inmigrants  and  that 
it  was  unlikely  to  bring  down  housing  prices  and  rents  to  a  level  where  they  were 
within  the  capacity  of  those  on  low  incomes.  In  the  public  sector,  there  are  no 
subsidies  for  capital  or  operating  costs  for  housing  construction  except  for  rental 
housing  construction  after  1985  thanks  to  the  increased  revenues  derived  from 
Korea's  phenomenal  economic  growth.  Therefore,  there  has  been  no  obligation  on 
public  bodies  to  build  for  general  needs.  There  are  no  significant  differences  between 
the  private  sector  and  the  public  sector  except  in  the  kind  of  overhead  costs,  such  as 
preferential  housing  fund  allocation  to  the  public  sector,  easy  construction 
permissions  in  public  sector,  etc.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  public  sector  cannot 
provide  housing  for  people  with  low  incomes  because  it  cannot  afford  the  costs. 
In  addition,  the  main  source  of  housing  finance  for  the  public  suppliers  comes  from 
the  NHSSD,  one  of  the  housing  related  saving  institutions,  and  the  houses  built  by 
the  public  sector  are  allocated  to  the  account  holders  of  the  NHSSD.  Therefore,  the 
main  fund  lenders  for  housing  construction  and  the  clients  for  the  houses  built,  and 
the  main  pressure  group  for  the  public  sector  housing  provision  is  those  who  have 
joined  the  NHSSD.  As  a  consequence,  the  system  itself  has  increasingly  selected  the 
beneficiaries  of  public  housing  on  the  basis  of  saving  ability,  irrespective  of  need. 
The  KNHC  and  local  government  have  provided  rental  housing  with  financial 
support  from  central  government  since  1985  and  loans  from  the  National  Housing 
Fund.  However,  a  considerable  amount  of  capital  input  had  to  be  covered  by  their 
own  balance  sheets  and  rental  deposits  from  tenants.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
problem  has  been  dealing  with  how  to  balance  restricted  rent-paying  capacity  among 
public  rented  occupiers  while  easing  public  housing  authorities'  financial  problems. 
This  financial  constraint  has  crucially  hampered  rental  housing  construction  in  the 
public  sector  and  confined  the  rented  houses  to  those  who  can  afford  the  deposit  and 
rent  to  cover,  at  least,  the  cost. 
Table  6-5  Composition  of  Finances  in  New  Rental  Housing  Construction  in  Urban  Areas,  in 
case  of  KNHC. 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Government  Contribution  -  -  -  10.0  16.0 
Loan  from  NHF  50.0  55.0  61.0  48.0  37.0 
KNHC  own  fund  35.0  30.0  21.0  25.0  27.0 
Deposits  from  Tenants  15.0  15.0  18.0  17.0  20.0 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Source:  KNHC  (1987) 
163 Indeed,  as  of  the  end  of  1990,  the  number  of  existing  rented  houses  provided  by 
the  public  sector  was  estimated  at  about  0.2  million  units  in  cities  (KNHC,  Housing 
Statistical  Year-book,  1991).  It  accounted  for  only  about  4.4  per  cent  of  total  housing 
stock,  accommodating  about  4.3  per  cent  of  tenant  households  in  cities  (Population 
and  Housing  Census,  1990).  The  level  of  rents  was  set,  neither  on  the  basis  of  a 
social  rent  nor  on  the  basis  of  a  market  rent.  According  to  the  KNHC's  estimation 
(Bang  J-W,  1987,  p.  89),  the  economic  rent  of  an  average  43  sq.  m.  new  apartment  in 
cities  in  1986  was  E48  a  month  with  f-2,567  deposit.  But  the  rent  set  by  the 
government  was  08  per  month,  about  80  per  cent  of  the  economic  rent,  with  the 
same  deposit.  Thus,  the  KNHC  showed  a  f-10  monthly  deficit.  The  deficit  had  to  be 
covered  by  profits  from  the  sale  of  other  houses.  Moreover,  in  order  to  reduce  this 
accumulating  financial  burden,  most  rental  housing  had  to  be  sold  after  one  or  five 
years  of  renting  at  controlled  prices,  not  historic  costs  or  market  prices,  and  all 
responsibilities  for  the  maintenance  and  repair  of  public  rented  houses  had  to  be  put 
in  the  charge  of  the  tenants. 
The  dilemma  which  the  public  sector  suppliers  are  facing  is  that  in  order  to  provide 
more  rented  houses,  they  have  to  be  financed  either  out  of  profit  from  selling  other 
houses  or  by  increasing  rents.  Therefore,  they  have  contrasting  difficulties  in 
reducing  the  price  of  the  houses  for  sale  and  rent  payments  in  rented  houses  for  the 
low-income  households.  The  steady  increase  in  construction  costs  have  made  it 
increasingly  difficult  to  accommodate  the  low-income  households  in  the  public  sector 
(Ha  S-K,  1991,  p.  30).  So,  public  housing  as  well  as  public  rented  housing  has  been 
mainly  confined  to  a  limited  range  of  income  groups.  Moreover,  with  limited 
resources,  in  order  to  build  more  houses  in  a  short  time  period  funds  invested  had  to 
be  returned  as  soon  as  possible  in  order  to  reinvest  in  new  housing  construction.  The 
best  way  to  return  the  fund  soon  was  to  supply  houses  for  those  could  afford  them  for 
sale. 
The  main  role  of  the  public  sector  was,  as  mentioned  in  Chapter  5,  to  counteract  a 
downturn  in  private  building  and  in  the  economy  generally.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
public  housing  has  helped  to  stabilize  house  prices  and  has  contributed  to  continuing 
economic  growth.  Moreover,  the  construction  of  public  housing  has  been  focused  on 
smaller  sized  houses  than  the  private  sector.  In  this  aspect,  public  housing  has 
contributed  to  increase  the  flow  of  resources  into  the  housing  for  moderate  and 
middle  income  households. 
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It  has  been  shown  that  under  the  changing  economic  structure  in  Korea,  the 
development  of  the  housing  system  has  created  circumstances  under  which  new 
houses  are  structually  and  increasingly  beyond  the  reach  of  low-income  households. 
What  has  happened  to  the  houses  which  have  accommodated  the  low-income 
households?  This  is  explored  in  this  section. 
The  first  phase  of  Korean  urbanisation  can  be  characterized  by  the  sudden  flow  of 
population  into  the  cities  resulting  from  external  factors  such  as  independence, 
partition  and  the  Korean  War.  During  this  period,  Korean  cities  were  characterized 
by  uncontrolled  development.  Squatter  settlements  were  to  be  found  everywhere  in 
the  cities  (Choi  C-H,  1985,  p.  59).  No  urban  planning  was  carried  out  in  advance  of 
the  squatter  settlements  (Lee  K-S,  1979,  p.  16  1).  Factories  and  offices  co-existed  with 
residential  buildings.  Many  buildings  served  as  both  home  and  workplace.  The 
clearance  program  was  inevitability  initiated  by  this  uncontrolled  urban  development. 
Since  1960,  rapid  industrial  isation  has  gripped  Korea.  The  lack  of  infrastructure 
and  public  facilities  which  were  destroyed  or  made  unusable  by  the  Korean  War  was 
a  constraint  to  the  industrialisation  process.  Moreover,  the  enormous  influx  of 
refugees  and  in-migrants  from  the  north  and  rural  areas  occupied  any  open  site  in 
cities.  As  the  economy  grew,  office  employment  in  both  private  and  public  sectors 
increased  and  concentrated  in  the  city  centres.  Increased  commuting  and  the  resultant 
congestion  generated  pressures  for  the  renewal  of  primary  urban  road  networks. 
The  government  enacted  the  Urban  Planning  Act  of  1962  in  which  land  use 
planning  was  adopted  and  the  Land  Readjustment  Projects  were  launched  as  a  major 
aspect  of  the  urban  development  and  restructuring,  as  outlined  in  Chapter  5.  This  was 
the  first  phase  of  functional  differentiation,  the  separation  of  industrial  and 
commercial  areas  from  residential  areas.  In  this  (re-)building  process  a  strong  role 
was  assumed  and  carried  out  by  the  government.  The  first  power  of  demolition  was 
contained  through  the  establishment  of  the  Land  Expropriation  Act  of  1962.  This 
legislation  also  included  the  power  of  compulsory  expropriations.  Since  then  the 
government  began  to  clear  the  massive  squatter  dwellings  located  on  the  land 
designated  for  the  construction  of  the  infrastructure,  especially  roads.  Housing 
clearance  and  redevelopment  offered  the  opportunity  for  urban  rebuilding  and  the 
instalment  of  new  roads  and  infrastructure,  and  the  replacement  of  outworn  roads  and 
infrastructure  that  were  no  longer  considered  appropriate  to  meet  the  requirements  of 
industrial  isation. 
Given  limited  national  resources,  however,  the  government  was  unable  to  pay 
much  attention  to  the  displaced  households.  Moreover,  factory  owners  rarely  took 
165 responsibility  for  housing  provision  in  the  period  of  large-scale  urbanisation  since 
there  was  a  plentiful  supply  of  cheap  labour.  Strong  sentiments  were  expressed  that 
the  demolition  of  poor  housing  and  the  resettlement  of  households  in  peripheral  areas 
many  miles  away  was  destroying  the  social  fabric  of  the  older  parts  of  cities  and 
breaking  links  between  work  and  home.  Indeed,  many  of  the  displaced  households 
returned  to  the  city  centres  again  (  KHB,  1975,  p.  171  and  Kim J-G,  Kim  K-Y  and  Son  J- 
Yý  199  1,  p.  134). 
For  the  government  at  that  time,  however,  it  might  have  been  difficult  to  make  a 
decision.  The  function  which  an  area  served  and  the  satisfactions  which  it  Provided 
for  its  inhabitants  were  not  the  only  factor.  The  government  had  to  consider  others 
such  as  the  need  for  new  roads,  schools  and  other  facilities  for  all  citizens  and  for  the 
next  generation.  A  public  authority  had  to  be  more  forward-looking  than  merely 
providing  for  individual  needs.  Indeed,  not  only  "slum"  and  "shanty  houses"  but  also 
"standard  houses"  were  demolished  in  order  to  make  room  for  development  projects. 
Most  of  these  relocation  sites  were  developed  in  the  suburbs  at  that  time,  and  were 
occupied  and  extended  by  the  ever-growing  inflow  of  inmigrated  families.  As  a 
result,  many  squatter  settlements  were  simply  relocated  from  inner  city  to  the 
suburbs.  However,  the  nature  of  the  housing  problem  needs  to  clarified.  As  seen  in 
Chapter  3,  the  combination  of  periods  of  rapid  economic  growth  and  the  open  social 
structures  successfully  absorbed  the  dwellers  in  the  squatter  settlments  into  the  formal 
sector.  Thus,  the  problem  was  the  squatter  settlements,  i.  e.  the  dwellings,  not  the 
dwellers  in  the  squatter  settlments  at  that  time. 
Population  growth  became  more  rapid  than  before.  The  highest  rate  of  urbanization 
in  the  period  after  1965  was  accompanied  by  mass  squatter  settlements.  Meiyer 
(1970,  p.  382)  described  such  dramatic  urbanisation  in  the  following  manner, 
"Nowhere  else  in  the  world  today  are  the  processes  of  urbanisation  so  intenseY  so 
compressed  in  time,  as  in  the  capital  of  South  Korea"  (requoted  in  Lee  K-S,  1979, 
p.  123).  Meanwhile,  in  the  summer  of  1966,  the  Great  Flood  of  Han  River  made 
many  squatters  roofless,  and  became  a  major  political  problem  (until  that  time, 
squatter  problems  were  mainly  in  Seoul).  Moreover,  a  general  election  was  scheduled 
for  1967.  The  government  planned  a  new  town  in  Gwangiu  (today  Seong-Nam)  for 
the  relocation  of  squatter  settlements  beyond  the  boundary  of  Seoul.  It  was  planned  to 
accommodate  a  population  of  200,000  with  labour-intensive  industries.  In  addition  to 
this,  on  the  public  land  in  the  Land  Readjustment  Projects,  high-rise  or  walk-up  flats 
were  under  construction  for  the  displaced  households.  It  was  the  first  and  last 
systematic  involvement  of  the  government  in  housing  for  low-income  households. 
However,  given  limited  national  resources,  public  effort  was  mainly  focused  on 
clearance  of  illegal  houses,  rather  than  rehousing.  For  instance,  there  was  a  massive 
166 clearance  of  poor  housing  undertaken  by  Seoul  city  in  1966  (Seoul  Metropolitan 
Government,  1979).  The  project  attempted  to  clear  130,000  poor  housing  units 
within  a  three-year  period  and  to  construct  90,000  units  of  public  housing  in  order  to 
accommodate  the  displaced  households.  More  than  70,000  poor  housing  units  were, 
in  fact,  destroyed  according  to  the  plan.  However,  only  16,000  units  were  built  by 
1970,  which  were  obviously  far  too  few  to  accommodate  over  230,000  displaced 
households.  Nevertheless,  there  was  little  opposition  to  the  clearance.  Most  of  those 
in  the  informal  economy  and  in  the  informal  housing  could  easily  be  absorbed  into 
the  formal  economy  and  housing  thanks  to  the  continuing  economic  development. 
The  Gwangiu  new  town  programme,  however,  came  to  an  abrupt  halt  in  the 
summer  of  1971.  Roughly  27,000  households  had  been  relocated  to  the  area.  It  was 
envisaged  originally  that  it  would  be  funded  by  private  finance.  Large  scale  removals 
of  squatters  from  Seoul  began  in  1968,  with  each  resident  receiving  an  allotment  card 
on  their  removal  from  their  former  house,  to  be  used  as  a  claim  for  about  65  sq.  m.  of 
land  in  Gwanju.  The  price  was  about  E50  at  current  prices,  repayable  at  about  f-17 
per  year  over  a  three  year  period,  following  a  two  year  grace  period.  However,  the 
various  promises  made  before  the  general  election  when  the  new-town  plan  was 
launched  were  not  fulfilled.  Water,  sewerage  and  electrical  facilities  had  not  been 
fully  installed.  Material  assistance  from  the  government  was  not  enough. 
Employment  was  hard  to  find  as  few  of  the  proposed  industries  had  actually  began 
operation  in  the  area.  Most  of  the  relocated  people  had  to  depend  upon  their 
livelihoods  in  Seoul.  Over  60  per  cent  of  relocated  families  went  back  to  squatting,  or 
doubling  up  with  relatives  in  Seoul  (KRIHS,  1983,  p.  23  and  The  Shin-Dong-A,  October 
1971,  pp.  171-2).  Nevertheless,  the  bus  service  to  Seoul  was  both  infrequent  and  slow 
with  high  costs,  and  moreover  taxes  on  the  land  and  charges  for  electricity  and  water 
increased  household  expenditure.  To  make  matters  worse,  the  urbanisation  recorded 
between  1966  and  1971  was  at  its  highest  and  the  competition  for  low-skilled  jobs 
was  increasingly  acute.  The  number  of  unemployed  was  growing  over  time  in  the 
area.  On  August  10,1971,  about  10,000  residents  of  Gwangiu  staged  a  mass 
demonstration  protesting  against  government  policy,  resulting  in  a  riot. 
Since  1968  high-rise  or  walk-up  flats  were  under  construction  by  local  governments 
for  the  displaced  households  in  the  Land  Readjustment  Projects.  As  outlined  in 
Chapter  5,  in  the  Land  Readjustment  Project,  the  project  land  was  divided  into 
broadly  three  parts;  cost-equivalent  land,  land  for  public  uses  and  land  returned  to  its 
former  owners.  Citizens'  flats  were  built  on  the  land  for  public  uses,  and  financed  by 
selling  the  cost-equivalent  land  on  the  private  market.  However,  developers  had  to 
finance  other  costs,  such  as  infrastructure,  by  selling  the  cost-equivalent  land.  This 
meant  that  the  higher  the  costs  were  for  the  citizens'  flats,  the  more  land  was  taken 
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bring  the  Land  Readjustment  Project  as  a  main  means  of  urban  development  to  a  halt. 
Thus,  a  major  difficulty  with  the  program  arose  in  the  area  of  resources  for  both 
municipal  governments  (the  suppliers  of  the  flats)  and  the  displaced  low-income 
households  (the  beneficiary).  The  displaced  squatters  were  expected  to  pay  for  the 
installation  of  water  and  electrical  facilities  for  their  own  use.  Due  to  the  financial 
incapacity  of  so  many  of  the  residents,  however,  buildings  often  lacked  water  and 
electricity  for  as  much  as  a  year  (Ha  S-K,  1984,  p.  153).  Moreover,  residents  were 
faced  with  two  other  major  costs.  Amortisation  for  the  unit,  although  it  was  cheaper 
than  other  flats,  and  a  service  charge.  On  the  other  hand,  the  lack  of  resources  in 
local  government  resulted  in  low-quality  flats,  poor  construction  methods  and 
architectural  faults.  In  1970,  Wa-Woo  Apartment,  a  five  storey  block  of  flats, 
collapsed,  killing  34  people.  Because  of  the  very  poor  construction  methods  and 
architectural  faults,  coupled  with  poor  management  (Kim  J-G,  Kim  K-Y  and  Son  J-Y, 
1991,  p.  135),  about  80  per  cent  of  the  citizens'  flats  have  been  demolished  as  of 
October  1975,  containing  18,417  households  (Ha  S-K,  1984,  p.  155).  This  led  the 
government  to  quit  its  direct  involvement  in  the  housing  of  low-income  households. 
During  the  1960s,  however,  clearances  were  implemented  near  the  city  centres  for 
the  instalment  of  infrastructure  or  public  facilities,  or  in  the  areas  which  were  under 
the  potential  danger  of  flood  or  landslide.  Although  industrial  isation  led  to  a  rapid 
urbanisation  and  a  huge  demand  for  space  for  housing  as  well  as  commercial  and 
manufacturing  activities,  there  was  relatively  enough  land  to  meet  these  demands. 
The  clearance  was  carried  out  providing  the  decanted  households  with  small  housing 
lots  or  flats.  The  core  of  the  problem  was  the  lack  of  national  resources.  Low-income 
households  could  build  themselves  homes  with  the  help  of  friends  or  relatives.  Other 
squatter  houses  and  slum  houses  were  largely  ignored  by  the  government.  Until  the 
early  1970s,  self-help  building  was  one  of  alternatives  for  low-income  households. 
Since  the  early  1970s,  the  government  reacted  against  freshly  built  illegal  housing, 
using  wrecking  crews  and  policemen,  more  strongly  than  ever  before.  By  contrast, 
housing  policy  towards  existing  poor  housing  shifted  towards  a  more  positive 
approach  with  legalisation  offering  the  option  to  improve  under  Temporary 
Management  Act  on  Housing  Improvement  of  1973.  The  Act,  which  had  a  limited 
period  of  time  until  the  end  of  1981,  provided  legal  support  for  housing  improvement 
and  legalization. 
Meanwhile,  the  industrial  isation  and  modernisation  of  Korea,  especially  in  the 
cities,  affected  the  physical  structure  of  housing.  One  of  the  impacts  on  housing  was 
the  use  of  fuel  for  heating  and  cooking  partly  because  it  was  increasingly  difficult  to 
supply  timber  in  cities  with  a  population  of  over  a  million.  The  change  in  fuel  from 
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physical  structure  of  housing.  Therefore,  most  in-migrants  who  had  traditional 
construction  skills  found  it  was  hard  to  use  their  skills.  Moreover,  given  increasing 
difficulties  in  getting  the  timber,  severe  winter  weather  in  Korea  did  not  allow  the 
conventional  type  of  self-build  housing  using  timber  for  heating  (Lee  K-S,  1979, 
p-  163).  In  addition  to  this,  the  provision  of  infrastructure  and  public  facilities  could 
not  keep  up  with  the  pace  of  urban  expansion.  Transport  costs  and  other  living  costs 
of  the  peripheral  areas  and  steep  upper  hillside  areas  began  to  exceed  the  rent  of 
existing  shanty  houses.  The  land  use  (zoning)  system  also  partly  contributed  to 
impede  the  shape  of  squatter  settlements.  The  outer  ring  areas  of  Seoul  and  Pusan  in 
1971  and  of  a  further  13  cities  in  1972  and  1973  were  designated  as  Green  Belt,  areas 
in  which  any  construction  activities  were  prohibited.  Most  areas  between  the  Green 
Belt  and  peripheral  built  up  areas  of  cities  were  designated  as  industrial  estates.  The 
keeping  of  the  Green  Belt  by  the  government  and  the  development  of  industrial 
estates  by  private  industrialists  has  effectively  cut  off  the  development  of  squatter 
settlements.  The  most  important  factor  was  that  the  continuing  economic  development 
made  more  households  able  to  take  part  in  formal  housing  markets. 
The  combined  effect  of  these  factors  was  the  decline  of  illegal  housing,  as  the  Table 
below  shows.  Newly  in-migrant  low-income  households  from  rural  areas  had  to  meet 
their  housing  needs  in  the  formal  markets. 
Table  6-6  Status  of  Illegal  Housing  in  Urban  Areas,  1966,1971,1977  and  1980. 
Year  All  Cities  Seoul 
1966  Housing  Units  (A)  1,160,000  361,945 
Illegal  housing  (B)  n.  a.  136,650 
%  B/A  n.  a.  37.75 
1971  Housing  Units  (A)  1,506,700  625,400 
Illegal  Housing  (B)  260,400  168,300 
%  B/A  17.3  26.9 
1976  Housing  Units  (A)  1,963,900  813,000 
Illegal  Housing  (B)  203,500  134,900 
%  B/A  10.4  16.6 
1980  Housing  Units  (A)  2,555,724  993,661 
Illegal  Housing  (B)  289,095  154,047 
%  B/A  11.3  15.5 
Note:  n.  a.,  not-available. 
Sources:  Seoul  Municipal  Government,  Statistical  Year-book  of  Seoul,  1966  and  Ministry  of  Home 
Affairs,  Municipal  Year-book  of  Korea,  1972,1977  and  1981. 
Many  shanty  houses  were  being  improved.  Some  described  this  in  terms  of  the 
"evolving  shanty-town",  and  argued  for  the  expansion  of  self-help  rehabilitation.  In 
order  to  involve  residents  in  the  renovation  process,  the  government  provided  them 
169 with  financial  and  organizational  assistance.  In  areas  where  squatters  were  illegally 
occupying  public  land,  the  government  legalized  the  ownership.  Nevertheless, 
voluntary  participation  in  these  self-help  renewal  programs  was  low  (Kim  J-G,  et  al., 
1991,  p.  138).  They  were  criticized  by  those  who  said  that  the  assistance  was  not 
enough  and  was  inefficient  (Hs  S-K,  1984,  p.  40).  These  arguments  may  be  partly 
true.  But  the  main  reason  did  not  lie  in  the  lack  of  assistance  or  with  inefficiency  but 
lay  with  the  social  mobility  of  the  dwellers.  For  most  dwellers  in  squatter  settlements 
and  shanty  towns,  when  their  economic  conditions  improved,  they  moved  to  houses 
in  better  locations,  rather  than  improve  their  existing  dwellings.  Soon  after,  the 
dwellings  were  occupied  by  subsequent  in-migrants.  Of  the  remaining  low-income 
households,  many  were  unable  to  improve  their  houses  by  the  assistance  alone 
because  of  their  own  lack  of  resources.  In  these  cases,  improvement  could  not  reduce 
future  needs  for  rebuilding  (Ha  S-K,  1984,  p.  14  1).  Indeed,  many  studies  have  shown 
the  reason  for  the  low  participation  of  the  residents  in  renovation  programs;  most 
dwellers  consider  their  time  in  the  squatter  settlements  and  shanty  towns  or 
collectively  poor  houses,  as  a  largely  transitory  period  before  they  purchase  a  house 
of  their  own  in  a  better  location.  By  contrast,  some  areas  where  there  has  been 
significant  improvement  have  seen  substantial  changes  in  the  nature  of  the  occupants 
from  low-income  households  into  moderate  and  middle  income  households. 
Rapid  urbanisation  especially  in  the  biggest  cities  increased  urban  costs  and  became 
a  difficult  problem  for  the  government.  Urban  planning  increasingly  tried  to  halt  the 
population  growth  in  the  biggest  cities  whilst  restructuring  the  city.  Moreover,  the 
government  realized  that  one  third  of  the  nation's  population  and  one  half  of  the 
nation's  industrial  facilities  were  open  to  bomb  attacks  from  North  Korea.  For 
instance,  Seoul  is  situated  only  40  miles  away  from  the  Demilitarized  Zone. 
Moreover,  the  relationship  between  North  and  South  Korea  has  worsened  over  time. 
The  government  determined  to  devise  strong  measures  for  population 
decentralization  and  industrial  dispersal  (Choi  S-C,  1976,  p.  60).  The  Seoul 
Population  Dispersed  Plan  was  established  in  1976.  It  was  intended  to  divert  the 
future  potential  migration  flow.  Deindustrialisation  of  the  city  was  promoted  by 
reducing  urban  land  use  designated  for  manufacturing  activities  and  moving  polluting 
industries  out  of  the  boundaries  of  the  city.  Extensive  expansion  of  urban 
redevelopment  projects  were  conceived  as  priority  projects  (Kim  H-K,  1980,  pp.  170- 
175).  Although  it  was  named  the  Seoul  Population  Dispersed  Plan,  in  fact,  it  applied 
to  the  other  biggest  cities  as  well.  As  a  legal  support,  the  Industrial  Distribution  Act 
and  Urban  Renewal  Act  were  enacted  since  1976.  Indeed,  by  1979  relocation  orders 
had  been  issued  to  1,813  firms  (as  of  1980,3,058  firms)  in  Seoul  alone  by  the 
Industrial  Distribution  Act. 
170 The  Urban  Renewal  Act  of  1976  distinguished  urban  renewal  into  downtown 
redevelopment  projects  and  housing  renewal.  The  main  motive  of  the  Urban  Renewal 
Act  was  comprehensive  renewal  offering  opportunities  for  urban  industrial 
restructuring  and  the  replacement  of  outworn  roads  and  infrastructure.  Until  that 
time,  a  direct  link  between  general  economic  performance  and  removal  of  poverty 
was  a  clear  and  major  theme  of  Korean  government  thinking;  continuing  economic 
development  was  the  most  important  key  to  ensuring  that  the  condition  of  housing 
improved. 
Another  aspect  of  the  downtown  redevelopment  was  that,  in  addition  to  being  a 
program  to  vitalize  the  city  through  new  development,  it  was  a  program  to  clear  poor 
houses  and  environments,  and  thereby  reduce  or  eliminate  the  costs  associated  with 
them.  It  was  often  described  by  the  terms  of  "cure",  "social  maladjustment"  and 
"undesirable  environment".  There  was  the  belief  that  the  removal  of  poor  physical 
environments  would  also  remove  some  of  the  social  and  economic  problems,  and  that 
clearance  would  reduce  the  threat  of  the  spread  of  social  disease  as  well  as  the  ugly 
image  of  cities.  In  addition  to  this,  as  some  argued  (Jang  S-H,  1989,  p.  226),  the 
clearance  and  redevelopment  might  have  offered  local  governments  the  opportunity  of 
raising  more  revenue  by  selling  public  land  occupied  by  squatters  illegally. 
However,  people  always  forgot  that  those  who  benefit  from  the  low  prices  of 
insecure,  low-quality,  squatter  housing  could  not  afford  the  secure,  improved 
environment  which  city  planners  wanted  to  create  for  them.  Extremely  small  amounts 
of  resources  were  allocated  for  urban  renewal  which  therefore  needed  to  be  carried 
out  by  private  investment.  As  a  consequence,  in  the  initial  years  of  the  urban  renewal 
projects,  relatively  few  downtown  projects  were  initiated. 
With  respect  to  housing  renewal,  by  shifting  the  use  of  AID  loans,  which  were 
introduced  in  1973  from  the  Agency  for  International  Development  (AID),  towards 
poor  housing  renewal,  the  massive  clearance  policies  only  began  to  start  after  1976. 
The  dwellers  of  poor  housing  could  afford  to  redevelop  their  housing  by  using  the 
loan,  and  the  city  could  invest  the  loan  to  build  public  facilities.  But  these  projects 
disappeared  as  the  AID  loan  stopped  in  1978.  Since  then  housing  renewal  has  been 
entrusted  to  private  contractors,  the  so-called  third  party  development.  However,  no 
major  results  were  accomplished  under  this  program  because  the  costs  far  exceeded 
the  value  (Kim  J-G,  et  al.,  199  1,  p-  13  8). 
Active  urban  renewal,  especially  downtown  renewal  projects,  was  initiated  just 
after  the  second  oil  price  shock  in  1979.  As  seen  in  Chapter  3,  the  Korean  economy 
began  to  be  centralized  by  Chaebols  since  the  mid  1970s.  The  firm's  planning 
requirements  and  demands  for  research  and  development,  prediction  and  control 
increasingly  grew.  As  firms  became  larger  and  more  complex,  a  larger  percentage  of 
171 their  workforces  were  employed  in  office  jobs.  At  the  same  time,  banking, 
accounting  and  law  offices  became  increasingly  important  to  the  big  businesses  in  the 
enlarged  economy.  The  changing  organizational  structure  stimulated  the  growth  of 
banking,  engineering,  accounting  and  legal  services,  often  called  producer  services'. 
It  was  at  this  point  that  the  government-led  financial  sector  was  being  challenged  and 
began  to  be  liberalized,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  3.  Although  the  Korean 
government  still  could  influence  these  banks  through  other  means,  for  instance  by 
influencing  the  appointment  of  a  bank's  chief  executive  and  the  like,  privatisation  was 
the  first  step  to  reduce  government  power  and  to  increase  market  forces.  As  a  result, 
the  share  of  external  funds  (bank  credit  and  foreign  loans)  of  the  corporate  businesses 
with  allocations  which  were  controlled  or  could  have  been  controlled  by  the 
government  shrank  to  29.3  per  cent  in  1980-84  from  56.3  per  cent  in  1975-79  and 
63.7  per  cent  in  1970-74  (Cho  Y-J  and  D.  C.  Cole,  1992,  p.  125;  italics,  their  stress). 
Since  then,  the  largest  Chaebols  have  been  more  directly  interlocked  with  financial 
institutions.  The  commercial  banks,  insurance  companies,  and  other  financial 
institutions  were  increasingly  able  to  control  the  flow  and  direction  of  capital  in 
favour  of  Chaebols,  and  they  have  become  an  increasingly  important  source  of 
Chaebols'  growth.  It  was  at  this  point  that  such  services  became  initiators  of  the 
impulses  of  urban  growth  and  vehicles  for  it. 
The  development  of  transport  and  telecommunications  massively  reduced  transport 
costs,  which  facilitated  investment  throughout  the  nation  and  allowed  the  physical 
separation  of  production  and  administration.  The  former  pushed  its  way  out  of  cities, 
reinforced  by  the  Industrial  Distribution  Act,  while  administrative  functions  were 
concentrated  in  higher  order  cities.  The  growth  of  Chaebols,  and  banking,  accounting 
and  legal  services  also  induced  related  office  growth  in  business  and  professional 
services,  generating  explosive  demands  for  offices  especially  in  central  cities.  These 
changes  have  profound  consequences  for  the  location  of  economic  activity.  Haig 
(1926),  Hoover  and  Vernon(1959)  and  Fitch  (1993),  in  studies  of  New  York  City, 
confirmed  that  such  activity  tended  to  agglomerate  in  the  central  business  districts  of 
a  few  very  large  metropolitan  areas.  Furthermore,  Moss  and  Dunau  (1986)  show  how 
most  financial  services  firms  which  relocate  their  offices  within  New  York  keep  them 
in  or  very  near  to  Manhattan. 
Meanwhile,  the  harvest  crisis  of  1980  pushed  out  many  unskilled  farm  workers  into 
cities.  As  Table  6-6  showed,  decreased  number  of  illegal  houses  were  again  increased 
in  1980.  For  the  very  unpopular  new  military  Chun  regime  which  came  into  power 
through  the  second  military  coup  in  1980,  economic  recession  was  the  heaviest 
burden.  The  construction  industry  was  seen  as  the  most  appropriate  industry  to  absorb 
these  and  other  unskilled  workers  at  that  time  of  economic  recession.  Massive  inner 
172 city  redevelopment  programmes  were  launched  which  originated  from  the  Seoul 
Population  Dispersed  Plan.  The  original  plan  was  changed  by  the  strong  single- 
minded  desire  to  replace  the  biggest  city's  blue  collar  industries  with  office 
economies  as  the  functional  nodal  centres  of  the  nation  and  regions. 
The  renewal  of  Korea  at  that  time  was  quite  similar  with  that  of  Britain  in  the 
1950s  and  the  early  1960s,  particularly  in  city  centres,  where  commercial 
development  replaced  former  housing  and  largely  small-scale  industrial  users 
(Goldsmith,  1880,  p.  123).  Moreover,  in  all  these  cases,  it  was  the  private  sector  that 
made  the  running.  It  was  the  property  developers,  often  called  FIRE  industry 
(finance,  insurance  and  real  estate  industry),  many  of  whom  have  made  vast  profits 
from  the  commercial  redevelopment  of  city  centres  (Marriott,  1967,  chs.  9  and  14), 
particularly  through  the  provision  of  office  space  (Elkin,  1974,  ch.  3). 
The  government  encouraged  the  construction  boom  as  a  means  to  overcome 
economic  recession  resulting  from  the  second  oil  shock.  Therefore,  the 
redevelopment  of  the  early  1980s  was  the  combined  result  of  the  political 
circumstance,  economic  policy  of  the  government  and  the  need  for  capital  and 
continued  capital  accumulation  of  the  private  sector.  These  have  not  always 
coincided. 
With  the  increasing  demand  for  offices  in  the  central  city  communicated  through 
the  market  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  extremely  small  amounts  of  resources 
allocated  for  urban  renewal,  the  government  entirely  relied  on  private  developers. 
Indeed,  over  90  per  cent  of  downtown  redevelopment  in  terms  of  areas  has  been 
carried  out  by  private  developers  (MOC,  1987,  p.  888).  However,  it  was  impossible 
for  the  small  firms  or  individuals  to  carry  out  the  large  downtown  redevelopment 
projects  which  were  left  to  big  businesses.  Since  then,  downtown  and  housing 
renewal  (which  will  be  discussed  later)  took  a  new  turn  in  scale  and  rate  which  varied 
between  cities  according  to  their  economic  structure. 
The  concentration  of  the  headquarters  of  the  Chaebols  in  Seoul  necessarily  brought 
about  the  most  active  downtown  redevelopment  of  all  cities.  Indeed,  according  to  the 
MOC  (Construction  Statistical  Yearbook,  1992),  as  of  1991,  the  completed  rate  of 
downtown  redevelopment  in  Seoul  since  1976  accounted  for  about  94  per  cent  of  total 
downtown  redevelopment  area  in  Korean  cities  (Pusan  1.6  per  cent  and  Daegu  4.3 
per  cent).  For  the  private  developers,  all  other  developments,  except  high-rise 
offices,  were  unprofitable. 
However,  land  was  difficult  to  assemble  because  of  its  fragmented  nature  of 
ownership  and  the  persistence  of  small  proprietors  who  survived  on  family  labour  and 
loyal  neighbourhoods.  Small  owners  held  out  for  high  prices  or  refused  to  sell. 
Private  redevelopment  without  powers  of  compulsory  purchase  was  often  very  time 
173 consuming  and  costly.  For  the  Chun  regime,  the  fastest  way  to  show  people  that 
something  was  happening  was  to  build  things.  The  '86  Asian  Games  and  the  '88 
Olympic  Games  were  often  explained  in  this  context.  Emphasis  was  focused  on 
construction  jobs,  contracts,  expanded  central  city  facilities,  and  prospective  rising 
tax  bases.  Local  business  and  many  white-collar  workers  were  clearly  expected  to 
receive  a  wide  range  of  benefits.  The  Amendment  of  the  Urban  Renewal  Act  in  1982 
gave  power  of  land  expropriation  to  private  developers.  This  was  the  most  important 
feature  of  urban  renewal.  Since  then,  urban  renewal  witnessed  large-scale  land 
assembly  by  private  developers,  and  downtown  redevelopment  became  active,  as 
Table  6-7  shows.  Downtown  land  ownership  became  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a 
few  Chaebols. 
Table  6-7  Status  of  Downtown  Redevelopment  (1,000  sq.  m). 
Total  Designated  Completed  On-going  Not  yet  started 
Year  Areas  Areas  Areas  areas 
1976-81  1,884  66  122  1,695 
1985  2,040  207  316  1,517 
1990  1,883  417  287  1,179 
Note:  The  present  condition  at  the  end  of  1981,1985  and  1990 
Sources:  EPB,  The  5th  Economic  and  Social  Development  Fiveyear  Plan,  1982-86,  p.  58  and  MOC, 
Construction  Statistical  Year-book,  1987  and  1991. 
The  Korean  government  believed,  without  question,  that  the  development  projects 
were  beneficial  to  business  interests,  benefiting  the  whole  economy  and  therefore  the 
people.  Redevelopment  was  legitimated  on  the  basis  of  its  macro-economic  effects.  It 
was  certain  that  redevelopment  projects  stimulated  new  private  and  public  investment, 
and  changed  the  urban  landscape.  The  hearts  of  big  cities  changed  into  offices  and 
related  service  activities.  These  business  districts  provided  the  necessary  quick  and 
efficient  communication  between  firms  and  within  firms.  This  was  a  natural  location 
for  markets  providing  information,  capital  and  expertise,  necessary  for  bureaucratic 
corporate  decision-making  in  Korea. 
Downtown  redevelopment  raised  the  productivity  of  land.  This  enhanced 
productivity  could  be  valued  in  terms  of  the  pre  and  post  clearance  land  prices.  In 
fact,  this  resulted  in  the  property  boom  of  the  early  1980s.  Indeed,  in  one  year,  1982, 
it  was  possible  to  buy  and  sell  land  without  even  occupying  that  land  and  still  make  a 
profit  higher  than  most  could  earn  in  a  lifetime.  The  property  boom  pushed  up  house 
prices  and  made  it  increasingly  difficult  for  first-time  buyers  to  break  into  the 
ownership  market.  In  1982,  price  control  was  extended  to  apartments  of  over  85 
sq.  m.  size. 
174 The  Korean  government  could  facilitate  public  infrastructure  without  any  additional 
public  investment  through  selling  public  land  in  the  areas  and  simply  by  imposing 
building  codes,  construction  codes,  and  planning  codes  on  the  private  developers. 
Moreover,  the  demands  upon  local  governments  to  balance  their  books  forced  them 
to  use  public  land  commercially.  Private  interest  groups  persuaded  them  to  use  the 
land  for  commercial  rather  than  for  social  purposes  under  the  banner  of  national 
economic  growth.  The  private  developers  could  cover  the  costs  of  the  infrastructure 
and  even  public  facilities  with  the  increased  prices.  In  this  aspect,  the  Korean 
government  again  used  the  market  well  in  urban  renewal,  just  as  with  the  Land 
Readjustment  Projects. 
As  Table  6-8  shows,  downtown  redevelopment  served  the  expansion  of  the  office 
economy.  They  did  not  provide  housing,  rather  they  destroyed  low-income  housing 
and  the  livelihood  of  many  of  the  city's  poorer  inhabitants.  The  typical  downtown 
areas  of  Korea  prior  to  the  development  were  dominated  by  the  urban  poor,  and  their 
housing  consisted  of  older,  lower  quality  rented  units.  Many  of  the  people  relied  on 
informal  trading  or  manufacturing,  and  even  prostitution.  The  expansion  of  the  office 
economy  in  downtown  areas  expelled  the  urban  poor  and  small  businesses. 
Table  6-8  Land  Use  in  Downtown  Redevelopment  (1,000  sq.  m.  and  percentages). 
Total  Official  Commercial  Official  and  Hotel  Official 
Areas  Commercial  and  Housing 
523  188  22  228  46  44 
100.0  35.9  4.2  43.6  8.8  8.4 
Note:  including  on-going  areas  at  the  end  of  1985. 
Source:  MOC,  1987,  p.  888 
Since  the  mid  1970s,  the  biggest  cities  have  exerted  more  influence  on  the 
hierarchy  of  centres,  and  on  the  pattern  of  service  employment  growth.  However,  in 
the  process,  the  city's  low-income  households  have  been  pushed  out  and  around  to 
make  room  for  the  new  activities  and  they  have  derived  little  benefit  from  the 
employment  that  was  created.  Industrial  redistribution  and  downtown  redevelopment 
contributed  to  reducing  the  proportion  of  informal  workers  in  official  statistics  as  well 
as  to  the  decline  in  the  share  and  level  of  industrial  employment  in  the  biggest  cities 
(Kim  J-G,  Kin  K-Y  and  Son  J-Y,  1991,  pp.  26-33  and  Pusan  Municipal  Government, 
1992,  p.  13).  Meantime  rapid  urbanisation  was  continuing. 
Work  by  researchers  at  the  British  Department  of  Employment  (Robertson,  Briggs 
and  Goodchild,  1982)  has  shown  Korea  a  lesson.  The  study  suggests  that  one-fifth  of 
jobs  in  miscellaneous  services  (low-income  jobs,  including  producer  services  and 
some  consumer  services)  are  derived  from  demand  in  the  manufacturing  sector 
175 (requoted  in  Hall,  1991,  p.  17).  The  government  working  in  a  highly  centralized 
bureaucracy  using  a  "top-down"  approach  of  policy  fornulation  overlooked  this  fact 
(see  Kim  K-S,  1983,  pp.  64-68).  The  government  believed  the  movement  of  the 
industries,  whether  they  were  polluting  or  informal  industries,  from  the  biggest  cities 
and  the  city  centres  to  other  areas  would  not  reduce  employment  as  a  whole  at  the 
national  level,  rather  the  growth  of  the  office  economy  would  increase  opportunities. 
Policy  makers  ignored  regional  changes  and  the  labour  market  readjustments.  As 
many  studies  have  pointed  out,  lower-income  groups  had  the  most  difficulty  in 
moving.  In  addition  to  this,  the  evidence  from  the  past  suggested  that  the  promotion 
and  the  development  of  new  industries  in  new  industrial  regions  could  take  some  ten 
to  twenty  years  to  have  a  major  effect  at  a  national  level  -  witness  the  development  of 
Ulsan  as  a  shipbuilding  and  automobile  centre  since  1962,  or  the  steel  industry 
development  of  Phohang  since  1973. 
Office  expansion  in  downtown  areas  drew  in  more  and  better-educated  people,  i.  e. 
white-collar  workers.  Whereas  the  low-income  blue-collar  workers  were  being 
gradually  replaced.  However,  because  the  development  of  transport  has  always 
lagged  far  behind  population  growth,  a  significant  result  has  been  increased  Journey- 
to-work  time  and  congestion.  As  Lee  K-S  (1979,  p.  135)  suggested,  "Presumably 
American  style  suburbanisation  development  with  the  use  of  private  automobiles  could 
not  occur  because  of  the  inconvenience  of  urban  transportation,  even  if  there  are 
many  private  automobiles  owned  by  many  middle  income  families".  Moreover,  the 
designation  of  the  Green  Belt  constrained  the  development  of  suburbs.  The 
combination  of  the  growth  of  housing  demands  associated  with  the  increase  in 
downtown  employment  and  the  inadequate  transport  network  resulted  in  explosive 
demands  for  houses  in  those  areas  most  accessible  to  the  city  centre.  In  those  areas, 
private  developers  have  been  able  to  nurture  profitably  the  emerging  market  for  high- 
rise  apartment  units  for  middle-income  white-collar  workers. 
New  housing  can  be  provided  only  at  a  price  which  is  sufficient  to  cover  the  cost  of 
providing  it.  If  the  cost  of  supply  is  higher  than  the  market  will  bear,  the  housing  will 
not  be  provided  unless  a  subsidy  is  given  to  bring  the  price  down  to  the  required 
level.  To  some  extent,  private  residential  renewal  is  economically  feasible  only  in 
areas  where  there  is  a  significant  middle-class  demand,  precisely  demands  for  owner- 
occupation.  New  housing  in  suburban  locations  can  be  provided  more  cheaply  than  in 
inner  cities,  since  land  prices  are  cheaper  and  no  renewal  is  required.  This  is  the 
reason  for  why  most  housing  renewal  projects  were  accomplished  in  the  areas  near 
city  centres  or  near  the  underground  stations  or  near  the  main  roads  despite  the  fact 
that  housing  standards  of  these  areas  were  better  than  other  poor  housing  areas 
176 (KNHC,  1993,  p.  96).  It  was  closely  associated  with  the  development  of  the  office 
economy  in  the  downtown  areas. 
With  respect  to  poor  housing  areas,  as  noted  earlier,  some  illegal  houses  were 
being  legalized  and  strong  regulations  over  existing  squatter  houses  were  being 
loosened  in  the  early  1970s.  Poor  housing  areas  were  quickly  incorporated  into  the 
formal  market.  Land  prices  began  to  jump.  Housing  and  land  prices  of  the  squatter 
settlements  and  slums  located  in  the  areas  accessible  to  the  city  centre  rose  faster  than 
other  areas.  The  increased  land  prices  in  poor  housing  areas  benefited  some  low- 
income  households.  It  was  a  blessing  for  some  early  inmigrants  who  had  built  their 
houses  illegally.  But  it  did  not  benefit  low-income  tenant  households. 
Many  middle  and  high-income  people  were  encouraged  to  look  for  real  estate  in 
squatter  settlements  and  in  run-down  areas,  mainly  for  investment  purposes.  Absentee 
landlords  began  to  increase  and  in  some  areas  the  figure  was  around  60  per  cent.  The 
increase  of  absentee  landlords  had  a  great  impact  on  the  poor  housing  communities. 
The  response  of  different  landlords  was  inevitably  varied.  The  relationship  between 
the  absentee  landlords,  interested  in  a  house  as  an  investment  producing  partly  rental 
income  and  mainly  capital  gain,  and  the  tenant  who  looks  to  the  house  as  his  home, 
was  not  harmonious.  The  relationships  between  landlords  and  tenants  was  worsening. 
Despite  the  provisions  of  various  Acts  in  relation  to  tenures,  more  families  were 
being  harassed  and  evicted  to  suit  the  financial  convenience  of  landlords  and  a  high 
proportion  of  poor  houses  fell  into  disrepair.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
government's  policy  of  self-help  rehabilitation  with  a  very  limited  public  grant  since 
the  mid  1970s  was  necessarily  ineffective. 
Since  the  collapse  of  the  Middle  East  construction  boom  in  1979,  most  construction 
firms  returned,  and  had  to  survive,  in  narrow  domestic  markets.  The  difficulties  in 
finding  sites  for  large  scale  house  building  were  so  great  that  building  firms 
recognized  that  it  was  necessary  to  redevelop  poor  housing  areas  at  high  densities. 
This  was  fuelled  by  the  increased  demands  for  better  housing  in  or  near  the  city 
centre  in  line  with  the  growth  of  the  office  economy. 
The  interests  of  white-collar  workers,  looking  for  houses  near  city  centres,  the 
interests  of  the  government,  macroeconomic  concerns  and  the  high-output  of  housing, 
the  interest  of  property  owners  in  poor  housing  areas,  capital  gains,  and  the  interests 
of  construction  firms,  utilizing  idle  facilities  and  equipment,  easily  joined,  and  led  to 
"Hapdong"  (cooperative  or  joint)  housing  renewal  since  the  early  1980s. 
Renewal  was  carried  out  by  a  voluntary  contract  between  the  associations  of 
property  owners  and  construction  firms  on  the  basis  of  absolute  property  rights. 
Tenants  had  no  rights  over  the  renewal  process  and  were  totally  excluded  from  the 
renewal.  The  construction  firms  built  high-rise  apartments  (13-15  storey)  to  house 
177 1.5  and  2  times  the  number  of  property  owners.  The  owners  each  received  a  unit, 
and  the  construction  firms  sold  the  remaining  units  to  the  holders  of  the  Housing 
Related  Saving  Accounts.  By  selling  off  the  remaining  units,  the  firms  recovered 
their  renewal  costs.  The  local  governments  were  in  charge  of  designating  areas  for 
housing  renewal,  approving  the  projects,  and  imposing  building  and  planning  codes. 
They  provided  the  redevelopment  areas  with  basic  facilities  such  as  roads  and  sewage 
systems,  financed  by  selling  off  public  land  occupied  by  squatters  to  the  Association 
of  property  owners  at  appraised  prices. 
With  chronic  housing  shortages  and  limited  budgets,  the  government  supported  the 
method  because  the  Hapdong  housing  renewal  achieved  not  only  the  renewal  of 
substandard  houses  but  also  quantitative  objectives  in  terms  of  the  number  of  housing 
units  built  without  requiring  public  investment.  For  instance,  throughout  the  Hapdong 
housing  renewal  programmes,  a  total  of  37,513  units  were  constructed  between  1983 
and  1988  in  Seoul,  approximately  double  the  number  of  demolished  units  -  17,555. 
Since  1983,  the  rebuilding  rate  through  housing  renewal  was  about  4  times  higher 
than  the  annual  average  for  1974-82,  the  period  before  the  Hapdong  housing  renewal 
was  introduced  (Kim  J-G,  et  al.,  1991,  p.  140). 
The  costs  tended  to  be  higher  in  redevelopment  schemes  than  on  virgin  sites 
because  of  the  demolition  costs  and  further  additional  costs  associated  with  the  length 
of  time  taken  by  clearance  and  renewal,  site  preparation  and  of  construction  itself. 
Hapdong  renewal  was  inevitably  costly  and  originally  unable  to  meet  low-income 
households'  housing  needs.  Therefore,  high-rise  flats  with  dwellings  of  an  average 
size  of  about  110  sq.  m.  were  supplied  by  the  renewal  programmes  replacing  the  land 
use  from  detached  houses  of  low-income  households  in  favour  of  upper-middle 
income  households.  Only  less  than  10  per  cent  of  the  former  residents  (all  of  them 
were  former  owner-occupiers  or  landlords)  remained  after  renewal  (KNHC,  1988). 
More  had  to  be  spent  on  maintenance  and  management  in  high-rise  flats  for  lifts, 
insulation,  heating,  etc.  Thus  others  were  excluded,  not  only  because  they  could  not 
afford  the  apartments,  but  also  because  they  could  not  afford  the  maintenance  and 
management  costs  of  high-rise  and  high  standard  housing  (KNHC,  1988). 
The  replacement  of  the  poor  housing  by  tower  blocks  of  flats  clearly  destroyed  the 
old  "communities"  and  "neighbourhoods"  based  on  the  tradition,  often  described  as 
that  of  urban  villages.  Moreover,  in  the  Hapdong  renewal  areas,  the  renewal  methods 
necessarily  divided  the  communities  into  owners  and  tenants,  resulting  in  the  break- 
down  of  communities  still  further.  The  intact  structure  of  mutual  self-help  within 
neighbourhoods,  often  highlighted  as  a  proud  Korean  value  and  indeed  the  major 
source  of  the  success  of  the  Saemaul  Movement  ("new-village"  movement)  in  the 
rural  areas  in  the  1970s,  broke  down. 
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office  economy,  and  the  Hapdong  housing  renewal  played  its  role  in  accommodating 
white-collar  workers  commuting  to  the  downtown  offices.  The  government  supported 
the  Hapdong  housing  renewal  for  this  simple  reason. 
Low-income  households  suffered  from  the  squatter  clearance,  and  from  the 
commercial  development  areas  in  the  ring  surrounding  the  urban  centres  in  the  1960s 
and  the  early  1970s.  The  urban  manifestation  of  economic  growth  has  been  the 
expansion  of  the  central  areas  which  accompanied  the  development  of  urban  road 
networks.  The  low-income  households  suffered  from  the  development  of  "new 
centres"  and  the  development  of  transportation  and  public  facilities.  The  low-income 
households  again  suffered  from  the  development  of  the  office  economy  and  then  from 
the  housing  renewal. 
The  tale  of  Sannge-Dong  clearly  demonstrates  the  plight  of  the  low-income  groups. 
Sannge-Dong  is  located  in  the  northeastern  part  of  Seoul.  Most  of  the  residents  were 
relocated  from  the  central  part  of  Seoul  during  the  1960's  when  urban  renewal  and 
site-and  services  programmes  were  developed,  with  15-19  sq.  m  of  land.  When  they 
were  forced  to  settle  in  this  place  it  was  not  considered  to  be  part  of  the  plan  for  the 
city's  growth.  In  1985,  a  major  underground  line  serving  the  city  was  extended  to 
Sangge-Dong.  Soon  after  the  extension  of  the  underground  line,  the  area  was 
declared  a  Hapdong  housing  renewal  project  area  displacing  the  poor  once  again. 
This  is  the  tale  of  an  evicted  65  year-old  woman  from  the  site  (quoted  from  Kim  J-C, 
1987,  p.  3). 
"Maybe  I  lived  too  long  to  experience  this  inhumane  treatment.  This  is  my 
third  relocation  in  20  years  and  each  time  they  told  me  that  it  was  our  last 
settlement  for  good". 
The  accumulating  consequences  were  gradual  regional  segregation  and 
overcrowding  with  increased  rents.  Kim  W-J's  case  study  (1985)  of  the  Hapdong 
housing  renewal  in  Guro  and  Daerim  and  Cho  E.  and  Cho  O-L's  study  (1987  and 
1992)  in  Sadang  provide  a  case  in  point.  These  showed  that  the  majority  of  residents 
in  the  renewal  areas  moved  into  nearby  housing  areas  which  were  also  physically 
decayed,  but  they  attracted  low-income  households  in  search  of  cheap  housing. 
Nevertheless,  eighty  per  cent  of  the  displaced  households  were  reported  to  have 
experienced  rent  rises  and  40  per  cent  of  them  paid  higher  rents  for  housing  which 
was  worse  than  before  (Kim  W-J,  1985).  Other  costs  should  be  kept  in  mind.  In 
districts  of  the  inner  city,  for  instance,  where  the  cost  of  housing  is  very  high  per 
unit,  living  costs  such  as  transport  costs  are  cheaper  than  in  other  places.  This  is  the 
central  theme  of  the  Ecological  Model  of  the  city  developed  by  the  Chicago  school. 
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livelihoods  necessarily  increased  general  living  costs  still  further. 
Perhaps  more  importantly,  the  demolition  of  the  poor  housing  neighbourhoods 
reduced  the  amount  of  jobs  as  well  as  the  information  about  jobs  available  to  the 
people  who  once  lived  there.  Most  studies  on  poor  housing  areas  indicate  many 
families  were  self-employed  and  this  work  was  dependent  on  their  neighbourhoods. 
Fewer  people  were  employed  for  wages  than  there  were  in  other  areas,  and  the  main 
source  of  information  about  jobs  was  the  neighbourhood  (Hur  S-L,  1989,  pp.  100-  1). 
Furthermore,  incomes  were  low  and  insecure  and  in  order  to  supplement  the 
househead's  meagre  income,  all  the  family  worked  if  they  could.  Because  of  their 
fluctuating  earnings,  indebtedness  to  relatives,  friends,  neighbours  and  shopkeepers 
was  very  common  in  poor  housing  areas.  Borrowing  was  common  and  often  the  only 
way  to  maintain  a  minimum  level  of  consumption.  Housing  renewal  of  poor  housing 
areas  were  accompanied  by  the  replacement  of  corner-shops,  street  shops,  and 
informal  workers  such  as  peddlers  and  hawkers  by  modern  super-chain  stores  with 
high  standards,  dismantling  existing  neighbourhoods. 
As  the  city's  demand  for  unskilled  labour  declined,  inner  city  redevelopment 
accelerated  the  decline  of  the  informal  (or  traditional)  sector  and  miscellaneous  jobs, 
and  then  housing  renewal  reinforced  the  trends.  Urban  renewal  did  little  to  provide 
new  employment  for  its  growing  pool  of  poor  in-migrants,  except  for  temporary 
construction  jobs.  Small  businesses  were  increasingly  displaced  by  urban  renewal  and 
by  the  sequent  increases  in  land  prices.  Low-income  housing  markets  and  low- 
income  labour  markets  tightened.  To  make  matters  worse,  the  baby  boom  generation 
(1955-60)  was  entering  into  the  housing  and  labour  markets. 
Not  surprisingly,  opposition  to  urban  renewal  came  from  the  tenants,  particularly 
the  low-income  households,  who  were  excluded  from  its  benefits.  This  led  to  tenant 
strikes  against  the  government,  and  many  conflicts  between  tenants  and  property 
owners  during  the  mid  1980s.  Strong  sentiments  were  expressed  by  the  public 
through  the  Mokdong  Struggle  in  1984  and  Sangge-Dong  struggle  in  which  one  of 
the  tenants  died  (some  argue,  "killed")  on  26  of  June,  1986  (Kim  H-K,  1989,  p.  241). 
Tenants'  groups  were  formed  in  many  urban  redevelopment  and  housing  renewal 
areas,  with  organized  protests.  The  strong  resistance  from  tenants  increased  the  costs 
of  renewal.  Since  the  mid  1980s,  policy  towards  poor  housing  shifted  towards 
encouraging  community  involvement  and  neighbourhood  revitalization  on  the  basis  of 
self-help  improvement  partly  because  academics  stressed  the  functional  virtues  of 
poor  housing  and  the  negative  effects  of  the  renewal,  but  mainly  because  of  the 
climate  of  public  outrage  against  the  housing  renewal. 
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permanent  rented  houses  for  the  urban  poor  over  a  period  of  five  years,  which  will  be 
discussed  in  detail  in  Chapter  7.  But  in  order  to  recover  the  costs  of  the  permanent 
rented  houses,  housing  prices  for  sale  had  to  be  raised,  shifting  from  a  price  control 
towards  a  cost-linking  system.  In  May  of  1989,  the  government  also  imposed  the 
construction  of  small  rented  units  for  displaced  tenants  in  the  housing  renewal 
projects  as  a  requirement  of  all  Hapdong  housing  renewals.  The  requirement  of 
rented  units  drove  down  profits  for  both  property  owners  and  construction  firms  (Kim 
J-G  et  al.  , 
199  1,  p.  14  1).  The  boom  of  the  Hapdong  renewal  soon  cooled. 
However,  the  continuing  increases  in  land  and  housing  prices  increasingly  removed 
such  a  valuation  gap,  the  difference  between  the  costs  of  rebuilding  an  older 
property,  including  rented  units,  and  the  increase  in  its  market  value.  Moreover, 
expansion  of  the  cities  rapidly  increased  suburban  living  costs.  Since  then  housing 
renewal  began  to  develop  in  a  different  way.  Property  owners  began  to  demand  the 
government  carry  out  housing  renewal.  The  government  answered  in  1992  by 
deleting  the  urban  redevelopment  code  which  ruled  that  "housing  renewal  projects 
can  be  carried  out  in  a  area  in  which  most  houses  were  over  20  Years  old".  Since 
then,  there  has  been  a  second  boom  of  Hapdong  renewal,  which  at  least  in  part 
reflects  the  cost  of  suburban  living. 
It  is  unclear  precisely  how  many  poor  houses  have  been  demolished  or  cleared,  or 
converted  into  other  uses  in  cities  over  the  past  three  decades.  However,  the  amount 
of  housing  loss  was  equivalent  to  about  over  30  per  cent  of  new  housing  construction 
each  year,  most  of  which  were  poor  houses.  In  this  process,  those  who  could  afford 
to  pay  had  the  widest  possible  choice  in  living  conditions  and  locations,  whilst  the 
poor  had  to  find  shelters  where  they  were  able  to  pay  in  the  areas  where  no  one  else 
had  chosen  to  live.  The  displaced  low-income  households,  who  could  not  get  access 
to  cheaper  decent  new  housing  had  to  share  through  subdivision.  Displaced 
households  concentrated  on  other  older  and  detached  houses.  Many  of  these  have 
subsequently  been  demolished  or  converted. 
Table  6-9  indicates  these  general  trends.  The  number  of  households  who 
exclusively  used  a  house,  whether  for  owner  occupation  or  rent,  had  declined  until 
1980,  thereafter  increasing  in  line  with  the  housing  supply  rate  (housing 
units  /households).  Whereas  households  sharing  with  over  three  other  households  in  a 
house  have  steadily  increased  over  time,  especially  since  1980.  Housing  conditions  of 
many  households,  in  terms  of  overcrowding  and  privacy,  have  improved.  However, 
housing  conditions  of  others  have  deteriorated  over  time  despite  rapid  economic 
growth  and  high  housing  output. 
181 Table  6-9  Number  of  Households  per  Housing  Unit. 
(in  cities,  1,000  households,  percentages  in  brackets) 
Year  Total  One  Two  Three  Over  three  Housing 
Households  household  households  households  households  supply  rates 
1970  1,398  771  372  152  102  58.8  % 
(100.0)  (55.1)  (26.6)  (10.9)  (7.3) 
1975  1,809  933  517  209  151  56.9  % 
(100.0)  (51.6)  (28.6)  (11.6)  (8.3) 
1980  2,468  1,261  698  290  219  56.6  % 
(100.0)  (51.1)  (28.3)  (11.7)  (8.9) 
1985  3,349  1,801  826  395  327  58.0  % 
(100.0)  (53.8)  (24.7)  (11.8)  (9.7) 
1990  4,646  2,882  831  445  488  65.6  % 
(100.0)  (62.0)  (17.9)  (9.6)  (10.5) 
Sources:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  each  year. 
6.5.  Summary  and  Conclusions. 
Wartime  destruction,  rapid  population  and  urban  growth,  etc.,  all  contributed  to  a 
major  and  consistent  crisis  of  housing  scarcity  in  Korea.  Nevertheless,  for  the  sake  of 
continuing  industrialisation,  housing  had  to  be  insulated  from  the  rest  of  the 
economy.  The  Korean  government  had  been  weighed  down  by  heavy  defence  costs 
and  its  ability  to  produce  a  lot  of  housing  quickly  was  reduced.  It  was  necessary  in 
some  way  or  other  to  harvest  a  lot  of  small  savings  from  large  numbers  of  households 
and  to  invest  this  money  in  housing.  The  Korean  government  perfected  unique  and 
original  ways  of  doing  this  by  developing  a  self-sustaining  housing  financial  system 
which  connected  household  savings  with  the  allocation  of  new  houses.  It  made  house 
purchasers  pay  part  of  the  price  in  advance  by  providing  incentives,  using  the  money 
for  housing  construction.  This  method  was  the  reverse  of  a  mortgage  in  which 
households  pay  the  price  after  purchase. 
However,  such  an  approach  inevitably  excluded  families  who  were  too  poor  to  save 
significant  sums  of  money,  unless  other  additional  methods  are  devised  for  financing 
their  housing  or  the  benefits  of  continuing  economic  growth  fully  trickle  down.  This 
will  remain  the  case.  Moreover,  under  the  rapid  and  sustained  housing  price 
inflation,  the  pre-exclusion  from  these  privileged  markets  meant  post-exclusion  from 
other  life  chances  of  capital  gains  for  the  poor.  However,  the  goverment  perfected 
methods  for  presenting  the  middle  income  groups,  who  have  been  the  main 
beneficiaries  of  such  schemes,  from  gaining  significantly  from  its  low-price  housing 
schemes.  In  effect,  the  government  created  a  protected,  self-sustaining  sub-market  for 
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groups.  But  to  make  this  system  work  it  was  neccessary  to  maintain  a  continuing  flow 
of  small  savings  at  low  interest  rates  which  could  only  be  secured  by  permitting  a  rate 
of  house  price  inflation  which  would  ultimately  make  growing  difficulties  both  for 
the  system  and  increasingly  for  the  lower  middle-income  households.  Moreover,  in 
this  system,  the  main  element  which  sustains  the  system  was  the  scarcity  of  housing. 
Thus,  chronic  shortage  of  housing  in  Korea  is  an  inherent  element  in  the  system. 
Policy  towards  poor  housing  during  the  1960s  and  the  first  half  of  the  1970s,  was 
motived  by  two  factors;  the  first  was  a  land  use  or  land  value  problem,  that  is  to  say 
the  adverse  impact  of  poor  housing  on  productive  activity  in  the  city  centre  or  near 
the  main  roads.  Secondly,  the  adverse  impact  of  poor  housing  on  society,  such  as  the 
great  fire,  flood  and  landslides  accompanied  by  the  loss  of  life.  However,  since  the 
late  1970s,  policies  for  poor  housing  were  motivated  by  the  economic  crisis  of  Korea 
in  the  pursuit  of  private  investment  and  development.  The  dangers  inherent in  this 
downtown  and  housing  renewal  since  the  late  1970s  were  the  scale  and  pace  of  the 
clearance  which  were  determined  not  by  the  number  of  unfit  houses  and  their 
function,  but  by  the  demands  of  businesses  and  middle-income  households.  Those 
with  financial  resources  could  change  the  poor  housing  areas.  Those  who  could  not 
afford  the  high  prices  of  renewed  areas  and  the  housing  related  savings  have  been 
excluded  from  their  existing  houses  and  new  housing  markets. 
The  evidence  from  the  Inner  Area  Studies  (Inner  City  Working  Group,  1.977,  p.  9) 
in  Britain  in  the  middle  1970s  stressed  the  importance  of  employment  opportunities 
and  levels  of  income  as  primary  causes  of  urban  problems,  which  are  related  to  major 
structural  changes  in  the  economy.  Nevertheless,  the  Korean  government,  rather 
Korean  society,  ignored  the  functional  need  for  low-cost  housing  for  low-income 
households  in  the  period  of  the  structural  changes  in  the  economy  and  relied  on  the 
unrealized  myth  of  "filtering  effects"  with  no  social  housing  for  those  who  suffered 
from  the  changing  industrial  and  social  structure. 
During  the  1960s  and  the  early  1970s,  clearances  were  accomplished  with  some 
alternatives,  such  as  relocation  plots  or  the  citizens'  flats.  The  main  problem  was 
always  the  lack  of  resources.  However,  since  the  late  1970s,  clearances  have  been 
carried  out  and  no  measures  to  provide  for  the  displaced  were  put  in  place.  Large- 
scale  downtown  and  housing  renewal  increasingly  widened  the  choice  of  middle-  and 
upper-income  households.  By  contrast,  for  low-income  households,  the  choice 
available  in  terms  of  the  style  of  houses,  their  form  of  tenure,  and  their  price  was 
increasingly  diminished.  The  problems  in  poor  housing  areas  have  often  been  tackled 
by  arranging  "over-spill"  to  adjacent  areas.  However,  in  Korea,  the  main  problems  in 
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flats  for  middle-income  groups. 
As  a  consequence,  low-income  households  have  been  increasingly  excluded  from 
benefiting  from  the  housing  system.  They  have  been  concentrated  on  the  peripheral 
areas  in  the  worst  environments.  Another  market  adjustment  of  the  low-income 
households  who  have  been  excluded  from  the  allocation  of  new  housing  and  excluded 
from  benefiting  from  price  increases  in  the  housing  market  was  to  share 
accommodation.  For  the  low  income  households,  new  inmigrants,  the  aged  and 
families  under  stress,  urban  renewal  was  one  big  "notice  to  quit". 
Unfortunately,  the  worst  things  are  likely  to  come  together  at  the  same  time.  When 
Korea  moved  to  a  "closed"  structure,  new  housing  schemes  based  on  the  assumption 
of  "filtering  up"  developed.  Meantime  existing  low  income  houses  were  demolished 
more  rapidly  than  ever  before. 
Note. 
Marshall  et  al.  (1988)  subdivide  producer  services,  showing  different  shapes  of  development  and 
location.  Firstly,  there  are  "pure"  producer  services  such  as  advertising  services,  management 
consultants,  investment  banking  services  etc  which  show  internalize  rather  than  externalize 
counsumption.  Second,  there  are  producer  services  generated  by  organizations  solely  for  their 
own  internal  use,  such  as  R&D.  Thirdly,  some  producer  services  are  generated  firms  dealing 
with  final  as  well  as  intermediate  demand,  sucha  s  commercial  banking,  accountants,  architectural 
services  etc  which  are  usually  classified  as  "mixed"  services  (recited  from  Daniels,  1991,  p.  76). 
These  producer  services  differ  from  other  "consumer  services"  in  their  location.  The  latter  are 
closely  correlated  with  the  distribution  of  population  both  within  and  between  urban  areas  . 
184 CHAPTER  7.  LOW-INCOME  HOUSEHOLDS  IN  CHANGING  HOUSING 
MARKETS  AND  THE  FILTERING  PROCESS. 
7.1  Introduction. 
The  first  half  of  the  previous  chapter  discussed  the  Korean  housing  system  focusing 
upon  new  housing  supply,  finance  and  allocation.  This  contained  two  assumptions, 
firstly  that  both  households  and  the  state  could  continually  spend  more  on  housing 
with  rising  national  income  and  secondly  that  benefits  would  be  transmitted  to  the 
bottom  income  groups  via  the  combination  of  trickle  down  and  filtering  up  processes. 
However,  the  system  has  increasingly  excluded  families  who  were  too  poor  to  save. 
In  contrast  to  this,  it  was  observed  that  many  houses  had  been  improved  through 
urban  renewal  at  the  expense  of  low  income  households.  The  evidence  from  the  last 
chapter  showed  that  a  complex  combination  of  economic,  social  and  political 
circumstances  led  to  a  particular  set  of  policies. 
In  this  chapter,  the  issues  dealt  with  are  the  housing  market  and  the  exclusion  of 
low-income  households  from  it.  At  a  first  glance,  housing  markets  seem  to  be  similar 
to  other  commodity  markets.  Less  than  7  per  cent  of  the  total  housing  stock  is  traded 
each  year  under  the  government  control.  Beyond  the  the  operation  of  the  market,  the 
nature  of  tenure  has  become  an  increasingly  important  aspect  of  life  chances  in 
Korea.  This  is  partly  because  of  the  question  of  equity  in  housing,  the  relative  costs 
and  advantages  offered  by  different  tenures.  There  is  little  doubt  that  one  of  the  main 
sources  of  inequality  in  life  chances  in  Korea  lies  in  the  difference  of  tenure. 
Nevertheless,  for  a  large  section  of  the  population,  no  choice  exists  between  them. 
The  first  question  in  this  chapter  is  whether  the  housing  market  is  any  different 
from  any  other  commodity  market  in  a  mixed  economy  in  which  invisible  hands 
principally  rule  the  market?  In  other  words,  are  housing  problems  of  low  income 
households  simply  a  symptom  of  low  incomes?  Or  do  they  have  special  features  not 
present  in  other  markets? 
There  are  certainly  a  number  of  ways  in  which  housing,  the  national  economy  and 
the  society  are  connected.  Housing  problems  arise  from  a  variety  of  circumstances 
and  time  and  poor  housing  conditions  affect  people  in  different  ways.  If  so,  does  the 
housing  market  only  reflect  the  changing  economic,  social  and  political 
circumstances,  or  mediate  such  changes?  How  are  they  connected  with  each  other? 
This  chapter  explores  the  connections  between  housing  and  the  economy,  society 
and  politics.  By  examining  these  questions,  further  development  in  the  housing 
market  may  be  predicted. 
185 7.2  The  Exclusion  of  Low-income  Households  from  Access  to  Owner-occupation. 
The  housing  market  in  Korea  is  divided  into  two  major  tenures,  owner-occupation 
and  renting.  There  is  no  public  housing  that  is  supplied,  allocated  and  managed  on 
the  basis  of  needs.  Therefore,  the  rise  and  fall  of  one  sector  is  the  fall  and  rise  of  the 
other.  The  basic  problem  for  the  housing  market  in  Korea  is  that  housing  is  too 
expensive  relative  to  earnings  of  most  households. 
Unfortunately  there  is  no  available  data  to  cover  the  period  1960-90.  Although  the 
Korean  Housing  Bank  has  carried  out  a  house  price  survey  since  1985,  in  fact  it  is  no 
more  than  an  indicator  of  trends  due  to  rapid  changes  in  house  prices  which  are  often 
observed  in  a  week.  Several  studies  and  surveys  have  shown  that  the  rise  in  the  cost 
of  housing  has  far  exceeded  that  of  wages  and  consumer  prices,  as  the  Table  below 
shows.  For  another  example,  house  prices  increased  by  6.5  times  between  1975  and 
1990,  while  the  increase  in  GNP  and  in  consumer  prices  was  3.5  and  4.1  respectively 
(Lee  K-B  and  Yang  B-M,  1992,  p.  23) 
Table  7-1  Indexes  of  House  Prices,  Wages  and  Consumer  Prices  (1965-80) 
Housing  prices  Urban  wages  Consumer  prices 
1965  100  100  100 
1970  379  339  178 
1975  1,108  763  364 
1980  3,936  2,847  805 
Average  annual  increase  rates  27.7%  25.0%  14.9% 
Source:  The  Bank  of  Korea  (requoted  from  Kang  M-S  and  Kim  J-W,  Ae  Present  and  Development 
Direction  of  Housing  Finance,  Seoul:  KDI,  1987,  p.  147). 
Average  house  price-to-income  ratio  was  2.3  in  1976  (KHB,  Housing  Finance  Bi- 
monthly  Review,  1991).  As  the  Table  below  shows,  it  rose  to  6.9  in  1989,  and  rose 
to  9.25  in  1991  in  Seoul  (Renaud,  1993,  p.  305). 
Table  7-2  Average  House  Price  to  Household  Income  Ratio  in  Sample  Houses  and 
Households,  1989. 
Owners  Tenants  Whole  household 
Seoul  7.9  9.2  8.4 
6  biggest  cities  5.7  7.6  6.3 
Other  cities  5.6  6.9  6.0 
Average  6.5  7.9  6.9 
Sources:  KHB,  Housing  Economical  Data-book,  1990. 
186 In  most  other  commodity  markets  in  the  long  run,  rising  real  incomes  are  reflected 
in  falling  relative  prices.  As  society  has  become  wealthier,  so  people's  incomes  have 
outpaced  commodity  prices  and  they  have  been  able  to  purchase  more  goods  for  the 
same  number  of  hours  worked.  This  has  not  happened  with  housing.  As  Professor 
Donnison  (1982,  p.  210),  Ball  (1983,  p.  98),  Saunders  (1990,  p.  121)  and  the  World 
Bank  Report  (1992,  p.  20)  show,  there  is little  systematic  variation  in  the  house-price- 
to-income  ratio  with  the  level  of  economic  development  over  time.  There  appears  to 
be  a  more  stable  connection  between  incomes  and  house  prices  in  the  long  run 
(Lansley,  1979,  p.  61). 
Various  explanations  have  been  put  forward  (see  Mayers,  1979;  Nellis  and 
Longbottom,  1981;  Buckley  and  Ermisch,  1982;  Hendry,  1984;  Meen,  1990;  etc).  In 
these  studies,  income  is  almost  always  a  highly  important  determinant.  However, 
besides  the  existence  of  mortgage  markets  in  their  equations  and  different 
circumstances  (for  instance  housing  surplus  in  their  studies  and  housing  shortages  in 
Korea  in  absolute  terms),  the  house  prices  of  Korea  which  increased  even  during  the 
period  of  declining  real  income  cannot  be  explained  by  these  econometric  models 
(Hur  J-W,  1991).  Surprisingly,  there  has  been  little  detailed  analysis  of  this 
phenomenon  in  Korea.  Some  studies  focus  on  the  nature  of  demand  for  housing, 
others  on  the  characteristics  of  supply.  Neither  factor  on  its  own,  however,  can  fully 
explain  why  house  prices  have  risen  steadily  and  at  a  faster  rate  than  other  prices. 
First,  there  was  a  great  demographic  impact.  According  to  the  Population  and 
Housing  Census,  between  1960  and  1990,  the  population  of  Korea  grew  from  25 
million  to  43  million,  equivalent  to  about  a2  per  cent  increase  per  annum.  Moreover, 
the  population  increase  in  cities  was  more  dramatic  than  the  average.  It  grew  from 
about  7  million  to  around  32  million,  equivalent  to  a  5.2  per  cent  increase  per  year. 
The  growth  of  households  in  cities  was  even  more  striking  than  that  of  population.  In 
1960,  the  number  of  households  in  cities  was  approximately  1.3  million.  By  1990  it 
had  reached  a  figure  of  around  8.5  million,  equivalent  to  a  6.6  per  cent  increase  per 
year. 
During  this  period,  in  Korea,  there  was  a  large  increase  in  real  and  money 
incomes.  Rapid  economic  growth  over  three  decades  certainly  contributed  to  the 
increase  in  household  incomes,  although  it  was  unevenly  distributed.  Households 
often  contained  more  than  one  earner;  average  earners  per  household  in  cities  were 
1.16  persons  in  1981  and  grew  to  1.39  in  1990  (NSO,  each  year).  As  a  consequence 
of  these  factors,  household  income  rose  by  1491.4  per  cent  between  1971  and  1987 
while  the  index  of  retail  prices  rose  by  591.6  per  cent  during  the  same  period  (EPB, 
Annual  Report  on  the  Family  Income  and  Expenditure  Survey,  and  Major  Statistics 
of  the  Korean  Economy).  This  added  to  the  bidding  up  of  house  prices. 
187 Income  may  not  be  of  major  importance  in  the  determination  of  house  prices  in  the 
short  run,  since  its  role  is  outweighed  by  the  greater  significance  of  other  factors  such 
as  credits,  the  ease  of  entry,  etc.  In  a  free  market,  the  most  important  factor 
determining  demand  in  the  short  term  is  the  availability  of  mortgage  finance 
(Lansley,  1979,  p.  50).  Rising  real  incomes  on  their  own  would  not  produce  rising 
house  prices  unless  buyers  could  borrow  more  money  on  the  strength  of  their 
incomes  to  finance  their  purchases  (Holmans,  1987,  pp.  263-4).  Indeed,  most 
economic  forecasting  models  strongly  suggest  that  conditions  in  the  mortgage  market 
are  of  crucial  importance  to  the  housing  market  (see  Meen,  1988  and  1990).  In 
Korea,  there  has  been  no  mortgage  market.  However,  it  is  certain  that  a  lump  sum 
deposit  in  the  Chunsei  system  (rental  system)  of  Korea  (which  will  be  discussed  later) 
has  operated  as  a  secured  mortgage.  Rental  markets  in  Korea  have  been  very 
competitive.  There  has  been  increased  effective  demands,  translating  into  inflated 
prices.  The  inflated  prices  in  turn  required  more  borrowing,  pushing  up  Chunsei.  The 
increase  in  the  Chunsei  again  served  to  boost  owner-occupation,  increasing  the 
demand  for  housing,  and  therefore  house  prices,  and  rents,  and  so  on  (see  Weibull, 
1983).  The  Chunsei  system  is  the  means  by  which  rising  real  incomes  are  transmitted 
into  rising  real  house  prices,  but  may  be  not  the  cause  of  it. 
In  addition,  the  strong  desire  for  owner-occupation  pushes  the  prices  higher  than 
otherwise  might  be  expected,  since  housing  is  the  best  investment  option  in  Korea. 
(This  will  be  discussed  in  detail  later). 
The  response  of  supply  is  of  particular  interest.  In  Britain  new  construction  usually 
represents  less  than  2  per  cent  of  the  stock  each  year  (Robinson,  1979,  p.  21,  Ball, 
1983,  p.  315  and  Laver,  1986,  p.  180).  In  Korea,  the  rate  of  new  housing  construction 
in  relation  to  the  existing  housing  stock  has  been  very  high.  Over  the  same  period  the 
rate  of  housing  losses  has  also  been  very  high.  As  a  result,  the  number  of  net  gains 
was  not  so  high  compared  with  the  increase  of  households.  During  the  period  1960- 
1990,  over  5.8  million  housing  units  were  supplied,  whereas  approximately  37  per 
cent  of  that  figure  disappeared  through  demolitions  or  conversions,  thereby  increasing 
the  housing  stock  by  3.7  million  units  (a  2.5  per  cent  annual  increase).  This  was  far 
below  the  growth  rate  of  households,  which  was  approximately  3.2  per  cent  per  year. 
In  cities,  households  increased  at  an  annual  rate  of  6.6  per  cent  whereas  new 
dwellings  were  added  at  a  rate  of  6.1  per  cent  each  year.  This  is  enormous  compared 
with  other  countries.  However,  as  a  way  of  measuring  housing  shortages,  the  ratio  of 
housing  units  to  households  which  was  65  per  cent  in  cities  in  1960  had  fallen  to  61 
per  cent  in  1990  because  the  number  of  new  houses  did  not  keep  pace  with  the  rise  in 
the  number  of  households,  resulting  in  increased  housing  shortages.  This  relative 
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owner-occupied  housing  has  been  reflected  principally  in  higher  house  prices. 
Other  explanations  for  the  trends  of  house  price  increases  has  been  the 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  houses.  The  quality  of  TV  sets  and  cars  have  improved 
as  well,  but  their  prices  have  fallen  in  relative  terms.  With  regards  to  the  quality  of 
houses,  the  most  important  factor  may  be  the  increase  in  housing  size.  However,  as 
Table  7-3  shows,  house  size  in  new  housing  construction  has  not  increased  in  line 
with  that  of  house  prices.  Therefore,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  increase  in  quality  is 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  full  relative  increase  in  house  prices. 
Table  7-3  Average  Size  in  New  Houses,  sq.  m. 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Public  sector  46.3  51.6  55.9  61.2  63.1  47.9  47.3  n.  a.  n.  a. 
Private  sector  92.9  106.5  122.3  125.6  128.9  102.5  117.4  n.  a.  n.  a. 
Average  68.8  86.9  96.2  92.6  90.6  78.0  88.6  91.9  102.4 
Source:  Department  of  Housing  Policy,  MOC. 
Other  explanations  refer  to  the  slower  rate  of  increase  in  productivity  in  house 
building  than  in  the  economy  as  a  whole.  As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  6,  although 
productivity  in  house  building  was  lower  than  in  manufacturing,  it  was  still  very  high 
in  comparison  with  other  countries. 
Another  factor  is  that  higher  house  prices  reflected  steady  increases  in  construction 
costs.  Construction  costs  can  be  roughly  subdivided  into  building  costs  and  land 
costs.  As  the  Table  below  shows,  it  is  likely  that  house  price  increases  are  closely 
related  to  the  trends  of  construction  costs  in  the  long  term.  However,  the  rise  in 
house  prices  cannot  be  explained  by  construction  cost  alone. 
Table  7-4  Indexes  of  Housing  Construction  Costs  and  House  Prices. 
Housing  Construction  Building  Land  costs  Share  of  Share  of 
Prices  Costs  (A  =B+  C)  Costs  (B)  (C)  (B)  in  (A)  (C)  in  (A) 
1975  100  n.  a  n.  a  n.  a  n.  a  n.  a 
1977  n.  a  100  100  100  -  - 
1980  355.3  205.4  201.7  217.1  0.758  0.242 
1983  358.7  262.4  251.3  298.5  0.765  0.235 
1985  397.0  291.7  264.2  363.6  0.723  0.277 
1987  400.8  328.7  278.2  451.3  0.708  0.292 
1988  466.5  380.0  290.3  579.6  0.690  0.310 
Note:  n.  a,  not  available. 
Sources:  Commission  on  the  Public  Concept  of  Land  Ownership,  1989  and  KHB,  1992,  p.  154. 
189 Additionally,  many  new  houses  were  built  after  demolition  of  old  houses,  so  the 
demolition  costs  added  to  house  prices.  According  to  KRIHS's  study  of  housing 
renewal  in  1982,  house  prices  increased  between  2  and  3  times  after  clearance  and 
renewal.  The  study  suggests  that  this  was  partly  because  of  the  improved  quality,  but 
mainly  because  of  the  transfer  of  demolition  costs  to  house  prices(1982,  p.  269) 
To  a  great  extent,  continuing  and  periodic  housing  inflation  is  explained  by  the 
nature  of  capitalism.  For  instance,  as  Ball  (1983,  P.  18)  suggests,  periods  of  rapid 
house  price  inflation  have  their  origins  in  the  attempts  of  housebuilders  to  raise  their 
profits  and  to  minimize  the  conversion  of  land  development  gain  into  land  rent 
appropriated  by  others.  In  Korea,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  Chapters,  prices  in 
new  houses  are  set  by  the  government  and  most  land  developments  are  carried  out  by 
the  public  sector.  This  argument  may  therefore  be  difficult  to  confirm  in  Korea. 
A  plausible  explanation  lies  with  tax  policy.  During  the  last  three  decades,  the 
government  has  tried  to  balance  increases  in  gains  from  wealth  and  income,  and 
reduce  general  price  increases  through  the  control  of  interest  rates,  rent  controls  on 
office  building  and  factories,  and  so  on.  However,  housing,  except  new  houses,  and 
existing  developed  residential  land  has  always  avoided  this  Policy.  This  has  attracted 
speculative  money  to  housing  and  the  developed  residential  land,  pushing  house 
prices  up  still  further.  Lee  S-K's  (1985)  study  concerned  with  the  relative  returns  to 
housing  and  competing  assets  with  a  non-neutral  tax  system  particularly  under 
inflationary  conditions,  concluded  that  tax  non-neutrality  would  lead  to  a  rise  in  the 
relative  return  to  housing  and  consequently  to  an  increase  in  the  price  of  housing  (see 
Hendershott  and  Hu,  1981;  Ebrill  and  Possen,  1982;  Kau  and  Keenan,  1983). 
However,  the  main  reason  for  recent  trends  in  house  prices  is  likely  to  lie  in  the 
Korean  housing  system  and  the  government's  policies.  As  we  have  seen  in  Chapters  5 
and  6,  the  government  has  promoted  very  rapid  development  of  housing  without  large 
investment  of  public  funds.  The  government  has  created  a  mass  market  for  owner- 
occupation,  financed  by  personal  savings  attracted  by  the  hope  of  speculative  gains. 
This  gave  the  government  a  reason  to  permit  continuing  increases  in  land  values  and 
house  prices  which  kept  the  flow  of  household  savings  moving. 
Housing  output  could  be  sustained  by  the  injection  of  new  personal  savings. 
Moreover,  there  are  few  leakages  of  personal  savings  out  of  the  housing  market,  not 
only  because  housing  has  been  the  best  investment  option,  but  also  because  there  have 
been  no  alternative  investment  options  for  ordinary  households.  Thus,  a  large  number 
of  transactions  can  be  financed  at  progressively  higher  price  levels  by  the  multiple 
effects  of  personal  saving  injections  as  a  result  of  household  income  growth,  despite 
quite  small  injections  of  new  funds  from  public  and  formal  financial  institutions. 
Furthermore,  when  new  injection  of  funds  from  personal  savings  into  the  housing 
190 market  was  declining  during  a  recession  period  while  a  huge  amount  of  capital  in  the 
curb  market  was  idle,  the  government  used  this  capital  to  sustain  high  housing  output. 
The  curb  market  has  played  an  important  role  in  channelling  savings  into  the  business 
sector.  As  Michell  (1988,  p.  68)  underlines  "The  government-controlled  network  was 
so  closely  geared  to  investment  and  export  credits  that  any  other  need  could  only  be 
satisfied  by  the  curb  market  loans".  The  exact  size  of  the  curb  market  was  hard  to 
determine.  For  instance,  in  accordance  with  the  August  3rd  Emergency  Measure  of 
1982,  the  reported  size  of  this  informal  market  at  the  time  was  equivalent  to  almost 
90  per  cent  of  the  total  money  supply,  or  33  per  cent  of  deposit  banks'  loans 
outstanding  (Sakong  11,1993,  p.  72).  This  gave  the  government  motives  for 
permitting  them  to  flow  into  the  housing  market  speculatively.  When  the  economy 
turned  towards  growth,  personal  savings,  in  turn,  were  injected  into  the  housing 
market.  In  order  to  direct  the  flow  of  capital  into  industrial  investments,  the 
government  launched  anti-speculation  measures.  Thus,  house  prices  in  Korea 
increased  even  during  the  period  of  declining  demand. 
In  contrast  to  the  rapid  increase  in  house  prices,  formal  supplies  of  housing 
finance,  especially  for  the  consumer,  lagged  far  behind  (KRIHS,  1990.12,  pp.  82- 
113).  At  national  level,  for  instance,  according  to  the  Bank  of  Korea  (National 
Account)  and  the  KHB  (Housing  Finance),  formal  housing  finance  including  both 
loans  for  suppliers  and  consumers  accounted  for  about  30  per  cent  of  housing 
investment  between  1977  and  1990.  This  means  that  about  70  per  cent  of  housing 
finance  was  provided  by  individual  households  or  by  informal  finance. 
One  of  the  by-products  of  the  lack  of  formal  finance  for  owner-occupation  has  been 
a  high  rate  of  residential  mobility.  The  percentage  of  households  moving  per  year  in 
Seoul  in  1982  was  43.3,  whereas  in  Bangkok  between  1980  and  1986,  Greater 
London  between  1986  and  1987  and  Paris  in  1984  these  figure  were  t9.2,13.5  and 
10.1  respectively  (Strassmann,  1991,  p.  765).  In  Korea,  when  a  couple  start  their  own 
household,  the  tenure  of  their  house  depends  on  the  wealth  of  the  family.  Some 
couples  from  wealthy  families  start  their  own  families  owning  their  own  home,  while 
couples  from  low-income  families  start  renting  on  a  monthly  basis.  When  those  who 
rent  have  accumulated  a  certain  lump  sum  of  money,  they  generally  move  to  Chunsei 
houses.  To  hedge  against  inflation,  they  build  up  their  key  money  in  successive 
moves  from  being  a  tenant  using  part  of  a  house  toward  becoming  an  exclusive  user, 
and  then  trade  up  as  an  owner,  possibly  with  chunsei  money  by  letting  part  of  the 
house.  Finally,  they  become  an  exclusive  user  of  their  own  house.  This  process  is  a 
major  contributary  factor  with  rapid  urbanisation  to  the  high  rate  of  residential 
mobility.  Table  7-5  shows  the  part  played  by  general  housing  finance  in  the 
consumption  of  Korean  households  in  this  process. 
191 Table  7-5  The  Source  of  Funds  for  Chunsei  Deposits  and  House  Purchase,  1989. 
Part-  Exclusive  First-time  Second-time 
Chunsei  Chunsei  Buyer  Buyer 
From  former  housing  sale. 
From  former  Chunsei  deposits. 
Their  own  savings. 
From  other  property  sale. 
Loans  from  formal 
financial  institutions. 
Loans  from  the  emplyer. 
Loans  from  curb-markets. 
Deposits  from  letting  part 
of  their  place  (or  house). 
Assistances  from  family. 
Others. 
7.2  16.3  66.8 
43.9  29.4  18.3  - 
32.9  36.5  42.8  14.9 
1.0  0.5  7.3  2.5 
1.3  1.0  9.8  6.2 
-  -  0.8  0.2 
1.4  1.4  3.2  2.0 
1.6  3.8  5.6  5.0 
9.1  7.7  9.1  2.2 
1.6  3.7  2.6  0.5 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source:  MOC,  1989,  pp.  19-20,  reconstructed  from  table  3-1  and  3-2. 
The  above  Table  suggests  several  things.  First,  the  main  source  of  housing  finance 
for  most  households  is  their  own  savings.  The  Citizens  National  Bank's  survey  of 
Actual  Household  Financial  Use  Conditions  in  1991  shows  the  main  purpose  of 
savings  in  ordinary  households  is  related  to  housing  consumption,  including  purchase, 
repair  and  upward  mobility.  The  high  rate  of  domestic  savings  in  Korea  (35.5  per 
cent  of  GNP  in  1990)  on  the  one  hand  can  be  powerfully  explained  by  the  deficit  of 
housing  finance  which  has  forced  people  to  save  (Song  B-N,  1990,  p.  149).  On  the 
other  hand,  low-income  households  or  large  families  who  spend  all  their  earnings  to 
meet  necessities  have  difficulty  in  improving  their  shelter  conditions  over  time. 
Table  7-6  Purpose  of  Household  Savings. 
For  children's  Prepare  for  For  To  repay  For  Others 
Total  For  education&  suddenneeds  retirement  debts  leisure 
housing  marriage 
100.0  %  34.3  30.3  21.8  10.5  1.9  0.4  1.0 
Source:  The  Citizens  National  Bank,  Survey  of  Actual  Household  Finance  Use  Conditions,  1991. 
Secondly,  the  role  of  the  family  in  housing  consumption  is  more  important  than 
that  of  formal  financial  institutions.  As  noted  earlier,  a  couple  start  their  own 
household  in  a  separated  house  from  their  family.  At  this  point,  Chunsei  deposits  or 
purchasing  money  (in  rare  cases)  is  generally  provided  by  the  parents  or  other  family 
members.  In  Korea,  it  is  a  responsibility  of  the  family  to  prepare  accommodation  for 
a  new  couple.  As  soon  as  a  couple  move  from  their  parents'  house  they  begin  to  save 
192 in  order  to  improve  their  housing  conditions  and  to  prepare  for  a  move  to  a  better 
Chunsei  house.  Parents  or  other  family  members  help  them  in  this  process.  The  aim 
is  to  become  an  owner-occupier.  After  a  couple  own  a  home,  assistance  from  their 
family  rapidly  declines  as  Table  7-5  showed.  For  many  low-income  households 
housing  conditions  were  improved  by  this  process  based  on  strong  family  ties  during 
the  1960s  and  the  1970s.  However,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapters  3  and  4,  low  income 
households  have  increasingly  had  to  help  other  low  income  households,  becoming 
lower-income  households  in  the  process.  They  were  increasingly  squeezed  out  of 
opportunities  for  owner-occupation  and  a  decent  home. 
Thirdly,  formal  financial  institutions  account  for  less  than  10  per  cent  of  the 
finance  for  housing  consumption  in  Korea.  The  operation  of  formal  financial 
institutions  in  Korea  is  of  particular  interest.  Most  housing  consumption  loans  from 
the  formal  financial  institutions  require  certain  amounts  of  savings  over  certain 
periods  or  some  securities  before  a  loan  will  be  given.  Low-income  households  or 
large  families  who  are  unable  to  save  to  meet  these  requirements  are  excluded  from 
the  loans.  Table  7-7  shows  that  most  housing  loans  have  been  allocated  to  upper- 
middle-income  households  who  could  repay  without  defaults  or  arrears. 
Table  7-7  Average  Monthly  Household  Income  of  Housing  Loan  Borrowers,  in 
Comparison  with  Average  Urban  Household  Income. 
1974  1976  1979  1982  1985  1988 
Loan  supported  households  f66.6 
All  urban  households  f44.8 
E99.3 
f80.  O 
f208.6 
f  176.3 
E367.5 
f264.2 
f495.0 
f359.2 
f  618.3 
f547.5 
Sources:  KHB,  Survey  of  Housing  Loan  Users,  1978,1979,  and  Survey  of  Actual  Conditions  of  Loan 
supported  Housing,  1982,1985,1988. 
However,  high  income  households  have  also  been  excluded  from  the  allocation  of 
housing  loans  from  the  Korean  Housing  Bank  and  the  National  Housing  Funds  by  the 
conditions  imposed  on  borrowers  as  a  guide  line.  Housing  loans  have  been  confined 
to  housing  of  less  than  330  sq.  m.  in  plot  size  and  less  than  100  sq.  m.  in  floor  area 
(KHB,  1990) 
Under  this  regime  of  limited  housing  finance,  rapid  increases  in  housing  prices 
gradually  eroded  effective  demand.  As  seen  in  Figure  5  in  Chapter  5,  ownership  rates 
gradually  declined  over  time,  despite  the  increases  in  housing  supply  rates.  Capital 
gains  were  therefore  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  declining  portion  of  the 
population.  Housing  has  become  a  visible  cause  of  inequality  over  time.  This  led  the 
government  to  launch  a  price-ceiling  system  and  housing  related  saving  schemes, 
with  the  twin  aims  of  raising  funds  for  housing  and  redistribution  of  wealth. 
However,  it  was  not  originally  intended  to  benefit  low-income  households. 
193 Minimum  lump-sum  deposits  and  monthly  saving  amounts  by  which  the  depositors 
were  entitled  to  the  preferential  purchase  rights  of  new  housing  units  at  controlled 
prices  after  certain  periods  were  Won  2,000,000  (about  f  1,667)  in  the  HSTD  and 
Won  20,000  (about  f-16.7)  in  the  NHSSD  in  1978  respectively  (see  Table  6-2  in 
Chapter  6).  The  Ministry  of  Construction's  '78  Survey  of  Actual  Living  Conditions 
(Urban  Tenants)  showed  that  those  households  with  monthly  savings  below  Won 
20,000  accounted  for  67.4  per  cent  of  urban  tenant  households,  as  Table  7-8  shows. 
Therefore,  the  beneficiaries  of  public  sector  housing  were  only  32.6  per  cent  of  urban 
tenant  households.  These  were  mostly  better-off  tenant  households.  In  1978,  the 
survey  also  showed  that  those  households  who  had  saved  over  Won  2,000,000  (about 
f-  1)  667)  accounted  for  only  11  per  cent  of  the  total  urban  tenant  households.  Even  in 
1988,  when  about  50  per  cent  of  households  in  Korea  had  less  than  Won  2,000,000 
of  monetary  assets  (Kwon  S-W,  et  al.,  1992,  p.  174),  a  lump  sum  deposit  of  Won 
2,000,000  for  the  allocation  of  the  smallest  private  sector  housing  was  beyond  the 
reach  of  many  moderate-income  households.  As  a  result,  the  government  created  the 
HISD  in  1989.  This  entitles  those  who  accumulate  a  specified  amount  of  monthly 
instalments  during  a  specified  period,  instead  of  a  lump  sum,  to  have  priority  in 
purchasing  private  sector  housing. 
Table  7-8  Monthly  Saving  Amounts  and  Proportion  of  Urban  Tenant  Households,  1978. 
(Korean  Won) 
Total  No  savings  below  10,000  10,000  -  20,000  Over  20,000 
Proportions(%)  100  24.9  27.4  15.1  32.7 
Source:  MOC,  '78  Survey  of  Actual  Living  Conditions  (Urban  tenants),  Seoul:  KHB,  1979,  p.  12. 
Table  7-9  Accumulated  Saving  Amounts  and  Proportion  of  Urban  Tenant  Households,  1978. 
(Korean  1,000  Won) 
Total  No  savings  Below  500  500  -1,000  1,000-2,000  2,000-5,000  Over  5,000 
100  %  32.1  17.8  22.7  16.4  9.1  1.9 
Source:  lbid,  p.  18. 
Increasing  number  of  people  could  have  benefits  from  this  scheme.  Howeven, 
housing  supply  lagged  far  behind  the  increase  in  urban  households.  Moreover,  social 
mobility  began  to  decline  through  the  restructuring  of  the  Korean  economy. 
Meanwhile  housing  prices  and  rents  continued  to  rise.  The  possibility  for  enjoying 
the  capital  gains  narrowed.  To  make  matters  worse,  economic  crisis  and  high 
inflation  in  the  early  1980s  sharply  reduced  effective  demands,  especially  in  salaried 
and  waged  workers.  This  circumstance  can  be  clearly  understood  by  looking  at  the 
housing  market  of  the  early  1980s  in  which  the  supply  of  small  houses  exceeded  the 
194 demand  resulting  in  many  unsold  small  houses,  conversely  the  supply  of  large  houses 
could  not  keep  up  with  the  demand  for  them  (Modern  Housing,  1993,  p.  39).  This  led 
the  government  to  launch  another  program,  called  Janggi  Ndai  Jutack  (long-term 
rented  housing  in  English),  which  leased  housing  for  five  years  with  the  option  to 
buy.  This  took  pressure  off  house  prices  for  a  period  of  five  years.  The  Janggi  Ndai 
Jutack  program  started  in  1982  with  the  launch  of  the  Plan  for  Supporting  Rented 
Housing.  These  houses  were  let  at  lower  rents  than  market  rents.  As  the  Table  below 
shows,  although  the  benefits  differed  from  city  to  city,  tenants  in  these  rented  houses 
paid  less  than  other  tenants. 
Table  7-10  The  Benefits  of  the  Janggi  Imdai  Jutack  Built  by  the  KNHC. 
City  Seoul  Big  cities  Small  and  Medium 
Estimated  Market  Rents  (A) 
Public  Rents  (B) 
E133 
flol. 
f  123 
f83 
f7l 
E58 
B/A  75.9%  67.5%  81.7% 
Source:  MOC,  1989,  p.  77. 
However,  these  rented  houses  were  allocated  according  to  the  housing  related 
saving  scheme.  Consequently,  as  Table  7-11  shows,  average  household  income  in 
them  was  higher  than  that  of  other  tenants  but  lower  than  in  the  owner-occupation 
sector.  A  striking  figure  is  that  local  governments  provided  rented  houses  for  higher 
income  households  than  the  KNHC,  a  quasi-public  organisation. 
Table  7-11  Comparison  of  Household  Incomes  by  Sectors,  1989. 
All  households  I  Households  in  rented  houses  leased  with  opti 
Owners  Tenants  Supplied  by  KNHC  Local  Govermnents 
to  buy 
Private 
E615  E418  E437  E475  E553 
Source:  MOC,  A  Study  on  the  Ettects  ot  Public  Housing  Projects,  Seoul:  K.  KIHS,  1989,  p.  42. 
Thanks  to  continuous  economic  growth,  most  moderate-  and  middle-income 
households  were  able  to  purchase  the  rented  houses  within  five  years.  Frequently  the 
tenants  in  the  Janggi  Imdai  Jutack  demanded  the  opportunity  to  buy  them  before  the 
five  years  were  completed  because  under  the  climate  of  rapidly  increasing  housing 
prices  the  earlier  a  household  could  purchase  a  house  the  more  they  could  gain.  There 
were  no  reasons  for  the  government  or  the  supplier  to  oppose  such  demands.  Most  of 
tile  rented  houses  were  sold  after  I  or  2  years  of  the  lease. 
The  supply  of  new  houses,  including  the  rented  houses  with  option  to  buy,  still 
lagged  far  behind  the  increases  in  the  number  of  households,  and  house  prices 
195 continued  to  increase.  More  and  more  moderate  and  middle-income  households  were 
excluded  from  enjoying  windfall  gains.  According  to  Korea  Housing  Bank  Surveys, 
in  1982,  the  average  period  of  time  that  a  household  would  take  to  become  an  owner 
occupier  after  marriage  was  5.9  years.  This  was  extended  to  7.8  years  in  the  1988 
survey. 
As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  6,  it  was  generally  higher  income  tenant  households 
who  joined  the  housing  related  saving  schemes  for  private  sector  housing,  such  as 
HSTD  or  HISD.  The  lower  income  households  joined  the  NHSSD  for  the  public 
sector  housing.  In  fact,  a  survey  (KHB,  1992a,  p.  88)  showed  that  average  household 
monthly  income  in  HSTD  was  about  f967,  about  E825  in  HISD  and  about  075  in 
NHSSD.  Households  with  lower  incomes,  of  course,  were  not  able  to  benefit  from 
the  windfall  gains.  In  1992  the  earnings  of  the  bottom  30  per  cent  of  urban 
households  was  below  075  per  month.  Amongst  those  who  joined  the  housing 
related  saving  schemes,  the  lower  income  households  could  only  join  accounts  which 
entitled  them  to  a  preferential  purchase  right  to  small  houses  of  40  sq.  m.  or  less  in 
size.  Thus,  in  Korea,  owner-occupied  housing  sizes  are  closely  correlated  with 
household  income,  rather  than  family  cycle.  Indeed,  a  recent  study  shows  that  the 
correlation  between  housing  size  and  household  income  was  0.96  in  1989  in  the 
houses  supplied  by  the  KNHC. 
In  terms  of  the  housing  size  supplied,  as  seen  in  Table  7-3,  the  average  size  of  new 
houses  built  by  even  the  public  sector  has  been  over  45  sq.  m.  For  example,  the 
KNHC,  which  has  supplied  over  60  per  cent  of  total  public  housing,  supplied 
549,139  housing  units  between  1977  and  1990.  Of  this  figure  only  80,023  or  14.6 
per  cent  of  the  supply  were  houses  of  40  sq.  m.  or  less  in  size. 
The  rapid  increase  in  housing  prices  and  the  shortfall  in  housing  resulted  in  many 
moderate  and  middle-income  households  seeking  accommodation  in  the  rented  sector. 
Indeed,  the  number  of  households  who  joined  the  housing  related  saving  schemes 
grew  over  time  to  2,923,945  households  in  1990  (HSTD;  939,582  households, 
HISD;  537,500  households,  and  NHSSD;  1,446,863  households).  This  was 
equivalent  to  about  34.5  per  cent  of  urban  households,  or  59.1  per  cent  of  urban 
tenant  households  (KHB,  Housing  Economic  Statistical  Year-Book,  various  issues 
and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  1990).  They  were  waiting  in  a  long  queue 
for  allocation  (precisely  a  privileged  purchase)  of  new  housing  at  a  controlled  price. 
However,  the  number  of  housing  units  being  sold  under  these  schemes  average  only 
two  hundred  thousand  a  year,  whereas  the  number  of  account  holders  was  increasing 
rapidly  as  were  housing  prices.  Consequently,  the  competition  for  aquiring  a  house 
was  very  severe  and  the  difference  between  owner-occupiers  and  tenants,  especially 
in  Chunsei,  in  terms  of  income  is  gradually  converging  over  time,  as  Table  7-12 
196 shows.  This  factor  explains  why  the  Korean  government  changed  housing  policy 
from  a  consumption-oriented  policy  into  a  supply-oriented  policy  from  1989 
onwards,  resulting  in  a  rapid  increase  in  housing  output. 
Table  7-12  Household  Income  by  Tenures,  as  percent  of  owner  occupiers'  incomes. 
Household  Owner-  Woelsei  with  Pure 
Year  Income  occupation  Chunsei  some  Chunsei  Sakwolsei  Wolsei 
On  Average  deposits. 
1983  E303  E380  (100-0)  69.9  61.7  52.0  56.5 
1985  E359  E453  (100.0)  71.3  62.8  48.8  48.0 
1987  E468  E579  (100.0)  71.4  63.8  53.4  55.2 
1989  E671  E821  (100.0)  71.6  62.3  63.2  57.9 
1990  E786  E951  (100-0)  73.6  65.2  64.6  51.9 
Sources:  NSO,  Annual  Report  on  the  Urban  Family  Income  and  Expenditure  Survey,  each  year. 
Under  these  institutional  and  market  arrangements,  on  the  one  hand,  low  income 
households  will  never  be  able  to  take  part  in  owner-occupied  markets  without 
increasing  their  wages  more  than  the  increases  in  house  prices.  On  the  other  hand, 
once  a  household  falls  into  low-income  group,  these  arrangements  make  it 
increasingly  difficult  for  them  to  gain  access  to  owner-occupation. 
7.3  Changing  Rental  Markets. 
As  we  have  seen  earlier,  it  is  clear  that  buying  a  house  is  not  a  feasible  option  for 
the  majority  of  existing  tenants  in  Korea  and  that  social  stratification  increasingly 
determines  tenure  divisions.  The  rental  sector  combines  the  role  of  "first  step"  in  the 
housing  life-cycle  for  young  households  who  have  difficulty  in  paying  for  owner- 
occupation  with  a  "last  refuge"  role  for  other  households  who  will  never  be  able  to 
afford  owner-occupation.  Therefore,  tenants  are  either  those  who  are  unable  to  afford 
owner-occupation  or  those  who  are  waiting  for  the  allocation  of  new  apartments  in 
the  Housing  Related  Saving  Schemes  (Ko  Chul,  Jin  J-S  and  Park  J-T,  1992,  p.  22). 
Basically,  the  rental  system  in  Korea  is  fairly  simple.  The  transactions  between 
landlord  and  tenant  are  not  different  from  any  other  commodity  transaction.  The 
price  and  availability  of  rented  accommodation  is  determined  by  laws  of  supply  and 
demand. 
The  term  Chunsei  is  Korean  for  a  collective  tenancy  which  is  subdivided  into 
Chunsei,  Wolsei  and  Sakwolsei,  according  to  the  method  of  rent  payments.  There  is, 
however,  no  difference  in  legal  rights,  obligations,  etc  among  them. 
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Chunsei  is  a  system  whereby  a  lump  sum  of  money  is  deposited  without  monthly 
rent  payments.  The  chunsei  deposit  is  at  the  level  of  half  of  the  housing  price.  These 
deposits  are  returned  to  tenants  when  the  rental  periods  are  finished.  Rents  are  the 
opportunity  costs  of  the  deposits  during  the  rental  periods.  Another  form  of  tenancy 
is  Wolsei,  which  is  similar  to  the  system  of  renting  in  Britain.  Rent  payments  are 
roughly  equal  to  the  short-term  curb  market  rate,  approximately  about  20  per  cent, 
for  the  Chunsei  deposit  (Renaud,  1993,  pp.  298-9).  The  monthly  rent  payments  vary 
according  to  the  contract  between  tenant  and  owner.  The  other  form  of  tenancy  is 
Sakwolsei.  According  to  this  form,  a  lump  sum  of  money  is  paid  when  the  rent  is 
initiated,  but  the  sum  of  money  differs  from  that  of  Chunsei.  It  is  equal  to  the  sum  of 
monthly  rent  payments  of  rental  Periods.  It  is  deducted  each  month,  exhausted  at  the 
end  of  the  rental  period  and  not  repaid. 
The  origin  of  today's  rental  system  is  not  clear.  Some  argue  that  the  Chunsei 
system  of  Korea  is  an  inheritance  from  the  agricultural  society  in  which  households' 
incomes  were  based  on  harvest  seasons.  Others  argue  that  it  is  closely  related  to 
inmigration  patterns.  Most  inmigrants  from  rural  areas  entered  into  cities  with  a  lump 
sum  of  money  raised  by  selling  their  land.  It  was  not  easy  to  find  jobs  for  them  in 
urban  areas.  Under  this  circumstance,  lump  sum  deposits  replaced  rents  as  a  method 
of  paying  for  housing  (Ryum  D-M  and  Kim  H-S,  1991,  p.  1).  However,  the 
development  of  the  rental  system  is  commonly  explained  in  terms  of  lack  of  housing 
finance.  With  no  mortgage  and  increasing  house  prices,  house  buyers  (owners)  were 
forced  to  share  the  costs  with  tenants.  Thus,  a  unique  rental  system,  the  "Chunsei" 
system,  has  been  developed  since  the  post-war  period  (Renaud,  1993,  p.  297,  Kim  K- 
H,  1990,  p.  7). 
For  house  owners,  a  lump  sum  Chunsei  deposit  substitutes  for  the  lack  of 
mortgages.  This  implies  that,  in  Korea,  tenants  Partly  play  the  role  of  informal 
mortgage  lenders.  As  KRIHS's  The  Survey  on  Actual  State  of  Rented  Houses  in  1980 
showed,  26.2  per  cent  of  houseowners  let  their  houses  to  repay  the  debt  incurred 
when  they  bought  the  house,  and  53.6  per  cent  of  houseowners  let  for  monthly  rental 
incomes.  Therefore,  for  landlords  who  let  part  of,  or  a  whole,  house,  the  rent  system 
acts  as  an  informal  mortgage,  a  source  of  income,  and  sometimes  individual  financial 
loans.  Indeed,  in  1980  the  Chunsei  claims  amounted  to  7  times  the  total  of 
outstanding  bank  mortgages  (Strassmann,  1991,  p.  766).  For  tenants,  the  system 
provides  various  alternatives,  suitable  for  various  households'  economic  situations. 
For  example,  a  young  and  highly  educated  couple  earning  much  but  with  little 
accumulated  capital  can  meet  their  housing  needs  through  the  Wolsei.  Alternatively, 
some  middle  aged  households,  earning  less  money  but  with  a  lump  sum  of  money 
already  saved,  can  meet  their  housing  needs  or  tastes  through  Chunsei.  In  this 
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of  conflict  (Fabian  society,  1973),  were  reconcilable. 
Under  this  rental  system,  however,  the  increase  in  house  prices  instantly  resulted  in 
an  increase  in  "Chunsei".  Furthermore,  given  competitive  rental  markets,  even  in  the 
recession  period,  as  households'  income  stagnates  and  thus  the  burden  of  housing 
prices  increases,  potential  house  purchasers  reduce  the  burden  by  increasing  the 
Chunsei  money.  Moreover,  in  rebuilding  or  repairing  houses,  landlords  offset  the 
difficulties  in  borrowing  money  from  formal  financial  institutes  by  increasing  the 
Chunsei.  While  these  arrangements  make  things  easier  for  those  who  have  some 
equity  in  a  house,  they  make  difficulties  for  tenants  whose  incomes  may  be  stagnant 
or  declining  while  their  housing  costs  rise. 
Table  7-13  House  Price  and  Rent  Indexes,  1985-1990(1985  =  100) 
Housing  price  Chunsei 
1986  (Dec.  )  97.3  105.4 
1987  (Dec.  )  104.3  125.6 
1988  (Dec.  )  118.0  142.9 
1989  (Dec.  )  135.2  168.0 
1990  (June)  153.2  197.6 
1990  (Sep.  )  158.8  199.8 
Source:  Minister  of  Construction. 
Over  the  last  three  decades,  many  factors  which  impacted  on  the  rental  market  have 
emerged  and  disappeared.  The  first  is  the  changing  labour  markets.  The  demand  for 
rented  houses  increased  with  the  rise  in  irregular  workers.  The  demand  for  owner 
occupation  also  increased  with  the  rise  in  the  number  of  professionals,  engineers  and 
craftsmen  etc,  and  of  households  with  two  earners.  As  households'  incomes  grew, 
more  households  preferred  privacy  to  the  rental  income.  As  Table  6-9  in  the  previous 
chapter  showed,  the  number  of  households  exclusively  using  a  house  has  increased 
over  time.  The  absolute  housing  shortages,  the  shortfall  in  housing  supply,  and  the 
growth  of  exclusive  users  has  placed  even  more  pressure  on  others  to  share  housing. 
These  trends  were  reinforced  by  the  development  of  housing  finance,  allowing  more 
purchasers  to  get  formal  housing  loans. 
The  importance  of  Chunsei  deposits  in  housing  finance  for  owner-occupation  has 
been  declining.  For  instance,  a  comparison  between  KRIHS's  1980  Survey  on  Actual 
State  of  Rental  Houses  and  MOC's  1985  Study  on  Directions  of  Housing  Policies  (6); 
the  Rented  Housing  show  that  the  percentage  of  house  owners  who  let  their  houses  to 
repay  the  debt  incurred  when  they  bought  the  house  had  fallen  from  26.2  per  cent  in 
1980  to  17.6  per  cent  in  1985.  Moreover,  price  controls  in  the  new  housing  market 
further  reduced  the  need  for  housing  finance. 
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and  place  increased  demands  on  rented  accommodation.  The  number  of  tenant 
households  has  increased,  and  become  an  important  aspect  of  the  housing  market. 
Nevertheless,  the  rapid  increase  in  house  prices  has  given  an  incentive  to  speculators 
to  buy  rented  property  and  then  sell  to  owner  occupiers  -  sometimes  after  rebuilding 
works  have  been  carried  out.  This  has  helped  to  create  a  problem  of  insecurity  and 
harassment  for  tenants. 
Although  operating  guidelines  are  provided  by  the  Tenant  Protection  Act  of  1981, 
landlords  can  exercise  their  absolute  property  rights.  In  practice,  there  is  no  secure 
system  against  arbitrary  evictions  and  arbitrary  increases  of  rent.  This  made  possible 
the  "Hapdong"  (co-operative)  housing  renewal  in  which  an  association  of  property 
owners,  excluding  tenants,  contracts  with  construction  firms,  and  converts  a  poor 
housing  area  into  high-rise  middle  income  flats  without  giving  any  alternative  to  their 
tenants. 
This  has  a  root  in  a  historical  background  in  association  with  landlords.  Landlords 
in  Korea  were  originally  not  an  exploitative  class.  There  has  traditionally  been  little 
hostility  against  landlords.  People  were  not  encouraged  to  possess  over  two  houses. 
Historically  owner-occupation  was  a  common  form  of  tenure  in  Korea.  Until  the 
early  1960s  over  60  per  cent  of  urban  households  were  owner-occupiers.  The 
problem  was  an  absolute  shortage  of  houses  compared  with  households. 
According  to  the  Population  and  Housing  Census  (EPB,  various  years),  the  number 
of  housing  units  did  approximately  correspond  to  that  of  house-owners  until  1960. 
This  implies  that  most  landlords  were  resident  landlords  who  let  a  part  of  their  houses 
to  tenants.  Even  nowadays,  according  to  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  in  1990,  there 
was  was  a  total  of  over  7  million  housing  units  in  Korea  and,  as  table  14  shows,  the 
number  of  house  owners  totalled  6,421,384  while  those  who  possessed  only  one 
housing  unit  totalled  5,987,500,  i.  e.  93.2  per  cent  of  owners.  Those  who  possessed 
over  two  housing  units  only  accounted  for  6.8  per  cent,  including  enterprises  and 
public  organisations.  This  implies  that  only  592,616  housing  units  could  be  inferred 
to  be  purely  rented  houses  let  by  absentee  landlords. 
Table  7-14  Scale  of  House  Ownership,  1990. 
(Nos.  of  houses  owned,  '000) 
One  Two  Three  Four  Five  Six  Seven  Eight  Nine  or  Total 
over 
Persons  5,987.5  377.3  41.5  8.0  2.6  1.4  0.7  0.6  1.9  6,421.4 
Source:  Ministry  ot  Home  Affairs. 
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rapid  social  and  residential  mobility  which  was  accompanied  by  changes  in  tenure, 
mainly  from  renting  to  owner-occupation.  During  this  period  of  rapid  social  mobility, 
most  tenants  saw  renting  as  a  largely  transitionry  period  before  they  could  buy  a 
house  of  their  own.  The  government  also  saw  the  rented  sector  in  a  similar  light. 
These  views  of  the  rented  sector  being  of  little  and  only  transitory  significance  have 
underlain  the  low  concern  and  relatively  limited  government  action  in  terms  of  policy 
for  the  rented  sector  in  Korea. 
Apart  from  the  public  sector  seen  in  Chapter  6,  the  reason  for  the  above  scenario  in 
association  with  the  supply  side  is  simple  enough;  lack  of  profits  in  commercial 
letting.  Unlike  resident  landlords,  house  builders  or  building  companies  which  let 
houses  are  taxed  on  rental  income  and  capital  gains.  Moreover,  rents  are  set  by  the 
government  at  the  level  of  60-70  per  cent  of  market  rents  and  they  can  increase  rents 
up  to  only  5  per  cent  per  year  (KO  Chul,  et  al.,  1992,  p.  76).  Furthermore,  the  sale 
prices  of  rented  houses  by  them  are  guided  by  the  MOC  at  prices  which  lie  between 
historic  costs  and  market  prices.  Under  these  circumstances,  as  many  studies  have 
consistently  confirmed,  commercial  letting  is  not  profitable.  This  is  the  reason  why 
in  Korea  there  are  no  commercial  landlords  who  posses  20  or  more  housing  units. 
The  government  are  aware  that  the  sector  cannot  be  operated  without  adequate 
returns.  However,  housing  is  the  most  profitable  investment  option  in  Korea.  The 
removal  of  the  regulations  and  controls  over  commercial  letting  would  cause  an 
influx  of  national  resources  into  the  housing  market.  Therefore,  letting  in  Korea  is 
left  in  the  hands  of  individuals.  Landlords  were  usually  people  earning  extra  income 
from  letting  a  part  of  their  houses.  They  operated  on  a  very  small  scale.  Thus,  the 
characteristic  of  Korean  landlords  was  that  they  are  "income  oriented",  rather  than 
the  "capital  gain  oriented".  Rental  markets  operate  on  a  very  small  scale  and  are 
crucially  affected  by  the  changes  in  the  whole  housing  market,  rather  than  certain 
rent  policies. 
As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  6,  the  government's  housing  policy  has  increasingly 
tended  to  focus  on  the  construction  of  high-rise  apartments.  High-rise  building  was 
not  at  all  part  of  the  cultural  tradition  in  Korea.  According  to  MOC's  '78  Survey  of 
Actual  Living  Conditions  (Urban  Tenants)  (KHB,  1979,  p.  8),  about  85  per  cent  of 
tenants  preferred  to  live  in  houses,  whereas  only  11.7  per  cent  of  tenant  households 
preferred  to  live  in  high-rise  flats.  The  high-rise  apartment  was  first  introduced  by  the 
construction  of  Mapo  APT,  an  area  in  Seoul,  by  the  KNHC  in  1961.  Since  then, 
high-rise  apartment  construction  has  been  advocated  by  several  factors.  Firstly,  it 
makes  intensive  use  of  land,  and  maximizes  the  number  of  dwelling  units  on  the  land. 
Construction  of  high-rise  flats  is  more  economically  efficient  than  building  detached 
201 houses.  It  contributes  to  reducing  housing  shortages  more  effectively  than  other 
housing  types.  In  addition  to  this  the  avoidance  of  urban  sprawl,  the  protection  of 
farming  land,  and  the  preservation  of  green  belts  were  seen  as  intimately  related  to 
high-rise  building  construction.  Indeed.  urban  planning  was  directed  to  providing 
more  open  spaces,  better  schools  with  play  grounds,  more  industrial  estates  and 
improved  transport  systems  in  urban  areas,  all  of  which  required  increasing  space 
allocations.  The  onus  of  land  saving  in  the  urban  area  fell  entirely  on  housing.  Unlike 
other  land  uses,  the  designation  of  residential  land  uses  has  decreased  over  time  in  the 
biggest  cities  (Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  Municipal  Year-book  of  Korea,  various 
years). 
Even  if  no  connection  was  made  between  high-rise/high  density  urban  development 
and  urban  land  savings  as  a  whole,  it  was  universally  believed  that  the  use  of  high- 
rise  apartments  on  a  particular  site  allowed  the  creation  of  open  spaces  within  the  city 
-  areas  of  grass  and  trees  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  private  spaces  of  the  house. 
Moreover,  optimistic  expectations  of  a  decline  in  construction  costs  were  held.  In 
Britain  many  studies  showed,  in  contrast  to  these  optimistic  expectations,  that  the 
aggregate  costs  of  high-rise  building  seemed  to  be  higher  than  those  of  low-rise 
houses  (Nevitt,  1966;  Stone,  1970  and  Dunleavy,  1981).  However,  optimistic 
expectations  of  high  rise  building  were  more  likely  to  be  true  in  Korea  with  limited 
land,  high  land  prices  and  high  housing  demands.  High-rise  housing  construction 
costs  less  than  detached  houses  under  the  the  building  codes  of  the  Construction  Act 
(KRIHS,  1989.12,  p.  10).  The  problem  was  that  these  optimistic  views  based  on 
efficiency  concealed  the  issue  of  who  are  excluded  from  high  rise  development. 
People  who  live  in  flats  have  a  greater  vulnerability  to  certain  kinds  of  illness 
because  they  undertake  less  physical  activity  and  go  out  of  doors  less;  loneliness  and 
social  isolation  are  common  problems  (Hong  D-S  and  Lee  D-W  (ed.  ),  1993).  The 
main  flaw  of  the  high-rise  apartment  development  in  Korea  is  that  most  low-income 
households  have  been  increasingly  excluded  from  access  to  owner-occupation,  and 
even  from  renting  by  the  supply  of  these  high-rise  apartments. 
High-rise  housing  in  Korea  is  so  expensive  that  most  low-income  households 
cannot  afford  to  use  it  (KNHC,  1983,  p.  115).  The  increasing  costs  of  high-rise 
construction  were  associated  with  the  need  to  include  lifts  and  to  shift  from  brick 
construction  to  more  expensive  building  materials  (Nevitt  1966,  pp.  107-9).  Thus, 
because  of  high  prices,  rents  per  unit  in  high-rise  apartment  are  higher  than  that  of 
other  forms  of  rented  houses  (Ko  Chul,  1992,  p.  66). 
The  increasing  proportion  of  high-rise  apartments  with  no  subsidies  necessarily 
reduced  the  choices  open  to  low-income  tenants.  Firstly,  apart  from  high  rents,  as 
Figure  7-1  shows,  the  maintenance  costs  in  apartments  are  higher  than  in  other  types 
202 of  housing.  These  are  mainly  due  to  management  costs,  such  as  lifts,  public  lighting, 
etc.,  on  which  individual  households  are  unable  to  economize.  Secondly,  moreover, 
the  design  of  high-rise  apartments  has  made  it  difficult  for  people  to  share  with  other 
families.  For  low  income  households,  the  sharing  of  a  house  with  other  families  is 
the  only  way  to  reduce  housing  consumption  costs.  As  a  consequence,  about  80  per 
cent  of  tenant  households  live  in  detached  dwellings,  whereas  about  10  per  cent  of 
tenant  households  are  in  apartment  units  (Population  and  Housing  Census,  1990).  Of 
those  in  apartments  97.3  per  cent  of  tenants  do  not  share  with  other  households 
whereas  only  8.8  per  cent  of  tenants  in  detached  dwellings  do  not  share  (KRIHS, 
1991.7).  This  indicates  that  most  low  income  households  live  in  the  detached 
dwellings  sharing  with  other  households. 
Figure  7-1  Maintenance  Costs  by  Housing  Types,  Korean  1,000  Won,  1990. 
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Note:  The  costs  are  based  on  the  actually  paid  by  occupants. 
Source:  KHB,  Survey  of  Actual  Conditions  in  Housing  Financial  Demands,  1990,  p.  52. 
The  choices  open  to  tenants  have  further  declined  with  the  demolition  and 
conversion  of  old  and  detached  dwellings.  As  Table  7-15  shows,  between  1975  and 
1990,  housing  loss  in  Korea  was  about  1.9  million  units  largely  because  of  the  loss  in 
detached  houses.  As  a  consequence,  the  KNHC  survey  in  1983  showed  that  urban 
tenant  households  used  1.81  rooms  per  household  on  average.  Five  years  after  the 
survey,  the  MOC  survey  in  1988  showed  that  this  declined  to  1.32  rooms  per 
household.  This  is  despite  increased  household  incomes  and  increased  housing 
supply  rates  (housing  units  to  households). 
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Detached  High-rise  Row 
House  Apartment  House Table  7-15  Changed  Housing  Stock  by  Housing  Types,  1975-1990. 
(Unit:  1,000units) 
Housing  Stocks  Detached  Row  house  High-rise 
Dwelling  Apartment 
1975  Census 
1990  Census 
4,636 
6,958 
4,382 
4,727 
165 
603 
89 
1,628 
Increases  (A)  2,322  345  438  1,539 
Units  supplied  between 
1976  and  1990  (B) 
4,214  1,350  679  2,185 
Housing  Loss  (A)  -  (B)  -1,892  -1,005  -241  -646 
Notes:  excluding  dwelling  units  in  the  building  not  intended  for  human  habitation;  Multi-family 
houses  are  included  in  the  row  houses. 
Sources:  EPB  and  NSO,  Population  and  Housing  Census,  1975  and  1990,  and  KHB,  Housing 
Economic  Statistical  Year-book,  p.  348. 
The  fall  in  the  number  of  rented  units  has  been  offset  by  more  people  sharing  and 
by  increasing  rents.  The  KRIHS's  study,  An  Evaluation  of  the  Government  Housing 
Programmes(1990),  in  Seoul,  shows  the  average  market  rent  to  be  f283  per  month 
while  the  equilibrium  rent,  based  on  the  economic  rent,  was  assessed  at  f  108.  This 
means  that  tenants  were  paying  in  excess  of  f  175  per  month  over  the  economic  rent. 
As  the  Ministry  of  Construction  (1993,  p.  52)  pointed  out,  "Tenants  pay  similar 
housing  consumption  costs  compared  with  owner-occupiers,  nevertheless,  they  live  in 
relatively  deteriorated  housing  conditions".  Given  absolute  housing  shortages  and  no 
alternatives,  there  is  little  scope  for  significant  increase  in  rents  without  causing 
widespread  hardship,  and  more  overcrowding.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  idea  of 
consumer  sovereignty  is  a  myth,  with  any  increased  income  of  tenant  households 
being  translated  into  increased  costs  of  consumption  without  any  improvement  in 
living  conditions. 
Another  unwelcome  feature  of  the  changing  housing  market  is  that  low-income 
households  suffer  more  than  others  within  the  rental  sector.  Slum  and  shanty  housing 
areas  in  which  most  old  and  detached  houses  were  concentrated  have  been  replaced 
by  high-rise  apartments.  The  high-rise  apartment  redevelopment  was  seen  as  a  way 
for  increasing  the  number  of  households  in  these  areas.  However,  this  was  an 
irrational  plan.  When  comparing  the  number  of  households  of  the  slum  areas  with  the 
number  after  redevelopment,  as  Kim  W-J  (1985)  showed,  it  can  be  seen  that  far  more 
households  lived  in  the  area  before  the  high-rise  redevelopment.  Over  H5,000  units 
were  destroyed  in  Seoul  alone  between  1973  and  1982  by  urban  renewal.  These  units 
could  have  housed  at  least  400,000  households,  mostly  the  urban  poor  using  one  or 
two  rooms  for  a  family  (Kim  J-H,  1990).  In  contrast  to  this,  most  new  housing  units 
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the  low-income  households  could  not  afford.  Housing  conditions  of  tenant 
households,  especially  in  low-income  households  deteriorated  over  time.  Nonetheless, 
rents  increased  more  than  housing  prices,  household  incomes  and  other  prices.  In 
June  of  1989,  several  families  committed  suicide  because  they  could  not  afford  the 
increased  rents,  causing  the  issue  to  become  a  focus  for  the  mass  media. 
Many  commentators  argued  that  rented  houses  were  necessary  and  that  some  kind 
of  financial  assistance  to  the  commercial  builders  for  the  supply  of  rented  houses, 
ranging  from  direct  subsidies  to  indirect  tax  relief,  was  necessary.  However,  the 
financial  subsidies  to  property  companies  raised  several  questions.  Firstly,  how  much 
financial  subsidies  were  necessary  to  supply  enough  rented  houses  by  the  private 
sector?  Secondly,  could  the  subsidies  paid  to  private  property  companies  induce  them 
to  supply  rented  houses  which  low-income  households  were  able  to  afford?  The  first 
permanent  rented  housing  program  for  the  urban  poor  was  introduced  in  the 
construction  plan  for  2  million  houses  by  the  government  in  1989  instead  of  subsidies 
to  property  companies.  And  in  1990,  the  government  introduced  a  multi-family 
housing  program.  It  may  be  too  early  to  assess  the  effects  and  impacts  of  the 
permanent  rented  housing  program  and  of  the  multi-family  housing  program. 
The  original  plan  for  the  permanent  rented  housing  aimed  to  provide  250,000  units 
for  a  similar  number  of  the  urban  poor  who  were  designated  as  beneficiaries  of  the 
poverty  relief  policy  in  six  big  cities.  The  central  government's  subsidy  accounted  for 
85  per  cent  of  the  construction  costs.  The  remainder  was  to  be  covered  by  the 
supplier  (local  governments  and  the  KNHQ  and  the  tenants.  It  was  allocated  to  the 
urban  poor  at  cheap  rents. 
In  practice,  only  60  per  cent  of  the  targeted  urban  poor  applied  for  permanent 
rented  houses  (KRIHS,  1989,  p.  62).  For  the  urban  poor,  apart  from  the  rents,  high- 
rise  apartments  were  too  expensive  to  maintain  (Ryum  D-M,  1993,  p.  64).  Moreover, 
in  order  to  reduce  the  costs,  the  suppliers  (local  governments  and  the  KNHQ  built 
the  flats  in  economically  and  geographically  peripheral  areas.  Even  though  85  per 
cent  of  construction  costs  were  subsidized  by  the  central  government,  the  remaining 
costs  and  the  operating  expenses  for  the  permanent  rented  housing  had  to  be  covered 
by  the  rent  income  which  accounted  for  60-70  per  cent  of  required  operating  costs 
(Ko  Chul,  et  al.  1992,  p.  74).  The  targeted  urban  poor  were  increasingly  reluctant  to 
move  into  these  rented  houses.  The  government  cut  down  the  target  number  of  the 
permanent  rented  houses  to  150,000  units  in  1990.  Nevertheless,  many  units 
remained  unlet  and,  moreover,  rent  defaults  began  to  occur.  For  the  urban  poor  who 
tended  to  live  hand-to-mouth,  the  rents  and  maintenance  costs  were  too  much  of  a 
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housing  related  saving  schemes. 
The  multi-family  housing  program  was  based  on  a  deregulation  of  building  codes 
in  the  construction  and  remodelling  of  a  house  to  allow  for  sharing.  It  arose  partly 
from  a  concern  about  how  to  improve  conditions  in  the  existing  rented  houses  and 
manage  the  process  of  decline.  In  a  sense  this  was  an  acknowledgement  of  the 
intractable  nature  of  the  problems  of  existing  housing  finance,  and  reflects  a  belief 
that  it  was  more  efficient  and  effective  to  use  existing  rental  systems,  using  individual 
resources.  The  government  still  believed  that  most  tenant  households  would  transfer 
to  owner-occupation  in  the  near  future  as  their  incomes  grew.  The  aim  of  the  multi- 
family  house  programme  was  concerned  with  temporarily  halting  the  decline  of 
rented  houses  and,  at  best,  achieving  a  marginal  increase  in  their  sizes  and  an 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  existing  rented  houses.  However,  as  the  Table  below 
shows,  KRISH's  survey  (1992)  of  the  source  of  finance  for  remodelling  of  detached 
multi-family  houses  in  Seoul,  Kwangju  and  Taijun  in  1992  indicates  that  about  37  per 
cent  of  the  construction  costs  were  financed  through  the  Chunsei,  whereas  formal 
finance  accounted  for  a  meagre  7  per  cent.  This  implies  that  many  of  these 
improvements  were  done  by  the  tenants  themselves. 
Table  7-16  The  Source  of  Finances  in  the  Remodelling  of  Detached  into  Multi-family 
House,  1992. 
(percentages) 
Sources.  Seoul  Kwangju  Taijun  Total 
Their  own-money  39.6  67.9  60.4  50.8 
Chunsei  deposits  48.0  21.4  26.3  36.9 
Loans  from  Banks  8.0  2.7  8.6  6.9 
Loans  from  Curb  market  2.2  2.0  2.4  2.2 
Others  2.3  6.0  2.2  3.1 
Source:  Ko  Chul,  Jin  J-S  and  Park  J-T,  Research  for  the  development  of  private  rental  industry,  Seoul: 
KRIHS,  1992,  p.  61,  Table  4-10. 
Multi-family  housing,  whether  through  new  construction,  rebuilding  or 
remodelling,  was  essentially  a  long-term  investment  for  private  property  owners.  This 
increased  the  rate  of  return  that  the  owners  required  in  order  to  invest  in  housing  to 
let.  As  with  repair  and  maintenance,  the  costs  were  passed  on  to  the  tenants  (Ko  Chul 
et  al.,  1992,  p.  68).  Moreover,  under  limited  housing  finance,  most  Wolsei  or 
monthly  rents,  were  converted  into  Chunsei  to  finance  construction  costs.  Many  low- 
income  tenants  were  evicted  by  the  landlords  after  improvements  to  accommodate  the 
better-off  Chunsei  tenants.  Monthly  renters  who  did  not  have  access  to  accumulated 
savings  from  relatives  or  from  good  incomes  increasingly  faced  severe  problems 
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low-income  households. 
7.4  Filtering  Up  and  Down. 
Filtering  has  for  over  three  decades  been  the  subject  of  a  policy  debate  concerning 
the  most  efficient  way  of  improving  housing  standards  for  Korean  society  (see  Rho 
Y-H,  1984;  Lim  G-C,  1987;  Johnson,  1987;  Baer,  1991,  p.  71;  Park  C-B,  1987, 
p.  171  etc).  An  empirical  study  (KRIHS,  1988)  carried  out  on  the  filtering  effect 
shows  that  "horizontal"  moves  producing  neither  gains  nor  losses  in  housing 
standards  were  similar  for  all  groups,  about  35  per  cent  of  households  made  upward 
adjustments  through  residential  mobility  while  40  per  cent  made  downward 
adjustments.  But  almost  31  per  cent  of  tenants  made  downward  adjustments  through 
residential  mobilitY  whereas  26.3  per  cent  of  the  homeowners  made  upward 
adjustments  in  housing  consumption. 
Table  7-17.  Changes  in  Housing  Consumption  with  Mobility,  1988. 
(unit:  %  of  total  moves) 
High-High 
Owners  4.8 
Tenants  4.7 
Horizontal  Moves 
Low  -  Low 
59.7 
56.2 
Downward  Moves 
High  -  Low 
9.2 
30.8 
Upward  Moves 
Low  -  High 
26.3 
8.2 
Notes:  Housing  consumption  was  calculated  by  the  equation  of  Imputed  rents/Hedonic  Function. 
Hedonic  Function  was  calculated  by  using  II  independent  variables  -  housing  type,  age,  floor  space, 
number  of  rooms,  heating  method,  toilet,  hot  water,  neighbourhood  income  level,  and  journey  times  to 
city  centre,  to  high  school,  and  to  shops. 
Source:  KRIES,  1988,  p.  65. 
Once  a  household  becomes  a  home  owner,  there  is  no  tax  on  imputed  rent  income. 
Moreover,  rental  income  is  not  taxed.  Although  the  returns  are  different  in  different 
areas,  types  and  times,  in  a  rapidly  growing  economy  which  was  accompanied  by 
high  inflation,  the  meaning  of  housing  possession  is  quite  different  from  what  it  is  in 
a  stable  society  in  which  annual  price  increase  is  less  than  8  per  cent.  In  a  simple 
calculation,  according  to  the  Annual  Report  on  the  Urban  Family  Income  and 
Expenditure  Survey  (NSO,  each  year),  Chunsei  deposits  are  about  half  of  the 
housing  price.  Monthly  rents  are  decided  by  the  interest  rate  secured  on  the  Chunsei 
deposits.  These  interest  rates  are  generally  20  per  cent  per  year  (Ryum  D-M,  1993, 
p.  133).  If  someone  lets  a  house,  therefore,  he/she  could  have  a  10  per  cent  untaxed 
return  from  housing  investment.  Considering  tax  and  other  overhead  costs,  this  rate 
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which  are  generally  10  -  12  per  cent. 
The  most  attractive  gain  from  owner-occupation  is  capital  gains.  These  gains  are 
also  variable  according  to  location,  type,  size  and  period.  There  are  no  systematic 
statistics  but  according  to  several  piecemeal  studies,  housing  investment  has  brought 
the  highest  returns,  even  considering  capital  gains  alone.  The  average  annual  return 
from  savings  and  stock  investment  between  1975-85  (KHB,  1989,  p.  87)  was 
estimated  as  14.7  per  cent  and  16.6  per  cent  respectively,  whereas  the  return  from 
housing  was  20.6  per  cent,  excluding  rental  incomes.  Another  study  found  that  the 
real  return  to  housing  investment  exceeded  that  of  corporate  bonds  by  a  very  large 
margin  of  between  3  per  cent  to  8  per  cent  (Kim  K-U,  1987). 
As  Table  7-18  shows,  according  to  the  Housing  Finance  Demand  Sur-Vey  in  which 
3,550  households  were  selected  at  random  (KHB,  1990),  the  annual  rate  of  return 
from  housing  investment  in  cities  was  34.43  per  cent,  mainly  due  to  the  rapid 
increase  in  housing  prices.  Whether  the  capital  gains  are  paper  gains  or  not,  it  cannot 
be  denied  that  for  ordinary  people  in  Korea  housing  is  the  best  investment  option. 
Table  7-18.  Differences  between  Purchasing  Prices  and  Present  Prices. 
Purchasing  Present  Residential  Increased  Annual  Rates 
Prices  Prices  Period  Amounts  of  Return 
(f)  (f)  (Years)  per  Year  (%) 
All  Households  30,342  89,894  5.7  10,448  34.43 
Seoul  42,333  147,942  5.1  20,708  48.92 
Big  Cities  21,796  57,918  6.3  5,733  26.30 
Other  Cities  24,103  52,624  5.7  5,003  20.76 
Source:  KHB,  Housing  Fiance  Demand  Survey,  1990. 
Although  there  is  no  precise  information  about  the  changes  in  the  wealth  of  Korean 
society  until  recent  years  (Choo  H-JI)  1982,  p.  95  and  Kwon  S-W,  1992,  p.  17  1),  the 
main  inequality  in  wealth  in  urban  areas  stemmed  not  from  the  monetary  assets  such 
as  stocks  and  savings,  and  the  mode  of  production,  but  from  physical  assets  such  as 
housing  and  land  (Kang  B-K,  1989,  pp.  75-90).  For  instance, 
)  when  the  government 
launched  the  currency  reform  in  1962,  about  10  per  cent  of  households  in  Korea 
accounted  for  about  50  per  cent  of  the  savings  (Bank  of  Korea,  1962).  Whereas, 
) 
according  to  the  Bank  of  Korea's  Saving  Market  Survey  in  1988,10  per  cent  of 
households  compromised  about  41  per  cent  of  total  savings.  For  another  instance, 
Choo's  study  (1982,  chapter  2)  based  on  the  National  Wealth  Survey  in  1977, 
although  it  excluded  savings  and  stocks,  showed  that  the  inequality  in  the  household 
wealth  between  regions,  ages,  and  occupations  was  mainly  caused  from  the 
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housing  policy  from  a  supply-oriented  policy  towards  a  consumption-oriented  policy 
in  which  price  control  and  the  housing  related  saving  schemes  which  give  priority  to 
tenant  households  were  the  two  wheels  of  the  changed  policy. 
Housing  in  Korea  compromised  67.0  per  cent  of  household  wealth  in  cities  in 
1989,  including  all  monetary  and  physical  assets,  as  Table  7-19  shows.  The  Korean 
housing  system  has  double  faces.  On  the  one  hand,  it  contributed  to  equalize  the 
housing  wealth  on  average,  by  giving  priority  to  tenant  households.  However,  as 
Figure  5-3  in  Chapter  5  showed,  ownership  rates  decreased  in  cities  from  62.0  per 
cent  in  1960  to  41.6  per  cent  in  1990.  In  this  respect,  housing  contributed  to 
aggregate  inequality  of  wealth  (Kwon  S-W  et  al.,  1992,  p.  180) 
Table  7-19.  The  Composition  of  Household  Wealth. 
Nation  Cities  Others 
Housing  55.7  67.0  17.4 
Other  estates  34.4  22.8  73.6 
Savings  5.1  5.8  2.7 
Stocks  1.3  1.6  0.2 
Bonds  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Insurances  1.1  1.3  0.6 
Savings  in  curb  market  0.9  1.0  0.6 
Machinery  0.5  0.1  1.7 
Car  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Poultry  0.4  0.1  1.3 
Others  0.4  0.1  1.9 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source:  KDI,  People's  Living  Standard  and  Economic  Perception  Survey,  1989. 
The  homeowners  have  been  able  to  build  up  an  equity  in  their  property  due  to  the 
rapid  increase  in  housing  prices  which  could  be  used  for  upward  mobility  in  the 
housing  market.  Moreover,  owner-occupation  is  the  cheapest  form  of  housing  tenure. 
Ordinary  households  in  Korea  save  mainly  for  the  purchase  of  a  house,  requiring 
them  to  build  up  holdings  of  financial  assets  by  reducing  purchases  of  other 
consumption  goods.  This  means  that  when  households  became  homeowners,  they 
need  not  save  up  for  housing  to  the  same  extent  as  they  used  to  (see  Table  7-20). 
When  they  become  owners,  they  begin  to  spend  on  other  consumption  goods  and 
services  more  than  before  not  only  because  of  the  reduced  savings  for  house 
purchase,  but  also  because  housing  costs  are  the  least  for  owner-occupiers.  They  can 
invest  more  in  their  children's  education  and  give  more  support  for  their  chilfren's 
access  to  owner-occupation  than  can  those  who  rent. 
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For  children's  Prepare  for  For  after  To  repay  For  Others 
Tenure  For  education&  suddenneeds  retirement  debts  leisure 
housing  marriage 
Total  34.3  30.3  21.8  10.5  1.9  0.4  1.0 
Owners  14.1  41.7  25.1  14.9  2.6  0.4  1.1 
Chunsei  65.3  14.3  14.6  4.1  0.9  0.3  0.5 
Wolsei  55.5  15.8  23.7  3.6  0.0  0.7  0.7 
Sakwolsei  47.5  20.5  20.5  6.4  1.3  0.0  3.8 
Source:  The  Citizens  National  Bank,  Survey  of  Actual  Household  Finance  Use  Conditions,  1991, 
p.  113. 
Some  substantial  residential  improvements  were  evidenced  among  the  middle  and 
upper  income  tenant  households  through  the  housing  system,  as  we  have  seen  in  the 
previous  chapter.  But  the  reverse  occurred  in  the  low  and  even  in  some  moderate- 
income  tenant  households  for  whom  things  have  become  progressively  more  difficult 
due  to  the  rapid  increase  in  rents.  If  the  low-income  households  were  successful  in 
purchasing  a  house,  it  was  usually  of  poor  quality,  small  in  size  and  an  illegal  one.  If 
they  failed,  what  options  were  open  to  them?  They  could  rent  shared  accommodation 
or  reduce  the  number  of  rooms,  or  live  with  a  family.  They  could  not  drop  out  of  the 
private  market  because  there  were  no  public  houses  for  them. 
Meanwhile,  most  new  and  large  housing  developments  have  been  concentrated  on 
the  outskirts  of  the  city,  taking  the  form  of  high-rise  apartments.  In  contrast  to  thisl 
most  new  industrial  estates  were  designated  in  peripheral  areas  and  suburbia,  and 
many  manufacturing  factories  in  the  inner  city  areas  were  increasingly  replaced  by 
office  buildings  and  relocated  by  the  Industrial  Distribution  Act  of  1972.  Thus,  as  Ha 
S-K  and  Kim  J-I's  study  (1992)  in  the  Greater  Seoul  area  shows,  many  white  collar 
workers  commute  from  the  suburbs  to  inner  city  offices,  whereas  many  blue  collar 
workers  commute  from  inner  city  to  the  outskirts  of  the  city  or  even  beyond  the  green 
belt  to  factories  located  still  further  away.  This  cross  commuting  increasingly  raised 
the  issue  of  congestion,  and  placed  pressures  on  the  government  for  the  construction 
of  new  roads,  underground  systems  and  public  facilities.  Many  cheaper  rented  houses 
have  been  gradually  demolished  to  give  way  for  new  roads,  and  stations,  etc.  The 
construction  of  new  roads  or  the  underground  soon  brought  about  housing  renewal  or 
gentrification,  as  seen  in  Chapter  6.  According  to  KNHC's  survey  about  the  urban 
poor  defined  by  the  Poverty  Relief  Programme,  over  18  per  cent  of  the  urban  poor  in 
Seoul  had  one  or  more  experiences  of  eviction  as  a  result  of  demolition  (12.5  per  cent 
in  Pusan,  10  per  cent  in  Daegue,  20  per  cent  in  Inchun,  and  so  on;  see  KNHC, 
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some  owners,  moved  to  old  and  inexpensive  dwellings  nearby.  If  that  was  not 
available,  they  had  to  move  to  inexpensive  rented  houses  in  areas  farther  away  from 
their  livelihoods. 
Moreover,  although  housing  consumption  costs  of  the  total  number  households 
increased,  the  proportion  of  household  income  spent  on  housing,  excluding  heating, 
maintenance  costs,  etc.,  varied  very  much  between  social  groups  even  in  tenant 
households.  As  Table  7-21  shows,  this  was  around  20  per  cent  for  higher  income 
groups  and  29  per  cent  for  lower  income  groups  in  1988.  When  including  other  costs 
related  to  housing,  such  as  heating  and  electricity,  the  poorest  tenants  were  paying 
over  50  per  cent  of  their  incomes  for  housing  consumption  costs  (Table  7-22). 
Table  7-21.  Rent-income  Ratio  of  Urban  Tenants  (without  utilities) 
Classification  1982  1984  1988 
among  tenants 
Low-income  group  0.21  0.23  0.29 
Middle-income  group  0.15  0.20  0.26 
Upper-income  group  0.13  0.18  0.20 
Note:  chunsei  deposits  were  changed  into  imputed  rents. 
Source:  KRIHS,  Housing  Market  Survey,  each  year. 
Table  7-22.  Housing  Consumption  Costs  of  Tenants,  as  percentage  of  the  household 
income,  in  Seoul,  1983. 
Income  Below  E167  -  E333  -  E500  -  over 
E167  E333  E500  E667  E667 
1)  Rents  (without  facilities)  30  %  26  %  23  %  22  %  Less  16  % 
2)  Total  Housing  Costs  56  %  50  %  46  %  44  %  Less  34% 
1)  'Chunsei'  deposit  was  changed  into  imputed  rent. 
2)  including,  rents,  repayment  for  debts  for  rent,  heating,  maintenance  and  repair  costs. 
Source:  Korea  National  Housing  Corporation,  1983,  p.  107. 
For  low-income  households,  the  difference  between  a  tolerable  life  and  mere 
survival  may  depend  on  their  earning  and  expenditure.  The  former  may  depend  on 
their  capacity  to  work  and  on  their  opportunities  to  work,  and  the  latter  may  depend 
on  the  proportion  of  their  expenditures  on  necessities  such  as  food,  clothing,  health 
care  and  housing.  Inadequate  income  is  not  the  only  problem  facing  urban  low- 
income  households.  Food  and  housing  are  the  most  important  areas  taking  the  money 
of  the  poor.  Shelter  costs  are  one  of  the  most  rigid  and  inflexible  of  all  consumption 
expenditures  because  the  Korean  winter  is  too  cold.  Sudden  reductions  in  earning  or 
increases  in  housing  consumption  costs  are  generally  reflected  immediately  in 
211 adjustments  of  the  amount  spent  for  other  items,  including  food,  clothing,  education, 
etc.,  but  not  in  the  amount  spent  for  housing. 
As  mentioned  earlier  several  times,  the  education  system  has  been  the  single  most 
important  channel  of  vertical  mobility  in  Korea's  history.  Kim  K-D  drew  the 
following  figure  which  most  aptly  explains  Korean  society. 
Figure  7-2.  Social  and  Economic  Characteristics  of  the  Occupation  in  Korea. 
Schooling 
Source:  Kim  K-D  and  Choi  T-L,  1983,  p.  5. 
Occupation  1  -1  -WT  Income 
In  this  structure,  between  1967  and  1972  the  increase  in  the  rate  of  household 
incomes  was  higher  than  that  of  tuition  fees  in  universities,  including  national  and 
private  universities.  Thereafter  until  1982,  the  increases  in  the  two  showed  a  similar 
level.  However,  since  1982,  it  was  reversed.  The  increase  in  the  rate  of  tuition  fees 
was  far  higher  than  that  of  the  household  incomes  (KCCI,  1990,  p.  386).  In  1985, 
those  households  whose  annual  household  incomes  were  below  the  university  tuition 
fees  accounted  for  34.3  per  cent  of  total  households  in  Korea  (Ibid,  p.  386). 
Moreover,  most  of  them  were  paying  higher  housing  consumption  costs  than  their 
counterparts.  This  increase  was  spiralling.  Increasing  educational  costs  progressively 
excluded  the  children  of  low-income  families  from  higher-education.  The  increasing 
housing  consumption  costs  aggravated  the  trends. 
In  order  to  reduce  housing  consumption  costs,  the  low-income  households  had  to 
share  with  other  families  and/or  reduce  the  number  of  rooms  they  occupied.  The 
National  Child  Development  Study  in  Britain  (Davie,  Butler  and  Goldstein,  1971, 
requoted  in  Nobbs  et  al.,  1980,  p.  372)  showed  that  children  from  over-crowded 
homes,  who  lack  a  quiet  and  private  place  to  study,  are,  by  7  years  of  age,  already 
nine  months  behind  their  school-mates  in  reading  attainment.  The  other  way  of 
reducing  housing  consumption  costs  is  to  live  together,  which  has  another  effect  on 
their  children.  Verbal  intelligence  tests  have  shown  that  children  from  large  families 
perform  less  well  than  those  from  small  families.  The  increasing  household 
expenditure  forced  children  and  woman  to  work.  In  order  to  get  more  income  to  meet 
the  increasing  housing  costs,  parents  worked  longer  hours.  Resultingly,  children  have 
to  carry  out  more  housework  and  their  parents  have  less  time  with  their  children. 
Some,  nonetheless,  on  the  basis  of  the  culture  of  poverty  thesis,  describe  this  as  a 
lack  of  parental  interest.  Nor  can  one  expect  the  most  patient  and  permissive  child- 
rearing  from  parents  who  are  very  tired.  Moreover,  the  development  of  the  sub- 
212 contracting  system  has  placed  many  unskilled  workers  on  piece  work  and  the  costs  of 
providing  a  workplace  has  passed  from  the  employers  to  the  employee.  Many  low- 
income  households'  homes  became  workplaces.  This  is  only  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  If 
capacity  is  the  other  side  of  opportunity,  the  lack  in  children  of  the  low-income 
households  is  not  the  capacity  but  the  opportunity,  as  Wedge  and  Prosser  (1973)  said 
in,  "Born  to  Fail?  ". 
On  the  one  hand,  for  low-income  households,  the  education  system  has 
increasingly  operated  against  social  mobility.  On  the  other  hand,  examination  of 
recruitment  into  the  powerful  elite  groups  has  shown  there  to  be  a  substantial  self- 
recruitment  from  people  with  similar  backgrounds,  excluding  low  income 
households.  They  also  marry  those  who  are  in  the  same  social  strata,  based  on 
knowledge  or  wealth. 
In  the  culture  of  poverty  theory  (Lewis,  1966),  there  was  a  cycle  of  deprivation 
which  was  transmitted  from  one  generation  to  another  in  certain  families  (Lewis, 
1959  and  1961).  This  was  often  denied  in  Korea  by  many  empirical  studies. 
Inequalities  of  income,  educational  and  employment  opportunities,  health  and 
environment,  these  interact  with  each  other  and  reinforce  each  other,  and  are  closely 
related  to  housing.  One  such  is  the  circle  of  cause  and  effect  in  which  being  on  a  low 
income  means  living  in  poor  housing,  which  means  a  poor  neighbourhood,  which 
means  going  to  a  second  rate  school,  second  rate  hospital  and  second  rate  public 
services,  which  means  having  an  inadequate  education,  which  means  having  a  low- 
paying  job  or  no  job  at  all,  and  thus  being  poor.  The  term  "the  culture  of  poverty" 
has  been  coined  to  describe  this. 
R.  Lewis  who  analysed  the  "culture  of  poverty",  emphasized  in  a  study  of  poor 
families  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  "In  these  so-called  apartments,  there  is  no  place 
for  children  ...... 
The  close  quarters,  the  drabnessY  the  lack  of  something  to  do  drives 
these  children  into  the  street"  (requoted  from  Schorr,  1968,  p.  12  1).  In  Korea,  over  28 
per  cent  of  urban  households  use  only  one  room  for  their  whole  family.  On  average 
this  is  3.7  people.  Thus  it  is  not  surprising  that  in  Korea  some  children  are  wandering 
on  the  streets  until  curfew  at  10  p.  m.  Housing  mediates,  sustains  or  ameliorates  some 
wider  aspects  of  deprivation.  Low-income  groups,  therefore,  demand  an  increases  in 
wages  on  the  basis  of  a  desire  for  minimum  living  standards. 
The  characteristics  of  industrial  disputes  in  Korea  are  as  follows;  firstly,  most  of 
the  industrial  disputes  are  led  by  production  workers.  Secondly,  recent  collective 
bargaining  experiences  have  almost  exclusively  concentrated  on  the  wage  issue  (Park 
F-K,  1993,  p.  60).  Wage  demand  shocks  are  often  explained  by  the  mismatch 
between  the  supply  and  demand  for  labour.  However,  in  recent  years,  this  mismatch 
has  been  only  a  part  of  the  story. 
213 The  key  issue  may  be  whether  house  prices  directly  affect  wage  demands  or 
whether  house  prices  merely  reflect  the  pressure  of  demand.  It  has  been  a  common 
assumption  that  high  housing  prices  put  pressures  on  wage  demand.  However,  with  a 
somewhat  different  specification  from  the  standard  Layard-Nickell  model  (1986), 
Meen  (1993)  suggests  in  the  Oxford  Economic  Forecasting  model  that  unemployment 
and  house  prices  appear  to  substitute  quite  well  for  each  other  in  an  equation  for 
manufacturing  earnings.  In  this,  it  is  difficult  to  conclude  unequivocally  that  house 
prices  play  a  key  role  in  wage  bargaining. 
In  Korea,  almost  all  wage  demands  in  wage  bargaining  are  based  on  increased 
living  costs.  As  Table  4-19  in  Chapter  4  showed,  household  expenditure  has 
increased  in  line  with  the  increase  in  household  income.  As  part  of  household 
expenditure,  the  rate  of  housing  consumption  costs  has  increased  more  rapidly  than 
other  expenditure  and  the  total,  especially  in  recent  years.  This  implies  that  housing 
consumption  costs  increasingly  absorbed  an  equivalent  slice  of  income.  As  a  result  of 
discontent  with  the  failure  of  living  standards  to  rise  fueling  wage  demands,  housing 
consumption  costs  became  the  main  factor  placing  pressure  on  wage  levels. 
Moreover,  as  seen  in  the  previous  section,  housing  tenures  in  Korea  represent 
different  social  and  life-cycle  factors.  The  low  incomes  are  in  the  rental  sector  with 
high  housing  consumption  costs  and  most  young  and  production  workers  who  are  the 
key  group  influencing  wage  struggles  are  in  the  rental  sector  in  which  rents  have  been 
increasing  more  than  housing  prices.  Table  7-23  used  by  trade  unions  for  wage 
bargaining  of  production  workers  shows  that  increasing  housing  consumption  costs 
became  the  main  reason  for  demanding  wage  increases. 
Table  7-23.  The  Composition  of  Minimum  Living  Costs  for  a  Family  of  Five,  in  a 
production  worker's  family. 
Year  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Foods  36.8  35.8  34.2  33.6  32.7  33.7  32.1  32.8  29.7 
Housing  24.5  25.3  27.6  29.5  29.8  28.9  30.0  29.1  33.3 
Clothing  8.7  7.9  8.0  8.3  8.2  9.0  8.8  9.2  10.4 
Education  12.4  13.1  12.3  11.8  11.9  10.8  10.6  10.6  9.3 
Transport  3.6  4.0  3.7  3.4  3.5  3.7  3.3  3.3  2.8 
Health  6.4  6.8  7.3  7.2  6.6  7.3  10.8  9.1  8.4 
Others  7.6  7.1  6.9  6.4  8.9  6.5  6.3  6.0  6.0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source:  Labour  Economic  Institute,  Study  on  the  improvement  for  housing  problems  of  workers, 
1990. 
In  contrast  to  this,  housing  and  other  social  policies  in  Korea  have  mainly  focused 
on  catering  for  middle-income  groups.  This  explains  that  there  have  been 
extraordinarily  few  industrial  disputes  involving  white-collar  workers. 
214 Workers  demand  higher  wages  to  compensate  for  rent  increasesl  thus  reducing  their 
company's  competitive  edge  in  the  international  market.  The  increase  in  wages  is, 
therefore,  self-defeating  because  of  the  Korean  housing  system  and  housing  markets. 
For  instance,  the  knock-on  effect  on  the  economy  in  comparison  with  Singapore  and 
China  is  clear.  Workers  in  the  factories  of  Seoul  and  Kwanju  receive  average  wages 
of  US$t,  000  a  month.  This  can  be  compared  with  US$700  for  their  counterparts  in 
Singapore  and  less  than  US$100  in  China  (The  Economist,  1993,  p.  75).  This  is 
despite  income  per  person  in  Korea  (about  US$  6,500)  being  far  behind  that  of 
Singapore  (about  US$  11,000).  However,  it  is  clear  that  housing  consumption  costs 
of  the  two  countries  are  far  below  those  of  Korea.  A  more  sophisticated  view  of 
economic  development  was  put  forward  by  James  Stewart  in  his  Principles  of 
Political  Economy  published  in  1979.  He  recognized  that  high  wages  meant  high 
consumer  purchasing  power,  which  stimulated  demand  and  the  expansion  of  the 
import  sector.  In  the  absence  of  continuing  technical  progress,  he  argued,  rising 
wages  would  eventually  check  national  economic  growth  by  raising  domestic  prices 
above  those  of  foreign  competitors  and  thereby  reducing  the  market  for  exports. 
Thus,  the  impact  of  housing  is  not  limited  to  the  low-income  households  alone  but 
extends  throughout  the  economy. 
However,  the  more  important  question  is  whose  demands  are  effective?  Under  the 
industrial  structure  noted  in  Chapter  3,  workers  in  large  firms  or  medium  firms  can 
organize  trade  unions.  For  example,  in  the  two  months  August  and  September  1987, 
3,250  cases  of  strikes  were  recorded.  Unfortunately  there  are  no  available  detailed 
data  about  the  strikes.  On  one  account,  about  70  per  cent  of  the  manufacturing 
establishments  with  more  than  1,000  workers  experienced  some  form  of  labour 
disputes  (Park  F-K,  1993,  p.  30).  In  1989,69  per  cent  of  the  establishments  with 
more  than  300  employees  had  become  organized,  and  among  those  firms  with  more 
than  500  employees,  82  per  cent  became  organized  (Park  K-S,  1991).  This  indicates 
that  the  most  organized  workers  were  those  who  were  employed  in  bigger  companies. 
So,  as  Tables  7-24  and  25  show,  they  could  effectively  achieve  their  demands. 
The  impact  of  trade  union  activity  on  wage  increases  can  be  found  in  the  union 
wage  premiums,  which  are  the  difference  between  wages  for  union  members  and 
non-union  members,  after  controlling  for  individual  human  capital  and  industry- 
related  variables.  The  union  wage  premium  in  1989  was  estimated  to  be  10.2  per  cent 
(Song  H-K,  1991).  In  small  subcontractors  and  family  firms,  the  typical  unit  of 
production  is  still  the  family.  Most  heads  of  these  families  are  self-employed  and 
relatively  few  individuals  are  employed  for  wages  as  the  business  relies  upon 
members  of  the  family  group  or  others  close  relatives.  Therefore,  in  small  firms  or 
215 family  firms  and  for  others  such  as  outworkers,  trade  union  organisation  is  not 
possible. 
Several  writers  noted  that  in  the  USA  the  narrow  conception  of  the  role  of  the  trade 
unions  and  the  lack  of  a  working  -class-based  political  party  has  been  significant  in 
contributing  to  the  relatively  underdeveloped  alternative  of  socialized  provision,  or  at 
least  to  the  restriction  of  such  provision  to  a  minimal  welfare  service  for  the  poor 
(Harloe,  198  1,  p.  27;  Marcuse,  1976;  Heidenheimer  et  al.  1975,  pp.  69-96). 
Moreover,  the  increased  wage  pushes  the  costs  up,  and  then  large  firms  pass  a  part 
of  the  costs  on  to  the  medium  sized  sub-contractor  (Kang  B-K,  1989,  p.  55).  The 
medium  firms  pass  the  costs  on  to  small  sub-sub  contractors,  and  then  to  the 
outworkers  (the  urban  poor).  Thus  the  wage  disparities  between  large  firms  and  small 
firms  or  formal  and  informal  have  been  widening  over  time.  Furthermore,  large 
firms  and  medium  firms  try  to  absorb  part  of  the  costs  by  rationalization,  using  more 
machines,  employing  more  part  time  women,  or  removing  factories  from  biggest 
cities.  A  study  (Kim  C-S,  1986)  estimated  that  a  one  per  cent  increase  in  real  wages 
in  manufacturing  industry  caused  a  decrease  in  employment  of  0.11  per  cent.  Who 
would  be  the  redundant? 
Table  7-24.  Wage  Increase  by  Firm  Size. 
1986  1987  1988  1989 
10-29  employees  7.8  8.6  10.1  16.2 
over  30  employees  8.3  10.3  16.2  21.2 
Source:  Ministry  of  Labour,  Monthly  Labour  Statistics  Survey,  quoted  in  Kim  Choong-Soo,  1991, 
p.  7. 
Table  7-25.  Wage  Dispar  ities  by  Firm  Size. 
10-29  employees  30-99  100-299  300-499  over  500 
1986  100  108  120  125  171 
1987  100  110  132  139  195 
1988  100  108  119  140  200 
Source:  Ministry  of  Labour,  Occupational  Wage  Survey,  each  year. 
Low-income  groups  demand  further  increases  in  wages  on  the  basis  of  a  desire  for 
minimum  living  standards,  but  employers  argue  that  increased  rates  should  be  in  line 
with  increases  in  productivity  (Kim  J-W,  1988).  Without  adequate  human  capital, 
they  are  limited  to  unskilled  and  vulnerable  work,  especially  when  the  industrial 
structure  is  changing  as  in  recent  Korean  history.  Moreover,  industrial  accidents  are 
mainly  concentrated  on  the  unskilled  production  workers.  The  number  of  cheap 
216 rented  houses  are  dwindling  and  rents  are  increasing.  Many  life  chances  are  cut  off 
not  only  by  income  but  also  by  this  consumption  factor.  So  they  are  more  likely  to 
need  their  children's  meagre  earnings,  at  best  reducing  expenditure  for  their  children. 
This  results  in  the  children  being  unable  to  attend  a  higher  school.  When  the  children 
are  grown  up,  they  may  have  difficulty  in  penetrating  into  bureaucracies  because  of 
this  low  level  of  schooling.  More  importantly,  thereby  the  poor  are  gradually 
excluded  from  the  political  market.  The  poor  are  caught  in  a  poverty  trap  via  this 
mechanism. 
In  the  1960s,  upward  mobility  was  a  common  expectation  for  every  Korean;  in 
the  1970s,  upward  mobility  was  the  expectation  for  a  large  part  of  Korean  society;  in 
the  1980s,  safety  in  their  existing  position  was,  for  many  on  low  incomes,  the  only 
aspiration;  and  in  the  1990s,  upward  mobility  is  a  hope  anchored  on  their  children. 
Indeed,  it  was  common  until  the  1970s,  for  people  to  move  'from  rags  to  riches,  or 
riches  to  rags'.  In  recent  years,  'from  rags  to  rags'  is  common  but  'from  riches  to 
rags'  is  rare  and  'from  rags  to  riches'  is  very  rare.  Increasingly  the  poor  help  the 
poor,  likely  becoming  the  poorer.  In  recent  years,  the  squatter  settlements  have 
emerged  in  the  biggest  cities  again.  The  squatters  are  not  in-migrants  but  those  who 
filtered  down. 
7.5  Politics  of  Housing. 
The  question  raised  here  is  how  these  arrangements  have  continued?  Before 
criticizing  the  government  and  arguing  the  failure  of  the  housing  market,  we  must 
look  at  how  many  people,  and  who,  benefitted  from  these  arrangements. 
Most  home  owners,  which  accounted  for  about  42  per  cent  in  cities,  are  happy 
about  continuous  increases  in  housing  prices.  In  a  housing  renewal,  property  owners, 
whether  they  are  the  poor  or  not,  benefit  from  it.  New  houses  built  through  the 
demolition  of  poor  houses  are  allocated  to  the  account  holders.  Over  half  of  new 
houses  are  allocated  at  controlled  prices  to  housing  related  saving  account  holders 
which  accounted  for  about  50  per  cent  of  tenant  households  in  cities.  Thus  those  who 
joined  housing  related  saving  accounts  are  potential  beneficiaries.  Even  among  those 
who  did  not  join  the  housing  related  saving  schemes,  those  who  achieved  housing 
improvement  through  increases  in  their  incomes  may  be  second  beneficiaries. 
Therefore,  the  excluded  are  tenant  households  whose  incomes  relatively  declined,  so 
they  could  not  join  the  housing  related  saving  schemes  and  made  downward 
adjustments  through  residential  mobility.  As  we  have  seen  in  Table  7-17,  they 
217 account  at  most  for  31  per  cent  of  tenant  households,  equivalent  to  about  18  per  cent 
of  all  households  in  cities. 
Another  empirical  study  carried  out  by  the  Korean  Institute  for  Consummer 
Protection  in  1991  also  shows  that  only  16  per  cent  of  tenants  moved  to  worsened 
accommodations.  Table  7-26  can  be  divided  into  two  groups.  Apart  from  those  who 
pay  less  for  lower  quality  accommodations  after  a  move,  tenant  households  in  the 
squares  shadowed  may  feel  unsatisfied  or  unfairly  treated  becasuse  they  pay  higher 
rents  than  before  for  similar  or  lower  quality  accommodations  through  residential 
mobility,  or  pay  similar  rents  for  lower  quality.  They  account  for  30.2  per  cent  of 
tenant  households.  In  1990,  tenant  households  accounted  for  about  60  per  cent  of 
households  in  cities.  That  is  to  say  they  are  about  18  per  cent  of  all  households  in 
cities. 
Although  18  per  cent  may  be  enough  to  raise  housing  issues  on  the  political 
agenda,  it  is  not  enough  in  terms  of  the  politics  of  number  to  change  existing  housing 
arrangements.  Moreover,  most  beneficiaries  are  those  who  are  white-collar  salaried 
workers,  who  lead  the  Korean  economy  and  society,  that  is  to  say  the  most  powerful 
groups.  We  have  seen  in  Chapter  3,  the  lack  of  power  in  workers  of  subcontracting 
firms.  We  have  seen  in  Chapter  4,  where  social  powers  lie  and  how  social  policies 
evolved.  Housing  is  not  an  exception. 
Table  7-26.  Changes  in  Residential  Mobility  in  Tenant  Households,  1991. 
Housing  Quality 
Rents  Better  Similar  Worse 
Total 
More  25.7  19.2  49.4 
Similar  7.3  29.5  6.5  43.3 
Less  -  2.3  5.0  7.3 
Total  33.0  51.0  16.0  100.0 
Source:  The  Korean  Institute  for  Consummer  Protection,  1991,  p.  161  (cited  in  Ryum  D-M,  1993, 
p.  60) 
In  housing,  over  60  per  cent  of  households  in  cities  lived  in  their  own  house  until 
the  late  1960s.  The  ratio  of  housing  price  to  income  was  less  than  2.3  until  1976. 
House  builders  were  no  more  than  small  artisans  until  the  early  1970s.  Thus,  housing 
was  not  a  significant  factor  in  the  sense  of  wealth  and  capital.  However,  housing 
became  the  best  investment  option  for  people  and  gave  to  some  enormous  fortunes,  in 
many  cases  far  more  than  the  life  time  earnings  of  salaried  workers.  House  builders 
began  to  change  from  small  artisans  to  large  construction  companies  and  increasingly 
dominated  housing  markets,  taking  a  great  portion  of  the  gains  from  housing 
inflation.  Home-ownership  became  a  significant  factor  determining  life  chances  in 
218 Korea.  Without  increased  taxation,  the  options  open  for  housing  policy  were  limited 
to  regulations  and  controls.  This  led  the  government  to  amend  the  Housing 
Construction  Promotion  Act  in  1977.  Through  the  amendment  the  Korean  housing 
market  was  framed  within  the  political  process.  The  house  builders  reorganized,  and 
prices  in  new  houses  were  set  by  the  government.  One  of  the  clearest  examples  of  the 
point  being  made  is  the  development  of  the  Housing  Related  Saving  Schemes  which 
give  priority  to  tenants.  In  1978,  through  the  amendment  of  the  Income  Tax,  very 
progressive  tax  rates  on  capital  gains  from  houses  were  imposed  except  when  a 
household  possessed  a  house.  Thus  the  government  was  able  to  invest  more  in 
housing  from  this  increased  revenue.  The  gains  from  housing  inflation  were, 
therefore,  redistributed  from  property  wealth  towards  salaried  workers,  i.  e.  those 
who  worked  for  the  bureaucracies.  Meanwhile,  the  land  in  cities  emerged  as  another 
source  of  great  windfall  gains.  The  next  step  was  the  legislation  of  the  Housing 
Estate  Development  Promotion  Act  of  1981.  Since  then,  large  housing  estate 
development  was  monopolized  by  the  public  sector,  removing  the  gains  from  land 
price  inflation  and  land  develoment  from  land  owners  and  builders.  Nevertheless, 
increasing  land  prices  gave  enormous  windfall  gains  to  property  holders  who  paid 
low  tax  on  their  gains.  Moreover,  urban  land  was  being  concentrated  in  the  hands  of 
a  few  individuals.  The  Commission  on  the  Public  Concept  of  Land  Ownership  was 
established  in  1989,  mainly  constituted  by  the  bureaucrats.  After  several  public 
hearings  and  opinion  polls,  in  1990  the  Aggregate  Land  Tax  was  enacted.  Since  then, 
capital  gains  from  land  price  inflations  in  urban  areas  were  taxed  after  assessement 
every  three  years.  Moreover,  in  six  ma  or  cities,  the  ceiling  in  the  possession  of 
residential  lands  or  high  property  tax  was  imposed.  The  ceiling  was  determined  at 
about  660  sq.  m.  without  any  theoretical  reason.  The  revenue  was  allocated  towards 
new  housing  construction,  and  the  houses  built  were  allocated  according  to  housing 
related  savings.  The  gains  from  the  land  price  inflation  were  again  redistributed  from 
property  wealth  towards  salaried  workers.  Thus,  housing  and  land  policies  have  acted 
as  a  weapon  which  impose  "checks  and  balances"  between  property  wealth  and 
salaried  workers. 
The  prominent  theory  behind  the  government's  housing  strategy  has  been  the 
readily  and  ideologically  acceptable  Keynesian  policy  of  more  housebuilding  to 
reflate  demand.  However,  given  the  limited  public  spending  on  housing,  housing  had 
to  be  financed  by  personal  savings,  mainly  from  the  pockets  of  the  salaried  workers, 
as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  6.  Personal  savings  must  therefore  be  compensated.  Price 
control  and  a  unique  allocation  system  were  imposed  at  the  expense  of  builders.  For 
those  who  joined  the  housing  related  saving  schemes  socialized  form  of  housing 
provision  financed  by  their  personal  savings  was  not  acceptable,  except  for  a  very 
219 rare  case.  Rents  in  public  rented  houses  must  cover,  at  least,  the  construction  costs. 
This  limitation  is  one  reason  why  low-income  households  have  been  left  to  the  rental 
sector  in  harsh  conditions  for  such  a  long  time.  Nevertheless,  there  has  been  little 
political  struggle  over  such  procedures  because  housing  system  has  not  completely 
blocked  people's  access  to  a  decent  home  with  a  possibility  of  making  great  windfall 
gains  through  the  difference  between  market  prices  and  controlled  prices.  However, 
this  was  only  possible  for  those  low  income  households  who  worked  hard  and  saved 
their  earnings. 
Since  there  was  always  a  possibility  of  upward  mobility  -  and  such  cases  occurred  - 
people's  sense  of  frustration  would  focus  on  the  individual,  either  for  themselves  or 
for  their  children,  rather  than  on  society.  The  sense  of  shared  experience  and 
common  prospects  among  the  victims  of  exclusion  could  thus  be  weakened,  and  a 
precondition  for  radical  mass  dissent  undermined.  This  was  accentuated  further  in 
Korea  in  so  far  as  social  circulation  made  for  ties  of  kinship,  personal  acquaintance, 
cultural  emulation  and  social  sympathy  across  the  lines  of  social  division.  The 
housing  system  of  Korea,  based  on  individual  success  or  failure,  hard  work  and  high 
savings,  gives  rewards  to  motivate  the  right  people,  operates  as  a  mechanism  of 
social  control  that  has  turned  structural  problems  into  individual  failure  and,  at  best, 
"bad  luck". 
The  powerful  groups  who  benefit  from  this  ethos  of  "self-help"  based  on  hard  work 
and  high  savings  made  the  wall  of  ideology  supporting  these  policies.  The  policy 
itself  imparted  social  education  by  which  most  people  took  the  ideology  for  granted. 
Indeed,  in  Korea,  over  70  per  cent  of  the  poor  perceive  poverty  as  their  individual 
failure.  Only  less  than  9  per  cent  of  the  poor  perceive  poverty  as  a  result  of  social  or 
structural  problems,  as  the  Table  below  shows. 
Table  7-27.  Perceptions  of  the  Reason  for  the  Poverty,  1981. 
Bottom  20  per  cent 
Households 
Individual  Failure  43.0 
Social  Structure  20.9 
Half  and  Half  34.8 
Others  1.3 
Total  100.0% 
Households  Under 
Absolute  Poverty  Line 
70.6 
8.1 
18.8 
2.5 
100.0% 
Source:  KDI,  Reality  of  Poverty  and  Government  Policy  (a  report  to  the  prime  minister),  198  1. 
The  housing  system  was,  therefore,  one  of  two  pillars  of  social  control,  along  with 
the  examination  system.  Thus  bureaucratic  procedures  increasingly  dominated 
housing  markets  with  little  or  no  opposition.  This  made  it  difficult  to  reform  housing 
220 structure  .  Choices  were  distorted.  Neither  the  need  for  decent  housing  at  low  prices 
for  low  income  households  nor  the  demand  for  higher  profits  by  the  builders  and 
property  wealth  have  been  met  in  Korea. 
7.6  Conclusion. 
Previous  chapters  have  shown  how  housing  and  urban  policies  evolved  with 
changing  economic  and  social  strutures.  In  this  chapter,  attention  has  turned  to  the 
changed  housing  market  and  how  changes  in  housing  conditions  mediate  economic 
and  social  structures. 
Demand  and  supply  seem  to  be  a  significant  factor  in  the  housing  market. 
However,  the  demand  and  supply  interact  under  the  house  building  and  financial 
structures  and  various  government  interventions,  which  are  being  re-organized  by  the 
changing  economic  and  social  structure.  In  the  process  of  economic  restructuring, 
those  people  excluded  from  the  benefits  of  the  economic  miracle  were  also  excluded 
from  politics  and  then  excluded  from  the  housing  market  through  the  price 
mechanism. 
They  increasingly  faced  difficulties  in  access  to  owner-occupied  markets  not  only 
because  of  their  low  incomes  but  also  because  of  the  arrangements  in  the  housing 
market,  such  as  the  need  for  savings,  formal  finance,  etc.  In  this  context,  the  housing 
market  seems  to  strengthen  the  nexus  of  social  relations.  By  contrast,  the  reduction  of 
the  available  lower  rented  stock  has  diminished  the  choices  available  to  those  on  low 
incomes.  Meanwhile,  continuously  increasing  housing  consumption  costs  have  begun 
to  eat  even  the  unevenly  distributed  fruits  of  economic  growth. 
Poor  housing  conditions  of  households  with  low  incomes  imposed  economic,  social 
and  political  costs.  But  the  costs  were  eventually  passed  on  to  low  income  households 
through  the  unequal  industrial,  social  and  urban  structures.  This  caused  the 
breakdown  of  social  mobility,  which  again  pushed  up  the  economic,  social  and 
political  costs  but  the  costs  again  were  passed  on  to  low-income  households.  Through 
this  process,  exclusion  pervaded  these  structures.  In  this  context,  poor  housing 
conditions  are  not  only  the  result  of  low  incomes  but  also  the  cause  of  low-income 
households. 
221 CHAPTER  8.  RESEARCH  FINDINGS  AND  POLICY  SUGGESTIONS. 
8.1  Research  Findings. 
Prior  to  1950,  the  economy  of  S.  Korea  was  dominated  by  agriculture,  and  the 
social  structure  of  S.  Korea  based  on  land.  So  the  distribution  of  income,  and  social 
cleavages  in  Korea  were  based  on  agricultural  assets.  The  land  reforms  in  1950, 
therefore,  played  a  central  role  in  flattening  the  distribution  of  wealth  and  social 
cleavages.  Moreover,  the  Korean  War  (1950-53)  destroyed  over  40  per  cent  of 
manufacturing  facilities,  over  20  per  cent  of  the  net  capital  stock  and  about  18  per 
cent  of  the  housing  stock.  Therefore,  the  War  also  flattened  the  distribution  of  non 
agricultural  assets  -  in  every  sense  -  leaving  the  majority  of  Koreans  in  destitution. 
After  the  Korean  War,  some  people  could  accumulate  large  amounts  of  wealth 
through  war-time  business,  tax  evasion  and  so  on;  but  just  after  the  military  coup,  the 
military  junta  launched  strong  measures  to  confiscate  unjustifiably  accumulated 
wealth.  The  total  amount  of  confiscated  wealth  was  significant.  Furthermore,  the 
military  government  launched  a  currency  reform,  and  forced  people  to  save  incomes 
over  certain  amounts  of  exchanged  money.  Then,  through  government  control  - 
nationalisation  of  commercial  banks,  the  Economic  Development  Plan,  etc.  -  the 
principle  of  private  ownership  was  crucially  restricted  and  the  government  came  to 
play  a  greater  part  in  the  control  of  economic  decisions. 
Also,  the  Korean  government  reorganized  and  centralized  both  the  budget  and 
planning  functions  in  the  hierarchical  bureaucracy.  The  bureaucracy  began  to  recruit 
the  most  talented  people  in  Korea  through  highly  competitive  examination,  which  was 
one  of  the  powerful  mechanisms  of  social  mobility  in  the  classless  society  and 
contributed  to  the  fluid  society.  The  rapid  industrialization,  starting  from  really 
nothing  since  the  early  1960s,  was  necessarily  orchestrated  by  the  government  and 
the  Korean  economy  and  society  were  led  by  the  public  bureaucracy. 
In  an  extremely  poor  country,  not  well-endowed  natural  resources,  which  was 
devastated  by  the  civil  war  and  had  about  half  of  the  population  in  destitution, 
economic  development  was  the  first  and  necessary  step  for  social  development.  As 
we  have  seen  in  Chapter  2,  on  the  route  to  industrialization,  the  government's  efforts 
focused  on  manufacturing  industry  for  exports  by  concentrating  national  resources  on 
this  fast  growing  sector  -a  policy  which  was  often  justified  with  phrases  such  as 
222 it  growth  pole",  "big  push",  "unbalanced  development"  as  necessary  for  reasons  of 
efficiency. 
The  government  left  domestic  markets  to  a  market  rationale.  Therefore,  the 
production  and  distribution  of  commodities  for  domestic  consumption  was  an  "open" 
structure.  In  contrast  to  this,  economic  growth  and  prosperity  based  on  exports  were 
achieved  via  a  state-dominated  partnership  with  large,  diversified  corporations.  With 
Japan  as  the  prototype,  Korea  was  the  best  example  of  this  mode  of  development 
(J.  Henderson,  1993,  p.  208).  As  a  result,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  3,  the 
combination  of  meritocratic  recruitment  in  the  public  bureaucracy  and  the  open 
economic  structure  contributed  not  only  to  increase  opportunities  for  social  mobility 
but  also  to  economic  growth. 
Meanwhile,  since  the  launch  of  the  Third  Economic  Development  Plan  which 
shifted  the  focus  of  industrial  policy  towards  heavy  and  chemical  industries  in  1972, 
the  growth  of  the  large  corporations,  chaebols,  was  accompanied  by  the  centralisation 
of  the  economy.  The  growth  and  the  collapse  of  the  chaebols  have  shaped  patterns  of 
employment,  wages,  tax  revenues  and  so  on.  This  meant  that  economic  power  has 
become  more  concentrated  and  hence  more  influential  in  dealing  with  the 
government.  In  other  words,  the  government  had  to  increasingly  take  account  of  the 
interests  of  these  powerful  big  businesses.  However,  control  over  the  capital  markets 
and  access  to  foreign  sources  of  credit  and  the  imposition  of  the  ceiling  in  stock 
holdings  of  corporations  by  individuals  and  foreign  investors  were  accompanied  by 
centralisation  of  the  economy,  but  without  entailing  the  concentration  of  wealth.  This 
necessarily  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  the  private  bureaucracy  which  actually  runs 
the  chaebols,  increasingly  recruited  through  a  highly  competitive  examination.  Since 
the  late  1970s,  there  were  two  bureaucracies,  the  public  bureaucracy  and  the  private 
bureaucracy,  which  have  led  the  Korean  economy  and  society.  In  a  country  where 
there  is  one  single  race,  a  single  language,  common  cultural  assumptions  and  a 
society  based  on  kinship,  the  competitive  examination  itself  justified  the  power  of  the 
bureaucracies. 
The  two  bureaucracies  were  homogeneous  on  the  basis  of  ability  or  education, 
rather  than  family  background  or  class  background,  sharing  the  common  objective  of 
economic  development  and  common  social  values.  In  a  classless  society,  the  selection 
of  the  most  talented  persons  through  the  highly  competitive  examination  in  the  two 
bureaucracies  was  the  main  source  of  what  Henderson  (1993,  p.  209)  pointed  out,  as 
having  "...  built  some  of  the  world's  most  successful  companies,  irrespective  of 
whether  they  have  been  state  or  privately  owned".  This  also  explains  how  the  state 
was  able  to  discipline  business  in  the  interests  of  national  economic  development 
rather  than  short-term  corporate  profitability,  without  generating  political  opposition. 
223 It  was  often  misunderstood  as  having  an  authoritarian-corporatist  nature  (see  Jones 
and  Sakong,  1980;  Mason  et  al.,  1980;  Amsden,  1989;  Wade  1990;  Henderson, 
1993),  and  this  led  Wade  to  believe  that  authoritarian,  non-democratic  regimes  are 
essential,  for  an  initial  period,  for  high  productivity,  high  wage  economies  in  the 
developing  world.  That  achievement  was  a  consequence  of  selecting  talented  people 
in  the  two  bureaucracies  having  the  common  objective  of  national  growth  and  thereby 
co-operating  with  each  other  through  variously  and  tightly  woven  informal  channels 
between  bureaucrats.  The  development  of  a  meritocratic  system  in  recruitment, 
promotion  and  rewards  in  the  classless  society  created  a  culture  of  hard  work.  Thus 
the  explanation  that  the  high  performance  of  Korean  workers  was  the  main  factor  in 
the  economic  miracle  of  Korea  (Ranis,  1973)  may  also  be  partly  plausible. 
Despite  small  government  spending  on  social  welfare  services  and  programmes,  as 
we  have  seen  in  Chapter  4,  this  meritocratic  system  and  the  pattern  of  economic 
development  encouraged  social  mobility  without  permitting  great  personal  wealth  and 
effectively  contributed  for  many  years  to  the  reduction  of  poverty  and  inequality. 
This  pattern  challenges  the  conventional  economic  wisdom  that  there  must  be  a 
tradeoff  between  augmenting  growth  and  reducing  inequality  in  the  course  of  the 
development  process. 
However,  rapid  industrialisation  has  not  lifted  all  boats  equally  and  has  not  offered 
equal  opportunities  for  everyone,  partly  because  of  the  massive  migration  of  people 
from  rural  areas  and,  in  contrast,  because  of  a  gradual  reduction  in  the  number  of 
urban  jobs  which  accommodated  the  bottom  income  groups.  As  always,  there  have 
been  optimists  emphasising  the  long-run  positive  influence  of  technical  change  upon 
employment  and  pessimists  pointing  to  the  large  reduction  in  industrial  employment 
produced  by  the  application  of  labour  saving  innovations.  Until  the  late  1970s,  the 
former  were  most  likely  to  be  right.  Although  inequality  in  income  increased  as  the 
Korean  economy  shifted  from  labour  intensive  industry  towards  capital-  and  skill- 
intensive  industry  since  the  early  1970s,  the  ratio  of  workers  to  population  increased 
until  the  late  1970s,  which  reduced  poverty  at  a  rapid  rate  and  increased  the  living 
standards  of  the  people  as  a  whole. 
Since  the  second  oil  price  shock  in  1979,  the  following  world-wide  recession  and 
the  emergence  of  China  and  South  East  Asian  countries  with  cheap  labour  in  the 
international  market,  Korean  industry  has  been  forced  to  restructure,  requiring  more 
flexibility  in  production  and  more  skill-intensive  industrial  isation.  It  was  certain  from 
1979  that  the  degree  of  standardisation  of  products  has  been  decreasing;  products  and 
management  have  become  more  sophisticated;  and  businesses  have  to  react  faster  to 
changing  product  market  conditions.  The  consequences  of  all  these  processes  were 
the  increase  in  subcontractors  and  irregular  workers,  and  the  decrease  in  the  ratios  of 
224 workers  to  population,  especially  in  production  workers,  and  the  division,  even 
among  production  workers,  between  key  workers  and  residual  workers.  Firms 
preferred  to  employ  daily  workers  or  part  time  workers  rather  than  full  time  workers. 
Moreover,  under  the  subcontracting  structure,  labour  organisation  and  wage  demands 
resulted  in  the  redistribution  of  income  in  favour  of  the  upper  low-income  groups  at 
the  expense  of  the  bottom  income  group. 
The  Korean  government's  interventions  in  the  redistribution  of  the  fruits  of 
economic  development  were  mainly  focused  on  the  issues  of  incomes,  such  as  wages 
and  disparities  of  wages.  They  were  not  extended  to  household  consumption.  This 
equalisation  of  income  does  not  result  in  equalisation  of  opportunities.  The  principle 
of  "equal  opportunities"  in  a  market  society,  in  theory,  can  only  be  realized  when 
people  have  equal  resources  at  their  disposal.  As  time  went  by,  the  consumption 
sector  has  increasingly  influenced  the  life-chances  of  the  people  as  significantly  as 
changes  in  cash  incomes. 
The  shift  of  the  priority  in  educational  policy  towards  higher  education  without 
increasing  public  spending  on  education  led  to  an  increase  in  education  costs  borne  by 
the  family.  The  low-income  households  were  gradually  excluded  from  the  only  ladder 
of  upward  mobility,  the  university.  In  contrast  to  this,  the  cornershops  were  closed 
down  by  urban  renewal  and  by  the  super-chain  stores.  Many  assembly  lines  were 
substituted  by  more  efficient  machines.  The  dominant  ethos  of  urban  life  came  to  rest 
not  on  tradition  or  kinship  but  on  money  and  the  welfare  of  a  nuclear  family  (Koo 
Hagen,  198  1,  p.  106).  Increasingly  divergent  opportunities  resulted  in  different  levels 
of  household  income,  gradually  stored  in  wealth.  Wealth  began  to  operate  as  a 
determinant  of  life  chances,  most  obviously  in  housing.  Then  the  differentiation  of 
opportunities  was  increasingly  shaped  not  only  by  increased  educational  costs  but  also 
by  the  increased  household  expenditure  on  housing. 
The  evidence  in  this  research  is  that  education  has  been  the  main  ladder  of  social 
mobility  and  housing  costs  have  been  the  main  obstacle  to  such  mobility.  In  this 
process,  the  bureaucrats  in  the  public  and  private  sectors  were  becoming  more 
homogeneous,  not  only  on  the  basis  of  their  ability  and  education  but  also  on  the 
ground  of  their  parents'  incomes  in  a  nuclear  family.  They  were  linked  by  cross- 
membership;  they  graduated  from  the  same  university,  they  had  common  economic 
interests  and  they  possessed  common  social  norms  and  values.  The  bureaucrats  are 
mostly  highly-educated  and  more  or  less  intelligent  members  of  the  society, 
developing  a  white-collar  politics. 
This  most  obviously  occurred  in  housing  policies,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  5. 
Like  all  the  developing  economies,  Korea's  housing  problems  were  always  essentially 
225 quantitative.  In  the  Korean  government's  housing  policy  -  better  described  as  a  policy 
for  built  environments  -  the  main  strategy  was  to  utilize  the  savings  of  households. 
In  most  countries,  the  construction  of  the  physical  infrastructure  or  built 
environment  was  largely  the  role  of  the  state  or  the  capital  market  making  loans  for 
such  investments.  In  Korea,  however,  it  was  the  household  orchestrated  by  the 
government.  As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  5  and  6,  in  the  early  stages  of 
industrial  isation 
,  such  a  strategy  of  urban  and  housing  development  seems  to  be  more 
efficient  and  effective  because  households'  growing  surplus  capital  could  be  used  for 
the  accumulation  of  fixed  capital.  The  investment  of  private  capital,  which  grew  in 
line  with  national  economic  growth,  played  a  great  role  in  the  provision  of  physical 
infrastructure  which  aided  production,  further  economic  growth  and  further 
employment. 
The  pre-condition  of  such  development  was  "profits"  to  investors  (in  other  words, 
speculators).  Such  profits  were  necessarily  individual  ones,  not  social,  and  thereby 
increased  the  material  well-being  of  speculators.  Due  to  high  social  mobility  which 
extended  opportunities  for  individual  profits  to  more  people  until  the  late  1970s,  such 
methods  themselves  operated  as  a  source  of  political  legitimacy  for  the  policy. 
Moreover,  through  a  simple  control  over  profits,  the  government  was  easily  able  to 
control  the  investment  patterns  in  close  relation  to  changed  economic  environments. 
Thus,  housing  and  other  real  estate  could  be  used  as  economic  regulators  and,  in  fact, 
played  a  great  role  for  the  "health  of  the  economy"  which  benefited  more  people. 
However,  although  industrialisation,  urbanisation  and  population  growth  generated 
massive  new  housing  demands,  it  became  apparent  that  the  private  builders  and,  to 
some  extent,  the  housing  market  as  a  whole,  were  unable  to  provide  the  required 
accommodation  not  just  for  low-income  households,  but  also  for  much  of  the  new 
middle  income  households.  The  possession  of  a  house  became  another  source  of  life 
chances.  The  growth  in  the  numbers  of  bureaucrats  and  managers  forced  the 
government  -  burdened  by  very  heavy  defence  expenditure  -  to  intervene  in  the 
housing  market  but  without  high  taxes  and  high  public  spending.  This  led  the 
government  to  amend  the  Housing  Construction  Promotion  Act  in  1977. 
Through  the  amendment  of  the  Act,  the  Korean  government  has  tried  to  cope  with 
a  chronic  housing  shortage,  the  deficit  of  housing  funds  and  unequal  distribution  of 
wealth  by  creating  a  special  market  for  house  building  and  allocation,  insulated  from 
the  rest  of  the  economy  and  using  what  amounts  almost  to  a  separate  currency  - 
money  which  flows  only  within  this  system.  In  that  system,  big  house  builders  were 
encouraged  to  play  the  role  of  agents  in  the  "quantitative  policy"  and  housing 
finances  have  supported  particular  categories  of  types  and  tenure  of  housing,  which 
has  been  one  of  the  major  influences  upon  the  shape  of  the  building  industry  and  of 
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rise  apartments  and  by  relying  on  owner-occupation  as  the  dominant  tenure,  those 
who  were  unable  to  afford  these  dwellings  have  been  increasingly  excluded  from  this 
privileged  market.  Meanwhile,  to  keep  personal  savings  flowing  into  this  privileged 
market,  house  price  inflation  and  speculation  were  needed  which  also  kept  out  people 
on  lower  incomes. 
Nevertheless,  the  Korean  housing  system  was  justified  by  penalizing  high-income 
households.  So  the  whole  system  works  well  for  middle  and  upper-middle  income 
salaried  groups.  This  system  has  helped  to  bring  about  a  redistribution  of  the  major 
asset,  housing,  among  Korean  households,  conferring  wealth  on  households  in  the 
middle  range  of  affluence  and  dividing  them  more  sharply  from  tenants.  Anyone  on  a 
low  income  with  little  or  no  savings  has  found  it  almost  impossible  to  become  an 
owner-occupier.  We  discussed,  in  Chapter  7,  how  greatly  the  owning  of  a  house 
influences  the  material  well-being  of  households.  Thus,  tenure  divisions  are  coming 
to  express  and  reinforce  existing  social  divisions  via  the  housing  system.  Meanwhile 
inheritance  of  house  property  tends  to  increasingly  reinforce  these  distinctions  in 
succeeding  generations. 
Under  these  changed  economic  and  social  circumstances',  increased  public  spending 
on  housing  mainly  benefits  those  who  are  already  doing  reasonably  well.  Butl  all  in 
all,  the  fatal  flaw  of  the  speculative  method  was  that  a  "scarcity"  has  been  essential 
for  the  working  of  the  system.  Indeed,  although  the  government's  white  paper  has 
every  year  restated  the  aim  of  providing  a  decent  home  for  all  families  at  a  price 
within  their  means,  over  the  past  three  decades  Korea  has  only  added  to  its  housing 
stock  at  a  rate  of  less  than  household  growth.  The  housing  scarcity  has  always 
continued. 
In  housing,  given  perfect  market  conditions,  the  fundamental  choice  would  be 
between  renting  and  buying.  But  the  increasing  cost  of  housing  and  the  increasing 
number  of  irregular  workers  mean  that  increasing  sections  of  the  population  have 
been  unable,  without  some  assistance,  to  afford  the  full  economic  price  of  decent 
accommodation.  The  public  provision  of  rented  accommodation  can  ensure  that  most 
households  who  cannot  afford  to  buy  can  be  supplied  with  housing  which  they  can 
afford.  But,  up  to  now,  the  housing  provided  by  the  public  sector  has  been  used  to 
provide  an  increase  in  owner-occupation  of  housing  too  expensive  for  people  with 
low  incomes.  This  housing  has  offered  little  flexibility  in  use,  and  has  often  been  in 
unsuitable  locations  for  households  with  low  incomes.  As  seen  in  section  3  in  Chapter 
6,  these  are  not  the  results  of  ideology  but  of  the  structure  of  the  public  sector  within 
the  housing  system.  As  long  as  management  was  judged  solely  on  the  criteria  of 
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houses  for  households  with  low  incomes  on  the  basis  of  needs. 
Under  this  structure  of  housing  system  and  market,  social  forecasts  based  on 
demographic  trends  have  never  been  the  main  basis  for  planning  housing  policy  and 
the  housing  shortage  and  housing  problems  of  the  low-income  households  would 
never  be  solved.  The  public  sector  can  contribute  something  towards  the  stabilisation 
of  house  prices  and  to  the  health  of  economy.  However,  benefits  are  not  likely  to  be 
transmitted  to  low  income  households  under  these  changed  social,  economic  and 
housing  structures.  Private  housing  construction  can  expand  only  by  drawing  in  lower 
income  households.  However,  the  low-income  households  are  increasingly  unable  to 
afford  the  increasing  costs.  Therefore,  house  builders  cannot  expand. 
In  theory,  more  rational  urban  planning  ought  to  help  all  social  groups  efficiently. 
It  should  keep  servicing  costs  down  and  allow  low-income  households  to 
accommodate  in  decent  housing  with  good  environments  and  at  cheaper  prices.  As  we 
have  seen  in  Chapter  6,  while  the  needs  for  decent  and  cheap  rented  accommodation 
grew  as  the  numbers  of  irregular  workers  grew,  the  numbers  of  professionals, 
engineers,  craftsmen  and  other  white-collar  workers  with  secure  jobs  and  high- 
salaries  increased  and  this  increased  housing  demands  for  better  owner-occupied 
houses  in  better  locations.  Moreover,  since  the  late  1970s,  in  line  with  changing 
industrial  structures  city  centres  increasingly  attracted  jobs  for  the  latter  at  the 
expense  of  the  former.  In  contrast  to  this,  most  new  housing  developments  have  been 
further  and  further  away  from  city  centres.  Once  built,  houses  cannot  be  moved. 
Homes  and  work  places  have  to  be  linked  through  journey-to-work  trips.  However, 
lagged  investment  in  transportation  gradually  increased  the  journey-to-work  times  and 
costs.  The  increased  costs  boosted  the  demands  for  better  houses  near  city  centres  or 
in  other  easily  accessible  areas.  Property  owners,  the  government  and  house  builders 
reacted  to  the  demands  by  replacing  poor  houses  with  high-standard  and  high-rise 
apartments  at  the  expense  of  the  minority  low-income  tenants.  Under  these  policies, 
urban  planning  alone  was  unable  to  help  the  low-income  households. 
As  a  consequence,  households  sharing  with  over  three  other  households  in  a  house 
have  increased  over  time.  Average  household  expenditure  on  housing  has  increased 
from  less  than  15  per  cent  of  income  to  35  per  cent  and  up  to  63  per  cent  in  some 
lower  income  households. 
Urban  land,  housing  and  other  forms  of  real  estate  are  more  than  just  items  of 
consumption.  Ownership  confers  rights;  rights  of  exclusion,  rights  to  decide  who 
should  or  should  not  have  access;  rights  to  revenue  and  to  capital  accumulation.  In  a 
rapidly  growing  economy,  which  tends  to  be  a  high  inflation  economy,  the  meaning 
of  ownership  was  quite  different  from  that  in  contrasting  economies.  As  we  have  seen 
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life  chances.  Urban  redevelopment  from  the  late  1970s  onwards,  especially  the 
Hapdong  renewal  described  in  Chapter  6,  has  been  of  the  most  regressive  kind, 
giving  most  to  those  who  already  have  a  lot  and  giving  least  to  those  who  need  most. 
In  the  short  run,  this  resulted  in  the  direct  displacement  of  low-income  tenants.  In  the 
long  run,  it  has  a  double  effect  via  a  reduction  of  the  available  cheaper  rented  stock. 
Homeowners  have  been  able  to  build  up  an  equity  in  their  property,  due  to  rapid 
increases  in  the  price  of  houses  and  land,  which  could  be  used  for  purchasing  better 
houses  or  a  house  in  more  desirable  locations  and  for  their  children. 
Housing  opportunities,  via  the  price  mechanism,  excluded  poorer  people  who  have 
already  been  excluded  from  economic,  social  and  political  areas  of  the  society,  and 
concentrated  them  in  particular  housing  and  urban  spatial  forms.  For  example,  as 
regards  the  housing  profile  of  the  urban  poor,  defined  by  the  poor-relief  program,  a 
survey  in  1989  (KNHC)  showed,  about  25  per  cent  of  the  poor  lived  in  illegal  houses 
and  80  per  cent  of  them  lived  in  rented  houses.  For  another  example,  regarding  the 
economic  profile  of  those  dwelling  in  the  poor  housing  areas  defined  by  the  urban 
renewal  program,  a  survey  in  1993  (KNHC)  showed  that  about  15  per  cent  of 
househeads  in  poor  housing  areas  were  unemployed  and  about  50  per  cent  were 
irregular  workers.  For  them,  the  average  monthly  household  income  of  tenant 
households  was  f570,  whereas  that  of  homeowners  was  about  f619,  while  for  urban 
households  on  average,  it  was  f  1,130.  A  socio-housing-tenurial  hierarchy  is 
emerging.  Spatial  patterns  are  a  consequence  of  the  evolution  of  this  hierarchy, 
distributing  life  chances  increasingly  unevenly.  The  children  of  well-educated  people 
live  in  a  neighbourhood  where  schools  are  better.  By  contrast,  houses  in  areas  where 
schools  are  better  are  more  expensive  in  prices  as  well  as  rents  (Ryum  D-M  and  Kim 
H-S,  1991,  p.  69). 
As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  7,  inadequate  income  was  not  the  only  problem  facing 
urban  low  income  households.  Housing  consumption  costs  were  so  expensive  related 
to  low  incomes  that  they  cut  back  other  expenditures  and  thereby  cut  back 
opportunity  for  the  future.  Lower  paid  workers  demand  increases  in  wages,  but  they 
benefit  least  from  wage  increases.  Moreover,  as  the  increased  wages  push  costs  up, 
large  firms  pass  these  costs  on  to  medium  sized  subcontractors,  and  then  to  the  urban 
poor. 
The  poor  housing  conditions  of  those  with  low  incomes  raise  an  issue  on  the 
political  agenda,  but  they  cannot  change  existing  systems  because  they  are  a  minority 
and,  more  importantly,  they  are  the  powerless  in  the  society.  Their  struggles  are 
often  frustrated  by  the  ideological  wall  that  the  housing  system  encourages  -  giving 
priority  to  those  who  are  perceived  as  working  hard  and  saving  a  lot. 
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families  from  higher  education.  The  increasing  housing  consumption  costs  aggravated 
these  trends.  When  the  children  are  grown  up,  they  cannot  penetrate  into  the 
bureaucracies  because  of  their  low  level  of  schooling.  Thereby  the  urban  low-income 
households  are  gradually  excluded  from  the  political  market.  They  are  caught  in  a 
poverty  trap  via  this  mechanism. 
Those  excluded  today  from  what  I  have  described  as  'mainstream'  opportunities  are 
defined  by  a  combination  of  handicaps,  including  the  support  available  to  them  from 
family  and  kin,  education,  skills,  income,  occupation  and  their  status  within  the 
labour  market  and  social  structure.  Poor  housing  plays  an  important  part  in  these 
processes  of  exclusion  both  as  cause  and  as  effect.  It  follows  that  no  single  indicator 
will  precisely  define  the  excluded. 
Table  8-1  Poverty  Line  in  a  Family  of  Five  Persons,  based  on  Monthly  Income. 
year  Poverty  Line  Reference 
The  Inquiry  Commission  on 
Health  and  Social  Affairs. 
Korea  Development  Institute. 
KRIHS. 
Seoul  National  University. 
The  Federation  of  Korean 
Trade  Union. 
1978  E276  6  bigest  cities 
1979  El  15  National  level 
1989  E360  Sample  in  Taegue 
1987  E600  In  cities 
1989  E838  In  cities 
Source:  quoted  in  KRIHS,  1989,  p.  115 
The  definition  of  poverty  on  the  basis  of  absolute  terms  by  the  government  (EPB, 
based  on  the  study  of  KDI)  and  on  the  basis  of  a  survey  of  a  sample  households  by  a 
quasi-government  body  (KRIHS),  shows  about  5  per  cent  of  the  population  in  poverty 
in  1990.  That  figure  may  help  to  reduce  the  responsibility  of  the  state  and  to  shift  the 
consideration  of  poverty  away  from  the  discussion  of  the  definition  and  measurement 
of  poverty  towards  the  poor  themselves  -  in  the  opposite  direction  to  that  taken  by 
Rowntree  (1901  and  1941).  As  Keith  Joseph  argued,  "An  absolute  standard  means 
one  defined  by  reference  to  the  actual  needs  of  the  poor  and  not  by  reference  to  the 
expenditure  of  those  who  are  not  poor.  A  family  is  poor  if  it  cannot  afford  to  eat" 
(quoted  in  Mack  and  Lansley,  1985,  p.  16).  By  contrast,  the  poverty  lines,  drawn  up 
by  Seoul  National  university  (Bae  M-K,  Park  D-J  and  Cho  W-H 
, 
1987)  and  the 
Federation  of  Korean  Trade  Unions  (1989)  on  a  relative  basis  indicate  that  about  50- 
70  per  cent  of  urban  households  in  Korea  in  1989  were  in  poverty.  These  can  be 
criticised  for  several  reasons,  chiefly  because  they  failed  to  distinguish  between 
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choice  and  those  who  did  not  because  they  could  not  afford  to  do  so. 
As  Chapers  5,6  and  7  showed,  housing  tenures  in  Korea  clearly  represent  social 
stratification.  Among  tenant  households,  those  who  did  not  join  the  housing  related 
saving  schemes  were  not  declining  to  do  so  as  a  matter  of  choice,  but  because  they 
could  not  afford  to  do  so.  The  allocation  of  the  privilege  of  a  new  house  strongly 
influences  the  life  chances  of  households,  not  only  through  capital  gains  but  also 
through  spending  and  saving  patterns,  which  in  turn  influence  the  life  chances  of  their 
children.  In  this  process,  those  who  are  excluded  from  the  economic  market  were 
unable  to  join  the  housing  related  saving  schemes  and  were  thereby  gradually  caught 
in  a  poverty  trap.  Thus,  those  tenants  who  cannot  take  part  in  the  housing  related 
saving  schemes  are  not  just  relatively  poorer  than  others  in  the  society,  but  lack  a 
mixture  of  basic  opportunities  for  material  well-being  -  they  fail  to  attain  certain 
minimum  'capabilities.  The  housing  system  in  Korea  plays  a  role  as  gate  keeper  and 
provides  a  powerful  indicator  to  identify  the  low-income  households  in  a  rapidly 
changing  society. 
In  rural  areas,  the  main  issue  related  to  poverty  is  that  households'  incomes  rely 
heavily  on  agricultural  output  which  fluctuates  according  to  the  harvest  cycle. 
However,  they  spend  on  housing  far  less  than  their  urban  counterparts  (see  Table  4- 
14).  In  urban  areas,  there  is  a  serious  deficit  of  houses  compared  to  households,  but 
in  rural  areas  one  of  the  housing  problems  is  that  there  are  an  increasing  number  of 
empty  houses  left  by  outmigrants.  In  contrast,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last  Chapters, 
in  urban  areas,  overcrowding,  the  rapid  increase  of  rents,  arbitrary  eviction  by  house- 
owners,  the  lack  of  amenities  and  public  facilities,  etc.,  all  these  are  concentrated  on 
and  connected  with  low  incomes.  My  estimate  would  be  that  when  describing  people 
as  'excluded'  from  mainstream  opportunities  we  are  talking  about  some  18  per  cent 
of  the  households  in  cities.  The  reasoning  which  produces  this  figure  is  explained  in 
Chapter  7,  on  page  217.  This  proportion  of  the  households  has  in  recent  years  been 
falling  mainly  because  of  continuing  economic  growth  and  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  households  in  those  cities.  But  the  absolute  number  has  not  been  falling. 
The  Korean  War  which  produced  so  many  widows  and  orphans  (see  Chapter  2), 
changes  in  economic  circumstance  that  have  led  to  an  increasing  number  of  irregular 
workers  (see  Chater  4),  demographic  changes  such  as  the  growing  number  of  older 
people  (see  Figure  2-1)  and  social  changes  which  have  produced  a  dominant  ethos  of 
urban  life  which  rests  not  on  tradition  or  kinship  but  on  money  and  the  welfare  of  a 
nuclear  family  -  together  these  all  have  the  implication  that  economic  growth  alone 
cannot  be  relied  on  to  raise  the  living  standards  of  low-income  households. 
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the  prospects  for  reunification  of  North  and  South  Korea. 
During  the  1960s  and  the  1970s,  many  low-income  households  solved  their  housing 
problems  through  mutual  help  of  the  family  thanks  to  high  social  mobility. 
Nowadays,  in  contrast  to  others,  increasingly  the  poor  help  the  poor  and  thereby 
become  poorer.  They  become  marginal  in  terms  of  economic,  Political  and  urban 
structures.  The  "problems  of  poor  housing"  are  a  physical  and  spatial  manifestation 
of  deeply  rooted  changes  in  the  economy  and  society.  These  patterns  tend  to  support 
and  solidify  the  existing  social  structure,  albeit  with  improved  living  standards  for  the 
households  of  the  middle  income  group.  It  is,  therefore,  clear  that  the  housing  needs 
of  the  poor  cannot  be  met  only  by  the  provision  of  urban  infrastructure  permitting  the 
poor  to  build  their  own  houses.  As  professor  Donnison  (1991,  p.  7)  euphemistically 
underlines,  "If  we  only  tidy  up  houses  and  the  surrounding  landscape,  leaving  the 
people  as  poor  as  ever,  decay  will  eventually  re-emerge  wherever  they  come  to  restil. 
This  implies  that  the  housing  problems  of  the  low-income  households  are  not  only  a 
matter  of  housing  and  low  incomes.  The  real  problem  for  low-income  households  in 
poor  housing  areas  is  the  loss  of  chances  or  powers  by  which  they  can  change  the 
socio-economic  structure  or  their  own  position  within  it.  Horizontal  spatial  policy 
without  combining  vertical  social  mobility  will  never  solve  the  housing  problems  of 
low-income  households. 
This  research,  therefore,  led  to  the  following  conclusions; 
1)  The  housing  situations  of  low-income  households  are  not  only  an  unfortunate 
effect  of  urban  growth.  They  are  also  the  products  of  the  general  changes  in 
Korea's  social,  economic,  political,  housing  and  urban  structures. 
2)  In  this  process,  poor  housing  is  not  only  a  symptom  of  low  income  but  also 
housing  itself  causes  low  income. 
The  evidence  for  these  conclusions  is  to  be  seen  in  the  decrease  in  the  chances  of 
upward  mobility  in  the  economic  and  social  structures.  With  decreasing  social 
mobility,  the  resources  of  public  spending  are  raised  by  taxation  on  uniform 
principles  which  result  in  low-income  households  paying  more  than  middle-income 
households,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  4.  Taxation  is  not  used  as  an  instrument  for 
income  redistribution.  Rather  it  is  used  to  satisfy  merely  collective  wants  of  particular 
groups.,  as  we  have  seen  in  social  welfare  services  in  Chapter  4  and  in  the  housing 
sector.  Thus  new  interest  groups  are  created,  stimulated  by  active  government 
policies,  and  then,  in  reverse  they  drive  policies  on  their  own  behalf. 
3)  Thus,  the  housing  situations  of  low-income  households  are  not  a  temporary 
problem,  but  are  becoming  structural  under  present  systems. 
232 4)  The  benefits  of  economic  growth  are  not  likely  to  "trickle  down"  to  the 
poorest  people. 
These  patterns  arise  not  from  "government  failure"  or  "market  failure"  but  from 
it  social  failure". 
8.2  Policy  Suggestions. 
8.2.1  New  Times. 
S.  Korea  is,  in  every  aspect,  likely  to  be  at  a  stage  of  transition.  Grouped  as  one  of 
the  poorest  countries  in  the  1960s,  it  is  now  often  called  an  industrialized  country.  In 
fact,  Korea  was  ranked  the  15th  largest  economy  in  the  world  in  1992  (The 
Economist,  Survey,  October  Ist  1994,  p.  4).  Moreover,  if  the  World  Bank's  forecasts 
are  right,  by  2020  she  might  jump  to  7th  place,  excluding  North  Korea. 
The  generation  who  experienced  the  most  difficult  and  the  greatest  changes  in 
Korean  history,  such  as  the  independence  from  Japan  and  the  partition  between  North 
and  South  Korea  in  1945,  the  Korean  War  (1950-53),  the  period  of  famine  and 
hunger  and  the  period  of  the  Cold  War,  has  led  the  Korean  economy  and  society 
from  nearly  nothing  to  the  15th  largest  economy  in  the  world  in  the  past  three 
decades.  But  they  are  now  moving  off  the  stage  of  history  and  a  new  generation  is 
coming.  These  historic  changes  are  enough  to  make  differences  between  the  old 
generation  and  the  new  generation  in  every  aspect.  As  Hwang  E-G  (1993,  p.  66) 
wro 
"I  myself,  who  was  11  years  old  when  the  war  broke  out,  have  vivid  memories 
of  being  very  hungry  and  of  many  people  starving  to  death,  adding  to  the  war 
casualties.  Those  who  survived  the  famine  years  filled  their  stomachs  either 
with  edible  grasses  and  foods  that  pigs  and  domestic  animals  ate,  or  with 
leftovers  from  the  foreign  military  compounds.  The  survivors  cannot  look  back 
on  those  days  of  agony  without  tears.  But  thefeeling  is  changing  now  with  the 
emergence  of  the  post-war  generation  to 
- 
National  solidarity  and  economic  development  were  the  first  and  prime  objectives 
and  values  in  the  old  generation.  Authoritarian  and  non-democratic  regimes  were 
tolerated  by  the  people  for  the  sake  of  national  solidarity  and  economic  development. 
Most  political  prisoners  were,  in  real  terms,  arrested  not  because  of  their  ideological 
backgrounds  but  for  their  impacts  on  national  solidarity.  In  a  restricted  sense,  most 
Korean  officials  can  be  called  socialists.  The  Land  Expropriation  Act,  the  amended 
233 Housing  Construction  Promotion  Act,  the  Aggregate  Land  Tax,  etc,  as  we  have  seen 
earlier,  are  all  commonly  found  in  socialist  countries. 
It  may  be  more  appropriate  to  describe  S.  Korea  (N.  Korea  too)  as  showing  a 
national  solidarity  which  achieved  national  economic  development,  enabling  almost 
all  sectors  and  social  groups  collectively  to  march  forward.  On  this  road,  the  public 
bureaucracy,  which  was  the  executive  committee  of  the  most  talented  people,  led  S. 
Korea  during  the  1960s  and  1970s.  Gradually  S.  Korea  came  to  be  led  by  the  two 
wheels  of  the  public  and  private  bureaucracies. 
As  time  went  by,  entry  to  university  and  then  to  these  bureaucracies  is  much 
influenced  by  family  background  today  and  depends  less  on  ability,  despite  the  very 
substantial  rise  in  the  number  of  university  students.  The  bureaucrats  in  the  two 
bureaucracies  became  homogeneous.  What  serves  the  bureaucrats,  as  mentioned 
earlier  -  the  control  of  the  concentration  of  wealth,  the  promotion  of  economic 
growth,  the  provision  of  qualified  manpower,  the  property-owning  democracy,  etc, 
leaving  the  low-income  households  as  they  were  -  becomes  "the  public  interest", 
dominating  the  issues  and  problems,  and  then  the  policies,  of  recent  years. 
The  balance  of  power  shifted  from  the  understanding  of  poverty  to  protecting  the 
interests  of  the  white  collar  group  as  the  older  generation  are  moving  off.  Inequality 
could  be  reduced  by  penalizing  the  very  wealthy,  but  the  hardship  of  the  low-income 
households  was  not  ameliorated  by  leaving  them  as  they  were.  Meanwhile  the  only 
and  the  most  valuable  resource  in  Korea,  human  capital,  is  wasting. 
The  failure  of  economic  growth  to  abolish  poverty  in  advanced  countries  gives  an 
important  lesson.  In  most  advanced  countries,  reformist  governments  since  the  last 
war  have  subscribed  to  the  view  that  people's  incomes  and  their  source  should,  in 
normal  circumstances,  be  left  to  the  interplay  of  market  forces  while  ensuring  that 
income  inequalities  should  somehow  be  reduced  through  the  operation  of  the  tax 
system  and  the  social  services.  As  George  and  Wilding  (1985,  p.  141)  pointed  out, 
"all  the  available  evidence  from  many  countries  now  shows  that  this  strategy  -  if  it 
can  be  so  described  -  has  failed".  The  experience  of  the  past  three  decades  in  Korea, 
and  to  a  great  extent  in  other  far  east  Asian  countries,  suggests  that  social  mobility 
and  the  aspirations  of  the  people  were  the  major  sources  of  economic  growth  and 
rapid  reduction  in  inequality  and  poverty.  All  in  all,  in  a  fluid  society,  many  policy 
makers  and  other  powerful  people  had  their  own  background  of  poverty,  and 
understood  the  needs  of  the  poor  pretty  well. 
In  recent  years,  every  statistic  shows  a  more  equal  society,  full  employment, 
continuing  economic  growth,  etc.  Nonetheless,  more  Koreans  are  increasingly 
worrying  about  their  unstable  society.  Until  the  1980s,  social  stability  was  achieved 
234 despite  growing  inequality  by  hopes  rather  than  reality  of  getting  a  foothold  on  an 
upward  ladder. 
As  we  have  seen  in  previous  chapters,  low  income  is  one  of  the  barriers  to  upward 
social  mobility.  In  contrast  to  this,  wealth  by  inheritance  is  also  one  of  the  barriers 
which  hinder  the  upward  social  mobility  of  those  who  lack  it.  Therefore  to  reduce  the 
vicious  inter-generational  cycle  of  poverty  will  call  for  a  reduction  in  the  cycle  of 
wealth  as  well.  Although  the  significance  of  income  inequalities  for  work  incentives 
is  not  clear,  no  one  thinks  it  inequitable  that  when  a  reasonable  provision  has  been 
made  for  all,  exceptional  responsibilities  should  be  compensated  by  exceptional 
rewards  as  a  recognition  of  the  service  performed  and  an  inducement  to  perform  it, 
provided  opportunities  for  attaining  the  exceptional  rewards  are  open  to  all.  In  recent 
years  wealth  began  increasingly  to  stem  from  inherited  property  and  not  from  work, 
reflecting  differences  in  opportunity  rather  than  differences  in  ability.  Moreover,  in 
the  fast  growing  economy  accompanied  by  high  inflation,  wealth  is  becoming  the 
main  cause  of  inequality  and  then  of  unequal  opportunities.  This  damages  hard  work 
and  social  morality. 
The  traditional  class  structure  was  completely  destroyed  and,  as  all  studies  have 
confirmed,  class  consciousness  has  not  formed  yet.  In  this  situation,  education 
became  the  main  machine  which  selects  and  divides  Koreans.  Thus,  equal  access  to 
education,  precisely  universities,  can  halt  the  emergence  of  a  divided  society. 
Nevertheless,  the  combination  of  increased  educational  costs  and  housing 
consumption  costs  increasingly  excludes  the  children  of  low  income  households  from 
higher  education.  What  is  needed  is  an  education  policy  not  just  another  university, 
and  a  housing  policy  not  merely  more  houses.  Education  policy  is  beyond  the  scope 
of  this  research,  but  principally  the  costs  of  learning  should  be  charged  on  a  basis 
affordable  and  open  to  all  at  all  stages.  An  improved  social  security  system,  national 
health  service,  etc.  -  increasing  incomes  of  the  poor  and  reducing  their  expenditures 
on  health  care  -  can  help  to  achieve  that.  That,  however,  will  depend  on  the  state  of 
the  national  economy. 
The  concept  of  housing  should  be  changed  from  a  market  commodity  into  a  social 
service.  Housing  policy  also  should  be  shifted  into  the  field  of  social  policy,  in  that 
the  distinguishing  feature  of  housing  policy  should  be  that  the  distribution  of  goods 
and  services  to  which  it  relates  should  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  an  assessment  of 
need.  Of  course,  the  need  is  often  determined  by  political  judgements  because  we  do 
not  know  precisely  how  to  measure  satisfaction,  happiness  or  the  quality  of  life. 
Often  the  poor  and  the  weaker  members  of  society  may  be  as  disadvantaged  in  the 
political  market  as  in  the  economic  market.  This  problem  can  only  be  tackled  with  an 
open,  fluid  society  in  which  low-income  children  can  take  part  in  political  debate  and 
235 implementation.  Then  the  political  need  will  not  differ  from  the  need  of  the  poor. 
Thus,  education  policy  and  housing  policy  must  operate  as  opposite  sides  of  the  same 
coin. 
But  real  crises  are  likely  to  be  coming  in  the  near  future.  With  the  Cold  War 
coming  to  an  end,  an  unpredicted  wind  that  blew  off  the  Berlin  Wall  in  October 
1990,  Koreans  (South  and  North)  see  no  reason  why  the  Korean  Peninsula  should  be 
left  out  of  the  surging  tide  of  detente.  On  17  September  1991  the  two  Koreas  became 
full  members  of  the  United  Nations.  The  older  generation,  including  Kim  11-Sung,  is 
moving  off  and  the  post-war  generation  is  coming.  Now  is  surely  a  time  of  change. 
There  are  many  unforeseeable  circumstances  around  reunification,  and  detailed 
discussion  of  them  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  research.  But  the  impact  which  these 
changes  are  likely  to  make  on  housing  is  so  great  that  some  consideration  must  be 
given  to  the  implications  of  reunification.  What  will  happen  in  the  Korean  peninsula 
after  the  reunification  which  now  seems  increasingly  likely?  Apart  from  emotional 
and  political  factors,  we  cannot  easily  dismiss  the  economic  impact  that  will  be  made 
on  the  society,  just  as  we  experienced  during  the  last  three  decades. 
Clearly,  there  are  several  hazards  in  attempting  to  compare  the  two  countries' 
economic  situations.  Firstly,  N.  Korea's  national  accounts  are  based  on  the  concept 
of  net  material  product  (NMP),  whereas  in  S.  Korea  they  are  based  on  the  gross 
national  product  (GNP)  at  market  prices.  Secondly,  there  are  difficulties  in  the 
interpretation  of  the  self-serving  and  often  falsified  statistics  put  out  by  each  country. 
Thirdly,  there  are  inconsistent  methods  of  imputation  used  to  account  for  production 
that  takes  place  outside  the  normal  buyer-seller  relationships,  hence  having  no 
monetary  value  assigned  to  it.  Fourthly,  an  important  factor  is  the  artificially 
maintained  exchange  rate  and  so  on.  Thus  if  we  seek  simple  comparisons  of  public 
welfare,  there  will  be  no  conclusion.  For  instance,  the  N.  Korean  economy  is 
extremely  biased  towards  heavy  industry  and  defence,  at  the  expense  of  consumer 
goods.  However,  in  S.  Korea,  high  economic  growth  has  been  accompanied  by  a 
serious  problem  of  pollution.  This  discussion  is  out  of  the  scope  of  this  chapter  (see 
for  details,  Hwang  E-G,  1993,  chapter  3).  The  comparisons  offered  are  based  on 
Hwang  E-G's  work.  To  overcome  such  shortcomings,  his  approach  was  to  aggregate 
the  official  physical  output  series  into  sector  and  GNP  indexes  using  weights 
constructed  from  official  data. 
Such  figures  show  the  N.  Korean  economy  grew  faster  than  that  of  S.  Korea  during 
the  first  decade  after  the  Korean  War,  but  since  the  late  1960s  S.  Korea  has  achieved 
tremendous  economic  growth,  exceeding  that  of  N.  Korea  in  the  1970s  and  1980s.  In 
absolute  magnitude  of  dollar  GNP,  S.  Korea  began  to  overtake  the  North  from  1976 
on,  but  in  terms  of  per  capita  income,  according  to  the  official  exchange-rate-based 
236 estimates,  this  did  not  occur  until  1985  because  the  smaller  population  of  N.  Korea, 
which  is  just  about  half  that  of  S.  Korea,  boosted  per  capita  GNP  relatively  higher 
than  S.  Korea's  up  to  1985. 
Figure  8-1  South  and  North  Koreas'  GNP,  million  US  dollars,  1953-1990. 
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Note:  Data  for  North  Korea  was  converted  into  US  dollars  by  using  North  Korea's  official  exchange 
rate. 
Source:  Hwang  E-K,  1993,  Table  3.11  (a)  and  (b). 
Figure  8-2  South  and  North  Koreas'  Per  Capita  GNP,  US  dollars,  1953-1990. 
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Note:  Data  for  North  Korea  was  converted  into  US  dollars  by  using  North  Korea's  official  exchange 
rate. 
Source:  Hwang  E-K,  1993,  Table  3.11  (a)  and  (b). 
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-------------------------------- The  gap  between  South  and  North  is  likely  to  grow  wider  owing  to  differences  in 
tabour  productivity.  The  N.  Korean  government  established  the  goals  of  tabour 
productivity  in  the  Second  Seven-Year  Plan  (1978-1984)  and  the  Third  Seven-year 
Plan  (1987-1993).  According  to  the  plan,  the  goals  of  industrial  and  basic 
construction  tabour  productivities  were  an  increase  of  1.7  and  1.6  per  cent  per  year  in 
the  Second  Plan,  and  1.6  and  1.5  in  the  Third  Plan  respectively.  Whereas,  as 
mentioned  in  Chapter  6,  in  S.  Korea,  value  added  per  person  in  manufacturing  and  in 
the  house  building  industry  increased  at  11.4  per  cent  and  4.8  per  cent  per  year 
respectively  between  1975  and  1985. 
The  gap  between  the  per  capita  GNP  of  North  and  South  does  not  necessarily 
indicate  their  real  living  standards.  As  Table  8-1  shows,  for  instance,  in  1985,  the 
World  Bank  estimated  the  food  intake  of  the  North  to  be  slightly  higher  than  that  of 
the  South.  The  World  Bank  Atlas  (1989)  gives  the  South  figures  of  60  and  70  years 
in  life  expectancy  in  1970  and  1988  repectively,  compared  with  60  and  69  for  the 
North.  The  total  fertility  rate  for  the  South  declined  from  4.2  in  1970  to  2.1  in  1988, 
while  for  the  North  it  declined  from  5.4  to  3.5  in  the  corresponding  years.  With 
regard  to  education,  in  1989,  the  literacy  rate  of  the  North  was  reported  to  have  been 
about  95  per  cent,  compared  with  over  90  Per  cent  in  the  South.  Among  other 
criteria,  male  and  female  income  and  employment,  urban  and  rural  standards  of 
living,  and  general  equity  seem  to  be  more  equal  in  the  North  than  South. 
Table  8-2  Major  Social  Indicators,  South  and  North  Korea,  1960  and  1988. 
South  Korea  North  Korea 
1960  1988  1960  1988 
Population  ('000)  24,994  42,380  10,789  21,877 
Daily  calorie  supply 
per  capita  (Kcal)  2,000  2,907  2,000  3,232 
Life  expectancy  50  70  50  69 
Total  fertility  5.3  2.1  7.8  3.5 
Literacy  rate  -  90  -  95 
Housing  supply  ratio  82.5  69.4  80.0  74.0 
TV  sets  (millions)  -  12.71  -  0.24 
Notes:  1)  1986  data  from  the  World  Bank  Atlas  (1989),  p.  7;  2)  1988  data  from  Hwang  E-G  (1993), 
p.  125. 
Sources:  North  Korea's  Chung-ang  Nyun-gam  (Central  Statistical  Yearbook),  each  issues,  South 
Korea's  Economic  Planning  Board,  Handbook  of  Korean  Economy,  each  issue,  and  John  Paxton  (ed.  ), 
The  Statesman's  Year-book,  1989-1990  (New  York:  St  Martin's  Press,  1990);  requoted  and  re- 
constructed  from  Hwang  E-G,  1993,  Table  3.12  and  3.13 
What  is  the  implication  of  the  widening  economic  gap  between  S.  and  N.  Korea  for 
the  people  in  the  future?  Firstly,  until  1989,  as  Table  8-2  shows,  in  the  North,  about 
over  8  million,  equivalent  to  37.5  per  cent  of  the  population,  were  engaged  in 
238 agriculture  over  about  214,000  ha  of  cultivated  land,  whereas,  in  the  South,  over  7 
million,  equivalent  to  17.3  per  cent  of  the  population,  engaged  in  agriculture  over 
about  212,700  ha  of  cultivated  land.  In  the  South,  rural  workers  have  been  and  are 
still  migrating  in  large  numbers  from  the  relatively  stagnant  primary  sector  as  the 
economy  grows,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  3,  whereas  North  Korean  workers  have 
not  been  free  to  change  jobs  without  official  permission.  Thus  it  can  be  fully 
expected  that  -  if  restrictions  are  lifted  -a  great  number  of  rural  workers  in  the  North 
will  migrate  from  rural  areas  to  urban  areas. 
Table  8-3  Total  Arable  Land  and  Grain  Production  in  North  and  South  Korea,  selected 
years,  1949-1989. 
South  Korea  North  Korea 
1949  1967  1989  1949  1967  1989 
Cultivated  land  ('000  ha)  205.3  231.2  212.7  196.6  199.6  214.0 
(Paddy)  (122.5)  (129.1)  (136.0)  (46.4)  (56.8)  (63.2) 
(Upland)  (82.8)  (102.1)  (76.7)  (150.2)  (142.8)  (150.8) 
Grain  production 
('000  metric  tons)  3,191  6,333  7,160  2,575  4,102  5,482 
Farm  population  ('000)  14,416  16,078  7,347  6,668  5,354  8,445 
(%  of  total  population)  (71.5)  (53.4)  (17.3)  (69.3)  (41.9)  (37.5) 
Sources:  For  North  Korea's  data,  Chosen  Chung-ang  Nyun-gam,  Rodong  Sinmun  (Pyongyand  news 
paper)  and  National  Unification  Board  (Seoul);  for  South  Korea's  data,  EPB,  Ministry  of  Agriculture 
and  Fishery  and  Bank  of  Korea  year-books;  requoted  from  Hwang  E-G,  1993,  p.  244,  Table  6.2. 
Secondly,  as  South  Korea  has  experienced  during  the  last  three  decades,  income 
disparities  between  regions  will  cause  a  massive  internal  migration  from  the  North  to 
the  South.  Moreover,  in  Korea,  there  is  still  one  single  race,  a  single  language  and 
common  cultural  assumptions  which  the  people  of  the  North  and  South  share.  Thus  it 
can  be  fully  expected  that  the  reunification  will  be  accompanied  by  a  massive  internal 
migration  in  the  Korean  peninsula  and  most  of  the  migrants  will  be  expected  to  go  to 
cities  in  the  South. 
However,  considering  the  industrial  structure  and  social  structure  in  the  South 
which  were  described  in  Chapters  3  and  4,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  growing 
competition  for  blue  collar  jobs  which  are  increasingly  declining.  But  considering 
their  education  level,  which  is  certainly  higher  than  their  counterparters  in  the  South, 
a  great  number  of  inmigrants  can  be  expected  to  get  a  job.  Thus  the  more  vulnerable 
people  in  the  South,  who  were  identified  in  Figure  4-3  in  Chapter  4,  will  become 
even  more  vulnerable  owing  to  the  competition  of  migrants  from  the  North. 
More  serious  problems  are  likely  to  occur  in  housing.  Housing  is  man's  most 
important  material  need  next  to  nourishment.  The  performance  of  economic  growth 
in  the  South  and  North  has  gone  far  to  tackle  the  grievances  of  nourishment.  it  is 
highly  probable  that  one  of  the  main  concerns  of  Koreans  will  be  therefore  housing. 
239 However,  as  of  1990,  the  housing  supply  rate  (housing  units  to  households)  in  the 
cities  of  the  South  is  a  mere  61.1  per  cent.  Under  this  circumstance,  a  sudden  influx 
of  inmigrants  will  be  fully  expected  to  lead  to  a  collapse  in  existing  housing  markets. 
It  is  not  likely  that  the  inmigrants  will  be  able  to  afford  the  housing  prices  which  are 
6.9  times  the  average  annual  income  of  S.  Koreans  in  cities  in  1990.  The  inmigrants 
from  the  North  have  to  face  an  unexpected  higher  expenditure  in  the  South  than  in 
the  North  in  which  they  spend  only  about  3.0-6.0  per  cent  of  their  household  incomes 
on  housing.  Housing  consumption  costs  will  cut  back  other  expenditure  and  thereby 
cut  back  opportunities  for  the  future. 
There  will  be  a  divided  society  instead  of  a  divided  country.  So,  what  should 
Korea's  housing  policies  now  be? 
8.2.2.  New  Policy. 
Once  that  expected  crisis  is  clear,  it  follows  that  housing  policy  should  abandon  the 
support  of  existing  systems  and  markets.  The  development  of  housing  finances,  rent 
policies,  etc.,  can  solve  some  problems  of  housing  politics,  but  will  never  solve  the 
more  fundamental  housing  problems  now  foreseeable.  It  is  high  time  to  go  back  to  a 
clean  sheet. 
Attention  can  then  be  given  to  the  supply  of  social  housing  on  the  basis  of  need. 
The  benefit  of  cheaper  housing  consumption  costs  should  be  focused  on  the  low- 
income  households  and  the  fruits  of  future  economic  growth  should  be  redistributed 
throughout  the  society  as  a  whole.  Bearing  in  mind  the  education  fever  of  Koreans, 
much  of  the  reduced  household  expenditure  on  housing  would  be  likely  to  flow  into 
the  education  of  their  children,  thus  increasing  social  mobility  as  well  as  reducing  the 
wastage  of  talented  human  resources.  Moreover,  through  the  allocation  of  social 
housing,  the  families  divided  between  the  North  and  the  South  can  be  more  easily 
reunited  and  the  strong  family  ties  which  have  been  the  key  of  the  Korean  social 
solidarity  system  can  be  revived. 
At  this  time,  it  is  urgently  required  for  the  S.  Korean  government  to  demonstrate  to 
low-income  households  and  future  inmigrants  that  the  society  is  interested  in  them. 
The  public  housing  system  in  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  gives  us  a  lesson.  As 
J.  Henderson  (1993,  p.  106)  puts  forward,  "In  the  case  of  Hong  Kong  where  the 
personal  security  of  an  immigrant  population  could  not  be  delivered  through 
citizenship  of  a  sovereign  state,  entrance  into  the  public  housing  system  became  its 
functional  equivalent  and  hence  a  central  mechanism  through  which  the  colonial 
regime  established  its  legitimacy" 
- 
When  housing  is  ignored  by  the  economic  planner, 
it  will  move  into  focus  through  the  politician. 
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